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Summary 
The modern banking environment no longer resembles the circumstances pertaining when 
the major banking law precedents were set. The Macmillan and Greenwood duties do not 
adequately protect banks from the unauthorized debit. Macmillan is hampered by the 
requirement that the negligence must be “in the transaction itself” while Greenwood, with 
its requirement of actual knowledge of forgery, allows customers to abdicate all 
responsibility for the conduct of their accounts. Different remedies for the allocation of loss 
have been proposed, such as the extension of the principles of contributory negligence and 
a statutory allocation of loss. Banks, for their part, contract in their standard terms and 
conditions for more protection than is otherwise available to them. 
 
A key provision is the verification and conclusive evidence clause. This is a stricter, 
contractual version of the Greenwood duty. It should not, however, be seen as a simplistic 
risk–shifting device. Unlike many other provisions in the standard terms, if properly 
observed, it need not alter the common law incidence of risk and it is a powerful tool for 
loss avoidance. It does have the potential to operate unfairly, and its availability where the 
bank has been negligent is particularly controversial. On the other hand, a verification duty 
without the backing of a conclusive evidence clause is toothless. The clause should be 
reformed, not rejected. It has a valuable role to play in modern banking. 
 
The Macmillan duty should be replaced by a general duty of care, to avoid fraud and 
forgery losses. The Singapore High Court recognized this need in Khoo Tian Hock v OCBC 
but it has yet to receive Court of Appeal endorsement and obiter dicta from the highest 
court suggest this will not be forthcoming. Some banks express such a broader duty in their 
terms. 
 
Singapore bank terms contain a myriad of other customer duties, exclusions of liability, 
indemnities and deeming provisions. Some of these are necessary to facilitate the effective 
operation of the verification and conclusive evidence clause. Generally these provisions 
reflect legitimate concerns but they have the potential to operate unfairly against the 
customer. Some terms give the bank unwarranted immunity from the risks of their business. 
In exchange for a broader customer duty of care and a verification and conclusive evidence 
clause, banks should relinquish many of these unfair terms. 
 
Electronic banking challenges the ability of the traditional rules to allocate risk fairly. At 
the same time, the trend in Singapore is to transfer all the risk for use of electronic facilities 
to the customer. This imbalance needs to be corrected. 
 
The common law and the Unfair Contract Terms Act are important tools to control banking 
contractual excesses. Because the Act is aimed at exclusions for negligence, it will not help 
a customer where the bank’s strict duty to pay only on a valid mandate is relaxed.  
 
Singapore banks should take the initiative to reform their standard terms to reflect a more 
equitable allocation of risk. Should they fail to do so, legislative change or enhanced soft 
law controls may be necessary. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview of the Banking Relationship 
The banking relationship is contractual. In Foley v Hill,1 the House of Lords, with reference 
to earlier cases and having regard to the rights of a bank in regard to the monies deposited 
with it, held that a bank–customer relationship is a debtor–creditor relationship.2 This was 
endorsed and further clarified in Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation.3 All three 
judgments in Joachimson recognized that the bank–customer relationship is not an ordinary 
debtor–creditor relationship.4 A customer (the creditor) must make a demand to the bank 
(the debtor) before seeking repayment of the debt. More recently, in Libyan Arab Foreign 
Bank v Bankers Trust Co,5 Staughton J said, “The obligation of a bank is not, I think, a debt 
pure and simple, such that a customer can sue for it without warning.”6 Certain acts or 
services by a bank may place it in the position of an agent or even a trustee.7 Thus, in 
Woods v Martins Bank8 the court held that a fiduciary relationship existed between Woods 
and the bank in circumstances where the bank agreed to act as Woods’ financial adviser.9 In 
                                                
1 (1848) 9 ER 1002. 
2 See view of R S T Chorley “Liberal Trends in Present–Day Commercial Law” (1939) 3 MLR 272 at 292 et 
seq. Lord Chorley says that that the banking relationship was initially viewed as one of bailment but the 
inability to explain the bank’s rights to the use of the money led to the formulation of the debtor–creditor 
relationship, which he describes as “a thoroughly inadequate basis”.  
3 [1921] 3 KB 110.  
4 [1921] 3 KB 110. Per Bankes LJ at 119, Warrington LJ at 126, Atkin LJ at 128. 
5 [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 259. 
6 Ibid, at 272. 
7 In Foley v Hill (1848) 9 ER 1002, Lord Brougham’s judgment, at 1008, recognizes the possibility of a bank 
undertaking a service which places him in the position of a trustee or an agent. Lord Brougham’s examples 
of where a fiduciary relationship might arise are where a bank accepts a deposit of exchequer bills and 
undertakes to receive the interest due on them or sell them on behalf of the customer. 
8 [1959] 1 QB 55.  
9 Ibid, at 72. 
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the payment of cheques drawn on the customer’s account,10 a bank is the agent of its 
customer. So, too, in the collection of cheques. In Barclays Bank plc v Quincecare Ltd,11 it 
was articulated as follows by Steyn J: “Primarily, the relationship between a banker and 
customer is that of debtor and creditor. But quoad the drawing and payment of the 
customer’s cheques as against the money of the customer’s in the banker’s hands the 
relationship is that of principal and agent”.12 A bank may also be a bailee, for example, 
where it accepts items for keeping in safe custody. This potential for a multi–faceted nature, 
has led to the view that the bank–customer relationship is a “sui generis” combination of 
well–recognised categories of contractual relationships.13 
 
There was a time when the contract between a bank and its customer consisted only of 
implied terms. In 1921 in Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation,14 Bankes LJ said, “In the 
ordinary case of banker and customer their relations depend either entirely or mainly upon 
an implied contract.”15 Long–established bank practice, however, is to contract on standard 
terms and conditions, a practice legitimized at least a century ago. Thus, in 1909, in 
Kepitigalla Rubber Estates, Limited v National Bank of India, Limited,16 Bray J said: “If the 
bank desire that their customers should make these promises they must expressly stipulate 
that they shall.”17 In 1931, Calico Printers’ Association Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd18 upheld 
                                                
10 Per Lord Atkinson in Westminster Bank Ltd v Hilton (1926–1927) 43 TLR 124 at 126: “It is well 
established that the normal relation between a banker and his customer is that of debtor and creditor, but it 
is equally well established that quoad the drawing and payment of the customer’s cheques as against money 
of the customer’s in the banker’s hands the relation is that of principal and agent.” 
11 [1992] 4 All ER 363. 
12 Ibid, at 375. 
13 E P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and Richard Hooley Modern Banking Law (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 
2006), at 125. 
14 [1921] 3 KB 110. 
15 Ibid, 117. 
16 [1909] 2 K.B. 1010. 
17 Ibid, at 1025. 
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an express exclusion of liability favouring the bank. In the United States, Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”) section 1–102 recognises the right of a bank and its customer 
to expressly contract for their rights and duties, subject to the requirement of 
reasonableness. In a recent decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal, the legitimacy of 
this practice was reinforced.19 
 
The object in this thesis is to examine the express terms of banks in Singapore, focussing 
on the allocation of risk in the event of an unauthorised debit.  
 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
Chapter 2 sets out the contractual principles relevant to standard terms including the 
common law relating to the incorporation and interpretation of standard terms and 
legislative curbs on freedom of contract. These principles are relevant background to the 
analysis of the express terms in the banking contract. The customer’s common law duties 
are dissected in chapter 3, with particular reference to their development and historical 
context. This is important to assess the legitimacy and effectiveness of the common law 
duties today. The discussion includes a consideration of the principles of estoppel and the 
law relating to implied terms. The next five chapters (4–8) focus on the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause. This clause appears in the terms and conditions used by all five 
major banks operating in Singapore that were selected for this study: United Overseas 
Bank, DBS Bank, Oversea–Chinese Banking Corporation, The Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation and Standard Chartered Bank. The clause is central to bank protection 
                                                                                                                                               
18 (1931) 36 Com Cas 71; affirmed (1931) 36 Com Cas 197. 
19 Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 293. 
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from fraud and forgery and, it will be argued, a justified incursion into the customer’s rights 
and duties. It accordingly merits the detailed attention it receives here. Chapter 4 
commences with an in–depth analysis of the operation of the clause. Chapter 5 weighs up 
the merits of a verification clause without the support of a conclusive evidence provision 
and concludes that it is an inadequate protection for the bank. In chapter 6, the use of a 
verification and conclusive evidence clause in the United States of America and Canada is 
discussed. The effect of Singapore’s Unfair Contract Terms Act on the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause is considered in chapter 7, followed in chapter 8 by 
recommendations for reform of the clause. Chapter 9 contains a discussion of mutuality in 
the bank contract. In chapter 10, sixteen other clauses in bank terms and conditions are 
analysed; these are either necessary for the effective operation of the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause or impact the risk and liability for the unauthorised debit in 
some other way. The terms regulating electronic banking are discussed in chapter 11. The 
final chapter, 12, looks at the cumulative effect of the terms on risk and liability allocation 
in the contract and concludes with recommendations. 
 
1.3 Overview of the Singapore Legal System 
Singapore has been an independent state since 1965. The Singapore Supreme Court 
consists of the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal is the highest 
court in the country since the abolition of rights of appeal to the Privy Council. This was 
achieved in stages,20 culminating in the removal of all remaining rights of appeal in April 
                                                
20 See, for example, the discussion by Dr Myint Soe Principles of Singapore Law (4th ed, The Institute of 
Banking & Finance, Singapore, 2001), at 74–76. 
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1994.21 The Second Charter of Justice, 182622 is regarded as making English law applicable 
in the Straits Settlements, which included Singapore,23 subject to changes to suit local 
conditions and to prevent harsh operation.24 Today Singapore has the Application of 
English Law Act, 1993,25 in terms of which English common law continues to be 
authoritative in Singapore subject to appropriate modification for local circumstances. 
English legislation is no longer generally applicable in Singapore but certain statutes were 
adopted by the Application of English Law Act and various Singapore statutes are re–
enactments, to a greater or lesser degree, of English legislation.26 English law has been 
central to the development of Singapore law and is still relevant; frequent reference will be 
made to it. 
 
1.4 Overview of the Customer’s Duty of Care 
In England, the customer’s duty of care under the general law is limited. The House of 
Lords decision in 1918, in London Joint Stock Bank v Macmillan & Arthur,27 is the leading 
authority.28 It held that a customer has a duty to its bank to exercise reasonable care in 
writing cheques. This is subject to the qualification, articulated in Paget’s Law of Banking, 
                                                
21 Judicial Committee (Repeal) Act, 1994 (Cap 143). 
22 Second Charter of Justice, dated 27 November 1826.  
23 Singapore was part of the Colony of the Straits Settlements from 1867 to 1946, see Dr Myint Soe 
Principles of Singapore Law (4th ed, 2001), at 4. 
24 G W  Bartholomew “The Singapore Legal System” in Singapore: Society in Transition, Riaz Hassan (ed) 
(Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1976) 84 at 88–90; David Hay (Gen Ed) Halsbury’s Laws of 
Singapore, Vol 1 “Administrative and Constitutional Law,” (Butterworths Asia, 1999), para 10.006; Dr 
Myint Soe Principles of Singapore Law (4th ed, 2001), at 2. 
25 Cap 7A. 
26 An example in the banking context is the Bills of Exchange Act, Cap 23. 
27 [1918] AC 777. 
28 Macmillan’s predecessor is Young v Grote (1827) 130 ER 764, which is discussed in chapter 3 below. 
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that the bank must not be negligent in failing to detect the alteration.29 Paget’s view was 
approved by the Singapore High Court in Bintai Kindenko Pte Ltd v Sanwa Bank Ltd.30  
 
Another major development came in 1933 in Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited.31 The 
House of Lords held that a customer is under a duty to inform the bank of any forgery of 
cheques drawn on his account as soon as he becomes aware of it, failing which the 
customer is estopped from disputing the bank’s right to debit his account. Some 30 years 
later, in Brown v Westminster Bank Ltd32 the Queen’s Bench Division (Commercial Court) 
held that the customer was estopped from denying the authenticity of her signature, which 
she had represented, upon enquiry by the bank, to be genuine. All the elements of an 
estoppel, as identified by Lord Tomlin in Greenwood’s case,33 were satisfied: a 
representation by the customer, conduct by the bank as a result of the representation 
(payment of the cheques) and detriment to the bank in consequence. These elements were 
endorsed in a decision of the Singapore High Court in Banque Nationale de Paris v Hew 
Keong Chan Gary & Ors.34  
 
In 1985, Hong Kong banks, operating in circumstances very different from those pertaining 
in Macmillan and Greenwood, sought recognition from the courts of a broader implied duty 
on the customer. The Privy Council, applying English law,35 was asked to review the extent 
of the customer’s duties in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and 
                                                
29 Mark Hapgood QC (Gen ed), Paget’s Law of Banking (13th ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2007) para 19.7, 
at 489. 
30 [1994] 3 SLR 459 at 468. 
31 [1933] AC 51. 
32 [1964] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 187. 
33 [1933] AC 51. 
34 [2001]1 SLR 300 at 341. 
35 [1986] 1 AC 80 at 108. 
 7
Others.36 It rejected the arguments that the extent of a customer’s implied duties to its bank 
should be any wider than those defined in Macmillan and Greenwood above.37 In 
Singapore, on the other hand, fifteen years after Tai Hing Cotton Mill, a bank’s argument 
for a wider common law duty of care on the customer found favour with the High Court in 
Khoo Tian Hock & Anor v Oversea–Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (Khoo Siong 
Hui, Third Party).38 The court reviewed authorities in Singapore, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada and made a deliberate decision not to follow Tai Hing 
Cotton Mill. It held that a customer had an implied duty to the bank not to facilitate fraud. 
Its reasoning is summarised in the words: “To draw a distinction between the drawing of 
cheques on the one hand and other steps or omissions on the other hand is to create an 
artificial and unrealistic distinction. After all, fraud is not facilitated by the careless drawing 
of cheques alone.”39 
 
1.5 Overview of the Bank’s Duty of Care 
In both England and Singapore, the bank’s duty of care to its customer is stated as a matter 
of principle; whether it applies in any given situation will depend on the particular 
circumstances. Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation,40 the usual starting point for a 
discussion of the implied terms in the bank–customer contract, said nothing about a duty of 
care on the bank toward its customer. Still, cases before and after Joachimson recognised a 
                                                
36 [1986] 1 AC 80. 
37 Discussed further in chapter 3 below. 
38 [2000] 4 SLR 673. 
39 [2000] 4 SLR 673 at 707. 
40 [1921] 3 KB 110. 
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bank’s duty of care to its customer.41 In 1959, in Woods v Martins Bank,42 the court decided 
that financial advice given by a bank to a customer, within the scope of the bank’s business, 
had to be given with reasonable care and skill. While Paget’s 9th edition said that the facts 
of the case were special and the decision may be “unsafe for general application,”43 a series 
of decisions confirmed the duty. In Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 
3),44 the Chancery Division had to consider a paying bank’s liability to its customer in 
negligence. The court acknowledged that Joachimson’s case did not mention a duty of care 
owed by the bank to the customer but rejected an inference that no such duty exists,45 ruling 
that “a bank has a duty under its contract with its customer to exercise ‘reasonable care and 
skill’ in carrying out its part with regard to operations within its contract with its 
customer.”46 Four years later, the same court, in a case with remarkably similar facts, said 
that a bank is required to “exercise reasonable care and skill in transacting the customer’s 
banking business”.47  
 
Selangor has been criticised on the facts48 but the principle was confirmed by the English 
Court of Appeal in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd and Another:49 “That a bank has a duty 
of care to its customer when carrying out its mandate is beyond doubt,” per Parker LJ50 
                                                
41 For example, Curtice v London City and Midland Bank Ltd [1908] 1 KB 293; Hilton v Westminster Bank 
Ltd (1925–1926) 42 TLR 423 (CA); Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 1 WLR 
1555 from 1594. 
42 [1959] 1 QB 55. 
43 Maurice Megrah and F R Ryder, Paget’s Law of Banking, (9th ed, London, Butterworths, 1982) at 131. 
44 [1968] 1 WLR 1555. 
45 Ibid, at 1595. In Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England [1924] KB 461, Atkin LJ said 
that Joachimson’s case did not contain an exhaustive list of the implied terms in a bank–customer contract. 
46 [1968] 1 WLR 1555 at 1608. 
47 Karak Rubber Co v Burden [1972] 1 WLR 602 at 629. 
48 See e.g., Ellinger, Lomnicka, Hooley Modern Banking Law, 153. 
49 [1989] 1 WLR 1340. 
50 Ibid, at 1376. 
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with Nicholls LJ concurring.51 This duty was held, for example, to extend to a funds 
transfer instruction in Royal Products Ltd v Midland Bank Ltd, by Webster J in the Queen’s 
Bench Division, on the basis that it was an ordinary banking operation.52  
 
Although the seminal cases53 were decided relatively recently, they confirmed a view long 
propounded by commentators including Heber Hart, who wrote in 1904: “Within the scope 
of his business, the banker is bound to exercise the degree of skill, care and diligence, usual 
in the ordinary conduct of banking business, and reasonably necessary for the proper 
performance of the duties undertaken by him.”54 
 
The Singapore Court of Appeal in Yogambikai Nagarajah v Indian Overseas Bank55 
endorsed the principle established in Selangor56 and Lipkin Gorman57. In Khoo Tian Hock v 
OCBC,58 the High Court stated the duty as follows: “To summarise, a bank must act with 
reasonable care. Whether a bank has behaved reasonably and discharged its duty of care 
must be viewed in all the circumstances.”59 The circumstances of each case are critical to 
whether the duty is owed, in the first place, and whether it has been breached, in the 
second. Suriya & Douglas (a firm) v Midland Bank plc60 is illustrative. The Court of 
                                                
51 Ibid, at 1387. 
52 [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 194 at 198. 
53 Selangor, Karak and Lipkin Gorman, above. These three cases also raised issues of constructive trust but 
the issue of a breach of care was dealt with separately. 
54 Heber Hart The Law of Banking (London, Stevens and Sons Limited, 1904), at 579. 
55 [1997] 1 SLR 258. 
56 With reservation on the application of the law to the facts in that case, see [1997] 1 SLR 258 at 275. 
57 [1997] 1 SLR 258. 
58 [2000] 4 SLR 673. 
59 Ibid, at 691. 
60 The Times, March 29, 1999. 
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Appeal (England) considered that the bank’s duty did not extend to advising a customer of 
new account types that would be advantageous to the customer. 
 
1.6 Interaction of the Two Duties 
The duties of care owed by the bank to the customer and vice versa are not two parts of one 
whole: some losses cannot be attributed to a breach of duty by either party, yet they will 
usually have to be borne by one of them. These losses can arise in a myriad of ways: losses 
may be caused by external political or economic factors that affect the availability of 
certain currencies or their exchange rates, or by the insolvency of a correspondent or by the 
bank failing to implement a countermand instruction. Losses may be facilitated by either or 
both bank and customer being in breach of their duties of care. One of the biggest concerns 
of banks is payment from an account without a mandate as a result of the dishonest scheme 
of a third party.  
 
Banks, conscious of the potential for losses for which they may be liable under the common 
law, seek protection. They do so in different ways. One of the most significant is through 
their terms and conditions.61 These terms are in standard, pre–printed form and will be 
referred to here as the ‘T&C’. The legitimacy of using express terms to create rights and 
duties not imposed by the common law is founded on the principle of freedom of contract. 
In the banking context, it was recognized, for example, in 1891 in The Governor and 
Company of the Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers,62 in 1909 in Kepitigalla Rubber 
                                                
61 Other ways include the adoption of business and security practices, and insurance. 
62 [1891] AC 107 at 125 per the Earl of Selborne, banks “are entitled to judge for themselves what risks they 
will run”. 
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Estates, Limited v National Bank of India, Limited63 and endorsed in Tai Hing Cotton 
Mill.64 Freedom of contract is subject to legislative and common law controls,65 most 
notably the Unfair Contract Terms Act,66 which will be discussed below.67 Through the 
T&C, banks attempt to shift some, maybe most, of the risk to the customer. The focus here 
is on these contractual terms in Singapore in the context of the unauthorised debit, how 
they are used and how they modify the common law; whether their use is legitimate, 
whether they reflect a reasonable apportionment of rights and duties between bank and 
customer; whether re–alignment may be appropriate; and how that may be achieved.  
 
1.7 The Express Terms 
This research is based on an analysis of the general T&C of five major retail banks 
operating in Singapore: United Overseas Bank (“UOB”), DBS Bank (“DBS”), Oversea–
Chinese Banking Corporation (“OCBC”), The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation (“HSBC”) and Standard Chartered Bank (“Standard Chartered”). The first 
three banks are based in Singapore and are prominent operators in the Singapore market; 
the latter two are headquartered in London but have a strong presence in Asia, including 
Singapore. Their T&C are accessible via the Internet and hardcopies are available from 
bank branches on request. Since the commencement of this research at the end of 2003, the 
above banks have made amendments to their T&C. References in this thesis are to the 
current editions of the T&C as of 15 February 2008. 
                                                
63 [1909] 2 K.B. 1010. At 1025 Bray J said: “If the bank desire that their customers should make these 
promises they must expressly stipulate that they shall.” 
64 [1986] 1 AC 80 at 110. 
65 Such as contracts infringing public policy. There are also soft law controls, such as the Banking Codes 
which are discussed below. 
66 Cap 23. 
67 See chapter 7 below. 
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The focus in this research is on the contractual terms for current accounts and primarily on 
the T&C for individual customers, although some reference will be made to business T&C. 
Given the diversity in banking products and services, including specialist savings schemes, 
fixed deposits, loans, share and margin trading facilities and foreign currency accounts, the 
one–size–fits–all T&C is no longer possible or appropriate. Bank documentation has 
accordingly mushroomed and specialist accounts and services are governed by their own 
T&C designed to deal with their own peculiarities and requirements. This study is therefore 
confined to the T&C for the core bank account, the current or cheque account. The T&C for 
this basic account are commonly incorporated into the T&C for the more specialised 
banking services. They commonly form the backbone of bank documentation.68 Some 
banks have separate T&C for personal and business customers.69 The T&C examined here 
are as follows: 
• UOB’s “Terms and Conditions Governing Accounts and Services”, undated70 
• OCBC’s “Terms and Conditions Governing Deposit Accounts”, undated71     
• DBS’s “Terms and Conditions Governing Accounts”, October 200672 
• HSBC’s “Terms and conditions governing personal deposit accounts”, 23 January 
200773 
• Standard Chartered’s “Standard Terms and Conditions,”74 undated. 
                                                
68 For example, DBS T&C for electronic services, Part A 29, Part B 11; HSBC’s T&C for Internet banking 
(online@hsbc), clause 2.b. 
69 For example, DBS and UOB appear to use the same current account T&C whether the account is personal 
or business while OCBC uses separate current account T&C for the two types of customer.  
70 Reference Feb 195800116D. 
71 Reference OCBC T&C–PE/0405. 
72 Reference 06–09–235. 
73 Reference SGH MKT WEL 052/1.  
74 Reference CB–0098–1206. 
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The five Singapore banks all have additional T&C regulating some or all of their electronic 
services which will be introduced in chapter 11; these will be referenced in the footnotes as 
“E–terms”. 
 
Reference will also be made to terms and conditions used by the following banks in 
England for comparative purposes: Barclays Plc (“Barclays”), National Westminster Bank 
Plc (“NatWest”) and HSBC Bank Plc (“HSBC”). These T&C are: 
• Barclays’s “Retail Customer Agreement,”75 2007 
• Natwest’s “Personal and Private Banking Terms and Conditions,”76 2007 
• HSBC’s “Personal Banking Terms and Conditions,”77 1 October 2007 
• HSBC’s “Business Banking Terms and Conditions,”78 2007 
 
A survey of the T&C reveals that the contractual obligations and liabilities of both parties 
are crafted in four main ways. The T&C: 
1. impose express duties on the customer;  
2. enhance the bank’s rights against the customer; 
3. exclude and limit bank liability; and  
4. indemnify the bank.  
These terms are supported by deeming provisions regarding, for example, the evidential 
value of bank records and receipt of bank communications. The ambit of the exclusions of 






liability, indemnities and customer duties is wide, extending into most facets of the 
ordinary bank–customer relationship. Some provisions are specifically targeted, such as an 
exclusion of liability for losses from observing or failing to observe a countermand 
instruction79 or the shifting of liability for losses caused by the insolvency or fault of a 
correspondent.80 Others are very widely drawn, rendering some of the more specific 
provisions superfluous, such as a customer indemnity to the bank for all costs, losses, 
damages, expenses and claims, howsoever suffered81 or the exclusion of liability arising 
from the bank’s exercise of its rights under the T&C.82 Relevant express provisions will be 
considered in more detail. 
                                                
79 For example, OCBC 8.2. 
80 For example, Std Ch 11.5. 
81 For example, UOB 21.1. 
82 For example DBS 21.1(e). 
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Chapter 2: The Contractual Background 
 
Before embarking on an analysis of the T&C, it is worth remembering the environment in 
which they are created and operate. It is this environment that provides the tools for the 
analysis that will be applied later on. The banking relationship is contractual.83 The T&C 
are not, however, negotiated between the bank and the customer. It is unlikely that any, 
other than possibly the biggest of customers, would have any prospect of altering the 
bargain which the bank presents to them in the form of the pre–printed T&C. In the words 
of the Canadian Supreme Court judge, Laskin J (dissenting), in Arrow Transfer Co Ltd v 
Royal Bank of Canada,84 “it is more a contract of adhesion than a bargained arrangement.”85  
 
In practice, it is unusual for a prospective customer to read the terms that will govern his 
contract with the bank. If he does, it is unlikely that he will comprehend the full impact of 
the provisions. They are pre–printed, often in small type, and are relatively lengthy.  
 
Standard terms have advantages, saving time and costs. They also pose problems: the party 
producing the terms is familiar with them and has probably had them prepared by experts 
while the other party is unfamiliar with them, may not have had an opportunity to read 
them and is not expected to read them.86 Abusive use of standard terms has provoked the 
courts and legislature to find ways to protect ignorant consumers from harsh provisions. In 
                                                
83 Established in Foley v Hill (1848) 9 ER 1002 to be that of debtor–creditor. 
84 (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81. 
85 Ibid, at 97. 
86 E Allan Farnsworth United States Contract Law (Transnational Juris Publications, Inc. Ardsley–on–
Hudson, New York, 1991) at 91. 
 16
Macaulay v Schroeder Publishing87 Lord Diplock, in the House of Lords, divided standard 
form contracts into two kinds. The first, he said, are “of very ancient origin”88 and have 
become settled through years of negotiation between the respective interests involved. Bills 
of lading and charterparties are examples. The second are more recent. They are “the result 
of the concentration of particular kinds of business in relatively few hands.”89 They have 
not been negotiated by the parties or approved by an organization representing the weaker 
party. The terms of the contract are dictated by one party, who is able to adopt a “take it or 
leave it” stance either because of his own superior bargaining power or because of the 
collective power exercised together with others providing similar goods or services.90 
 
In Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes91 Dillon LJ said, “printed 
conditions have tended to become more and more complicated and more and more one–
sided in favour of the party who is imposing them”.92 Later cases echo the same view. In 
AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd93 Hobhouse LJ (dissenting) commented: “As is almost 
inevitable in printed standard terms, they are not related to the particular circumstances of 
the case and, furthermore, they stipulate for a greater protection of the seller than is 
reasonable”.94 These dicta reveal the judicial distaste for standard terms; they create a 
tension between freedom of contract on the one hand and abuse of a dominant contractual 
position on the other. Over the years, standard terms have been challenged, using a variety 
of contractual tools. An overview of these tools, in the banking context, follows. 
                                                
87 [1974] 1 WLR 1308. 
88 Ibid, at 1316. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 [1989] QB 433. 
92 Ibid, at 438. 
93 [1996] CLC 265. 




A customer wishing to open an account in Singapore will be asked to sign an Application 
or Request for an Account which states that it will be governed by the bank’s standard 
T&C. Banks may, as a matter of practice, ask the customer to sign a copy of the T&C, 
which should then be kept on file. Today the customer will normally be given a copy of the 
T&C, which is strongly recommended.95 The Singapore Code of Consumer Banking 
Practice, published by the Association of Banks in Singapore,96 requires that the T&C be 
made “readily available” to the customer.97 Where the customer does not sign the T&C, but 
only the application form stating that the contract will be governed by the T&C, they are 
incorporated by reference, a recognized method of importing terms into a contract. In Press 
Automation Technology Pte Ltd v Translink Exhibition Forwarding Pte Ltd, 98 the 
Singapore High Court decided that terms may effectively be incorporated by reference 
where the contract that incorporates those terms by reference is signed, even if the terms are 
not given to and are not read by the other contracting party.99 The position may be different 
where the terms to be incorporated are not made available despite the request of the other 
party.100 In both cases, i.e. actual signature of the T&C or signature only of the application 
form incorporating the T&C by reference, the customer will in all likelihood not have read 
the T&C or even the signed application form. What is significant though, in both cases, is 
                                                
95 See dictum of Hobhouse LJ (dissenting on the issue of incorporation) in AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource 
Ltd [1996] CLC 265 at 277. 
96 See further discussion of the Code in chapter 2.3 below. 
97 Code of Consumer Banking Practice (Sep 2002) cl 8.a.i. In the United Kingdom, banks undertake in The 
Banking Code (March 2005) s. 6.1, to provide a customer with the relevant T&C when a product or service 
is applied for. 
98 [2003] 1 SLR 712.  
99 Ibid, at 725. 
100 Circle Freight International Ltd v Medeast Gulf Exports Ltd [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 427 at 433; AEG (UK) 
Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265 at 275. 
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that there is a signed contract and the customer is bound by it.101 In the words of Hobhouse 
LJ,102 there is a “fictional element of consent which has nevertheless to be accepted by 
contract law in the interests of having a coherent objective scheme.”103  
 
Singapore law distinguishes between a signed agreement104 and the so–called “ticket 
cases,” in which it is sought to impose contractual terms without the other party agreeing 
orally or by signature: “When a document containing contractual terms is signed, then, in 
the absence of fraud, or …, misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound, and it is wholly 
immaterial whether he has read the document or not.”105 In Singapore in 1959, in 
Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Marian Chye106 Chua J stated: “I think it is quite clear that 
when a party signs a contract knowing it to be a contract which governs the relations 
between them, then to use the words of Denning J in the case of Curtis v Chemical 
Cleaning and Dyeing Co ‘his signature is irrefragable evidence of his assent to the whole 
contract, including the exempting clauses, unless the signature is shown to be obtained by 
fraud or misrepresentation.’ ”.107 Sir Guenter Treitel108 adds one proviso to this proposition: 
The document which was signed must be one which could reasonably be expected to be 
                                                
101 As was held in Consmat Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association 
[1992] 2 SLR 828 at 838; Stephan Machinery Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Overseas–Chinese Banking 
Corporation Ltd [2000] 2 SLR 191at 193; Elis Tjoa v United Overseas Bank [2003] 1 SLR 747 at 765. 
102 Hobhouse LJ dissented on the issue of incorporation. 
103 AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265 at 278. Later, at 278: “it is a necessary incident of a 
law of contract that in various commercial and other situations parties must objectively be taken to have 
agreed to clauses even though they have not actually applied to those clauses, and indeed may never have 
taken steps to inform themselves of their content.” 
104 An interesting critical analysis of the weight attached to a signature to a document in English law is 
contained in the Canadian decision of Tilden Rent–A–Car Co v Clendenning (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 400 (Ont 
CA).  
105 Per Scrutton LJ in L’Estrange v F Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394 at 403, affirming Parker v South Eastern 
Ry Co CA (1877) 2 CPD 416. 
106 (1959) 25 MLJ 113. 
107 Ibid, at 114. A more recent reiteration of this position can be found in Kenwell & Co Pte Ltd v Southern 
Ocean Shipbuilding  Co Pte Ltd [1999] 1 SLR 214 at 224. 
108 G H Treitel The Law of Contract (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003), at 217. 
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contractual in nature.109  This qualification is made in the light of Grogan v Robin Meredith 
Plant Hire and Another.110 The Court of Appeal (England) held that time sheets which 
contained words purporting to incorporate standard terms of business, and which were 
signed by the other party as signifying number of hours worked, did not vary the existing 
contract between the parties so as to incorporate the standard terms. The time sheets 
recorded performance of a contractual obligation; they did not purport to be a contract or to 
have contractual force. This development is recognized in Chitty on Contracts, evident 
from a comparison of the three most recent editions. In the 27th edition, it says: “The other 
party may have signed the document, in which case he is bound by its terms.”111 Parker v 
South Eastern Ry Co112 is cited in support. In the 28th and 29th editions, it says: “If a party 
signs a contractual document, he will normally be bound by its terms”113 and reference is 
made to Grogan.114  
 
A potential avenue of escape from signed contractual terms lies in onerous or unusual 
terms. The source of this doctrine is said115 to lie in a statement by Bramwell LJ in Parker v 
South Eastern Ry Co.116  The doctrine, which has come before the Court of Appeal 
(England) a remarkable number of times, was first developed in the context of unsigned 
                                                
109 Ibid. 
110 The Times, February 20, 1996. 
111 AG Guest (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (27th ed, 2 vols, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) vol 1 para 12–
007. 
112 (1877) 2 CPD 416. 
113 HG Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (28th ed, 2 vols, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999) vol 1 para 12–
008; HG Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2 vols, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) vol 1 para 
12–008. 
114 The Times, February 20, 1996. 
115 See for example, Robert Bradgate “Unreasonable Standard Terms” (1997) 60 MLR 582 at 589. 
116 (1877) 2 CPD 416 at 428: “I think that there is an implied understanding that there is no condition 
unreasonable to the knowledge of the party tendering the document and not insisting on its being read”. 
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contracts. In Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd117 Megaw LJ said: “where the particular 
condition relied on involves a sort of restriction that is not shown to be usual in that class of 
contract, a defendant must show that his intention to attach an unusual condition of that 
particular nature was fairly brought to the notice of the other party.”118 Lord Denning MR, 
in the same case, said of the term: “it is so wide and so destructive of rights that the court 
should not hold any man bound by it unless it is drawn to his attention in the most explicit 
way.”119 The Court of Appeal (England) in Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual 
Programmes120 took the concept further. In Thornton’s case, the term was considered 
unusual for the contract type in which it was inserted, while in Interfoto, the term was not 
unusual in itself121 but, being extortionate, the term was unusual in degree. It was held that 
onerous or unusual terms must be highlighted to the other party. Dillon LJ said that this was 
“a logical development of the common law into modern conditions”.122 Bingham LJ went 
so far as to say that it represented the concept of fair dealing in English contract law.123  
 
This development made its way into the realm of written contracts. The Court of Appeal 
(England) in AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd124 endorsed the following statement in 
Chitty on Contracts: “Although the party receiving the document knows it contains 
conditions, if the particular condition relied on is one which is a particularly onerous or 
                                                
117 [1971] 2 QB 163. 
118 Ibid, at 172. 
119 Ibid, at 170. Lord Denning went on to say: “In order to give sufficient notice, it would need to be printed in 
red ink with a red hand pointing to it – or something equally startling.” This is a reference to a similar 
statement made in an earlier judgment of his, J Spurling Ltd v Bradshaw [1956] 1 WLR 461 at 466. 
120 [1989] QB 433. 
121 In Interfoto the court referred to evidence of similar terms from ten other operators in the same market, see 
[1989] QB 433 at 436. 
122 [1989] QB 433 at 438. 
123 Ibid, at 439, 443. See also Bradgate  “Unreasonable Standard Terms” at 588.  
124 [1996] CLC 265 at 273. Here the written contract was constituted by an exchange of correspondence being 
an order, an acknowledgement of order and a confirmation of order. 
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unusual term, or is one which involves the abrogation of a right given by statute, the party 
tendering the document must show that it has been brought fairly and reasonably to the 
other’s attention”.125 The requirement was subsequently applied in Ocean Chemical v 
Exnor,126 by Evans LJ. In AEG all members of the Court of Appeal agreed that a sub–
clause must be considered in the context of the clause as a whole and not in isolation. 127 
The majority128 found that the clause was “extremely onerous and unusual”129 and as it had 
not been brought to the attention of the other party, it was not incorporated into the 
contract. Hobhouse LJ (dissenting) supported the proposition that onerous or unusual terms 
must be brought to the attention of the other party130 but differed by saying that: “it is 
necessary to consider the type of clause, and only if it is a type of clause which it is not to 
be expected will be found in the printed conditions referred to then to go on to question its 
incorporation.”131 He considered that only in “the most exceptional circumstances”132 is a 
party able to complain that a clause, of a type one would expect to find in printed terms, is 
not incorporated by standard words of incorporation.133 Hobhouse LJ found that the clause 
in question dealt with a topic one would expect in contracts in the industry concerned and 
therefore was not to be scrutinised for being onerous or unusual.  
 
                                                
125 Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2004) vol 1 para 12–015.  
126 [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 446 at 454. 
127 [1996] CLC 265. 
128 Judgment was delivered by Hirst LJ. 
129 [1996] CLC 265 at 273. 
130 Note his support for the statement of Dillon LJ in Interfoto Picture Library v Stiletto Visual Programmes 
[1989] QB 433 at 439. 




In Ocean Chemical v Exnor,134 a written contract for the supply of bunkers to a ship 
included a clause shortening the limitation period to six months. Evans LJ suggested that 
even in the case of a signed document, having regard to the nature and effect of the term, 
there may be a duty to bring it to the attention of the other contracting party in order to 
effect its incorporation into the contract: “in some extreme circumstances, even a signature 
might not be enough.”135  
 
Tilden Rent–A–Car Co v Clendenning136 is a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, 
Canada. The majority held that the hirer of a motor vehicle was not bound by “stringent and 
onerous provisions”137 contained in the fine print of the standard form agreement, which 
denied the hirer insurance cover for damage to the vehicle, despite his signature to the 
agreement. It was held that such terms could not be relied on if they had not been drawn to 
the attention of the other party. 
 
In Singapore, however, the “onerous or unusual” line of argument was rejected in Consmat 
Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association.138 The 
plaintiffs sought to exclude a term from a bank contract on the ground that it was onerous 
and unreasonable and the defendant had not taken adequate steps to draw it to their 
attention. The High Court said “the plaintiffs signed the general agreement. Having signed 
it, they must be taken to have read and understood the terms thereof.”139 Absent evidence 
that the agreement was not freely entered into, the court was not prepared to entertain the 
                                                
134 [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 446. 
135 Ibid, at 454. 
136 (1978), 83 DLR (3d) 400 (Ont CA).  
137 Ibid, at 408. 
138 [1992] 2 SLR 828. 
139 Ibid, at 838. 
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argument that the term was not incorporated in the contract. In Ri Jong Son v Development 
Bank of Singapore140 the bank relied on an exclusion of liability in their T&C. It was 
contended by the customer that the significance of the T&C should have been brought to 
his attention. The Singapore High Court held that in the circumstances of the customer not 
speaking English, and the bank officer not speaking Korean (the customer’s language), it 
was “unduly onerous”141 to require the bank officer to bring the terms and conditions or the 
particular exclusion clause to the customer’s attention.  
 
In Press Automation Technology Pte Ltd v Translink Exhibition Forwarding Pte Ltd, Judith 
Prakash J said, “the line of authorities that decides that onerous and unusual conditions 
cannot be incorporated unless the attention of the party sought to be bound has been 
specifically drawn to them does not apply to a case … where there is a signed contract with 
an explicit incorporating clause.”142 This, notwithstanding that the incorporated terms were 
not given to the other party and were not read. The court went further, endorsing a 
statement of Hobhouse LJ143 in AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Limited144 that it was no 
longer necessary to introduce stricter criteria for the incorporation of contract terms by 
reference as the reasonableness of a contract term can be assessed in terms of the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act.145 From the viewpoint of a contracting party wanting to escape a 
clause in a contract, however, the exclusion of the clause through the rules for incorporation 
is far preferable to the protection offered by the Unfair Contract Terms Act, which, if it 
                                                
140 [1998] 3 SLR 64.  
141 [1998] 3 SLR 64, at 72. 
142 [2003] 1 SLR 712 at 725. 
143 Dissenting on the issue of incorporation. 
144 [1996] CLC 265 at 277. 
145 Press Automation Technology Pte Ltd  v Translink Exhibition Forwarding Pte Ltd  [2003] 1 SLR 712 at 
726. 
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applies at all, operates in most cases on the more nebulous concept of reasonableness,146 
making the outcome less certain.  
 
As a legal doctrine, onerous or unusual terms is a weak option on current authority. In the 
bank customer’s favour, the Singapore Code of Consumer Banking Practice147 says that 
banks should be transparent about their T&C, use legible print, plain English148 and not 
include “harsh, oppressive or excessively one–sided terms” in their agreements.149  
 
The law relating to unconscionable terms provides limited scope to avoid standard banking 
T&C. Historically, English law only protected against specific limited categories of 
exploitation. According to Andrew Burrows,150 exploitation of mental weakness has 
enjoyed greater protection in English law than exploitation of a difficult predicament,151 for 
which he says there is little authority in English law.152 More recently, there were 
indications of a willingness to develop the limited categories into broader principles or at 
least update them to modern situations.153 The Queen’s Bench decision of Lloyds Bank v 
Bundy154 was one of these decisions. Lord Denning (dissenting) indicated his support for an 
“inequality of bargaining power” principle in English law. However, in National 
                                                
146 See, for example, the comment of Andrew Phang in “Interpretation, Severance and Policy and the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act” [1992] LMCLQ 467 at 470: “for the most part the ascertainment of the 
reasonableness of a given exception clause is an exercise fraught with difficulties (particularly of a factual 
nature)”. 
147 See further discussion of the Code in chapter 2.3 below. 
148 See the “Guidance for Code Subscribers” 1 Sep 2004, cl 3b, available at 
http://www.abs.org.sg/documents/Guidance%20for%20CCBP%20Subscribers.pdf. 
149 Ibid, cl 3a.  
150 Andrew Burrows The Law of Restitution, (2nd ed, Great Britain, Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2002). 
151 Excepting extortionate salvage agreements, see Burrows, Restitution at 268. 
152 Burrows, Restitution, at 268. 
153 For example, Cresswell v Potter [1978] 1 WLR 255; Backhouse v Backhouse [1978] WLR 243. 
154 [1975] QB 326. 
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Westminster Bank v Morgan,155 Lord Scarman said: “And even in the field of contract I 
question whether there is any need in the modern law to erect a general principle of relief 
against inequality of bargaining power.”156 He considered that this was a matter for the 
legislature and, with reference to a number of statutes, commented that it was a task they 
had already undertaken.157 Nevertheless, in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v 
Burch,158 dicta by the Court of Appeal (England) supported the setting aside of a legal 
charge as an unconscionable bargain. An additional factor limiting this line of attack lies in 
the orthodox view that the doctrine may only be invoked in cases of procedural unfairness 
as opposed to substantive unfairness. Burrows acknowledges that “the judicial desire to 
push forward the frontiers of legal protection on the grounds of exploitation has 
receded”159.  
 
In Singapore, “the more conservative English approach has found favour”,160 yet there are 
“signs of a more liberal approach”161 in Fong Whye Koon v Chan Ah Thong.162 Andrew 
Phang, while favouring a broader application of the doctrine, recognises that clear judicial 
support for it is currently lacking.163 In Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore, he writes: 
“unconscionability as a broader independent doctrine in itself has yet to be conclusively 
                                                
155 [1985] AC 686. 
156 Ibid, at 708. 
157 Ibid. 
158 [1997] 1 All ER 144. 
159 Burrows, Restitution, at 271 –272. 
160 Hans Tjio ‘Undue Influence, Unconcscionability and Good Faith’ 8 SAcLJ (1996) 429 at 441. 
161 Ibid. 
162 [1996] 2 SLR 706. 
163 Andrew Phang (Gen Ed) Basic Principles of Singapore Business Law, (Singapore, Thomson, 2004) at para 
13.49. 
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adopted by the Singapore courts”.164 The doctrine has, however, been applied in Singapore 
to give relief from forfeiture165 and to restrain calls on performance bonds.166  
 
There are other possible bases for excluding the T&C or one or more of the clauses from 
the banking contract. Misrepresentation167 (fraudulent, negligent or innocent), duress and 
undue influence168 are well–established categories.  Fraud, duress or undue influence by a 
bank employee inducing a customer to open an account on given terms is uncommon.169 So 
too, the likelihood of unconscionability in the context of bank T&C for the opening of a 
current account is small. In contrast, it has found application in the context of security for 
advances.  
 
Negligent or innocent misrepresentation leading to the conclusion of the banking contract, 
on the other hand, poses a realistic danger for banks. It threatens the basis from which they 
derive their authority to transact banking business on behalf of the customer. The integrity 
of the contracting process is dependant upon bank officers following, without exception, an 
established procedure in the opening of the account. Bank staff performing this task are 
unlikely to be familiar with the detailed contents of the T&C or with general contract law, 
                                                
164 Andrew Phang and Teo Keang Sood (Gen Ed) Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore, Vol 7 “ Contract”, (Lexis 
Nexus Singapore, 2005 Reissue), para 80.250.  
165 Pacific Rim Investments Pte Ltd v Lam Seng Tiong [1995] 3 SLR 1. 
166  See Phang and Teo (Gen Ed) Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore, vol 7, para 80.250. 
167 See Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Marian Chye (1959) 25 MLJ 113. 
168 Illustrated by Consmat Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association 
[1992] 2 SLR 828. This is a well established ground for which there is a lot of authority. 
169 If established, duress and undue influence have the effect of rendering the contract voidable at the instance 
of the victim. A contract induced by fraudulent misrepresentation can be rescinded and damages can be 
claimed. 
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although the Guidelines to the Singapore Banking Code do say that staff should be familiar 
with the T&C, their main features and be able to discuss them with customers.170  
 
It is conceivable that the bank officer may on occasion deviate from the laid–out procedure 
for opening an account, or a small percentage of prospective customers may ask questions 
about the T&C that the bank officer is ill–equipped to answer and in the process of doing 
so, misrepresent the effect or meaning of the clause. It is at this stage that the risk of 
misrepresentation (most likely innocent or negligent) arises, as happened in Curtis v 
Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing Co Ltd.171 In AEG, Hobhouse LJ (dissenting on 
incorporation) said, “selective and misleading quotes may detract from the incorporation 
which they are seeking to achieve.”172 It is conceivable for a customer to express concern 
about a particular provision in the contract, in response to which he receives an assurance 
from the bank officer that while it is in the contract, the bank would never exercise its 
rights in the manner envisaged. Even more worrying for the bank is the scenario, based on 
personal experience, of the prospective customer asking for a copy of the T&C and being 
given, for example, a leaflet setting out only applicable interest rates, the official thereby 
representing that there are no other terms. The customer may even be told that there are no 
other terms. In the case of the average customer who does not know better, this could 
amount to a misrepresentation.  
 
                                                
170 See ‘Guidance for Code Subscribers’, cl 8.a.i.  
171 [1951] 1 KB 805; Canadian authority that an incorrect explanation of a contractual term can amount to 
misrepresentation is Tilden Rent–a–Car Co v Clendenning (1978) 83 DLR 3d 400. 
172 AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265 at 277. 
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Two Canadian cases serve as a warning to banks on their contracting procedures: In 
Armstrong Baum Plumbing & Heating v Toronto Dominion Bank,173 the customer had three 
accounts with the bank. The verification clauses applying to two of the accounts were 
similar, that applying to the third, the most recently opened, was more onerous. It included 
an exclusion for forgeries by employees of customers. It stated that it applied to all 
accounts operated by the customer, i.e. to the other two accounts as well. Subsequently, in 
circumstances of employee fraud, the bank disputed its liability to reimburse the customer 
on the basis that the customer had not complied with the new clause. The customer 
disputed the application of the term to his agreement with the bank. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal174 confirmed the trial court decision in favour of the customer on the basis that the 
bank officer attending the customer at the time of signature of the new T&C had 
misrepresented it as similar to the old T&C, whereas in fact they were significantly 
different. Rancan Fertilizer Systems Inc v Lavergne et al 175 also concerned an amended 
verification agreement in the context of losses from forgeries perpetrated by an employee. 
The change was introduced by the bank, without informing the customer, when the 
customer requested the addition of two signatories to the account. The Manitoba Court of 
Appeal confirmed the trial court decision that the bank had misrepresented the T&C to the 
customer by not informing him of a fundamental change in the terms of the agreement.  
 
Adequate training of staff with appropriate procedures on how to deal with questions is 
obviously an essential yet easily neglected area. If an imperfection in the contracting 
process is discovered before a dispute arises, the bank may seek to rely on its contractual 
                                                
173 (1994) 15 BLR (2d) 84; on appeal (1997) 32 BLR (2d) 230. 
174 (1997) 32 BLR (2d) 230. 
175 (1999) 134 Man R (2d) 73. 
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right to amend the terms of the contract176 or its common law right to terminate the contract 
by giving reasonable notice to the customer.177 It is more likely, however, that the frailties 
in the contracting process will become known only when a dispute arises. Effective 
incorporation of the T&C into the contract is the first hurdle which must be passed and 
should receive proper attention from bank management. 
 
2.2 Interpretation 
Assuming that a clause has been validly incorporated into a contract, the next issue is to 
identify what it means. The golden rule for the interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the 
objective intention of the parties.178 The test, according to Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, is 
“what would a reasonable person in the position of the parties understand was the meaning 
the words were intended to convey?”179 With this object in mind, rules of construction have 
been developed and include maxims such as giving words their ordinary meaning,180 
adherence to established judicial interpretation,181 avoidance of absurd or inconsistent 
interpretation,182 deference to established customary meaning183 and construction of the 
document as a whole184. According to Chitty on Contracts,185 the modern, English, 
approach to construction is common sense interpretation with rules of construction serving 
                                                
176 All the T&C examined contain variation clauses. They are discussed in more detail below in chapter 10.15. 
177 Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110 at 127, per Atkin LJ. 
178 See e.g. Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2004) vol 1 para 12–042 and Law Society of 
Singapore v Lau See-Jin Jeffrey [1999] 2 SLR 215 at 221. 
179 Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, “My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words” (2005) 121 LQR 577 at 
579. 
180 See e.g. Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2004) vol 1, para 12–051. 
181 Ibid, para 12–053. 
182 Ibid, para 12–055. 
183 Ibid, para 12–058. 
184 Ibid, para 12–063.  
185 Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2004). 
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as guidelines rather than rigid rules.186 The contra proferentem rule, stating that a clause is 
interpreted against the party who included it in the contract, is applicable where there is 
ambiguity and all other construction aides fail.187 In the context of a bank’s standard T&C, 
the rule requires ambiguous terms to be strictly interpreted and to be construed against the 
bank who has inserted them.188  
 
Exemption clauses are “construed strictly”189 or in the words of Evans LJ in Ocean 
Chemical190 there is “a more stringent approach”191 to such clauses. This, says Chitty, 
means that they must be clear, unambiguous and must apply exactly to the situation which 
has transpired.192 In Bintai Kindenko Pte Ltd v Sanwa Bank Ltd & Anor193 the Singapore 
High Court held that to exclude liability for negligence, the clause had to be clear and 
unambiguous.194 Limitations of liability, as opposed to exclusions of liability, are treated 
more leniently. The Singapore High Court in The Neptune Agate195 endorsed the statement 
to this effect in Ailsa Craig Fishing  v Malvern Fishing,196 reiterated in George Mitchell 
(Chesterhall) v Finney Lock Seeds.197 Limitations of liability must nevertheless be 
unambiguous and will be construed contra proferentem.  
                                                
186 Ibid, para 12–045. 
187 Ibid, at para 12–083. 
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192 Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2004) vol 1 at para 14–006. 
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195 Zenith Taiwan Corp v Owners of and Other Persons Interested in the ships or Vessels ‘Neptune Agate’ et 
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197 George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803 at 814. Ailsa Craig has been 
endorsed in Singapore in Rapiscan AsiaPte Ltd  v Global Container Freight Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR 325 at 
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Drafting of bank T&C is a delicate task. They must cater for all possible situations, 
including the unforeseen. At the same time, the T&C must be precise, concise, 
unambiguous and clear. A sound knowledge of the law, a good command of the language, a 
creative mind and lateral thought are all prerequisites. 
 
2.3 Validity and Enforcement  
Aside from the rules relating to the incorporation of terms into a contract and their 
meaning, there are other common law and legislative controls on the legality, validity and 
enforceability of contracts and contractual terms. Examples of common law rules are those 
concerning contracts contrary to public policy, contracts in restraint of trade and penalty 
clauses. The most relevant statutory rules in Singapore in the context of a bank’s standard 
terms are contained in the Unfair Contract Terms Act,198 which will be referred to hereafter 
as the “UCTA”. It has been described as “one of the most important statutes which have 
been enacted in recent times.”199 
 
In England and Singapore the UCTA imposes controls on exemption and restriction of 
liability clauses in consumer and commercial contracts. It is not concerned generally with 
the fairness of the contract or its provisions. Recourse to the Act is not excluded because a 
party knowingly and willingly entered into a contract with an exclusion or restriction of 
                                                                                                                                               
343 and Emjay Enterprises Pte Ltd v Skylift Consolidator(Pte) Ltd (Direct Services (HK) Ltd, third party) 
[2006] 2 SLR 268 at 273. 
198 Chapter 396. 
199 Kenwell & Co Pte Ltd v Southern Ocean Shipbuilding Co Pte Ltd [1999] 1 SLR 214 at 225. 
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liability.200 The Act renders certain exclusions or restrictions invalid,201 while others are 
made subject to the requirement of reasonableness. For example, section 2(2) requires a 
clause restricting loss or damage, other than from death or personal injury, to be reasonable. 
Section 3 applies to contracts in which one party deals as a consumer or contracts on the 
other’s standard terms. Its effect is that clauses excluding or restricting liability of the other 
party for a breach of contract and clauses permitting the other party to render performance 
substantially different from what was reasonably expected, or no performance at all, must 
be reasonable. In the banking context, section 4 requires an indemnity given by a non–
business customer for a liability incurred by his bank for negligence or breach of contract to 
be reasonable. Section 12 clarifies that a customer who does not open the account in the 
course of business, deals as a consumer. Section 13 extends the ambit of Part 1 of the Act 
(primarily sections 3–7) to exclusions of or restrictions on the rules of evidence or 
procedure, or any right or remedy in respect of the liability, and the imposition of restrictive 
or onerous conditions on the liability or its enforcement. Although not stated in section 13, 
a contractual term which does any of these things must pass the test of reasonableness.202 
 
The Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act, (Chapter 52A) in Singapore aims to protect 
consumers against certain unfair trade practices. As articulated by consumer advocates,203 
the problem with the “buyer beware” stance of the law is that businesses do not fully 
                                                
200 Ibid, at 228; Press Automation Technology Pte Ltd v Translink Exhibition Forwarding Pte Ltd [2003] 1 
SLR 712 at 727. 
201 For example, section 2(1) disallows exclusion or restriction of liability for negligence causing death or 
personal injury. 
202 See Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] QB 600 at 606, 608. 
203 Stephen Loke, Chia Ho Beng, Joyce Goh  A Consumer’s Guide to Fair Trading (Times Editions, 
Singapore, 2004). 
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inform consumers about their business or product.204 The Act does not, however, apply to 
any transaction or activity regulated by specified written laws, including the Banking 
Act.205 Banking business is regulated by the Banking Act; according to section 4, banking 
business “means the business of receiving money on current or deposit account, paying and 
collecting cheques drawn by or paid in by customers, the making of advances to customers, 
and includes such other business as the Authority may prescribe for the purposes of this 
Act”.206 As a result, the activities of banks are not subject to the provisions of this 
consumer protection legislation. The reason for this exclusion was apparently to avoid 
confusion and cost increases.207 It is not apparent why these concerns arise particularly in 
the financial services sector so as to justify their exclusion from the legislation. Another 
argument justifying the exclusion of banks from the Act is their regulation by the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore and the application of the Code of Consumer Banking Practice 
(discussed below). 
 
On 13 November 2005, the Straits Times newspaper in Singapore reported that the 
Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) Act would be extended to apply to the financial 
services sector including insurance companies and banks, but this amendment is not yet 
reflected in the Act. In the event that this Act does come to apply to the banking contract, it 
would enable a consumer to take action against a supplier for an unfair practice.208 An 
unfair practice occurs, inter alia, when the conduct of the supplier of goods or services may 
reasonably deceive or mislead a consumer or take advantage of him where he is not able to 
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understand the transaction.209 The Second Schedule of the Act lists specific unfair practices 
including taking advantage of a consumer by use of terms that are unconscionable (which 
includes harsh and one–sided terms),210 and concealing from or misleading a consumer on 
an important matter by using small print.211 The reasonableness of the conduct of the 
supplier is relevant to determine whether there has been an unfair practice.212 There is a 
prescribed limit, currently $20,000, for the value of a claim under this Act.213 The 
consumer may abandon any amount in excess of the limit in order to bring his claim within 
the statute. The provisions of the Act cannot be contracted out of214 and a contra 
proferentem interpretation of ambiguous provisions, against the supplier, is applied.215 It is 
clear that there is scope for application of these provisions to the banking contract in the 
event that the Act becomes applicable to banks.  
 
In September 2002, the Association of Banks in Singapore (“ABS”) published the first 
Code of Consumer Banking Practice outlining the minimum standards a customer can 
expect from its bank.216  It is premised on four principles: “fairness”, “transparency”, 
“accountability” and “reliability” and invites customers to use the code as a benchmark by 
which to measure the conduct of their banks. The code falls into the category of so–called 
“soft law” as it does not have legislative force and is based on voluntary subscription by 
ABS members. The code reflects generally accepted contractual procedures to ensure 
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fairness and fair dealing in the banking industry. It sets out a dispute resolution process 
which can be escalated to a mediation panel convened under the auspices of the ABS to 
decide the matter.  
 
In England, The Banking Code for personal customers was first effective in 1992; it has 
been revised over the years217 and a similar code for small business customers218 has been 
developed.  The codes set standards for good banking practice;219 they are drafted as an 
agreement between bank and customer. Subscription to the codes by banks is widespread 
and this will generally be stated in the T&C. Copies of the codes are available from bank 
branches. This leads to the view that the codes’ “provisions may well be treated as implied 
terms in the banking contract”.220 It is doubted, however, whether provisions in the codes 
contrary to the customer’s interests and not reflected in the T&C, are binding on a 
customer. 
                                                
217 The current edition is dated 1 March 2005. A new edition is scheduled to be released on 3 March 2008. 
218 Businesses with a turnover of up to 1 million pounds a year. 
219 Available on the website of the British Bankers’ Association at http://www.bba.org.uk 
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Chapter 3: The Customer’s Contractual Duties to the Bank in Singapore 
 
This chapter focuses on the customer’s implied duties, in particular those in Macmillan, 
Greenwood and Khoo Tian Hock. It starts with a list of the customer’s express duties221 in 
the T&C of the Singapore banks that are analysed here, to show the contrast with the 
implied duties.222 Then there is a discussion of the historical development of the principles 
of causation and negligence in English law as they have shaped the customer’s duty 
recognised in London Joint Stock Bank v Macmillan and Arthur.223 This puts Macmillan 
and its predecessor, Young v Grote (1827) 224 in context. “Negligence in the transaction 
itself” emerges from Macmillan as the test to determine the extent of customer’s duty. The 
concept is traced through 19th century cases to explore its meaning and rationale. This leads 
to a discussion of the evolution of causation in English law, culminating with a conclusion 
on the role of “negligence in the transaction itself” today. The focus then shifts to the 
general principles governing implied terms as they relate to the Macmillan, Greenwood and 
Khoo Tian Hock duties. An analysis of the law of estoppel as applied to the customer’s duty 
in Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited225 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.1  The Express Duties 
Under the common law, the customer has a duty to exercise care in drawing cheques226 and 
to notify the bank on becoming aware of forgery.227 In Singapore, there may be a broader 
                                                
221 The express duties are analysed in detail in chapters 4, 10 and 11. 
222 Mentioned in the Overview in chapter 1 and discussed in detail in this chapter. 
223 [1918] AC 777. 
224 (1827) 130 ER 764. 
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duty not to facilitate fraud in general.228 The T&C of the five Singapore banks analysed 
here set out more detailed customer duties, including to 
1. notify the bank of a change in particulars;229 
2. notify the bank of non–receipt of a bank statement;230 
3. notify the bank of non–receipt of a cheque book;231  
4. prevent the loss or theft of a cheque, cheque book or ATM card;232 
5. comply with the T&C on the cheque book cover;233 
6. notify the bank if a cheque, cheque book or ATM card is lost, stolen or mislaid;234  
7. draw cheques and keep a cheque book in a way that does not facilitate fraud, forgery 
or alterations;235 
8. operate an account in a manner that does not facilitate fraud, forgery or alterations;236 
9. safeguard passwords and codes;237  
10. monitor the account at all times and report unauthorised debits;238 
11. examine statements and other advices and report omissions, wrong or unauthorised 
entries;239 
12. sign and return confirmation slips if requested to do so.240 
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A consideration of these provisions reveals that they are all directed, to some or other 
extent, at the problem of the unauthorised debit or payment without a mandate. This is one 
of the biggest concerns for banks. The bank wishes to debit the customer’s account with a 
payment while the customer denies the bank’s entitlement to do so. Under the common 
law, unless the bank can point to a breach by the customer of his duties to the bank, the 
bank must, even where innocent of negligence, bear the loss itself or recoup it elsewhere. 
Old authority for this proposition includes Hall v Fuller 241 and Young v Grote.242 It can be 
explained in terms of the doctrine of mandate: non–observance of the mandate does not 
entitle the bank (the agent) to reimbursement from its principal (the customer).243  In Hall v 
Fuller,244 which appears to be based on the mandate rationale, Abbot CJ said: “Bankers can 
only charge their customers with sums of money paid pursuant to order.”245 It can also be 
explained as a consequence of the debtor–creditor nature of the bank–customer 
relationship,246 which was settled some 22 years after Hall v Fuller in Foley v Hill.247 
Money deposited with the bank belongs to the bank and represents a debt that must be 
repaid to the customer according to the terms of their agreement, commonly on demand.248 
If a debtor (the bank), makes a payment to the wrong person, it obviously does not reduce 
the debt owed to the creditor (the customer).  
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It is interesting to compare in more detail the above list of express contractual duties with 
the common law duties of the customer. The common law duties, or elements of them, are 
evident among the express duties listed above. 
 
The customer’s duty to its bank to exercise reasonable care in writing cheques, confirmed 
in 1918 by Macmillan,249 is reflected in the following express duties: 
• to draw cheques in a way that does not facilitate fraud, forgery or alterations; and 
• to comply with the T&C printed on the cheque book cover.  
The instructions printed on the cheque book cover are concerned primarily with the 
Macmillan duty, giving instructions on how to write a cheque so as to prevent fraudulent 
alteration. 
 
The Greenwood duty250 is to notify the bank as soon as the customer becomes aware of a 
forgery on his account. This enables the bank to endeavor to protect itself from further 
loss.251 This common law duty is reflected in these express duties: 
• to monitor an account at all times and immediately report unauthorised debits; and  
• to examine statements, passbooks and other advices and report omissions and wrong 
or unauthorised entries. 
The duty to examine bank statements and report errors and omissions is part of a 
controversial clause, now common in Singapore and, for example, Canada. The operation 
and merits of the verification and conclusive evidence clause, as it is known in Singapore, 
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will be discussed in detail later.252 There is a striking similarity between the clause and the 
Greenwood duty, which it is submitted can be seen as its common law ancestor:  
• Both the Greenwood duty and the verification duty require that in certain 
circumstances the customer notify the bank about activity on his bank account. 
• In certain circumstances, both duties will preclude the customer from disputing an 
unauthorised debit. 
• The two duties share an underlying rationale that the bank is entitled to protection 
from third party dishonesty. 
 
The Khoo Tian Hock duty253 recognised that the customer in Singapore has a general duty 
to prevent fraud. As such, it will depend on the particular circumstances whether the duty 
arises and whether it has been breached. In this case, the customer (a husband and wife with 
a joint current account) claimed against the bank for monies paid out on cheques, which the 
court found had been forged by the customer’s son, who had a previous history of such 
conduct. On the face of it, the bank had no mandate to make the payments and the customer 
was therefore entitled to have the debit entries reversed. The bank claimed, however, that 
the customer was estopped from relying on the forgeries, alternatively, was in negligent 
breach of duty to the bank. The court held that a customer has an implied duty to the bank 
not to facilitate fraud; the customer had breached this duty and therefore could not raise the 
forgeries against the bank.  
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Based on the facts in Khoo Tian Hock, we know that this general duty propounded by the 
court encompassed a duty to safeguard a cheque book against misuse by a known fraudster.  
Interestingly, both Parke B in Bank of Ireland v Evans’ Charities254 (1855) and Lord 
Macnaghten in Scholfield v The Earl of Londesborough,255 (1896) rejected the careless 
keeping of a cheque book as justifying the placement of liability on the customer in the 
event of ensuing loss.256 Parke B’s reason appears to be remoteness. In Khoo Tian Hock 
there was one important additional factor: the fraudster in Khoo Tian Hock was known by 
the customer to have committed a fraudulent act about a month before the incident that led 
to the dispute and was known to have had access to the cheque book. The banking 
environment had also changed dramatically in more than a century since the earlier cases. 
 
Elements of the Khoo Tian Hock duty are evident in numerous provisions of the T&C, 
including the duty to:  
• keep a cheque book in a secure place; and 
• operate an account in a manner that does not facilitate fraud or forgery;  
 
Because the Khoo Tian Hock duty is articulated as a general principle, it may extend to 
other aspects of operating a bank account, including the duty to verify bank statements, the 
duty to notify the bank of the theft of cards, a cheque book or access codes and the duty 
(primarily of corporate customers) to supervise employees and implement appropriate 
systems. In fact, all of the express duties listed above can arguably form part of a general 
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duty, as set out in Khoo Tian Hock, not to facilitate fraud. It would subsume the Macmillan 
and Greenwood duties. It could apply to a factual scenario which is as yet unforeseen.  
 
The question arises whether the Khoo Tian Hock duty, set out in a decision of the 
Singapore High Court, will endure in the domestic banking landscape. The Court of Appeal 
has not yet had occasion to endorse the development. There is, however, an indication from 
the Court of Appeal that the decision is not supported. V K Rajah J, in Pertamina Energy 
Trading Limited v Credit Suisse,257 said, obiter, that Khoo Tian Hock had “obscured” the 
legal position in Singapore and that a revision of the law in Macmillan and Tai Hing Cotton 
Mill was “unnecessary and perhaps undesirable”.258 
 
The reasoning of the court in Khoo Tian Hock is attractively logical and compliments the 
practices of modern banking: fraud is not facilitated only by the careless drawing of 
cheques, and drawing a distinction between the execution of cheques, on the one hand, and 
other steps or omissions, on the other hand, appears arbitrary. Lord Finlay LC in Macmillan 
said, “it appears obvious that in drawing a cheque the customer is bound to take usual and 
reasonable precautions to prevent forgery.”259 Some 78 years later, Woo Bih Li JC in Khoo 
Tian Hock considered it obvious that in conducting his banking affairs, the customer is 
bound to take usual and reasonable precautions to prevent fraud. The two judgments agree 
in principle: the customer has certain responsibilities in the conduct of his bank account. It 
is the extent of the duty which is in issue. The customer’s implied duties will be analysed 
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and their adequacy in the modern banking environment debated after setting out the 
background on causation and negligence. 
 
3.2 Historical Development of Causation and Negligence 
Khoo Tian Hock challenges the limited ambit of the Macmillan duty. This calls for a 
discussion of Macmillan’s ancestry, starting with the decision in Young v Grote (1827).260 
First, however, it will be helpful to have regard to the development of the concepts of 
“causation” and “negligence” in English law.  
 
Percy Winfield, writing in 1926, said that Anglo–Saxon law (449–1066), on the whole 
“gropes its way along with no more than a sub–conscious grasp of the differences between 
‘intent,’ ‘negligence,’ and ‘unavoidable harm’”.261 According to Sir William Holdsworth, 
under Anglo–Saxon law the guiding principle was that an act causing damage must, to keep 
the peace, be compensated;262 remoteness of damage and fault were disregarded.263 The 
focus of the law was to compensate the victim or his family in order to suppress feud and 
revenge; this dictated an emphasis on the feelings of the victim(s) at the expense of 
evaluating the fault of the perpetrator.264 Thus, Holdsworth said, there was “a time when 
the common law had no doctrine of negligence”.265  
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This came to be tempered during the mediaeval period (1066–1485), when liability 
depended on bringing a claim within one of a number of recognised actions, but still 
irrespective of fault.266 The only requirement was that the act must have caused the 
damage.267 Provided the wrong complained of fell within one of the forms of action, 
liability was strict268 although there was some recognition of justification for certain types 
of harm.269 For example, certain acts of self–defence or exercise of property rights that 
caused damage may have been excused.270 A development in the mediaeval period was that 
a man would only be liable if his conduct was the proximate cause of the harm.271 
Holdsworth wrote that the “conception of negligence is latent in such a limitation” and 
“although this latent consequence has not been discovered”,272 it familiarized “the courts 
with the idea that in a large number of cases liability was grounded upon negligence.”273 
The requirement of proximity eventually led to the reception of the doctrine of 
negligence274 but in the meantime causation remained the prime determining factor.275 The 
governing principle was that a man acted at his peril and conscious modification of this 
position was a long way off.  
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Winfield views Holdsworth’s account as an “inaccurate” generalisation,276 a criticism 
which implicitly acknowledges that there is some merit in Holdsworth’s view.277 
Winfield’s point is that “in many instances a mediaeval man did not act at his peril”,278 and 
“there was a rough appreciation of the distinction between intention, inadvertence, and 
inevitable accident.”279 He concedes, however, that “in theory there was a tendency to hold 
a man liable for some (but not all) purely accidental harm”.280  
 
The period following 1485 saw some development of torts of wrongful intent and torts of 
negligence.281 Factors contributing to the development of the common law were the growth 
of English commerce and industry and the addition of mercantile jurisdiction to the 
common law, which had previously been exercised by the Court of Admiralty; this 
involved the application of rules until now not used in the common law courts.282  
 
Thomas Street, in 1906, wrote that the “law of negligence historically starts from the idea 
of failure in performance of a determinate provable legal duty.”283 He cites cases from the 
14th to 18th centuries evidencing recognition of liability for negligence. This occurred first 
where the parties were in a “contractual, quasi–contractual, or proprietary” relationship284 
giving rise to a positive duty to act. It might arise by virtue of ownership of property,285 
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public office such as the position of sheriff created by statute,286 public calling such as that 
of smith, innkeeper or carrier,287 or the relationship of bailment.288  
 
The next development was recognition of a duty not to cause harm in the pursuit of one’s 
own affairs. Street says this step marked the “beginning of the conception of negligence in 
its ordinary sense.”289 He cites cases from the 14th and 15th centuries that would fall into 
this category. Implied duties to exercise care in one’s conduct first arose where there was a 
relationship of contract, limited initially to those engaged in a common calling, e.g. a 
ferryman or surgeon.290  
 
Winfield acknowledges that from the mid–16th to the end of the 17th centuries there was 
little development in the general theory of negligence.291Around the end of the 17th 
century292 to the beginning of the 18th century,293 negligence came to be regarded as a basis 
of liability;294 but until the early 19th century, trespass remained the remedy for damage 
caused even if it was negligent and not intentional.295  The next development was an action 
in negligence as an alternative to trespass,296 followed by the development of the objective 
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standard of the reasonable man and the idea that negligence was linked to a duty not to 
cause harm.297  
 
David Kretzmer298 notes that the “conventional wisdom of tort scholars” was that “until the 
nineteenth century liability in tort was based on ‘cause’ rather than ‘fault’.”299 Kretzmer 
argues that this conventional view is inaccurate in placing too much emphasis on causation 
and ignoring the role of fault which is evident in pre–nineteenth century English law.300 
The merits of that debate are outside the focus of this paper but Kretzmer’s point is not so 
much to deny the importance of causation pre–nineteenth century but to give recognition to 
a role played by fault during that time. He concedes “that a shift in the basis of liability did 
take place in the course of the nineteenth century”,301 that shift being away from causation 
towards notions of fault.  
 
In the 19th century, according to Winfield, “the development of the conception of 
negligence as an independent tort is comparatively rapid” and “we are not far out if we 
select the period from about 1825 onwards as the most fruitful.”302 This is significant. 
Macmillan’s ancestor, Young v Grote (1827),303 to be discussed next, was decided at the 
start of that period. The yardstick of the reasonable man by which to judge negligence was 
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only expressly recognized in 1837 by Tindall CJ in Vaughan v Menlove,304 10 years after 
Young v Grote. Tindall CJ in the Court of Common Pleas said: “The care taken by a 
prudent man has always been the rule laid down”.305 This suggests that the concept was 
familiar but that it had not before been articulated.306  
 
3.3 Young v Grote 
In contemplation of a period of absence from home, Mr Young signed cheques in blank and 
authorised his wife to complete them as necessary. Such a need duly arose and Mrs Young 
directed a clerk in the employ of her husband to fill out one of the cheques. This he did in a 
manner that facilitated alteration. The clerk subsequently increased the amount of the 
cheque and appropriated the proceeds. The bank paid the cheque for the increased amount 
and Mr Young disputed its right to debit his account accordingly. The Court of Common 
Pleas decided unanimously in favour of the bank.  
 
Thomas Bevan,307 writing in 1907, points out that the judgments in Young v Grote,308 were 
delivered orally at the conclusion of the case and were “likely to be very inexactly 
expressed”.309 Bearing that in mind, the following dicta from the case should be 
mentioned.310 Best CJ, citing the French jurist Pothier in support, decided that it was the 
fault of Mr Young that the bank paid more than they ought. He identified the customer’s 
fault as lying in his choice of the person with whom he entrusted the signed blank cheques: 
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“If Young, instead of leaving the check with a female, had left it with a man of business, he 
would have guarded against fraud in the mode of filling it up”.311 Park J agreed that Mr 
Young was negligent: “He leaves blank checks in the hands of his wife, who was ignorant 
of business”.312 The cheque as issued by his wife became his genuine order.313 Burrough J 
said the “blame is all on one side”;314 it consisted in leaving a blank cheque with the 
customer’s wife, who then wrote it up inadequately. Gaselee J found on the basis of the 
“great negligence on the part of Young”, but he didn’t identify what it consisted in.315  
 
Prior to Young v Grote, Lickbarrow v Mason316 (1787) stated the following principle: 
“whenever one of two innocent parties must suffer by the act of a third person, he who has 
enabled such person to occasion the loss must sustain it.”317  This dictum and that of Best 
CJ in Young v Grote – “if it be the fault of the customer that the banker pays more than he 
ought, he cannot be called on to pay again”318 – have common ground with the proposition 
espoused by Pothier that the giver of a mandate, who with fault misleads the receiver of the 
mandate, must bear the loss occasioned by it.319 Lickbarrow v Mason was subsequently 
criticised for stating the principle too widely.320 Yet, in Meyer & Co Limited v The Sze Hai 
Tong Banking and Insurance Company Limited,321 (1913) the Privy Council (composed, 
                                                





316 (1787) 100 ER 35. 
317 Ibid, at 39.  
318 Ibid, at 766. 
319 This translation of Pothier’s doctrine is taken from the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in Scholfield v The 
Earl of Londesborough [1896] AC 514 at 545–6. 
320 For example in Arnold v Cheque Bank (1876) 1 CPD 578 at 587; Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] 
AC 107 at 170 –171 by Lord Field (dissenting); London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v Macmillan and Arthur 
[1918] AC 777 by Lord Parmoor at 836. 
321 [1913] AC 847. 
 50
inter alia, of Viscount Haldane and Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, who were present five years 
later in the House of Lords decision in Macmillan322), decided against a customer, whose 
employee had fraudulently misappropriated cheques, on the basis that “as between two 
innocent persons, one of whom must suffer by the fraud of a third person, he should suffer 
who by his conduct has enabled such third person to occasion the loss.”323 The decision in 
Khoo Tian Hock is compatible with the old statements of the law in Young v Grote and 
Lickbarrow v Mason.  
 
In Scholfield v The Earl of Londesborough,324 Lord Macnaghten considered Pothier’s 
doctrine “not unreasonable” but said that it was not applicable to the facts there 
pertaining.325 Lord Halsbury, in the same case, criticised Best CJ for deciding Young v 
Grote on the authority of Pothier, which rule he rejected as not forming part of English 
law.326 Lord Halsbury preferred to invoke the principles of estoppel where the customer’s 
neglect justifies a departure from the general rule. In Macmillan, Lord Finlay LC and Lord 
Shaw defended Best CJ’s decision in Young v Grote and supported the application of 
Pothier’s principle to English law.327 Lord Finlay (in Macmillan) considered estoppel to be 
an expression of Pothier’s principle.328 He says: “In whichever of these ways it may be 
put,329 the ground is really one and the same – as the negligence of the customer caused the 
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loss, he must bear it.”330 Both Pothier’s rule and negligent estoppel are predicated on a duty 
on the part of the customer.  Benjamin Geva writes that despite the “reinstatement of the 
authority of Pothier”, it has “ceased to play an explicit role in subsequent case law” and, 
today, Macmillan is rationalised as fundamental to the bank–customer relationship rather 
than in terms of the doctrine of mandate.331 
 
The exact basis for the decision in Young v Grote332 was contentious among the judges who 
subsequently considered it.333 There were two main views: presumed authority and 
negligence.  
 
The first view, that by signing an incomplete cheque, authority is given to fill it up in 
whatever way the blank permits, is a principle of the law merchant.334 This was the view 
favoured in Robarts v Tucker335 (1851), in Swan v North British Australasian Company 
(1863) by Blackburn J336 and in Barker and Another v Sterne337 (1854) by Pollock CB who, 
obiter, preferred to base the rationale of Young v Grote on a presumed authority for the bill 
of exchange to be completed rather than on the negligence of the drawer.338 A later 
comment on Young v Grote describes Pollock CB’s view as “clearly wrong”339 on the basis 
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that the alteration was made without any authority at all.340 Thomas Bevan argued that 
Young v Grote can be seen as the operation of an estoppel because the customer is estopped 
from denying that the cheque as paid by the bank was his order. It is not, however, a 
negligent estoppel.341  
 
The second view is that Young v Grote is based on the negligence of the drawer, pertaining 
to the completion of the cheque in such a manner as to facilitate a subsequent fraud. 
Interestingly, little is said in the subsequent cases about Mr Young’s negligence in leaving 
the cheque with a woman ignorant of business.342  
 
Overall, the weight of authority is in favour of the negligence rationale, but the effect of 
such negligence is contentious. There are two possibilities: it gives rise to an estoppel 
against the customer or it gives the bank a separate cause of action and therefore, to avoid 
circuity of action, it can be raised as a defence. In The Governor and Company of the Bank 
of Ireland v The Trustees of Evans’ Charities in Ireland 343 (1855), Lord Cranworth said 
Young v Grote was decided on the basis of estoppel arising from the negligence of the 
drawer. The Guardians of Halifax Union v Wheelright344 (1875) said Young v Grote was 
decided on the basis of negligence and suggests that it gives rise to an estoppel: A man 
cannot complain of his own wrong against another who was misled by it.345 In Arnold  v 
The Cheque Bank346 (1876) Lord Coleridge CJ expresses the view that Young v Grote was 
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decided on the basis of Pothier’s rule where the drawer of the cheque was at fault in the 
manner of drawing the cheque and that subsequent cases explained that for the negligence 
to estop, it must be negligence in the transaction itself.347  
 
In Swan v North British Australasian Company (1863),348 Cockburn CJ is emphatic that 
Young v Grote was not decided on the basis of estoppel but possibly to prevent circuity of 
action because the customer would have a claim against the bank for the unauthorised 
payment and the bank would have a claim against the customer for negligence.349 In 
Macmillan, Lord Finlay LC, supported by Lord Shaw, is clear that the sole basis for the 
decision in Young v Grote is the customer’s duty of care breached by his negligence.350 
Viscount Haldane does not regard Young v Grote as “instructive”351 and Lord Parmoor 
doesn’t give his opinion on the basis for the decision but considers the case law subsequent 
to Young v Grote to have clarified the duty of the customer to his bank.352 He does, 
however, indicate his support for the view that a customer who signs an incomplete 
mandate must be taken to have given authority to his agent to fill it up, which he is 
precluded from denying.353  
 
Lord Finlay LC in Macmillan said that Young v Grote354 was decided on the sole ground 
that “Young was a customer of the bank owing to the bank the duty of drawing his cheque 
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with reasonable care”.355 Young v Grote,356 however, contains no statement of a particular 
duty of care on the part of the customer and no delineation of the kind of negligence that 
will justify a decision against the customer. The discussion above on the historical 
development of the concept of negligence suggests that this was not possible at the time.357 
Percy Winfield’s statement that negligence “as a technical term began to clarify in the early 
nineteenth century”358 can explain the vague articulation of Mr Young’s negligence in 
Young v Grote. Negligence was at that time a nascent concept poised to undergo substantial 
development. This raises the question whether the court in Young v Grote359 used the term 
“negligence” as a technical term signifying the existence of a duty of care or in a more 
general sense.  
 
Negligence can be used in two different senses. The House of Lords in Gallie v Lee 
articulates the distinction:360 in a broader or general sense negligence can refer to 
carelessness, failure to take sensible precautions, lack of prudence or common sense. In the 
narrow or technical sense it refers to breach of a duty of care such as would found an action 
in tort (or contract, where applicable).  Having regard to this dual nature and considering 
the immaturity of the law of negligence and the concept of a duty of care at the time of 
Young v Grote, conclusions about a duty of care from the dicta in Young v Grote must be 
cautiously made. Was Mr Young’s negligence a breach of a duty owed by him as a 
customer to his bank or was it carelessness justifying an application of the principle that 
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“no man may take advantage of his own wrong”?361 There is no discussion or elaboration 
of a “duty of care” in Young v Grote; and use of the words “fault”, “want of proper caution” 
and “blame” in the dicta of the case suggest carelessness or lack of prudence rather than a 
technical duty of care.  
 
There are two ways in which Mr Young could be viewed today as negligent. They are not 
mutually exclusive. The first is in the manner of drawing the cheque. Young’s wife, his 
agent in the matter, drew the cheque in a manner that facilitated alteration. Young was 
liable for his agent’s negligence. Young himself signed the cheques in blank. This, by 
today’s standards, is likely to be negligence in the drawing of the cheque, which would be 
considered under Macmillan and Tai Hing Cotton Mill as a breach of the customer’s duty. 
But, interestingly, no fuss is made of this aspect of Mr Young’s imprudence by the court in 
Young v Grote. Best CJ even appears to entertain the possibility that the demands of 
commerce might require such a practice, as argued by Mr Young’s counsel. Rather it is the 
second aspect of Mr Young’s conduct that is highlighted, particularly by Best CJ: Mr 
Young’s choice of his wife, a woman not experienced in the ways of business, as the 
custodian of the signed cheques with authority to fill them up as necessary.  
 
If this is what Mr Young’s negligence consisted in, then it did not pertain to the drawing of 
the cheque. The judgements in Young v Grote all condemn Mr Young’s lack of caution or 
negligence, but there is little expression that it pertained to the drawing of the cheques. The 
facts are capable of supporting such a conclusion but the court did not clearly rest its 
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decision on that basis. One must agree with Cockburn CJ in Swan362 that Young v Grote 
was decided on the basis of Mr Young’s negligence,363 but the effect and nature of that 
negligence is not explicit. Cockburn CJ does not specify what the negligence consisted in.  
 
3.4  The Macmillan Duty  
In London Joint Stock Bank v Macmillan,364 a dishonest clerk in the employ of Messrs 
Macmillan & Arthur presented Mr Arthur with a cheque for signature. The cheque had 
been filled up by the clerk with blank spaces facilitating alteration of the amount payable, 
which happened after Mr Arthur had signed it. The London Joint Stock Bank disputed its 
liability to reimburse the firm. The House of Lords held in their favour on the ground that 
the customer has a duty not to be negligent in the completion of a cheque.  
 
A preliminary question is whether the Macmillan duty is limited to the drawing of cheques 
or whether it extends to the giving of any mandate to the bank. In Macmillan, Lords Finlay 
and Shaw and Viscount Haldane confine their discussion to the drawing of cheques. Lord 
Parmoor, however, recognises that the duty applies to a mandate: “it is the duty of a 
customer to use due caution in the preparation and issue of a mandate to his banker.”365 The 
language of Lord Scarman in Tai Hing Cotton Mill is confined to the drawing of cheques. 
Common sense dictates that the duty extends to the giving of a mandate to the bank, in 
whatever form it might take. The scenario of a customer sending a standing payment 
instruction to the bank by signing the appropriate form in blank and leaving it to be 
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completed and delivered to the bank by another who dishonestly inserts his own account 
details and possibly a different amount, is so similar to the signing of cheques in blank as to 
require the same outcome.366 The restrictive language of the Law Lords other than Lord 
Parmoor can be explained on the basis of the facts pertaining in those two cases. There is 
no suggestion that they intended that the duty should be confined to the drawing of cheques 
as opposed to mandates generally. To the contrary, reasoning based on the significance of 
the mandate, as in the judgments of Viscount Haldane367 and Lord Shaw,368 suggests 
otherwise. Kepitigalla Rubber Estates Limited v National Bank of India Limited369 supports 
this view: “It seems to me to be clearly the duty of a person giving a mandate to take 
reasonable care that he does not mislead the person to whom the mandate is given.”370 
 
3.5 Negligence in the Transaction Itself 
Macmillan emphatically limits the customer’s liability for negligence to “negligence in the 
transaction itself”.371 There is no mention in Young v Grote of “negligence in the 
transaction itself”. Lord Parmoor in Macmillan acknowledged that “the principles involved 
in the duty which a customer owes to his banker have been further defined and made more 
exact in a number of subsequent decisions.”372 A House of Lords reference in 1854 to 
Young v Grote makes no mention of a requirement that the negligence be in the transaction 
itself: “where the customer’s neglect of due caution has caused his bankers to make a 
payment on a forged order, he shall not set up against them the invalidity of a document 
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which he has induced them to act on as genuine.”373 Lord Finlay in Macmillan said that the 
requirement of “negligence in the transaction itself” is recognised in preceding cases.374 
This is correct, as the following cases show.  
 
In The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland v The Trustees of Evans’ Charities in 
Ireland375 (1855), stock held by the Trustees of Evans’ Charities registered in the bank was 
fraudulently transferred to a third party by the secretary of the Trustees, who used the seal 
of the charity to forge the transfer papers which bore genuine signatures. The fraud was 
facilitated by the forger having custody of the corporation’s seal, an arrangement that was 
arguably negligent. The House of Lords, rejecting the argument of the Bank of Ireland, said 
the negligence must be in or immediately connected with the transfer of the stock.376  
 
In Swan v North British Australasian Company (Limited) (1863),377 the owner of shares 
executed transfer forms in blank for his intended sale of certain shares. He gave them to his 
broker who, contrary to instructions, used them to sell other shares and appropriated the 
proceeds. Blackburn J said that “the neglect must be in the transaction itself and be the 
proximate cause of leading the party into that mistake; and it must be the neglect of some 
duty that is owing to the person led into that belief”.378 Blackburn J’s statement in Swan 
subsequently received endorsement in authoritative bank–customer cases, for instance from 
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Lord Coleridge CJ in Arnold and Others v The Cheque Bank (1876),379 from Lord Field 
(dissenting on other grounds) in Bank of England v Vagliano Bros (1891) 380and from Lord 
Parmoor in Macmillan.381  
 
This decision in Swan was the last in a trilogy of cases in which Mr Swan sought a remedy 
for the losses he had suffered at the hands of his broker. The history of his campaign is 
convoluted and bears explanation. In 1859, Mr Swan brought an ex parte application in the 
Court of Common Pleas to have the share register of the company amended to reflect his 
name as the owner of the shares that had been fraudulently sold by his broker. The decision 
is reported as Ex parte Swan.382 The matter was argued twice; it was initially directed that 
the then registered holders of the shares should have an opportunity to be heard; when the 
matter was argued again, the court was equally divided and the motion failed. Erle CJ and 
Keating J considered that Mr Swan’s negligence precluded him from obtaining relief, while 
Willes and Williams JJ considered that ownership of the shares had not been changed by 
the forged transfers. In 1862, Mr Swan brought an action in the Court of Exchequer against 
the company in which he had owned the shares to have his name restored to the share 
register. This decision is reported as Swan v North British Australasian Company 
(Limited).383 The court was again equally divided (Martin B and Channell B in favour, 
Wilde B and Pollock CB against) and in 1863 the matter was taken to a Court of error on a 
special case stated for the opinion of the Court of Exchequer.384 In the Court of error, six of 
the seven Judges found in favour of Mr Swan, Keating J dissented on the basis of Mr 
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Swan’s negligence. Despite the strong support for Mr Swan’s position in the Court of error, 
this history shows how marginal the merits in favour of Mr Swan were. 
 
Bank of England v Vagliano Bros (1891)385 involved false bills of exchange forged by the 
customer’s employee and accepted by the customer as drawee. The case was decided 
primarily on an application of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882,386 but six of the eight Law 
Lords who decided the case also considered the bank’s liability on the basis of the conduct 
of the parties. Lords Halsbury387 and Field,388 (the latter dissenting on the outcome), clearly 
reiterate the requirement of negligence in the transaction itself. Lord Bramwell (also 
dissenting on the outcome), puts it in causation terms: “the conduct of the bank’s customer 
to enable the bank to charge the customer must be conduct directly causing the 
payment.”389 This is interesting and will be raised again later. 
 
Lewes Sanitary Steam Laundry Company (Limited) v Barclay, Bevan & Co (Limited)390 
(1906) considered Evans’ Charities to have established the requirement that “negligence to 
make an estoppel must be in, or immediately connected with, the transaction itself”391 and 
cited reinforcing extracts from Vagliano, specifically the judgements of Lord Bramwell 
(emphasising the requirement of a causal connection) and Lord Halsbury (that carelessness 
or neglect unconnected with the act itself cannot be relied on by the banker to justify his 
                                                
385 [1891] AC 107. 
386 Lords Herschell and Morris confined themselves to the issue on the Bills of Exchange Act, see [1891] AC 
107 at 156 and 161–163. 
387 [1891] AC 107 at 115. 
388 Ibid, at 171. 
389 Ibid, at 136. 
390 (1906) 11 Com Cas 255. 
391 Ibid, at 267. 
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default).392 In Lewes, the negligence lay in the lack of checks and controls in a company 
employing the son of the chairman who knew his son had a history of forgery. The other 
directors were not aware of this and the court was unwilling to impute the chairman’s 
knowledge to the whole board. The court’s finding was that the lack of checks and controls 
was not negligence in the transaction itself and the employment of the son with his history 
of dishonesty (known only to his father, the chairman) did not excuse the bank.  
 
Kepitigalla Rubber Estates v National Bank of India393 (1909) involved forged cheques. 
Bray J (in the King’s Bench Division) considered himself bound by the authority of Evans, 
Swan and Lewes that for the customer’s negligence to serve as a defence to the bank, it 
must be “in or immediately connected with the transaction itself and must have been the 
proximate cause of the loss.”394 
 
These are the seminal authorities referred to in Macmillan, particularly by Lord Finlay, for 
ruling that the customer must have been negligent in the transaction itself to excuse the 
bank from liability for an unauthorised debit. There are two unanswered, related questions: 
what does “negligence in the transaction itself” mean, and what is the rationale for this 
requirement?  
                                                
392 Ibid. 
393 Kepitigalla Rubber Estates Limited v National Bank of India Limited [1909] 2 KB 1010.  
394 Ibid, at 1025. 
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3.5.1 Meaning of “Negligence in the Transaction Itself” 
The Singapore High Court in Khoo Tian Hock posed the crucial question: “what is meant 
by negligence ‘in the transaction itself’”.395 It answered: “In my view it is merely a 
reference to the principle of causation and was not intended to limit the duty of care owed 
by a customer to his bank.”396 This is the nub of the court’s position in Khoo Tian Hock.397 
It is a plausible proposition and merits investigation.  
 
Parke B in Evans’ Charities (1855) treated the stated requirement of “negligence in or 
immediately connected with the transfer itself” as a requirement of causation. He said: “If 
there was negligence in the custody of the seal, it was very remotely connected with the act 
of transfer.”398 The point is not lost in Khoo Tian Hock.399 Parke B appeared to regard the 
conduct of the careless–yet–innocent witnesses in Evans’ Charities, who attested to having 
seen the seal properly affixed to the powers of attorney, as a novus actus interveniens, 
breaking the chain of causation between the conduct of the Trustees and the loss from the 
fraudulent sale of the stock. Either way, the ratio for Parke B’s decision is rooted in 
causation.400   
 
                                                
395 [2000] 4 SLR 673 at 709. 
396 Ibid. 
397 There are other examples of this reasoning in Khoo Tian Hock [2000] 4 SLR 673. For example, with 
reference to a passage cited from Lord Bramwell’s judgment (Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] AC 
107 at 136 ), Woo Bih Li JC says at 706: “[it] was on causation and not the extent of the duty of care owed 
by a customer of a bank.” 
398 (1855) 10 ER 950 at 959. 
399 [2000] 4 SLR 673 at 702. 
400 See comments by Hunter J in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1984] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 570. 
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This accords with the interpretation given by Wilde B in the 1862 Court of Exchequer 
judgment in Swan,401 who says, “the sole question raised [in Evans Charities] was whether 
the negligence in the particular case was established and the consequences sufficiently 
proximate.”402 Subsequently, in the Court of error (Swan, 1863), Mellor J’s dicta reveal 
that, in his view, “negligence in the transaction itself” is the requirement of causation in the 
sense that it is the immediate cause of the loss.403 Lord Cranworth in The British Linen Co v 
The Caledonian Insurance Co404 says of Young v Grote, “there might be negligence in the 
circumstances that were the immediate cause of the payment by the bank”. The requirement 
of immediate cause is stressed but no mention is made of “negligence in the transaction 
itself”.  
 
In Staple v Bank of England405 (1887), the Court of Appeal (England) gives rare attention 
to the meaning of the phrase. Lord Esher MR refers to Evans’ Charities and points out that 
Parke B drew a distinction there between negligence (on the part of the other party or 
customer) which excuses the bank from liability for acting without authority and 
“negligence generally.”406  In the words of Lord Esher MR, the former is “negligence in or 
immediately connected with the transfer itself”407 which is “a very strong expression”408 
and must be construed as meaning that “the negligence must be proximately connected with 
the transfer itself.”409 Bowen and Fry LJJ concurred. Bowen LJ says, “it must be shewn not 
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merely that the plaintiff corporation were careless, but that the carelessness of the 
corporation directly and proximately led to the loss of the property which the banker was 
called upon to make good.”410 He does not think that there can be any doubt that this is the 
meaning of the phrase.411  
 
Further support for the view that the phrase refers to causation is to be found in the 
statements of Lord Halsbury and Lord Bramwell in Vagliano:412 Lord Halsbury says, “the 
carelessness of the customer, or neglect of the customer to take precautions, unconnected 
with the act itself, cannot be put forward by the banker as justifying his own default.”413  
Lord Bramwell (dissenting on the outcome) put it like this: “I think that the result of the 
authorities, …, is, that the conduct of the bank’s customer to enable the bank to charge the 
customer must be conduct directly causing the payment.”414 Kennedy J in Lewes415 said the 
bank “must show that the customer caused him to pay the money upon the forged 
cheque”416 and he cited Lord Halsbury’s dicta above.  
 
This discussion demonstrates that there is strong support in the seminal cases for the 
causation interpretation of “negligence in the transaction itself”. So too, in Macmillan there 
are dicta supporting the view that “negligence in the transaction itself” is a requirement of 
causation: Lord Finlay LC stated the customer’s duty and then said:  “Whether what 
happened in this case can be considered a natural and direct consequence of the customer’s 
                                                
410 Ibid, at 174. 
411 Ibid, at 175. 
412 Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] AC 107 at 115–116 and 136. 
413 Ibid, at 115. 
414 Ibid, at 136. 
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negligence in drawing the cheque is in controversy.”417 There is further support for the 
causation interpretation later in his judgement.418 Viscount Haldane sought to justify the 
view that a negligently drawn cheque is more immediately connected to the loss resulting 
from fraudulent alteration than other carelessness in the conduct of the account, such as 
leaving a cheque book or passbook in the wrong hands.419 The difference, according to 
Viscount Haldane, is that the “loss has resulted immediately”420 from the negligence in 
Macmillan whereas, he would say, losses from a failure to supervise employees421 are not 
“brought into existence as the immediate and natural outcome”422 of the customer’s 
negligence. Viscount Haldane said an imprudent man who enables his clerk to forge a 
cheque by leaving the cheque book in the hands of the clerk, “is not liable, for this reason, 
that the direct and real cause of the loss is the intervention of an act of wickedness on the 
part of the clerk,”423 These dicta from Viscount Haldane align “negligence in the 
transaction itself” with the requirement of causation. It suggests that the negligence must be 
in the transaction itself because that establishes an adequate causal connection. The irony is 
that the loss in Macmillan, for which the customer was held liable, was indeed caused by 
the intervention of an act of wickedness on the part of a clerk.  
 
                                                
417 [1918] AC 777 at 789. 
418 Ibid, at 799–800: “the decision of Young v Grote, while establishing that it applies only to cases in which 
the negligence is in the transaction itself and has no application to cases where the fraud has been merely 
facilitated by negligence in the custody of the seal of a corporation or of transfers in blank.” 
419 [1918] AC 777 at 815–816. Other forms of such carelessness could include a lack of supervision of 
employees and knowingly employing a fraudster as an accounting clerk. 
420 Ibid, at 815. 
421 Such as the facts in Tai Hing Cotton Mill v Liu Chong Hing Bank & Others. 
422 [1918] AC 777 at 815.  
423 Ibid, at 815–816. 
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The clear link between “negligence in the transaction itself” and causation evident in the 
older cases is consistent with what David Kretzmer424 called the “conventional wisdom of 
tort scholars”, that “until the nineteenth century liability in tort was based on ‘cause’ rather 
than ‘fault’.”425 
  
The extent of judicial emphasis on “negligence in the transaction itself”426 as a requirement 
of causation may seem surprising given that a causal link between a breach and a loss is 
today a fundamental requirement to be liable for breach of a duty of care, whether in 
contract or tort. The historical importance of causation in English law reflects a deeply 
rooted legacy of the importance of causation. The comments of Hunter J in Tai Hing 
Cotton Mill in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal are apposite.427 In his view, Evans’ 
Charities demonstrated the “reluctance of the Courts to hold anyone civilly responsible for 
the criminal act of another” and “it marked the confines of what the law then recognized as 
proximate cause, with which phrase [negligence in the transaction itself] was to become 
synonymous.”428 On Hunter J’s analysis,429 “negligence in the transaction itself”, became 
synonymous with a restricted view of proximate cause that governed and confined the duty 
for years to come.430  
 
                                                
424 David Kretzmer, “Transformation of Tort Liability in the Nineteenth Century: The Visible Hand” (1984) 4 
OJLS 46. 
425 Ibid at 46. This is a view which he criticised, as mentioned in chapter 3.2 above. 
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428 Ibid, at 570. 
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[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 570. 
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3.5.2 Evolution of Causation 
In Swan431 in the Court of error, there was no mention in the assenting judgements of Byles 
J and Cockburn CJ (who broadly concur), of “negligence in the transaction itself”. They 
agreed that there was no negligence by Swan but even if there had been, the requirement of 
causation was not met. Byles J considered that the acts of Swan’s dishonest broker were 
new causes intervening. Cockburn CJ identified the dishonest conduct of the broker as the 
proximate cause of the loss. Mellor J adopted a similar view on causation. The reasoning of 
Byles and Mellor JJ and Cockburn CJ in Swan reflects the narrow interpretation of 
causation that was prevalent at that time. In Holmes v Mather,432 Bramwell B, in an action 
for injury from a runaway horse, said, “you must look at the immediate act which did the 
mischief” for if you look at the last act but one “you might as well argue that if the driver 
had not started on that morning,…, this mischief would not have happened.” This view of 
causation has its origins in the strict liability under the mediaeval forms of actions.433  
 
The same reasoning is evident in other old cases: in Evans’ Charities Parke B said: “The 
transfer [of the stock] was not the necessary or ordinary or likely result of that 
negligence.”434 This may be true, but what is important is that the fraud was a possible 
result of the negligence. The possibility of the transfer of the shares without the knowledge 
of the owner is the reason why, it is submitted, the execution and delivery to another of 
transfers in blank is negligent.  
 
                                                
431 Swan v North British Australasian Company (1863) 159 ER 73. 
432 (1875) LR 10 Ex 261 at 268. 
433 See Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol VIII, 446. 
434 (1855) 10 ER 950 at 959. 
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If the causation reasoning used in Swan in the Court of error in 1863 (by Byles and Mellor 
JJ and Cockburn CJ) is applied to Young v Grote, it was the intervention of the criminal act 
of the clerk that caused the loss, not the signature of cheques left blank or the poor choice 
of Mrs Young as custodian of the blank cheques. On this basis, Young v Grote, should have 
been decided in favour of the customer.  
 
The thief’s conduct is always going to be the immediate cause of the loss. To deny the 
causal link between the negligence of Mr Swan and the unauthorised share transfer, or of 
Mr Young and the unauthorised debit, is to deny any scope for shifting the loss from the 
bank in circumstances where there was dishonesty by a third party. Neither negligence in 
the drawing of a cheque nor other neglect (such as in the custody of a cheque book or 
supervision of an employee) necessarily results in loss to the customer. Both require the 
intervention, whether planned or opportunistic, of a fraudster. In Macmillan, the signature 
of the incomplete cheque was negligent because of the possibility of the intervention of a 
criminal, even though it was not “the necessary or ordinary or likely result of that 
negligence”.435 
 
The historical emphasis on causation and relative disregard of fault appears to have led to 
the narrowing of causation in order to limit what would otherwise be an untenably wide 
scope of liability. In 1904, Sir Frederick Pollock wrote: “Liability must be founded on an 
act which is the ‘immediate cause’ of harm or of injury to a right.”436 He elaborates on 
immediate, proximate or natural and probable cause. It is what the reasonable man in a 
                                                
435 Ibid. 
436 Pollock Law of Torts, 29. 
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similar situation to the defendant would “be expected to foresee as likely to follow upon 
such conduct”.437 By the time of Macmillan, a shift in the principles of causation is evident, 
for if the reasoning in Evans’ Charities, Swan and Staple had applied, it would have 
resulted in a finding in favour of the customer. To the contrary, Lord Finlay (in Macmillan) 
said: “The fact that a crime was necessary to bring about the loss does not prevent its being 
the natural consequence of the carelessness.”438  
 
More than half a century earlier, Keating J in Swan in the Court of error, 1863439 was a 
dissenting voice taking the same approach as that of Lord Finlay in Macmillan. He adopted, 
it is submitted with respect, the correct approach on causation, pointing out that forgery 
was no more the “necessary or ordinary result” of the cheques having been signed in blank 
in Young v Grote than of the transfers having been signed in blank by Swan.440 Keating J 
considered that Mr Swan was estopped from recovering his loss because of his negligence.  
 
Earlier, in Ex parte Swan441 (1859), when Mr Swan sought to have his name restored to the 
company’s register of shareholders, the judges were divided. Erle CJ applied the principles 
of estoppel to hold against Mr Swan. He was guilty of negligence (“of an extreme trust”442 
in his broker) and of misconduct for intending that transfers which were not properly 
executed or attested should be used as valid deeds, and this negligence and misconduct was 
proximate to the crime of the broker. In contrast, there was no want of care on the part of 
the company in registering the sale of the shares. Keating J, concurring with Erle CJ, cited 
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440 Ibid, at 75. 
441 (1859) 141 ER 871. 
442 Ibid, at 886. 
 70
Lickbarrow v Mason443 with approval. In his opinion, Mr Swan’s conduct “mainly 
contributed to the loss which has occurred.”444 On the other hand, Williams J was hesitant 
to recognise the application of estoppel or a rule of the law merchant outside of the field of 
negotiable instruments and in any event did not consider Mr Swan to have been 
negligent.445 Willes J in his brief judgement was unwilling to apply Young v Grote to deeds 
for the transfer of property.  
 
Wilde B (dissenting), in the first Court of Exchequer decision in Swan (1862), held that Mr 
Swan’s careless conduct was the proximate cause of the forgery and that he was estopped 
from asserting the invalidity of the transfers.446 Blackburn J’s answer, in the Court of error 
(1863), to the dissenting judgments of Keating J, in the same court, and of Erle CJ and 
Keating J, in the Court of Common Pleas, (1859)447 and of Wilde B, in the first Court of 
Exchequer, (1862)448  was to emphasise that for a man’s negligence to estop him from 
asserting a particular fact, it must be “neglect of some duty cast upon the person who is 
guilty of it.”449 This requirement was clearly not met, in Blackburn J’s view.  
 
Other early judgments disagreed with the narrow application of the principles of causation 
in assessing the link between the plaintiff’s conduct and his loss. They were also more 
willing to recognise breach of a duty of care on the part of the plaintiff. In the court a quo in 
                                                
443 (1787) 100 ER 35. 
444 (1859) 141 ER 871 at 888. He refers to Evans Charities and the requirement of negligence immediately 
connected with the transaction itself but to stress another point. 
445 Ibid, at 890. 
446 (1862) 158 ER 611 at 626. 
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449 (1863) 159 ER 73 at 75–6 quoting Parke B in Freeman v Cooke (1858) 154 ER 652. 
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Staple450 (1887), Day J said he could not distinguish the case before him from Young v 
Grote.451 Wills J said he could not follow the reasoning of the House of Lords, in 
distinguishing Evans’ Charities, which like Staple involved carelessness in entrusting the 
custody of a seal used to effect transfer of stock, from Young v Grote.452 Day and Wills JJ 
considered themselves bound by the decision of the House of Lords in Evans’ Charities,453 
but Day J in particular made it clear that he would otherwise have decided the case in 
favour of the bank. He considered the conduct of the plaintiff to be “a case of the very 
greatest negligence”,454 which was “the direct cause of the loss.”455 By comparison, the 
negligence in Young v Grote was “trifling”.456 The House of Lords, finding in favour of the 
Charities in Evans’ Charities, held that the negligence was too remote to affect the transfer. 
In Staple, on the other hand, Wills J considered that the negligence of the customer in the 
custody of the seal was more obvious than the negligent conduct of the customer in Young 
v Grote: “the mode of keeping the seal was eminently calculated to facilitate, if not to 
invite, the commission of forgery.”457 His reasoning was that the physical act of affixing a 
seal “is a much easier operation than that of imitating handwriting and filling in the 
cheque.”458  The Court of Appeal confirmed the decision against the bank in Staple.459  
 
Turning to recent cases, in Tai Hing Cotton Mill a dishonest employee of the customer 
forged cheques over a period of nearly five years. This was largely facilitated by a lack of 
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supervision and absence of checks and balances in the running of the business. Tai Hing 
Cotton Mill and Khoo Tian Hock are similar in that the customers had no intention to give 
the bank a mandate to pay and played no part in drawing the cheques. It is submitted, 
nevertheless, that the negligence in Macmillan, where the partner signed a cheque drawn 
with blank spaces, is no more closely connected to the loss than the customers’ neglect in 
Tai Hing Cotton Mill or Khoo Tian Hock.  
 
What the ruling in Khoo Tian Hock underscores is that drawing a distinction between 
negligence in the execution of the mandate and extraneous negligence, as the determining 
factor to establish causation, is spurious and unhelpful. It is a smokescreen resulting in 
unfounded distinctions between different varieties of customer negligence. In Macmillan, 
Viscount Haldane drew a distinction between negligence in drawing a cheque and 
negligence in the conduct of an account, for example, entrusting a cheque book to a clerk. 
He ruled that the former would be the proximate cause of any loss resulting from criminal 
intervention but not the latter. The distinction is artificial. Take the modern–day 
equivalents: assume a customer negligently leaves his ATM card lying around with the PIN 
written on the card, or remains logged on to his bank account at an Internet café after 
departing from the premises. These acts, it is submitted, are as directly connected to any 
subsequent loss caused by a criminal act as was the negligence of Mr Arthur in Macmillan. 
While criminal intervention is not an inevitable consequence of customer carelessness, it is 
a possible outcome, and it is necessary that the law discourage carelessness posing the risk 
of such loss.  
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This point was argued in Scholfield,460 in a dispute involving a bill of exchange: to say that 
the proximate cause of the loss is not the form of the instrument but the criminal 
intervention of the thief amounts to a denial of the existence of a duty of care.461  
 
3.5.3 Meaning of “Negligence in the Transaction Itself” Reconsidered  
The interpretation of “negligence in the transaction itself” as a requirement of causation is 
undermined by dicta stating the requirement of proximity in addition to the requirement of 
“negligence in the transaction itself,” suggesting that they are distinct requirements. This 
development seems to have its genesis in the Court of error decision in Swan,462 in the 
judgment of Blackburn J. He reiterates that “the neglect must be in the transaction itself”,463 
but continues by saying, “and be the proximate cause of leading the party into that 
mistake.”464 This statement by Blackburn J is endorsed in Arnold v Cheque Bank465 (1876) 
and in Kepitigalla466 (1909), where Bray J considered himself bound by the authority of 
Evans’ Charities, Swan and Lewes, holding that for the customer’s negligence to serve as a 
defence to the bank, it must be “in or immediately connected with the transaction itself and 
must have been the proximate cause of the loss.”467 Lord Parmoor in Macmillan468 endorses 
the principle, saying it is “not sufficient to show negligence in or immediately connected 
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with the actual transaction unless it can further be shown that the act of the banker in 
making the payment … followed in natural sequence from the negligent act.”469  
 
It was not the absence of proximate cause that Blackburn J based his decision on. He did 
not succumb to the narrow application of causation used by the other judges in Swan to 
affirm the decision in favour of Mr Swan. More than anything else, his judgment focused 
on the form of negligence necessary for an estoppel. He said that it must be neglect of a 
duty owed to the other person or to the general public and not a lack of prudence or neglect 
of a duty owed to specific third persons. And then he said, “and these distinctions make in 
the present case all the difference.”470 In conclusion, and somewhat confusingly, he found 
the case to be governed by Evans’ Charities, which treats “negligence in the transaction 
itself” as a requirement of causation. In summary, while the judgement of Blackburn J 
suggests that “negligence in the transaction itself” is more than a requirement of causation, 
his position is not clear. 
 
If “negligence in the transaction itself” is no longer synonymous with causation, it could be 
a reference to the nature or extent of the customer’s duty. It may be another way of saying 
that the customer’s duty is limited to care in the physical drawing of his mandate. In the 
words of Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in Macmillan: “The duty is so to fill up his cheque as 
that when it leaves his hands a signed document it shall be properly and fully filled up, so 
that tampering with its contents or filling in a sum different from what the customer meant 
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it to cover shall be prevented.”471 On this view, the customer must have been negligent in 
the manner of drawing the mandate (the extent of the duty, denoted by the phrase 
“negligence in the transaction itself”) AND that negligence must have resulted in the bank 
paying without a mandate (causation). The court in Khoo Tian Hock rejects this 
interpretation472 and the weight of the old authorities do not support it. On the other hand, 
Blackburn J’s judgement in Swan, referred to by Lord Field in Vagliano,473 is consistent 
with “negligence in the transaction itself” being a reference to the ambit of the duty; in 
Macmillan,474 Lord Finlay’s use of the phrase appears first to be a reference to the ambit of 
the duty,475 and later to the requirement of causation.476 
   
The concept of a duty of care belongs to the law of tort. It is the yardstick by which 
actionable and non–actionable negligence are distinguished. There are well–established 
categories of duty of care in which the existence of the duty would not be in dispute. There 
are other areas in which the plaintiff would need to persuade the court to recognise it. The 
principles by which such determinations are made have long been grappled with.477 The 
customer’s duty to exercise care in the drawing of cheques arises not in tort but in contract. 
It is an implied term of the bank–customer contract and today it finds expression in the 
T&C. This is one of the advantages of suing in contract; it relieves the bank of establishing 
the existence of the duty. To say that the customer has a duty of care in the drawing of 
cheques is the same as saying that the customer must not be negligent in the drawing of 
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cheques. All the judgements in Macmillan give clear recognition to the duty.478 If therefore, 
“negligence in the transaction itself” is a limitation of the ambit of the customer’s duty, 
then it serves the purpose of controlling the floodgates.  
 
There is a surprising dearth of information in more recent cases as to the meaning of 
“negligence in the transaction itself”. One of the few that raises the issue is the Canadian 
case of Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal et al.479 An employee of the 
customer forged 23 cheques on the customer’s account over a period of 15 months. The 
customer received daily statements from the bank, which contained a request for 
verification and notification but there was no verification agreement between the parties. 
The trial court480 found that the customer had been negligent in various ways relevant to the 
fraud while the bank had not been negligent; it recognised an implied duty on sophisticated 
customers to verify bank statements. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision by a 
majority.481 On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the customer’s 
appeal. In the words of Le Dain J in the Supreme Court of Canada: “One explanation of the 
requirement that the negligence be in the transaction and be the proximate cause of the loss 
is that it must result in a representation concerning the instrument that causes prejudice or 
detriment.”482 Le Dain J’s articulation of the requirement is reminiscent of Blackburn J in 
Swan. His explanation suggests that the negligence operates as an estoppel and “negligence 
in the transaction itself” means the customer’s duty of care is limited in nature. He does not 
address why that should be so. 
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It is clear that by the time of Macmillan “negligence in the transaction itself” was no longer 
a straightforward requirement of causation; it had taken on the role of qualifying the duty of 
care but without shedding early links to causation. This, it is suggested, is linked to the 
development and refinement of the concept of a duty of care and the consequent liberation 
of causation from its narrow confines. In Scholfield483 (1896), there is reference to the 
concept of a customer’s duty of care although Scholfield was not a bank–customer case. 
Lewes Sanitary Steam Laundry (1906)484 contains one of the earliest statements articulating 
the customer’s duty. It is true that as far back as Young v Grote, the customer’s negligence 
was held to qualify the bank’s obligation to pay in accordance with the mandate, but there 
was no statement of a particular duty on the part of the customer. In Lewes, Kennedy J 
says: “Negligence, to constitute an estoppel, implies the existence of some duty which the 
party against whom the estoppel is alleged owes to the other party. I think that the relation 
of bankers and customers does involve a duty on the part of the customer.”485 He goes on to 
discuss the circumstances in which the duty might arise, the nature of the duty486 and he 
emphasises the requirement of a causal connection and that the negligence must be in or 
immediately connected with the transaction itself.487 In Kepitigalla, Bray J had to rule on 
the bank’s liability for payment on forged cheques.  He considered, both on authority and 
as a matter of principle, it to be “the duty of a person giving a mandate to take reasonable 
care that he does not mislead the person to whom the mandate is given.”488 He cited Young 
v Grote, Scholfield and Vagliano Brothers and rejected the bank’s argument for a broader 
duty on the part of the customer to take care in the course of their business to prevent 
                                                
483 [1896] AC 514. 
484 (1906) 11 Com Cas 255. 
485 Ibid, at 266. 
486 Ibid, “I assume that there is a duty to be careful not to facilitate any fraud”. 
487 Ibid, at 267. 
488 [1909] 2 KB 1010 at 1022. 
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forgeries by their employees, on the basis of failing to meet the requirements for an implied 
term.489 The concept of “negligence in the transaction itself,” with the endorsement by the 
House of Lords in Macmillan (1918), 490 moved away from embodying the requirement of 
causation and embraced the duty of care to control the floodgates, at least in the bank and 
customer context. “Negligence in the transaction itself,” still echoing its conservative 
causation roots, started to embrace the concept of a customer’s duty of care. 
 
The cases following Young v Grote reflect a concern for opening the floodgates of 
customer liability for negligence. Parke B’s concern in Evans’ Charities is clear: “If such 
negligence could disentitle the plaintiffs, to what extent is it to go?”491 This concern is 
reiterated in Arnold v The Cheque Bank.492 As a result, Young v Grote was viewed and 
adopted with caution, even suspicion.493 Aspects of the judgment494 were glossed over. In 
Colonial Bank of Australasia Ltd v Marshall,495 the Privy Council marginalized the case by 
holding that it was qualified by Scholfield.496 In 1904, Heber Hart supported Young v Grote, 
considering the law on this issue to be determined by the question whether the customer’s 
negligence caused the bank to be misled.497 He does not articulate the law in duty of care 
terms but the key factor of negligence is present.  
 
                                                
489 Ibid, at 1025. 
490 [1918] AC 777. Lord Finlay at 795 first states the principle, again at 800; Viscount Haldane at 815; Lord 
Parmoor at 834. 
491 The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland v The Trustees of Evans’ Charities in Ireland (1855) 
10 ER 950 at 959. 
492 (1876) 1 CPD 578 at 589. 
493 See Geva, for example, who acknowledges the scepticism about the case, in “Reflections on the Need to 
Revise the Bills of Exchange Act – Some Doctrinal Aspects” (1981–82) 6 Can Bus LJ 269 at 319. 
494 E.g. the condemnation of Mr Young’s choice of his wife to complete the cheques. 
495 [1906] AC 559. 
496 Scholfield v Earl of Londesborough [1896] AC 514. 
497 Heber Hart The Law of Banking (London, Stevens and Sons, Limited, 1904), at 282. 
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Macmillan, when it came before the House of Lords in 1918, was at a crossroads. There 
was a line of authority going back to Young v Grote, supported by the dictum in 
Lickbarrow v Mason and the writings of Pothier and academic opinion excusing the bank 
for paying without a mandate in limited circumstances but there was also Privy Council 
authority498 that Young v Grote no longer represented the law. Both courts who heard 
Macmillan prior to the House of Lords agreed with the latter argument and found in favour 
of the customer.499 The House of Lords’ decision would bring finality to the debate, and the 
individual law lords were conscious of the significance of their decision.500 In Khoo Tian 
Hock, the court concluded from its analysis that while Macmillan acknowledged a duty to 
draw cheques with reasonable care, at the same time it did not limit the duty to the drawing 
of cheques. This is true; but it was not necessary for the House of Lords in Macmillan to go 
further than the drawing of cheques for, crucially, on its facts, Macmillan involved 
negligence in the drawing of a cheque.501  
 
Judicial development of the law is by and large accomplished in small steps. In these 
circumstances, the House of Lords in Macmillan was unlikely to take the matter any further 
than the facts demanded. Adherence to “negligence in the transaction itself” in Macmillan 
served a few purposes: on the facts it produced a just result, it observed the long line of 
authority preceding it and it avoided controversy by not infringing too far on the 
fundamental principle of banking law that the bank may only reimburse itself if it has 
observed the customer’s mandate. If the facts of Macmillan had been those of Tai Hing 
                                                
498 Colonial Bank of Australasia Ltd v Marshall [1906] AC 559. 
499 [1918] AC 777 at 787. 
500 Ibid, at 786 per Lord Finlay LC: “My Lords, this is a case raising an important question of commercial law 
as to the relations between banker and customer.” 
501 The judgment of Lord Shaw is apposite, [1918] AC 777 at 828. 
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Cotton Mill one wonders whether the House of Lords could have justified their loyalty to 
the old line or would their instinct to do justice have established a new principle?  
 
3.5.4 Rationale of “Negligence in the Transaction Itself” 
The discussion above is concerned primarily with the meaning of “negligence in the 
transaction itself”. It is apparent that it serves to limit the ambit of the customer’s liability 
but is the limitation of the duty to the framing of a mandate arbitrary or rational? One 
possible rationale appears in the judgements of Lord Finlay LC, Viscount Haldane and 
Lord Shaw in Macmillan.502 It is this: special care is required in the framing of a mandate 
to the bank because of the significance of a mandate. The bank is obliged to punctually 
execute a valid mandate, and this entitles the bank to receive mandates in a clear and 
unambiguous form. There is a statement of this in Kepitigalla.503 The customer therefore 
has a duty of care in the framing of his mandate. But the object of this duty is not primarily 
to protect a bank that delays honouring an ambiguous or unclear mandate. It is to prevent 
unfair exposure of the bank to forgery facilitated by the customer.  
 
The duty of care in framing mandates serves to prevent the inequity of the bank bearing a 
loss occasioned by the customer through conduct beyond the control of the bank. This 
rationale is evident in the cases. For instance, Lord Macnaghten in Vagliano Bros explains 
his reason for finding against the customer who accepted false bills of exchange: “the loss 
would fall, not on the acceptor whose negligence had led to it, but on the banker, who could 
have no means of detecting the forgery and must have been thrown off his guard by the 
                                                
502 [1918] AC 777, at 789 (per Lord Finlay), 814 (per Viscount Haldane) and at 824 (per Lord Shaw). 
503 [1909] 2 KB 1010.  
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carelessness of his employer.”504 Lord Field (dissenting) in the same case acknowledged 
the hardship on the bank but he did not consider that the law allowed him to make a finding 
in the bank’s favour because the “negligence in the transaction itself” requirement was not 
met.505 Lord Field’s application of this requirement (in the sense that it refers to a limited 
duty) is technically correct because the bills in question had been forged, they had not been 
negligently drawn. Lord Bramwell’s dissenting judgement had hints of the same 
sentiment.506 Those in the majority, who considered this aspect, acknowledged and 
expressed allegiance to the requirement of “negligence in the transaction itself” but if it 
referred to a limited ambit of the duty, they did not allow it to interfere with the outcome 
which justice, in their view, demanded. Lord Halsbury’s judgment is a good example.507 
Vagliano highlights the fallacy of the distinction between forged signatures and altered 
amounts.  
 
The bank’s obligation of prompt execution of the mandate is not sufficient to explain 
limiting the duty of care in framing mandates. Bearing in mind the purpose of the duty, 
restricting it to the giving of a mandate is difficult to fathom. Customers are the custodians 
of their cheque books, their ATM cards with PIN details, Internet and telephone banking 
codes. Many customers delegate the operation of their accounts to another person chosen 
by them. In all these instances, a lack of care has the potential to result in loss, as occurred 
in Khoo Tian Hock and Tai Hing Cotton Mill. These acts involved in the operation of a 
                                                
504 [1891] AC 107 at 161. 
505 Ibid, at 169–171. 
506 Ibid, at 136–7. 
507 Ibid, at 115. 
 82
bank account do not, however, attract a duty of care because they do not constitute a 
mandate to the bank.  
 
La Forest J in the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of 
Montreal508 proffers two reasons for the narrow duties of care on a bank customer: certainty 
and loss distribution. Loss distribution, while it has its merits, should not, it is submitted, be 
a determining factor for the incidence of liability between bank and customer. Certainty is 
important but it can be achieved adequately without a limited duty of care. 
 
One difference between a carelessly executed cheque, subsequently altered, and most if not 
all other forms of carelessness by the customer in the operation of a bank account, which 
may explain their different treatment in law, is that the former contains an authentic 
signature which ordinarily would constitute a mandate binding on the bank, while the latter 
does not. Provided the fraudulent alterations to the cheque do not arouse suspicion, the 
signature will pass any verification undertaken by the bank and the cheque will be paid. 
Other forms of carelessness or neglect by the customer in the operation of a bank account 
may involve a forged signature. But is this difference significant, justifying different 
treatment in law?  
 
The argument might be that, as the Macmillan scenario involves an authentic signature, the 
bank is denied the means of detecting the fraud. But forged signatures can be so skilfully 
performed so as to be undetectable by any ordinary examination, in some cases even 
sophisticated examination. Furthermore, with modern banking facilities the customer’s 
                                                
508 (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 at 433–434. 
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mandate may take the form of a user ID and a PIN number. Where this information falls 
into criminal hands, any ensuing fraud may be undetectable and no bank can be aware that 
a valid mandate does not exist. The fact that in one scenario the form of the mandate is 
genuine and in the other there is none, does not seem to be a material difference on which a 
legal distinction should be based. Cons J in Tai Hing Cotton Mill in the Hong Kong Court 
of Appeal509 said, “it is the fact of payment, not the intrinsic invalidity of the cheque, which 
causes the loss.” 
 
The judgement of Lord Halsbury in Scholfield v The Earl of Londesborough510 suggests 
another reason why the negligence should be in the transaction itself: the law does not 
generally deprive a man of his property “where his own carelessness has given opportunity 
for the commission of a crime.”511 Lord Halsbury recognises though that there should be 
some limitation to this principle by saying that a customer should not be able to raise his 
neglect against the bank that is misled by it.512 Notably, this qualification does not 
encompass the requirement of “negligence in the transaction itself” and there is no reason 
why it should not apply to the facts of Tai Hing Cotton Mill or Khoo Tian Hock.   
 
In Macmillan, while their Lordships agreed that the negligence of the customer was the 
basis for their decision, they were divided as to the effect of the negligence. Lord Parmoor 
considered that the customer’s negligence operated as an estoppel.513 Viscount Haldane 
agreed that it could act as an estoppel alternatively, he said, it served to avoid circuity of 
                                                
509 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 562–3. 
510 [1896] AC 514. 
511 Ibid, at 521. See the reiteration of this by Lord Wilberforce (dissenting on the issue of negligence) in 
Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings [1977] AC 890 at 902. 
512 [1896] AC 514 at 523–4. 
513 [1918] AC 777 at 835. 
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action.514 Lord Finlay515 recognised the estoppel and circuity of action rationales, but said, 
either way, the basis was the customer’s negligence;516 Lord Shaw concurred, apparently 
rejecting estoppel as a ground for the decision.517 Spencer Bower on Estoppel by 
Representation regards the Macmillan duty as an estoppel by negligence.518  
 
The emphasis of the law merchant and the modern interpretation of “negligence in the 
transaction itself” both focus on the drawing of the mandate. The underlying rationale of 
the law merchant’s principle of presumed authority is that there should be confidence in 
negotiable instruments as forms of payment. It is submitted that the basis in negligence is 
preferable to presumed authority for two reasons. First, the fact that the cheque in 
Macmillan was a negotiable instrument is irrelevant to the issues arising in that case. The 
cheque in that case served as an instruction to the bank, a demand for (partial) repayment of 
the bank’s debt to the customer. It was not furnished to a third party and it was not 
negotiated. In those circumstances, the reasoning of the law merchant and the interests of 
international commerce are not compelling. The second reason is an ideological one, 
namely the negligence rationale is capable of supporting a broad duty, one which extends to 
all facets of the banking relationship and not focussing only on the form of the mandate.  
 
                                                
514 Ibid, at 818. 
515 Ibid, at 794. 
516 Lord Shaw leaves open the possibility that even in the absence of negligence, where undetectable 
fraudulent alterations are made before presentation of the cheque to the bank for payment, the resulting 
loss would fall on the customer. 
517 [1918] AC 777 at 827. 
518 Piers Feltham, Daniel Hockberg, Tom Leech Spencer Bower: The Law Relating to Estoppel by 
Representation (4th ed, Lexis Nexis, UK, 2004), 55.  
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3.5.5 Conclusion 
The court in Khoo Tian Hock rejected the requirement of “negligence in the transaction 
itself.” It noted that Best CJ in Young v Grote519 considered that Young was negligent in 
choosing his wife as his agent. From this it concluded that the customer’s duty in Young v 
Grote was not confined to the careless drawing of cheques.520 In Vagliano, Lord Halsbury 
found satisfaction of the requirement of “negligence in the transaction itself” in the causal 
connection between the customer’s fault and the bank’s error.521 The instances of the 
customer’s fault that Lord Halsbury itemised included the customer’s duty to know the 
state of his account with the apparent drawer of the false bills and the state of his account 
with the bank. Neither of these examples pertain to the drawing of the bills. On this basis, 
Khoo Tian Hock concluded that Lord Halsbury’s dicta broadened the principle to 
negligence other than the manner of drawing the cheque. Khoo Tian Hock 522 cited 
Kennedy J’s words in Lewes to the effect that a customer has a duty not to facilitate fraud523 
and maintained that it is unclear in Kepitigalla524 whether Bray J was dealing with the 
customer’s duty of care or with causation when he said that for the customer’s negligence 
to serve as a defence to the bank, it must be “in or immediately connected with the 
transaction itself and must have been the proximate cause of the loss.”525 The court in Khoo 
Tian Hock considered itself unfettered by this dictum because of its ambiguity.526 Khoo 
Tian Hock acknowledged that Macmillan supports the requirement of “negligence in the 
                                                
519 (1827) 130 ER 764. 
520 [2000] 4 SLR 673 at 701. 
521 Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] AC 107 at 115–116; Khoo Tian Hock v OCBC [2000] 4 SLR  
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525 Ibid, at 1025. 
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transaction itself” but maintained that the judgements do not confine the customer’s duty to 
care in the manner of drawing cheques.527  
 
The position taken by the court in Khoo Tian Hock is consistent with the passages cited 
from Vagliano,528 Lewes,529 Kepitigalla530 and Macmillan.531 There are passages in these 
older cases, however, which detract from the conclusion in Khoo Tian Hock.532 
Nevertheless, the position taken in Khoo Tian Hock has merit. Some of the cases appear, on 
the one hand, to use “negligence in the transaction itself” to restrict the customer’s liability 
to negligence in the drawing of the cheque, but they make statements, on the other hand, 
which are inconsistent with that notion; Lord Halsbury in Vagliano is a good example.533  
 
It is submitted that the necessary and sufficient condition for customer liability for loss 
from an unauthorised debit is that the negligence should have an adequate causal 
connection with the loss to warrant legal sanction. The importance of the causal connection 
was recognised by Lord Bramwell (dissenting) in Bank of England v Vagliano Bros:534 
“conduct of the bank’s customer to enable the bank to charge the customer must be conduct 
directly causing the payment”; and by Lord Halsbury in the same case: “But how can it be 
said in this case that the default is unconnected with the act? The very thing which the 
                                                
527 Ibid, at 708 and 710.     
528 Ibid, at 703–704. 
529 Ibid, at 703–705. 
530 Ibid, at 705–706. 
531 Ibid, at 708–710. 
532 Such as the qualification by Kennedy J in Lewes (1906) 11 Com Cas 255 at 266–267: “It must be shown, if 
the defence is to succeed, that the conduct of the plaintiff company, in or immediately connected with the 
forging or uttering of the cheques, misled the defendant bank into making the payments upon those 
cheques.”    
533 Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] AC 107 at 115–116. 
534 [1891] AC 107 at 135–6. 
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banker does is induced by the fault of the customer.”535 Kennedy J in Lewes said: “He must 
show that the customer caused him to pay the money upon the forged cheque.”536 Also 
Lord Parmoor in Macmillan: the bank’s payment must follow “in natural sequence from the 
negligent act.”537 This is the position taken in Khoo Tian Hock, where the court holds that, 
“the balance between the interests of the bank and the customer and the interests of justice 
would best be served if there is a wider duty of care but leaving the questions of negligence 
and causation to be determined according to the particular facts of each case.”538 
 
“Negligence in the transaction itself” is, for historical reasons, a murky, ill–defined concept 
that no longer serves a useful purpose. In the modern context of standard T&C, the extent 
of the customer’s duty can be expressly defined without reference to old terminology and 
limitations; and the requirement of a causal connection between a breach and a loss, even if 
not expressed in the T&C, is so fundamental as to be required by general principles of the 
law. If the emphasis is on an adequate causal connection (as the old cases indicate), the 
customer’s duty need not be confined to the framing of mandates. Giving pre–eminence to 
causation is not compatible with recognising a limited duty of care in the drawing of 
mandates because, as many of the cases show, a limited duty of care dictates that conduct 
not pertaining to the drawing of a mandate but which has facilitated loss from the 
dishonesty of a third party, must be disregarded. In other words, a limited duty of care 
detracts from giving pre-eminence to causation. 
 
                                                
535 Ibid, at 115–116. 
536 (1906) 11 Com Cas 255 at 266–7. 
537 [1918] AC 777 at 835. 
538 [2000] 4 SLR 673 at 708.  
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Even a wide duty of care as proposed by Khoo Tian Hock leaves intact the basic rule that a 
bank can only reimburse itself for authorised payments. The court in Khoo Tian Hock said 
that the wider duty of care which it proposes can be tempered by “not being too quick to 
find that the customer has been negligent or that the negligent conduct has caused the 
loss.”539 Caution is required, however, in adopting this approach for the reason summed up 
in the maxim that “hard cases make bad law.” Courts could find themselves distorting legal 
precedent and principles pertaining to negligence or causation where the law favours the 
bank but the equities favour the customer. The areas of causation and negligence, while 
unavoidably involving an exercise of judgement, should be determined as far as possible by 
the application of well–defined legal principles to the established facts and should be 
unfettered by a need to make correcting adjustments. Determination of the wrongfulness 
(duty of care) of the customer’s conduct is the element most appropriately used by the 
courts to determine issues of public policy. If banking in the 21st century requires, in the 
interests of justice and of society, a broader duty of care, there is no need to interfere with 
the application of the other elements of negligence and causation.  
 
Thus the Khoo Tian Hock view that the customer today owes the bank a wider duty of care 
is supported in principle. A general duty to exercise care in the conduct of a bank account 
to prevent loss, flexible enough to deal with all factual situations in any age, will serve the 
needs and mores of society better than a rule limited to one factual situation, such as the 
customer’s duty to exercise care in the framing of mandates. 
 
                                                
539 Ibid, at 707. 
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The question whether negligence is a satisfactory basis on which to determine the incidence 
of loss between two parties innocent of wrongdoing is discussed in the context of the 
verification and conclusive evidence clause below.540  
 
 3.6  Implied Terms 
The law recognises that the parties to a contract may leave some terms unexpressed; once 
recognised, implied terms are as effective as express terms.541 Implied terms may arise in 
fact or by law.542 The Macmillan, Greenwood and Khoo Tian Hock duties are terms implied 
into the bank–customer contract. In Macmillan this is not stated explicitly in the individual 
judgments, save in the decision of Lord Parmoor: “The relationship implies, however, a 
special duty on the customer to use due caution in the preparation and issue of a mandate to 
his banker …”543 Bankes LJ, in Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation,544 confirms this: 
“The recent decision of the House of Lords in London Joint Stock Bank v Macmillan, 
approving Young v Grote, affords one striking instance of an obligation implied in the 
relation of banker and customer…”545 There is scant indication, however, whether the term 
is implied in fact or by law. In Young v Grote there is no statement that the customer’s 
neglect is a breach of a duty, let alone that it arises by an implied term of the contract. In 
Tai Hing Cotton Mill, prior to the advice of the Privy Council, in the Hong Kong Court of 
                                                
540 In chapter 4 below. 
541 It is beyond the scope of this work to discuss the position where a term implied by law and an express term 
conflict but see Johnstone v Bloomsbury Health Authority [1991] 2 WLR 1362 and Andrew Phang 
“Implied Terms in English Law – Some Recent Developments” (1993) JBL 242 at 252 et seq. 
542 This terminology is used by G H Treitel The Law of Contract (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003) 
at 201 et seq which was adopted in National Bank of Greece SA v Pinios Shipping co No 1 and Another 
[1990] 1 AC 637 at 644. See also the terminology of Lord Denning MR in Greaves & Co (Contractors) 
Ltd v Baynham Meikle & Partners [1975] 1 WLR 1095 e.g. at 1099: “A term implied by law is said to rest 
on the presumed intention of both parties: whereas a term implied in fact rests on their actual intention.”  
543 London Joint Stock Bank v Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 at 830. 
544 [1921] 3 KB 110. 
545 Ibid, at 119. 
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Appeal, Hunter J assumes that Young v Grote was the application of an implied duty of 
care, the basis of implication not being stated but he says “it seems implicitly to have been 
an implication of law.”546 The duty (to speak) in Greenwood was admitted by the customer; 
its nature was not analysed in the House of Lords.547 In Khoo Tian Hock, the implied nature 
of the term is stated explicitly. The court was clear that it was applying the business 
efficacy test; it concluded that the duty not to facilitate fraud can be said to be in the minds 
of customers when they open a bank account.548 This is consistent with the term implied 
being implied in fact. Yet, V K Rajah J commenting recently in the Court of Appeal on 
Khoo Tian Hock, suggests that the implication is by law.549 In another Singapore High 
Court decision, 550 the business efficacy test was used to reject the application of the 
Greenwood duty to a private banking contract for share and foreign exchange trading 
transactions, an indication that the Greenwood duty is an implication of fact.  
 
The theory is that terms implied in fact should reflect the intention, albeit unexpressed, of 
the parties. Terms implied by law are, in this important respect, different. They reflect what 
the law considers to be the necessary “incidents”551 for particular contract types, based on 
policy considerations;552 they do not necessarily accord with the intention of the parties.553 
                                                
546 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 570. 
547 Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited [1933] AC 51 at 58. 
548 [2000] 4 SLR 675 at 707. 
549 Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 292. 
550 Banque Nationale de Paris v Hew Keong Chan Gary & Ors [2001]1 SLR 300 at 340. 
551 See, for example, the dictum of Stephenson LJ in Mears v Safecar Security Ltd [1983] QB 54 at 78; Lord 
Bridge in Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board [1991] 3 WLR 778 at 787; also Treitel, 
Contract, 208. 
552 Elisabeth Peden identifies a number of policy considerations which the courts appear to use in determining 
whether to imply a term in law, see “Policy Considerations Behind Implications of Terms in Law”, (2001) 
117 LQR 459. 
553 See for example the discussion by Treitel Contract, 201 et seq; Michael Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot & 
Furmston’s Law of Contract (15th ed, Oxford University Press, 2007), at 183; HG Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty 
on Contracts (29th ed, 2 vols, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) vol 1 para 13–003.  
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Terms implied by law are an “implicit requirement from the nature of the contract.”554 A 
criterion of reasonableness for implied contractual terms, whether in fact or by law, has 
been rejected by the House of Lords.555 Andrew Phang, however, has argued that the 
criterion of necessity for terms implied by law is in effect a criterion of reasonableness.556 
 
A third basis for implying a term, custom and usage has played an important role in the 
development of banking law; this is also rooted in the presumed intention of the parties.557 
 
In England and Singapore558 two tests have been used by the courts to ascertain whether a 
term should be implied in fact: the business efficacy test559 and the officious bystander 
test.560 The business efficacy test is premised on a term being so necessary to give the 
contract business efficacy that the parties must have intended it. The officious bystander 
test puts an imaginary person at the negotiating table who mentions a term for inclusion in 
the contract which is so obvious that the parties unanimously chorus “of course!” It is so 
obvious that they have not bothered to express it. 
 
                                                
554 Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd [1990] 1 QB 818 at 895. 
555 See Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 at 257, 262, 265 and Scally v Southern Health and 
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It has not been authoritatively decided whether the tests are alternative or cumulative. 
Treitel561 and Chitty on Contracts agree that satisfaction of either test is generally sufficient 
to justify implication of a term.562 Andrew Phang argues that “both tests should be utilized 
in a complementary and cumulative fashion”563 because the business efficacy test, with its 
focus on the business expectations of the parties, is the better theoretical guide but it lacks 
practical guidance on how to ascertain the mutual intention of the parties. The officious 
bystander test, on the other hand, is the better practical guide to ascertaining the intentions 
of the parties but it lacks a theoretical focus.564 The two tests do not state the same principle 
but the latter can be used to arrive at the former.565 Phang, while supporting the cumulative 
use of both tests, indicates his preference for the business efficacy test because of its focus 
on a central interest of contract law, namely business efficacy.  
 
Phang’s criticism of the officious bystander test, that it lacks a theoretical focus, is perhaps 
harsh. The object of a term implied in fact is to give effect to the unexpressed intention of 
the parties. The officious bystander test addresses this goal very directly. This is lacking in 
the business efficacy test, which is concerned primarily with the business functionality of 
the contract, the reasoning being that business functionality will be co–extensive with the 
parties’ mutual intention. But this is not necessarily so. Where a contract lacks a crucial 
                                                
561 The general discussion of this topic in Andrew Phang and Teo Keang Sood (Gen Ed) Halsbury’s Laws of 
Singapore, Vol 7 “ Contract”, (Lexis Nexus Singapore, 2005 Reissue), para 80.95 draws from Treitel, 
Contract. At para 80.095 Halsbury’s says “Local case law appears to follow general English principles as 
laid out above.” 
562 Treitel, Contract, at 203. He says that only if the “evidence negatives” the officious bystander test is it 
inappropriate to imply a term on the business efficacy test. Also Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th 
ed, 2004) vol 1 para 13–004. 
563 “Implied Terms Revisited” [1990] JBL 394 at 396. The Singapore High Court in Forefront Medical 
Technology (Pte) Ltd v Modern-Pak Pte Ltd [2006] 1 SLR 927 at 935 et seq stated that the tests are 
complementary. 
564 “Implied Terms Revisited” [1990] JBL 394 at 395 - 396. 
565 Ibid. 
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provision and the contracting parties wish to imply the missing term but they disagree on its 
content, if both versions would give efficacy or functionality to the contract, the business 
efficacy test will not assist in determining what it was they had in mind at the time of 
contracting. A court is more likely to be assisted by the officious bystander test in these 
circumstances. Like reasonableness, business efficacy seems to be a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition566 for an implication of fact.  
 
A term implied in fact must be reasonable but this is subsumed in the requirement that it 
accords with the parties’ intention as an unreasonable term is unlikely to have been 
intended by the parties. The business efficacy test does emphasise the important element of 
necessity as opposed to reasonableness.  
 
Unfortunately, the language of necessity is used in the case law in both the context of terms 
implied in fact and terms implied by law. Treitel567 and Phang568 maintain that cases using 
the language of necessity for terms implied by law do so in a different sense from necessity 
for terms implied in fact. In the case of terms implied in fact, necessity refers to what is 
necessary to give effect to the intention of the parties. For terms implied by law, it is 
necessity in a broader sense, based on wider, policy considerations.569 Stephenson LJ in 
Mears v Safecar Security Ltd570 explained that it is not sufficient for terms implied by law 
                                                
566 Ibid, at 395–396. 
567 Treitel Contract, at 208. 
568 Andrew Phang “Implied Terms in English Law – Some Recent Developments” (1993) JBL 242 at 246. 
569 Ibid. Andrew Phang in “Implied Terms Revisited” [1990] JBL 394 at 400, while questioning the validity 
of the distinction between terms implied in fact and terms implied by law other than by legislation, 
recognises the scope for such an argument. 
570 [1983] QB 54. 
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to be reasonable; they must be necessary.571 In the words of V K Rajah J in Pertamina 
Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse,572 “a court should be slow to intervene and imply 
a term in a contract as a matter of law. It should do so only if the term to be implied is, in 
all the circumstances, fair, reasonable and sound in policy.” Unless the court is specifically 
directing its mind to the distinction between implications of fact and those of law, care 
should be taken in attaching too much significance to their words in order to conclude that 
it is one or the other.573  
 
Bearing this in mind, in Tai Hing Cotton Mill,574 Lord Scarman considered an implied 
customer duty wider than that upheld by Macmillan. Applying the test of necessity, he 
rejected the implied term contended in that case, and justified the implied term recognised 
in Macmillan.575 It is not explicit in Lord Scarman’s judgement which of the two senses of 
necessity he had in mind. However, in the course of his argument justifying Macmillan and 
rejecting the bank’s argument for a wider customer duty, he cites as support a dictum of 
Bray J in Kepitigalla,576 apparently referring to terms implied in fact.577 In rejecting the 
term contended by one of the parties, Bray J said: “It cannot be said to be necessary to 
make the contract effective. It cannot be said to have really been in the mind of the 
customer, or indeed, of the bank, when the relationship of banker and customer was 
created.”578 The words “necessary to make the contract effective” indicate that he was using 
                                                
571 Ibid, at 78. 
572 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 292. 
573 The judgment of Le Dain J in Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 is 
one judgement where the distinction is kept clearly in mind. 
574 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 1 AC 80 at 104–5. 
575 Ibid. 
576 [1909] 2 KB 1010.  
577 Ibid, at 1025–1026. 
578 Ibid. 
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the business efficacy test, a test for terms implied in fact. The reference to the parties’ 
intention is a clear indication that it is a term implied in fact because terms implied by law 
are not determined by the parties’ intention. From this one can argue that Lord Scarman is 
dealing with the terms in Tai Hing Cotton Mill and in Macmillan on the basis that they are 
implied in fact.  
 
Negating this argument is Lord Scarman’s reference to the test propounded by Lord 
Wilberforce in Liverpool City Council v Irwin579 for a term implied by law580 and his 
endorsement of the approach of Cons J in Tai Hing Cotton Mill in the Hong Kong Court of 
Appeal.581 Cons J uses the test of necessity for terms implied by law. He concludes that “in 
the world in which we live today, it is a necessary condition of the relation of banker and 
customer that the customer should take reasonable care to see that in the operation of the 
account the bank is not injured.”582 The meaning of necessity is important.583 Cons J 
acknowledges that he is applying “necessity” in a “practical”584 sense, taking his cue from 
Lord Salmon in Liverpool City Council v Irwin,585 who describes the contract as otherwise 
“futile, inefficacious and absurd”. It seems “necessity” is not to be taken to mean a 
“conditio sine qua non”,586 for the term implied as a legal incident in Liverpool City 
Council v Irwin587 can hardly pass that test.588 Stephen A Smith expresses the view that it 
                                                
579 [1977] AC 239. 
580 [1990] 1 AC 637 at 646. 
581 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 559–560. 
582 Ibid, at 560. 
583 A point also made by Emil L Hayek in “Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal” (1988) 14 Can 
Bus LJ 361 at 370. 
584 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 560. 
585 [1977] AC 239 at 263. 
586 This is Hayek’s apposite label in “Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 
361 at 370. 
587 [1977] AC 239. 
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means “reasonably necessary”.589 So too, the Macmillan duty can hardly be regarded as a 
conditio sine qua non of the banking relationship, but in the wider sense it may pass the test 
for a term implied by law. In National Bank of Greece SA v Pinios Shipping Co No 1 and 
Another,590  Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal591 clearly considers that Lord Scarman (in Tai 
Hing Cotton Mill) is dealing with a term implied by law. Perhaps Lord Scarman’s reference 
to Kepitigalla is not made with the distinction between terms implied in fact and by law at 
the forefront of his mind. 
 
An implied term that is specific to the circumstances of an individual bespoke contract is 
unlikely to be implied by law. Terms implied by law apply to contracts by type.592 The fact 
that the Macmillan term applies to bank–customer contracts in general may suggest that it 
is implied by law.593 But this is not conclusive. Terms implied in fact may be so obvious 
that they would normally apply to all contracts of that nature. The implied term in 
Joachimson’s case (payment on demand) is an example. Of the three judges, Atkin LJ is 
clearest on the issue. He refers to the intention of the parties, which points directly to a term 
implied in fact. He asks, “did the parties in fact intend to make the demand a term of the 
contract?”594  Bankes LJ expressly uses Lord Esher’s test in Hamlyn v Wood,595 that a term 
will not be implied in a contract unless “an implication necessarily arises that the parties 
must have intended that the suggested stipulation should exist.” This is the language of a 
                                                                                                                                               
588 See a similar view expressed by Stephen A Smith Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th ed, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005) at 161. 
589 Ibid. 
590 [1990] 1 AC 637 at 646. 
591 This aspect of the decision was not taken on appeal to the House of Lords. 
592 Such as insurance, charterparties, employment. 
593 This may be the view of Lloyd LJ in the Court of Appeal in National Bank of Greece SA v Pinios Shipping 
co No 1 and Another [1990] 1 AC 637 at 645 although it is not clear. 
594 [1921] 3 KB 110 at 129. 
595 [1891] 2 QB 488 at 491. 
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term implied in fact. Bankes LJ adds that it is impossible to imagine the bank–customer 
relationship without a stipulation that repayment must be preceded by a demand. This 
statement of universal application would be consistent with an implication by law but it 
doesn’t preclude an implication of fact. Warrington LJ does not directly discuss the issue in 
terms of implied terms. On balance therefore, despite the term applying generally in the 
banking contract, the indicators are that this was a term implied in fact. 
 
Terms implied by law were distinguished from those implied in fact only relatively 
recently, in Lister v Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd596 (1957) and Liverpool City 
Council v Irwin597 (1977). On this basis, one may be tempted to argue that terms implied in 
the banking contract at the time of Macmillan in 1918 were implied in fact, the only 
acknowledged basis for implication at that time. The counter–argument is that terms 
implied by law existed albeit they weren’t expressly acknowledged at that time.  
 
It is not possible to conclude with confidence that the implied term in Macmillan is one of 
fact or of law.598 Lord Wilberforce’s statement that terms implied in fact and terms implied 
by law are parts of a “continuous spectrum”599 is apposite. At the extremes of the spectrum 
the distinction is clear but there is a middle ground where the concepts merge and the 
distinctions blur. If the criterion of necessity, for terms implied by law, is used in a practical 
                                                
596 [1957] AC 555. 
597 [1977] AC 239 although, see for example Andrew Phang’s argument that an analysis of the five detailed 
judgments in this case reveals only ambiguous recognition of the category of terms implied by law in 
“Implied Terms Revisited” [1990] JBL 394 at 403. 
598 Counsel in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Tai Hing Cotton Mill v Liu Chong Hing Bank and Others 
[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 559 argued that it was an implication by law. 
599 Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 at 254. 
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as opposed to a strict sense,600 the overlap between necessity based on presumed intention 
and necessity based on legal incidents is all the greater. The correlation between contracts 
that would otherwise be “futile, inefficacious and absurd”601 (for terms implied by law) and 
terms being so necessary to give the contract business efficacy that the parties must have 
intended it (for terms implied in fact) is plain.  
 
What of the nature of the bank’s implied duty of care? Ungoed–Thomas J in Selangor602 
does not refer to the bank’s duty of care as an implied term but he does make it clear that it 
arises out of the contractual relationship.603 In Karak Rubber,604 Brightman J says605 that 
“the implied duty of care formulated in the Selangor case” passes the officious bystander 
test first propounded in Reigate,606 based on the intention of the parties, indicating that 
Brightman J viewed the bank’s duty of care as an implied term in fact. Still, Hunter J in Tai 
Hing Cotton Mill in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal expresses the view that the bank’s 
duty in Selangor was implied by law, based on proximity, because there is no reference in 
the judgement to the presumed intentions of the parties.607 Referring to Brightman J’s 
contrary dicta, Hunter J says: “This seems to put the matter on both grounds.”608 It is not 
obvious what Hunter J means by this latter statement but it seems that he may be saying 
                                                
600 As per Cons J in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
555 at 560 following Lord Salmon in Liverpool City Council v Irwin  [1977] AC 239 at 263 who describes 
the contract as otherwise “futile, inefficacious and absurd”.  
601 Per Lord Salmon in Liverpool City Council v Irwin  [1977] AC 239 at 263. 
602 [1968] 1 WLR 1555. 
603 Ibid, from 1594. 
604 [1972] WLR 602. 
605 Ibid at 629. 
606 Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) [1918] 1 KB 592 at 605. 
607 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 575. 
608 Ibid. 
 99
that the term can pass the tests for both terms implied by law and in fact. This would put it 
somewhere in the middle of Lord Wilberforce’s implied term spectrum.609  
 
Joachimson’s implied term also falls in the middle ground. Overtly it appears to be implied 
in fact but it would also pass the test for terms implied by law. The “nature of the contract 
itself implicitly requires”610 that there should only be a repayment obligation on demand, 
for otherwise the bank would immediately on receiving a deposit from a customer have to 
make repayment, defeating the object of the deposit. 
 
Unless a court is expressly directing itself to the distinction between a term implied in fact 
or one by law, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from dicta about implied terms. It is 
not possible to conclude categorically in relation to the Macmillan and Greenwood duties 
whether they are required by law or whether they are based on the mutual intention of the 
parties. Andrew Phang says that the distinction between the two categories of implied 
terms, is attractive in theory but may not in practice be useful.611 It is submitted that the 
tests for the two varieties of implied terms do help courts to decide disputes about implied 
terms. An example is Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal,612 a seminal 
banking case on issues directly relevant to this study. Le Dain J in the Canadian Supreme 
Court considered the scope for recognising broader implied customer duties on the bases of 
both presumed intention (implication in fact) and the legal incidents of the banking contract 
(implication by law). He used the tests of business efficacy and the officious bystander for 
                                                
609 The Court of Appeal in Lipkin Gorman [1989] 1 WLR 1340 did not shed any light on this debate. 
610 Lord Wilberforce’s words in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 at 254.   
611 Andrew Phang “Implied Terms Revisited” [1990] JBL 394 at 395 and “Implied Terms in English Law –       
Some Recent Developments” [1993] JBL 242 at 243. 
612 (1988) 40 DLR (4th) 385. 
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implications of fact and of necessity for implications of law.613 A second use for the 
distinction is that terms implied by law apply to future contracts of the same type, whereas 
terms implied in fact are, at most, presumed to apply to future contracts, the presumption 
being rebuttable on the basis of inconsistency with the parties’ intention. 
 
To a large extent, the significance of implied terms in the bank–customer contract has 
diminished with the use of extensive express standard terms to regulate the relationship. 
Unforeseen circumstances will, however, always arise and the law of implied terms will 
always be relevant.  
 
3.7 Estoppel 
The law of estoppel is relevant to both the duties recognised in Macmillan and Greenwood 
v Martins Bank Limited.614 In the latter case, Mrs Greenwood forged cheques on her 
husband’s account with the bank. Mr Greenwood became aware of those forgeries but did 
not notify the bank of them immediately. By the time the bank was notified, Mrs 
Greenwood had committed suicide. Before a more detailed discussion of the Greenwood 
duty, a discussion of the relevant principles of estoppel would be appropriate. 
 
Estoppel comes in a variety of forms: for example, estoppel by representation, proprietary 
estoppel, promissory or equitable estoppel, estoppel by convention, estoppel by 
acquiescence and estoppel by deed. In Johnson v Gore–Wood & Co (a firm),615 Lord Goff 
                                                
613 Ibid, 422 et seq. 
614 [1933] AC 51. 
615 [2002] 2 AC 1. 
 101
of Chieveley rejected the view, propounded earlier by Lord Denning MR,616 that all 
estoppels can be “accommodated within a single formula”617 echoing Millett LJ’s view in 
First National Bank plc v Thompson618  that there was no overarching principle of estoppel. 
Lord Goff considered, however, that unconscionability was the link between the various 
estoppels.619 Spencer Bower identifies unfairness as the common principle. 620 Estoppel by 
representation is most relevant to this study. 
 
Historically, common law estoppel took three forms: estoppel by record, estoppel by deed 
and estoppel in pais.621 Millet LJ in First National Bank v Thompson622 said estoppel by 
representation of fact is an extension of the old, restricted estoppel in pais.623 Parke B 
considered the requirements for an estoppel in pais in Freeman and Another v Cooke624 
(1848). He approved an earlier statement in Pickard v Sears,625 which laid down the 
elements as: “where one, by his words or conduct, wilfully causes another to believe in the 
existence of a certain state of things, and induces him to act on that belief, or to alter his 
own previous position”, the former is estopped from denying that state of things against the 
latter.626 Elaborating, Parke B said, “conduct, by negligence or omission, where there is a 
duty cast upon a person, by usage of trade or otherwise, to disclose the truth”627 may often 
have the effect of precluding him from contesting its truth. In First National Bank v 
                                                
616 In Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1982] QB 
84. 
617 [2002] 2 AC 1 at 41. 
618 First National Bank plc v Thompson [1996] Ch 231. 
619 [2002] 2 AC 1 at 41. 
620 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, 23. 
621 See statement in First National Bank plc v Thompson [1996] Ch 231 at 236. 
622 [1996] Ch 231 at 236. 
623 Ibid. 
624 (1848) 154 ER 652. 
625 ( 1837) 112 ER 179. 
626 (1848) 154 ER 652 at 656. 
627 Ibid. 
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Thompson, 628 Millet J said estoppel by representation of fact requires “a clear and 
unequivocal representation, inducement and materiality”.629 
 
Estoppel by representation is sometimes referred to as estoppel by negligence or estoppel 
by conduct. For example, in Canada, Le Dain J in Canadian Pacific Hotels  v Bank of 
Montreal630 said one species of estoppel by representation is estoppel by negligence, also 
known as estoppel by conduct. In the Court of Appeal (England) in Greenwood, Greer LJ 
said: “Estoppel by negligence is representation of fact by conduct”.631 Spencer Bower says 
that estoppel by negligence is not a discreet category of estoppel but refers to the way in 
which the representation is made; it can thus manifest as an estoppel by representation of 
fact, promissory estoppel or proprietary estoppel.632 This is supported by the dictum of 
Lord Salmon (dissenting) in Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings,633  who said that 
estoppel by negligence is a form of estoppel by conduct.634 Estoppel by negligence is thus 
widely seen as a species of estoppel by representation, which may also be called estoppel 
by conduct, a modern form of estoppel in pais. 
 
There is, however, an important distinction between negligent estoppel and other estoppel 
by representation evident in the dictum from Pickard v Sears635 cited above. The conduct or 
representation in an estoppel by representation is made deliberately to induce a certain 
                                                
628 [1996] Ch 231 at 236. 
629 Per Millet J in First National Bank plc v Thompson [1996] Ch 231 at 236. 
630 (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 at 394. 
631 Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited [1932] 1 KB 371 at 388. 
632 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, 8 - 9, 23, 59. 
633 [1977] AC 890. 
634 Ibid at 912. 
635 (1837) 112 ER 179. See also the judgment of Lord Edmund–Davies in Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v 
Twitchings [1977] AC 890 at 919. 
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belief. The conduct or representation in a negligent estoppel is not intentional but careless, 
and will only be penalised if there is a duty not to have acted in that manner.   
 
The elements of the estoppel in Greenwood were succinctly summarised as a 
representation, reliance and detriment.636 This was endorsed by the Singapore Court of 
Appeal in Pertamina.637 Where the representation takes the form of silence there must have 
been a duty to speak as there is generally no such duty. It may arise outside of a contractual 
relationship in which case it may be imposed by business usage or practice.638 There is high 
authority that the duty to speak is not akin to a duty of care founding an action in tort. In 
Fung Kai Sun v Chan Fui Hing,639 the Privy Council considered the defence of estoppel by 
silence against an owner of property who discovered that his property had been 
fraudulently mortgaged. Although the property owner was not a customer of the putative 
mortgagee (lender), the Privy Council considered that he had a duty to inform the 
mortgagee upon becoming aware of the fraud. Lord Reid said it was well established that 
silence can give rise to an estoppel without there having been a duty such as would support 
an action for damages or breach of which would amount to a tort.640 From this it must 
follow that the duty to speak is a lesser duty and will arise more readily than a duty of care.  
 
This can be contrasted with estoppel by negligence. There is ample authority going back to 
the 19th century that negligence will not give rise to a cause of action nor an estoppel unless 
                                                
636 [1933] AC 51 at 57. 
637 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 300 et seq; also United Overseas Bank Ltd v Bank of China [2006] 1 SLR 57 at 63. 
638 See Le Dain J in Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal et al (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 at 412. 
639 [1951] AC 489. 
640 Ibid, at 501. 
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there is a duty of care.641 In Evans’ Charities,642 Parke B said that negligently entrusting the 
seal of the corporation to the secretary was not that “species of negligence”643 which would 
warrant a finding against the Trustees. Lord Cranworth, in the same case, said that the 
negligence in question must amount to an estoppel.644 In the Court of error decision in 
Swan,645 Keating J (dissenting) states that a person may be estopped where he is guilty of 
“culpable negligence”;646 Blackburn J stresses that there must be breach of a duty owed to 
give rise to an estoppel;647 Byles J says “mere negligence” is not sufficient to found an 
estoppel;648 and Cockburn CJ says that “negligence alone” is not a sufficient ground for 
estoppel.649 Lord Coleridge CJ in Arnold650 seems to agree.651 In Lewes,652 Kennedy J says: 
“Negligence, to constitute an estoppel, implies the existence of some duty which the party 
against whom the estoppel is alleged owes to the other party.”653 The judgments of Lord 
Edmund–Davies654 and Lord Salmon655 (dissenting) in Moorgate are supportive. There are 
similar statements by commentators: Pollock656 in 1904, Geva,657 Christopher Allen658 and 
Spencer Bower. 659 
                                                
641 See, for example, Lord Wright’s discussion in Mercantile Bank of India Ltd v Central Bank of India Ltd 
[1938] AC 287 at 298–299. Also Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 
1 AC 80 at 111; Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal et al (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 at 421. 
642 (1855) 10 ER 950. 
643 Ibid, at 959. 
644 Ibid., at 960. 
645 (1863) 159 ER 73. 
646 Ibid, at 75. 
647 Ibid, at 75–76. 
648 Ibid, at 77. 
649 Ibid, at 79. 
650 Arnold  v The Cheque Bank (1876) 1 CPD 578. 
651 Ibid, at 589. 
652 (1906) 11 Com Cas 255. 
653 Ibid, at 266. 
654 [1977] AC 890 at 919. 
655 Ibid at 912. 
656 Sir Frederick Pollock The Law of Torts: A Treatise on the Principles of Obligations Arising from Civil 
Wrongs in the Common Law (7th ed, London, Stevens and Sons, Limited, 1904), 429. 
657 “Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills of Exchange Act” (1981–82) 6 Can Bus LJ 269 at 319:  “It is 
fundamental that estoppel by negligence presupposes the existence of a duty of care.” 
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In negligent estoppel, the negligence leads to a misrepresentation relied upon to the 
detriment of the other party, fulfilling the essential elements of the estoppel. Applying this 
analysis to Macmillan, the negligent completion of the cheque gave rise to the 
representation that the increased amount of the cheque was the mandate given by the 
customer; this was relied on by the bank to its detriment. In Greenwood, the bank–customer 
relationship gave rise to a duty to speak where the customer had actual knowledge of 
forgery on his account. This was breached, giving rise to the representation that the bank 
had observed its customer’s mandate in paying the cheques forged by his wife; the bank 
relied on this to its detriment by not taking timeous action against the wife. In Macmillan, 
the representation was caused by negligence. In Greenwood there was no negligence; the 
representation was deliberate. Adrian Keane cites Greenwood as an example of estoppel by 
representation of fact.660 
 
The similarity between negligent estoppel and the rationale in Lickbarrow v Mason is 
apparent: “whenever one of two innocent parties must suffer by the act of a third person, he 
who has enabled such person to occasion the loss must sustain it.”661 Spencer Bower labels 
this the “facilitation” theory, and criticises the dictum for being too wide because of its 
harsh operation against the careless or imprudent.662 Judicial criticism of the maxim for the 
                                                                                                                                               
658 Christopher Allen Practical Guide to Evidence (2nd ed, London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001) at 
390. 
659 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, 59, para III.5.1.  
660 Adrian Keane The Modern Law of Evidence (5th ed, Butterworths, London, 2000), 613–614. The 
discussion is omitted in the 6th edition. 
661 (1787) 100 ER 35 at 39.  
662 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, 72 - 73, para III.5.23 - 5.24. 
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same reason has already been mentioned.663 A key difference between negligent estoppel 
and the rationale in Lickbarrow v Mason lies in the requirement of a duty of care for 
negligent estoppel to arise. This narrows the ambit of the facilitation theory.   
   
In Macmillan, their Lordships did not agree on whether the customer’s negligence in that 
case served to avoid circuity of action or operated as an estoppel.664 The obvious question 
is whether it makes any difference? Lord Finlay in Macmillan seems to say not, either way, 
the basis for the decision is the customer’s negligence 665. Yet, in Swan, Wilde B in the 
Court of Exchequer 666 wished to stress the distinction between an action based on 
negligence and the doctrine of estoppel. An action for negligence is based on the breach of 
an obligation to another. The doctrine of estoppel is based on the injustice of allowing 
someone to cause his own misfortune and leave others to face the consequences. Both 
require the consequences to be proximate and not too remote but, says Wilde B, the 
similarity ends there; the two principles have different sources and go in different 
directions.667 These comments are valid in the context of estoppel in general. The majority 
of estoppels do not involve a determination of the issue of negligence. Negligent estoppel 
(as a species of estoppel by conduct or representation) is different. Spencer Bower submits 
that the duty of care giving rise to an action in tort is of the same nature as the duty giving 
rise to a negligent estoppel, albeit that the point has not been decided.668 This is supported 
                                                
663 For example in Arnold v Cheque Bank (1876) 1 CPD 578 at 587; Bank of England v Vagliano Bros [1891] 
AC 107 at 170 –171 by Lord Field (dissenting); London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v Macmillan and Arthur 
[1918] AC 777 by Lord Parmoor at p836; see the discussion of these cases in chapter 3.5 above. 
664 See the discussion in chapter 3.3 above. 
665 [1918] AC 777 at 794. 
666 (1862) 158 ER 611 at 625 -6. 
667 Ibid. 
668 Ibid, 62, para III.5.6. 
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by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton in Moorgate.669 It is clear that there is a considerable overlap 
between negligent estoppel and a duty of care giving rise to an action in tort. Spencer 
Bower says that it is arguable that estoppel by negligence “has now been supplanted by the 
tort of negligence and the doctrine of agency by ostensible authority.”670   
 
3.8 The Greenwood Duty 
A necessary precursor to the analysis of the verification and conclusive evidence clause 
which is to follow is the Greenwood duty or estoppel: a customer who checks his bank 
statements and detects an error but who does not notify the bank, is estopped from 
subsequently asserting the error if he is aware that forgery was involved.671 Spencer Bower 
says that this is not an estoppel unique to the bank–customer relationship: “It is a perfectly 
ordinary example of the estoppel which arises from failure to discharge a duty to speak in 
circumstances in which such a duty has arisen.”672 In Greenwood, the Macmillan duty did 
not avail the bank as the cheques were not drawn by the customer but forged by his wife. 
There was no “negligence in the transaction itself.” A decision in favour of the bank had to 
be based on different principles. The House of Lords held, based on an admission by the 
customer, that the customer has a duty to notify the bank immediately he becomes aware of 
forgeries on his account. His failure to do so resulted in his being estopped from pleading 
the forgeries.  
 
                                                
669 [1977] AC 890 at 924. 
670 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, at 8–9. 
671 In accordance with Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited [1933] AC 51. The bank must have suffered 
detriment, as to which, see the discussion below. 
672 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, at 248. 
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Although the duty of notification is associated with Greenwood, and carries its name, it was 
not a groundbreaking development in 1933. In 1904, for example, Heber Hart’s Law of 
Banking recognised the estoppel,673 based on the authority of M’Kenzie v British Linen674 
(1881). M’Kenzie concerned forged signatures on two bills. The House of Lords stated, 
with reference to Freeman v Cooke,675 (1848) that a person who knew that a bank was 
relying on his forged signature, would be estopped from asserting the forgery if the bank 
altered its position to its detriment.  
 
While in Macmillan, the House of Lords was divided on whether the customer’s negligence 
gave rise to an estoppel or gave the bank a defence to avoid circuity of action,676 in 
Greenwood the Law Lords expressly held that it was an estoppel. The elements of this 
estoppel will now be analysed in detail. 
 
3.8.1 Knowledge 
In the Greenwood context, the representation by silence presupposes knowledge of the 
forgery. This is particularly pertinent to the discussion in the next chapter of the verification 
and conclusive evidence clause, which seeks to ensure that the requirement of knowledge is 
met by imposing a duty to examine the bank statements. Knowledge, we know from the 
case law, is not an absolute concept, it comes in degrees. In Baden v Societe Generale,677 
Gibson J famously set out his five degrees of knowledge in the context of a constructive 
                                                
673 Hart, The Law of Banking, 275. 
674 (1881) 6 App Cas 82. 
675 (1848) 154 ER 652. 
676 See discussion in chapter 3.5.4 above. 
677 Baden, Delvaux and Lecuit v Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de 
l’Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 WLR 509. 
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trust issue. Roper v Taylor’s Central Garages (Exeter) Ltd678 was another case to identify 
degrees of knowledge, with particular significance for the Greenwood duty. Roper involved 
a contravention of a road traffic statute. The matter was decided on a narrow point of no 
relevance to this debate but Devlin J in the King’s Bench Division went on to discuss the 
meaning of knowledge (in the context of mens rea) in a breach of a statutory provision. He 
identified three degrees of knowledge: 
1. “Actual knowledge”; 
2. Shutting one’s eyes “to an obvious means of knowledge”, which he described as a 
person deliberately refraining “from making inquiries the results of which he might 
not care to have”679; and  
3. “Constructive knowledge”, or the neglect of obtaining knowledge which the 
reasonable person would obtain. “It does not mean actual knowledge at all; it means 
that the defendant had in effect the means of knowledge.”680 
The distinction between the second and third forms of knowledge is that shutting ones eyes 
is deliberately not knowing while constructive knowledge is neglecting to know.681 
Essentially, the difference is that in the former there is an element of dolus while in the 
latter fault takes the lesser form of culpa. In the context of Roper, i.e. for the purposes of 
the criminal law, Devlin J considered that shutting one’s eyes to knowledge amounted to 
actual knowledge, while constructive knowledge was not knowledge at all.682 Gibson J’s 
more detailed analysis of knowledge in Baden v Societe Generale683 includes two 
                                                
678 [1951] 2 TLR 284 at 288–289. 
679 Ibid, at 288. Devlin J was here quoting Lord Hewart CJ in Evans v Dell (1937) 53 TLR 310. 
680 [1951] 2 TLR 284 at 288 –9. 
681 Ibid, at 289. 
682 Ibid. 
683 Baden, Delvaux and Lecuit v Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de 
l’Industrie en France SA [1993] 1 WLR 509. 
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additional categories between shutting one’s eyes and constructive knowledge. Ross 
Cranston argues that excessive categorization can be misleading by over–emphasizing the 
degree of knowledge and neglecting the purpose of the knowledge.684 
  
In Price Meats Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc,685  the issue was liability for the loss from forged 
cheques. The matter came before the Commercial Court in the Chancery Division as an 
appeal from a failed application to strike out a defence.686 It was argued by the bank, in 
support of its defence, that the customer had constructive knowledge of the forgeries, thus 
bringing the Greenwood duty into play. The knowledge, on which the bank based this 
argument, took two unrelated forms: a warning by the bank to the customer to investigate 
the size of its overdraft and the customer’s discovery that its clerk (the one said to have 
committed the forgeries) had misappropriated petty cash monies. The court adopted Devlin 
J’s analysis in Roper of the degrees of knowledge and decided that the customer did not 
have constructive knowledge of the forgeries and therefore that the particulars did not 
support a conclusion that the customer had reasonable grounds to suspect forgery. What is 
significant is that the court doubted that constructive knowledge was sufficient to invoke 
the Greenwood estoppel. Its analysis of the authorities687 was that “reason to know” i.e. 
constructive knowledge, was not sufficient to give rise to the duty to inform the bank. 
Reference was made to Roper to emphasise that constructive knowledge was not actual 
knowledge.688  
 
                                                
684 Ross Cranston “Understanding Banking Law” (1988) LMCLQ 360 at 370. 
685 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 346. 
686 On the grounds that it failed to disclose a reasonable ground of defence. 
687 McKenzie v British Linen Co (1881) 6 App Cas 82; Ogilvie v West Australian Mortgage and Agency Corp 
Ltd [1896] AC 257; Morison v London County and Westminster Bank Limited [1914] 3 KB 356. 
688 [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 346 at 351. 
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One of the authorities referred to in Price Meats was Morison v London County and 
Westminster Bank Limited.689 Morison’s bank account was debited over a period of almost 
five years with cheques fraudulently drawn by his employee. The employee had authority 
to sign cheques on behalf of Morison and there was therefore no forgery690 and no 
“negligence in the transaction itself”. Morison sued the collecting bank, not his own, for 
conversion, alternatively money had and received. This was not therefore a case concerning 
the bank–customer relationship. Section 82 of the Bills of Exchange Act691 availed the bank 
in relation to some of the cheques; in relation to others it did not.692  It was argued, 
concerning these and some earlier cheques, that Morison had ratified his employee’s 
actions. The Court of Appeal agreed.693 A precondition of ratification is knowledge of that 
which is said to be ratified.694 Knowledge of the wrongdoing was imputed to Morison695  
after he ordered his accountants to investigate his accounts.696 In circumstances where the 
customer had some knowledge and chose to know no more, Phillimore LJ doubted whether 
the maxim, that the “means of knowledge are not the same as knowledge”,697 would apply 
but he refrained from deciding the point.  
 
                                                
689 [1914] 3 KB 356. 
690 Counsel for the customer did argue that there was forgery but this was rejected by all the judges. The 
signature was genuine but amounted to a misuse of authority. 
691 Protection for a bank collecting cheques in good faith and without negligence.  
692 Some of the cheques were not crossed and in the case of the early cheques the court did not consider the 
bank met the ‘without negligence’ requirement. 
693 [1914] 3 KB 356, per Lord Reading CJ at 370–373; per Buckley LJ at 377; per Phillimore LJ at 385. 
694 Ibid, per Phillimore LJ at 384. Also stated in Price Meats Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [2000] 2 All ER 
(Comm) 346 at 348. 
695 [1914] 3 KB 356. This is most evident in the judgments of Lord Reading CJ at 370–373 and Phillimore LJ 
at 385 but see Buckley LJ at 377. 
696 It appears from the report that the accountants were negligent and may not have had actual knowledge of 
the fraud. 
697 [1914] 3 KB 356 at 385. 
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In Patel v Standard Chartered Bank698 it was argued for the bank that the Greenwood duty 
extended to fraud which the reasonable customer ought to have enquired about.699 Toulson 
J rejected the submission. He affirmed that wilful blindness was tantamount to knowledge 
but said “it is an unacceptable leap to equate means of knowledge with actual 
knowledge.”700 To hold otherwise, he said, would be to enlarge the scope of the duty of 
care contrary to the ruling in Tai Hing Cotton Mill.   
 
At this stage, therefore, the point would seem to be settled: constructive knowledge is not 
knowledge for the purposes of the Greenwood duty. This was the view of Le Dain J in the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1988.701 Recently, the Singapore Court of Appeal in 
Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse702 said that the Greenwood duty would 
arise where the customer had “actual knowledge” of any forgery or unauthorised payment 
instructions.703 
 
Thus, a customer who knows that there is an error in his account, has no reason to suspect 
forgery, and neglects to raise the matter with the bank (as a reasonable customer would do) 
would not have the necessary knowledge for the Greenwood estoppel to arise, while a 
customer who deliberately avoids knowing the facts behind an error in his bank statement 
because he does not want to confront the truth, would be estopped under Greenwood. On 
this basis, a customer who examines his bank statements, but negligently or innocently does 
                                                
698 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 229. 
699 Ibid, at 237. 
700 Ibid, at 238. 
701 In Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal et al (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 at 410. His survey of 
existing English and Canadian cases showed that they “were all cases in which there was actual knowledge 
of the forgery or alteration.” 
702 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 292. 
703 Ibid, at 300. 
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not detect the error, is not estopped under Greenwood from subsequently disputing an 
incorrect entry in his bank statement. Such a customer would lack the necessary knowledge 
for the duty of notification to arise. Nor would a customer who simply does not check his 
bank statements at all be estopped under Greenwood because there is no duty, under 
Macmillan or Greenwood, to check bank statements.704 This is one of the innovations of the 
verification and conclusive evidence clause. It imputes to the customer knowledge of the 
contents of his bank statements by imposing on him a duty to examine them.  
 
3.8.2 Reliance and Detriment 
In order for any estoppel to operate, the party pleading it must have relied on the 
representation and suffered prejudice or detriment;705 there must be a causal link between 
the representation relied on and the detriment.706  Reliance will be present “if the promise 
had a material influence or effect on the conduct of the estoppel raiser.”707  
 
Gillett v Holt708 concerned proprietary estoppel. The Court of Appeal (England) said 
detriment “is not a narrow or technical concept.”709 It need not consist in monetary 
expenditure or quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is substantial.710 Spencer 
Bower says that any prejudice “which the law recognizes as sounding in damages” will 
satisfy the requirement of detriment, and even unfairness which would be remedied by 
                                                
704 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 1 AC 80 at 105–107. 
705 See M’Kenzie v British Linen (1881) 6 App Cas 82 on detriment. 
706 See statement in Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 at 232 in the context of proprietary estoppel.  
707 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, at para XIV.2.33. 
708 [2001] Ch 210. 
709 Ibid, at 232. 
710 Ibid. 
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equity may suffice.711 Detriment can take different forms.712 In the bank–customer context 
it may be loss of the opportunity to take steps to prevent subsequent losses713 (e.g., where 
the fraud is repeated), loss of the right of action against the wrongdoer (as in Greenwood) 
or loss of access to assets to recompense the crime (where the assets are disposed of or 
removed in the time after the representation is made, as discussed in Fung Kai Sun v Chan 
Fui Hing and Others714). In Ogilvie v West Australian Mortgage and Agency Corporation 
Limited715 (1896), the Privy Council considered that the requirement of prejudice was met 
if the forger absconded out of the jurisdiction of the court. Spencer Bower refers to 
authorities to the effect that proof of a loss of a chance to protect oneself can establish 
detriment without establishing that the chance would have been successful.716 
 
Previous editions of Paget took the view that it was immaterial that legal proceedings 
against the wrongdoer would not be productive of the stolen monies.717 This view is 
supported by Ogilvie,718 where Lord Watson rejected an argument that an estoppel was 
limited to the amount which the bank could have recovered from the forger. This was 
“contrary to all authority and practice”,719 he said. In Fung Kai Sun720 (1951), however, 
Lord Reid in the Privy Council, said “this is the true test: the chance of recovering must 
                                                
711 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, 116. 
712 See examples listed in Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, 118 et seq. 
713 See Mark Hapgood (Gen Ed) Paget’s Law of Banking (13th ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2007) para 19.8 
at page 491. 
714 [1951] AC 489. 
715 [1896] AC 257. 
716 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation 4th edition, 120. 
717 Hapgood Paget’s Law of Banking, para 19.8, at page 492. 
718 [1896] AC 257. 
719 Ibid, at 270. 
720 [1951] AC 489. 
 115
have been materially prejudiced by the delay”.721 On the facts in that case it was necessary 
to show that a lender suffered detriment by the delay in notification of a fraudulent 
mortgage. The action failed on this point. The evidence suggested that the lender would not 
have taken any action had he been told of the forgery earlier and therefore the court was not 
prepared to assume otherwise. Fung Kai Sun’s case is not mentioned in the last two 
editions of Paget,722 which does, however, qualify its previous view by saying that today 
the tendency is against recovery of an amount greater than the detriment suffered.723  
 
Fung Kai Sun was relied on in the Singapore High Court decision of Kodrat Suradji v 
Banque Nationale de Paris724 on the issue of detriment.725 In Pertamina Energy Trading 
Limited v Credit Suisse,726 in the Singapore Court of Appeal, V K Rajah J relied on Fung 
Kai Sun, in holding that it was necessary for the aggrieved party to plead and identify the 
steps it would have taken, prove a real chance of protecting or improving its situation and 
that it would have taken that chance.727 On the facts, the estoppel claim in Pertamina was 
dismissed because there was inadequate evidence that the chance of recovering monies had 




                                                
721 Ibid, at 506. The case is cited with approval in Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse [2006] 4 
SLR 273 at 306. 
722 Mark Hapgood (Gen Ed) Paget’s Law of Banking: (12th ed, Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2003); (13th ed, 
Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2007) 
723 Hapgood Paget’s Law of Banking para 19.8 at page 492. 
724 [1992] 2 SLR 676. 
725 Ibid, at 687. 
726 [2006] 4 SLR 273. 
727 Ibid, at 306. 
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3.8.3 Forgery or Fraud? 
In Greenwood, the duty to disclose knowledge of forgery was admitted by the customer.728 
The court did not consider whether the duty extended to knowledge of fraud. The two 
concepts are related but are not identical. In both England and Singapore forgery is now 
dealt with by legislation.729 Its essence is the falsification of a document coupled with the 
necessary intent. The Singapore Penal Code730 defines forgery as the making of a false 
document with a mens rea that may take various forms including intent to cause damage or 
injury, intent to cause a person to part with property or enter into a contract, or intent to 
commit fraud.731 Fraud is not defined in the Penal Code. Section 25 states that a thing is 
done “fraudulently” if it is done with the intention to defraud. This “leaves the 
interpretation of the word ‘defraud’ to the courts”.732 The essence of fraud is conduct 
causing detriment or prejudice (which need not be economic)733 coupled with intent. 
Forgery is narrower in the sense that the actus reus of the offence is the making of a false 
document. Fraud commonly involves deceit although it seems that this is not an essential 
element of the offence.734  
 
Returning to Greenwood, there is no logical reason why a customer should notify his bank 
of forgery on his account but not of fraud; and there is no reason why a customer’s silence 
                                                
728 Rightly, in the view of the court: Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited [1933] AC 51 at 58. 
729 UK: Forgery and Counterfeiting Act, 1981; Singapore: Penal Code, Cap 224. 
730 Cap 224. 
731 Section 463. 
732 Molly Cheang Criminal Law of Malaysia & Singapore: Principles of Liability (Kuala Lumpur, 
Professional (Law) Books Publishers, 1990), 52. 
733 Ibid. 
734 J C Smith Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (10th ed, Bath, Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2002), 310. 
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about fraud (as distinct from forgery) should not found an estoppel.735 In Tai Hing Cotton 
Mill, Lord Scarman was emphatic that the customer’s duties under the common law are 
confined to those upheld by Macmillan and Greenwood.736 Whether or not his intention 
was thereby to limit the customer’s duty of notification to forgery, as distinct from fraud, is 
not the issue here. The point is that a contractual clause that extends the duty of notification 
to fraud is reasonable. It is inconceivable that in 1933 the House of Lords decision would 
have been any different had the unauthorised transactions of Mrs Greenwood been procured 
by fraud not involving forgery, albeit difficult to see how this could have been achieved at 
that time. Today, in the age of electronic banking, whether the Greenwood duty extends to 
fraud is crucial.  
 
T&C that enhance the Greenwood duty so as to encompass fraud in addition to forgery 
would be uncontroversial. From there it is only a small step to justify a clause imposing a 
duty of notification if errors or omissions are detected in a bank statement, regardless of 
how they arose. This, it is submitted, is a reasonable departure from the common law. 
 
                                                
735 There is support for this in the literature, see for example: E P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and Richard Hooley 
Modern Banking Law (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 2006), 226–227; The Jack Report (Banking 
Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee, Feb. 1989), at 42. 
736 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 1 AC 80 at 108. 
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3.8.4 The Role of Negligence 
An outstanding issue is the role of negligence in the Greenwood duty. It is clear from the 
discussion above737 that negligence has no relevance in determining the customer’s 
knowledge of a forgery. The requirement is actual knowledge or “Nelsonian 
knowledge”.738 What about the duty to speak on a customer having the necessary 
knowledge; is it a duty of care or an absolute duty? This is not an aspect of the Greenwood 
duty that has received much attention. In 1904, Hart discussed the Greenwood estoppel 
under the sub–heading, “Customer’s Subsequent Negligence,” in The Law of Banking, 
suggesting that the failure to notify the bank must be negligent. He does not expressly say 
so.739 Greenwood is not helpful on this point as there the customer’s failure to speak was 
deliberate;740 a fortiori the duty arose. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which 
a customer is thwarted in his attempts to notify the bank of a forgery by events beyond his 
control (intervening accident, communication failure) or a customer who endeavours to 
notify the bank but because of negligence fails to do so (e.g. a notice incorrectly addressed, 
inadequate postage on an envelope containing the notice, an electronic message not 
delivered because of failure to click “send” or an inaccurate email address). Negligence in 
fulfilling the obligation to notify would not be excusable. The position where the 
customer’s failure to notify the bank of a forgery is without negligence is unclear, but it 
will be submitted that a non–negligent failure should not be penalised. 
  
                                                
737 In chapter 3.8.1. 
738 A phrase dating to an incident in which Lord Nelson was said to have put his blind eye to a telescope, 
thereby avoiding knowledge of the enemy’s surrender, i.e. shutting one’s eyes to an obvious means of 
knowledge. 
739 Hart The Law of Banking, 275, 282. 
740 [1933] AC 51at 58.  
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Another aspect of negligence in the context of the Greenwood duty is the effect of 
negligence by the bank. In Greenwood, it was found that the bank had been negligent in not 
detecting that the signatures on the cheques had been forged.741 Lord Tomlin in the House 
of Lords expressly pointed out that this made no difference to the operation of the 
estoppel.742 He said: “For the purposes of the estoppel, which is a procedural matter, the 
cause of the ignorance is an irrelevant consideration.”743 The estoppel arose because of a 
breach of the duty to disabuse the bank of its ignorance concerning the forgeries. In the 
Court of Appeal, this aspect received more attention. Scrutton LJ explained that the bank’s 
loss lay in the lost opportunity to sue the forger744 and the bank’s negligence was not a 
proximate cause of its loss of the right of action.745 Romer LJ agreed. In conclusion, 
negligence on the part of the bank had no bearing on the operation of the estoppel against 
the customer. This issue is important under the verification and conclusive evidence clause 
and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
If one compares the Macmillan and Greenwood duties, the dichotomy between the 
restricted Macmillan duty, which arises only in the case of customer negligence in the 
execution of a cheque, and the general Greenwood duty to speak on becoming aware of 
forgeries, is striking. A general duty to prevent fraud, along the lines of Khoo Tian Hock, is 
doctrinally more consistent. If, at the time of Macmillan, a duty on the customer extending 
to the entire banking relationship had been recognized, it would not have been necessary 
for the Greenwood duty to be implied. The customer’s duty to notify the bank of forgeries 
                                                
741 Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited [1933] AC 51 at 56. 
742 Ibid, at 59. 
743 Ibid. 
744 Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited [1932] 1 KB 371 at 383. 
745 Ibid, at 384. 
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on becoming aware of them would be caught by the broader principle that a customer must 
exercise care to prevent fraud in the operation of his bank account. 
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Chapter 4: The Verification and Conclusive Evidence Clause 
 
The main shield used by banks in Singapore against unauthorised debits is the “verification 
and conclusive evidence” clause. It imposes a duty on the customer to examine his bank 
statements and notify the bank of any errors within a specified period of time, failing which 
the statement is taken as conclusive evidence of its contents and the customer is precluded 
from disputing any entries thereafter. The implication is that errors notified to the bank 
within the stipulated period will be rectified subject, it must be assumed, to the bank 
verifying the facts including that the debit did not result from a breach by the customer of 
his duties. The verification and conclusive evidence clause appears in all of the Singapore 
T&C examined.746 It is controversial for a number of reasons: it enlarges the scope of the 
customer’s duties by imposing an obligation to examine his bank statements that does not 
exist under the common law;747 it applies to errors of which the customer is not aware and, 
perhaps the foremost reason, is the drastic consequence of precluding a customer from 
objecting to a debit on his account procured by fraud. This could happen while, for 
example, the customer is absent from home and unable to read his statement within the 
stipulated time,748 a scenario prompting Poh Chu Chai to describe the clause as “very 
draconian”.749 
 
It should be pointed out that there are numerous other clauses in the T&C that can affect the 
incidence of loss between bank and customer. These other clauses will be discussed later. 
                                                
746 UOB 13.4; OCBC 9; DBS 11.1(c); HSBC Part A 3.1; Std Ch 5.1.1. 
747 A position confirmed in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 1 AC 80 
at 105–107. 
748 The example given by Poh Chu Chai Law of Banker and Customer (5th ed, Lexis Nexis, 2004), 918. 
749 Ibid. 
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For the present, the verification and conclusive evidence clause will be considered in 
isolation without regard to its interaction with other clauses. Bookkeeping or paper errors 
are not the concern of the verification and conclusive evidence clause. They are easily 
rectified. It is fraud or forgery that is the problem as the resulting loss must often fall on 
innocent shoulders. 
 
The effect of the verification and conclusive evidence clause extends beyond errors or 
omissions that have actually been detected. From the bank’s perspective, this is one of its 
innovations, addressing the biggest weakness in the Greenwood duty, the requirement of 
knowledge. For more than a century, banks have sought, with scant success, judicial 
recognition for the proposition that the customer has an implied duty to examine his bank 
statements; an argument rejected, for example, by the Privy Council in Tai Hing Cotton 
Mill.  
 
4.1 An “Account Stated”? 
Edwin Mujih has argued that Tai Hing Cotton Mill could have been decided differently, 
based on the “settled account” defence, also known as an “account stated”, citing authority 
predating Macmillan and Greenwood.750 Ellinger, Lomnicka, Hooley751 explain the 
significance of an account stated: The “customer and the bank would lose the right to query 
the correctness of given items once the bank statement or the pass–book became an account 
stated.”752  
                                                
750 Edwin C Mujih “Could ‘Tai Hing’ Have Been Decided Differently?” (1998) Tr. LR, 129. 
751 E P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and Richard Hooley Modern Banking Law (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
752 Ibid, at 225. 
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Mujih’s argument is relevant to the debate on the acceptability of the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause, for if he is correct, it would imply common law support for the 
customer’s obligation to examine bank statements.753 Devaynes v Noble: Clayton’s case 
(1816),754 is Mujih’s main authority. Here the court adopted a Master’s report on the facts 
and held that a customer’s silence after receipt of his bank statement was acquiescence in 
its accuracy. A dictum by Sir J Cross in Ex parte Thomas Randleson755 (1833) is in 
support756 although no reference was made to Clayton’s case. However, Chatterton v 
London and County Bank757 (1891) diverged from this view and in Kepitigalla758 (1909) 
Bray J was dismissive: “I know of no authority in this country for this proposition.”759 It 
would lead to absurd results, he said.760 Bray J endorsed the following statement by Bowen 
LJ in the Court of Appeal in Vagliano Brothers: “But there was no evidence to shew what, 
as between a customer and his banker, is the implied contract as to the settlement of 
account by such a dealing with the pass–book, or that, having regard to the ordinary course 
of dealing between a banker and his customers, the plaintiff had done anything which can 
be considered a neglect of his duty to the bank or negligence on his part.”761 While Bray J 
said this dictum was not doubted in the subsequent House of Lords decision, on further 
appeal in Vagliano Brothers, 762 he seems to have overlooked this statement by Lord 
                                                
753 See Mark Hapgood  Paget’s Law of Banking (11th ed, Butterworths, London, Edinburgh & Dublin, 1996), 
162–163; Mujih “Could ‘Tai Hing’ Have Been Decided Differently? (1998) Tr. LR, 129. 
754 35 ER 767 at 778. 
755 (1832–1833) Deacon & Chitty Reports 534.     
756 Ibid, at 541: “The only inference, therefore, that can be drawn of any entry in the pass–book is, that the 
customer, by keeping the book, admits the statement in it to be correct.”  
757 The Times, 21 January 1891. 
758 Kepitigalla Rubber Estates Limited v Bank of India Limited [1909] 2 KB 1010 at 1026. 
759 Ibid, at 1027.  
760 Ibid, at 1029. 
761 (1889) 23 QBD 243 at 263. 
762 [1909] 2 KB 1010 at 1028. 
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Halsbury: “Was not the customer bound to know the contents of his own passbook?”763 
Lord Halsbury’s dictum suggests that the customer may be bound by the contents of his 
passbook. Nevertheless, the weight of authority is against the “settled account” defence in 
the bank–customer context in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.  
 
Recent editions of Paget764 deal with the matter more cursorily than the 9th edition, but they 
are to the same effect: bank statements do not constitute an “account stated” unless there is 
agreement to that effect.765 The reasoning in the latest edition is based on the absence of a 
common law obligation on the customer to check his bank statements.766 Ellinger, 
Lomnicka and Hooley in the 4th edition of Modern Banking Law, agreed that passbooks and 
bank statements are not regarded in English law as constituting an “account stated”.767 This 
was supported by Ellinger, writing in the Canadian Business Law Journal: “The attempt to 
resort to the doctrine of account stated in the context of periodic statements respecting bank 
accounts is highly artificial.”768 Older editions of Paget769 and Modern Banking Law,770 
however, supported the logic of a bank statement constituting an “account stated”, a 
position recently endorsed by Singapore’s Court of Appeal in Pertamina Energy Trading 
Limited v Credit Suisse.771   
 
                                                
763 The Governor and Company of The Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers [1891] AC 107 at 116. 
764 10th edition (1989), 11th edition (1996), 12th edition (2003) and 13th edition (2007).  
765 Mark Hapgood  (ed) Paget’s Law of Banking, (12th ed) para 11.7, (13th ed) para 11.7; Maurice Megrah and 
F R Ryder Paget’s Law of Banking, (9th ed, London, Butterworths, 1982), 105, 108. 
766 Hapgood (ed) Paget’s Law of Banking (13th ed) para 11.7. 
767 E P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and Richard Hooley Modern Banking Law (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 
2006), 225. 
768 E P Ellinger in “Reflections on Recent Developments Concerning the Relationship of Banker and 
Customer” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 129 at 135. 
769 Maurice Megrah and F R Ryder, Paget’s Law of Banking, (9th ed, London, Butterworths, 1982), 104. 
770 E P Ellinger and Eva Lomnicka Modern Banking Law, (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 1995), 172. 
771 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 296. See also the view of Cons J in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Tai Hing 
Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 560. 
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The 9th edition of Paget, after explaining that statements of account are the modern 
successor to the passbook,772 said: “The proper function of the passbook should have been 
to constitute a conclusive record of the transactions between banker and customer, but it 
never acquired that status; it has never been regarded unquestionably as an account stated 
and the modern replacement of the passbook would seem to be no different.”773 The latter 
part of this statement was effectively endorsed four years later in Tai Hing Cotton Mill, 
when the Privy Council emphatically rejected an implied duty on the customer to examine 
his bank statements and report errors to the bank.774 The absence of an obligation on the 
customer to examine his bank statements is fatal to the “account stated” argument.775  
 
In contrast, Ross Cranston776 supports the current position on a customer’s duty to examine 
his bank statements, saying that the purpose of bank statements is to inform the customer 
and not to benefit the bank.777 Roy Goode agrees, as the purpose of bank statements is to 
give the customer “a record of the movements on his account.”778 The point is obviously 
debatable. The banks in Tai Hing Cotton Mill did not rely on Clayton’s case779 and the 
“settled account” argument before the Hong Kong Court of Appeal or the Privy Council, 
presumably because the law on this issue was then settled. Ellinger in 1988 expressed the 
                                                
772 See discussion by Ellinger, Lomnicka Modern Banking Law, 225. 
773 Maurice Megrah and F R Ryder, Paget’s Law of Banking, ( 9th ed, London, Butterworths, 1982), 104. 
774 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd, [1986] AC 80 (PC) at 101, 104 and 107. 
775 See Mark Hapgood (ed) Paget’s Law of Banking (11th ed, Butterworths, London, Edinburgh & Dublin, 
1996), 162–163. 
776 Ross Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2002). 
777 Ibid, at 164. 
778 R M Goode “Comments on Peter Ellinger’s Paper” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 179 at 180. 
779 Devaynes v Noble: Clayton’s case (1816) 35 ER 767 at 778. 
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view that it is “unlikely that the argument concerning the account stated will be raised in 
future cases”,780 but the position in Singapore is less certain in light of Pertamina. 
 
Given the uncertainty, banks seeking to render customers’ statements “accounts stated” 
must use the T&C and the duty to examine the bank statements must be an essential 
ingredient. An alternative provision could be that the customer is deemed to be familiar 
with the contents of his bank statements a set number of days after receipt or dispatch. This 
would deem the customer to have the necessary knowledge for the Greenwood estoppel to 
arise. It is submitted that an express verification obligation on the customer is preferable in 
that it explicitly tells the customer what action is required. 
 
4.2 Public Policy 
Turning now to the conclusive effect of the verification clause, a preliminary issue is its 
validity on public policy grounds. This does not seem to have arisen in any reported case 
concerning a current account but it has in the context of bank guarantees. In Bache & Co 
(London) Ltd v Banque Vernes et Commerciale de Paris SA,781  notice to a guarantor (bank) 
of default of payment by a customer was conclusive as to the amount of the bank’s liability 
to the holder of the guarantee. This meant that no evidence could be lead to dispute the 
amount of the indebtedness under the guarantee although separate proceedings could be 
instituted to correct any error. The Court of Appeal (England) rejected the argument that 
the clause was contrary to public policy for ousting the jurisdiction of the court. The court 
                                                
780 E P Ellinger “Reflections on Recent Developments Concerning the Relationship of Banker and Customer” 
(1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 129 at 135. 
781 [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 437. 
 127
referred to the Australian decision of Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd,782 which 
drew a distinction between a clause denying access to the courts and a clause setting out the 
method to ascertain rights or facts.783 The Singapore High Court, in Bangkok Bank Ltd v 
Cheng Lip Kwong,784 cited Bache v Banque Vernes with approval, accepting that absent 
fraud or patent error, a certificate of indebtedness issued under a conclusive evidence clause 
was effective as such.785 In Bangkok Bank, the contract provided that the amount owing 
under a guarantee would be determined by a conclusive evidence certificate. Yong Pung 
How J (as he then was), upholding the clause, explained that it was “the dictates of 
commerce”786 that led to the use of the conclusive evidence certificate and the practice was 
supported by the regulation of banks coupled with their complete honesty and reliability.787 
This was followed in the Singapore High Court in Oversea–Chinese Banking Corporation 
Ltd v The Timekeeper Singapore Pte Ltd & Ors.788 In the same court, Judith Prakash J, in 
Bok Chee Seng Construction Pte Ltd v Development Bank of Singapore Ltd,789 stated obiter 
that conclusive evidence clauses should be interpreted strictly, according to their terms 
because they oust the jurisdiction of the courts, but, it seems, that they do not infringe 
public policy.790  
 
Lord Denning MR said in Bache v Banque Vernes that the use of the conclusive evidence 
clause was “only acceptable because the bankers or brokers who insert them are known to 
                                                
782 [1935] 53 CLR 643. 
783 Ibid, at 657. 
784 [1989] SLR 1154. 
785 Ibid, at 1159. 
786 Ibid, at 1159. 
787 Ibid. 
788 [1997] 2 SLR 526. 
789 [2002] 2 SLR 61. 
790 Ibid, at 66 –7. 
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be honest and reliable men of business who are most unlikely to make a mistake.”791 V K 
Rajah J, in the Singapore High Court in Standard Chartered Bank v Neocorp International 
Ltd,792 rejected Lord Denning’s “sole rationale”,793 noting that the clauses are used and 
accepted in many other commercial endeavours such as construction agreements, and 
preferring to base recognition of such clauses on the principle that parties must honour the 
terms of their contracts. V K Rajah J said that there is a rebuttable presumption against 
giving one party the right to conclusively determine issues pertaining to a claim and that a 
conclusive evidence clause should not be used to make a false claim.794  
 
The conclusive evidence clause in bank T&C is used by banks to identify their mistakes 
and can be used to avoid liability for payments without a mandate. It therefore operates 
differently from the conclusive evidence clauses considered in Bache, Dobbs and the 
Singapore cases discussed above. It is submitted that this difference is not material to the 
issue of validity on public policy grounds and it is unlikely that these clauses in bank T&C 
would now be regarded as offending public policy.795 They have been enforced in a number 
of cases, in Singapore and other jurisdictions, to be discussed below.  
 
                                                
791 [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 437 at 440. 
792 [2005] 2 SLR 345. 
793 Ibid, at 353. 
794 Ibid, at 354–5. 
795 See Paget’s Law of Banking 2003 at 172. 
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4.3 Operation of the Clause 
Opponents of the verification and conclusive evidence clause argue that the business of 
banking is the business of the banks.796 Their point is that “customers are entitled to rely on 
banks performing their own functions to the highest professional standards.”797 In 
particular, they say that banks must accept that they are liable to pay out only on an 
authentic mandate from the customer. As Geva puts it, the bank is primarily responsible for 
detecting forgeries and unauthorised payment orders.798 Poh Chu Chai is a staunch critic of 
the clause. He argues that the verification and conclusive evidence clause allows banks to 
shift their responsibility to verify the customer’s mandate.799 This is a serious allegation 
because payment on a valid mandate is fundamental to the banking relationship. 
 
Assuming that the customer is diligent about checking his statements and reporting any 
errors, the verification and conclusive evidence clause has no impact on the risk for 
unauthorised debits. Once notified of an error, the bank ordinarily becomes liable to make 
correcting entries in the customer’s account. In these circumstances, the clause does not 
alleviate the bank of the responsibility to pay only on an authentic mandate. The 
verification and conclusive evidence clause may seem to operate harshly against a dilatory 
customer800 in the event of a one–off fraud.801 Had the customer complied with his 
contractual duty to verify the account entries and notify the bank of the error, the bank 
                                                
796 See, for example, Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 1 AC 80 at 106.  
797 Banking Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee, (HMSO, London, Feb. 1989, Cm 
622), at 43.  
798 Benjamin Geva “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparitive Aspects, Policies and a Model for 
Reform” (1998) 114 LQR 250 at 288. 
799Poh Chu Chai Banker and Customer (5th ed, Lexis Nexis, 2004), 921. See also 912, 915. 
800 The customer who does not check his statements regularly or at all. 
801 This is one of Geva’s criticisms of the clause: Benjamin Geva “Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills 
of Exchange Act – Some Doctrinal Aspects” (1981–2) 6 Can Bus LJ 269 at 323. 
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would ordinarily have to bear the loss. The conclusive evidence clause, however, enables 
the bank to assert the conclusiveness of the bank statement after the stipulated period of 
time and saddle the customer with the loss. Failure by the dilatory customer to notify the 
bank of a one–off unauthorised debit is not the cause of the loss. The detection occurs after 
the fraud and notification cannot prevent the loss from occurring.  
 
The benefit of having a chance to recover the money from the fraudster is, however, 
significant and should not be overlooked. The bank’s chances of recovery from a thief, 
albeit remote, would generally be enhanced by acting promptly. We have seen that in 
Greenwood the bank’s loss of its right of action against the customer’s wife was sufficient 
to constitute the necessary detriment for the estoppel to arise.802 In that case the bank 
actually lost its right of action through the death of the wife. In Ogilvie v West Australian 
Mortgage and Agency Corporation Limited803 (1896), the Privy Council found detriment in 
the forger absconding out of the jurisdiction of the court, underscoring the importance of 
prompt notification to the bank. 
 
The one–off fraud is not the primary target of a verification and conclusive evidence clause. 
It is directed particularly at the ongoing fraudulent scheme of which there can be few better 
examples than Tai Hing Cotton Mill. There, losses amounting to about HK$5.5 million 
accumulated over a period of five to six years from about 300 forged cheques in 
circumstances where little supervision was exerted over the dishonest employee who 
                                                
802 Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited [1933] AC 51 at 58. 
803 [1896] AC 257. 
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occasioned the loss and no significant verification of bank transactions was undertaken.804 
The majority of the loss could have been avoided if it had been detected and reported to the 
bank at an early stage. The Privy Council’s advice to deny the banks relief prompted the 
Jack Report to recommend that the law be reformed to give banks a limited defence of 
contributory negligence in appropriate cases. 805 Khoo Tian Hock is a less spectacular but 
equally supportive example. In any fraudulent scheme, if the first or early withdrawals are 
detected and reported by the customer, the scheme can be arrested in its tracks. The 
recommendation of the Jack Report in this regard has not been implemented in England 
and finds no expression in Singapore. 
 
To summarise, the above analysis of the operation of a verification and conclusive evidence 
clause reveals that: 
1. It does not penalise a customer who is the innocent victim of a fraud but who detects 
the error in his bank statement and notifies the bank punctually. 
2. It penalises a dilatory customer where the fraud is perpetrated repeatedly over a 
period of time. Of course the equities in such a case are ambiguous. Tai Hing Cotton 
Mill is an example. 
3. It penalises the dilatory customer in the case of a one–off fraud despite the absence of 
a causal connection between the customer’s dilatoriness and the bank’s loss. The 
customer’s neglect does, however, deprive the bank of acting to recover the loss. 
 
                                                
804 The finding of the trial judge which was accepted on appeal to the Privy Council. See [1986] 1 AC 80 at 
99. 
805 Banking Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee (Feb, 1989), at 43. 
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Poh Chu Chai’s criticism that a verification and conclusive evidence clause enables a bank 
to shift its responsibility to examine the customer’s mandate is correct in specific situations, 
but only in an ex post facto sense. The verification and conclusive evidence clause does not 
relieve banks from the responsibility of paying only on valid mandates, though they may 
rely on the clause to escape the consequences of breaching that duty in limited situations. 
This is not a radical departure from the common law: in Greenwood, the customer’s failure 
to comply with his duty to report known forgery relieved the bank of responsibility for 
negligently paying without a mandate. In other words, while the verification and conclusive 
evidence clause may enable banks to escape the common law consequences of paying 
without a mandate, it does not exonerate banks from their responsibility to verify the 
customer’s mandate. This responsibility remains intact.  
 
As a matter of practice, banks do not examine mandates, for example cheques, that they 
receive for transactions below a certain amount806 because the time and cost involved is not 
warranted by the potential loss. While insulating the bank, insertion of a verification and 
conclusive evidence clause does not altogether remove the risks entailed by this practice. 
Opponents of the clause would argue that if banks choose to conduct their business in a 
riskier way to maximize profits, they should also bear the consequent losses.807 They 
should not be able to increase their profits and pass the attendant risk on to the hapless 
customer. Benjamin Geva does not support exonerating banks in these circumstances: 
                                                
806 See e.g. David Hay (Gen Ed) Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore “Finance and Banking” vol 12 (Lexis Nexis 
Singapore, 2002) para 140.658 fn 4; J R S Revell Banking and Electronic Fund Transfers 1983, at 18, 82; 
R M Goode (editor) Electronic Banking – The Legal Implications  1985 “Introduction”, page X; Johanna 
Vroegop “The Legal Implications of Cheque Truncation” (1990) LMCLQ 244 at 250; see further 
discussion below, chapter 10.12. 
807 The view of the Privy Council in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 
1 AC 80 at 106. 
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“Technological enhancements should not be used as an excuse to neglect basic 
responsibilities.”808  
 
The point remains, however, that the clause does not penalise the customer who fulfils his 
duty to verify and notify the bank. Rather it is the bank that will lose as their prospects of 
recovery from the thief are precarious. Banks do not know in advance which of their 
customers fulfil the verification duty and which do not. They do not therefore choose with 
which customers to be more careful and with which they can throw caution to the wind. 
Even if they did, it cannot be suggested that banks examine cheques to discern whether 
they have been written by a diligent or a dilatory customer and on that basis either adopt a 
careful or a careless examination of the cheque for compliance with the mandate. In 
choosing to automatically process cheques up to a certain amount, there is a risk that a 
customer will query a transaction and that the bank will be in breach. This, it will be 
argued, is one of the advantages of the verification and conclusive evidence clause; it 
respects the basic tenet of the relationship, that the bank may only reimburse itself to the 
extent of the customer’s authority, provided the customer has verified and notified and not 
breached its duties of care. 
 
4.4 Benjamin Geva’s Standards 
Geva has put forward a proposal for the allocation of loss between bank and customer 
arising from a forged cheque.809 His goals are “loss reduction” and “loss distribution”.810 In 
                                                
808 Benjamin Geva “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparative Aspects, Policies and a Model for 
Reform” (1998) 114 LQR 250 at 289. 
809 Ibid. See also Geva “Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills of Exchange Act – Some Doctrinal 
Aspects” (1981–82) 6 Can Bus LJ 269 from 313. In the context of Electronic Funds Transfers he expresses 
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doing so, he strives to meet the following standards that would be widely accepted as 
desirable in governing the bank–customer relationship: 
1. The bank is primarily responsible for detecting forged and unauthorised mandates.811 
This comes from the common law: the bank must act in accordance with its mandate 
and may not reimburse itself if it fails to do so, irrespective of fault. Erosion of this 
principle is controversial, it undermines one of the fundamental bases on which the 
banking contract is founded.  
2. From point 1 it flows that banks should be encouraged to invest in mechanisms to 
detect forgery.812  
3. Linked to points 1 and 2, the bank is the “superior prepayment detector.”813 The 
problem of allocating losses from forgery and alteration only arises if the bank pays a 
forged or altered instrument. The primary goal is to prevent the loss from arising at 
all. 
4. “The bank is the better risk bearer or insurer.”814 The bank can distribute the losses, 
for example through bank charges or insurance.815 The customer, on the other hand, is 
a poor risk bearer; he cannot distribute the losses and may be crippled by them.816  
                                                                                                                                               
many of the same sentiments, see Benjamin Geva “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds 
Transfers” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 207, which is discussed in more detail in chapter 10, “Electronic 
Banking”. 
810 “Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills of Exchange Act – Some Doctrinal Aspects” (1981–82) 6 Can 
Bus LJ 269 from 313. 
811 Geva “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparative Aspects, Policies and a Model for Reform” 
(1998) 114 LQR 250 at 288. See also Benjamin Geva “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic 
Funds Transfers” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 207 at 228. 
812 Ibid, at 285. See also Benjamin Geva “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” 
(2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 207 at 229. 
813 Ibid, at 288. 
814 Ibid at 285. 
815 Ibid. 
816 Ibid, at 285. See also Benjamin Geva  “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” 
(2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 207 at 231, 237. 
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5. The rules for allocation of liability between bank and customer for forgery and 
unauthorised alterations should be certain, fair, and reduce risk.817 Risk reduction 
refers to linking liability to fault so as to “encourage diligence and the maintenance of 
sound practices to detect and eliminate forgery losses.”818 
6. Allocation on the basis of negligence is unattractive as the determination of fault819 
and apportionment of fault for contributory negligence could involve expensive 
litigation.820 
 
It is interesting to evaluate the verification and conclusive evidence clause against Geva’s 
standards: 
1. The clause does not change the bank’s primary responsibility. A customer who 
notifies the bank of an unauthorised transaction will be reimbursed, subject no doubt 
to an investigation into the veracity of the customer’s allegation and ascertaining that 
the customer has not breached his duties of care. 
2. The point about forgery detection mechanisms is an important one. Edward Rubin 
says: “Banks design the system, and banks can avoid losses by restructuring it, by 
training their employees or by developing new technologies.”821 He appears to 
suggest that a bank’s failure to invest in the research and development of new 
technologies is not, but should be, regarded as “fault” when evaluating liability for an 
                                                
817 Ibid, at 286. 
818 Ibid, at 285. 
819 Ibid.,at 287. Geva refers to the customer’s fault; later, at 289 he writes that the bank’s fault is relatively 
easier to determine. 
820 Ibid, at 287. Benjamin Geva  “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” (2003) 38 
Can Bus LJ 207 at 229, 237. 
821 “Efficiency, Equity, and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4” E Rubin 42 Ala L Rev (1991) 551 at 
568. 
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unauthorised debit.822 Customers, on the other hand, cannot change the system or be 
expected to invest in it.823 Rubin has a valid point in principle but failure to invest 
sufficiently in research and development cannot approach fault without evidence that 
investment in research would have yielded effective technology. Rubin’s criticism 
must be confined to known advancements that banks have failed to embrace. If no 
such advancements exist, the point should not be over–emphasized. A second point is 
that there is no logic in any suggestion that the verification and conclusive evidence 
clause discourages investment in technological advancements. As the bank’s primary 
responsibility remains unchanged under the verification and conclusive evidence 
clause, they are vulnerable to fraud and forgery and have every incentive to enhance 
their detection mechanisms.  
3. The bank is the superior prepayment detector. Geva may be referring to the fact that 
the bank is the entity that has the last opportunity to avoid ensuing loss by declining 
payment; and it has the means to invest in up–to–date technology to aide that task. As 
stated above, banks can only be criticised if they fail to deploy known forgery 
detection methods. On the other hand, the customer, through verification and 
notification, is the superior post–payment detector. Although the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause focuses not on prevention but on cure, it is very effective 
at this level. It should not, and it does not, detract from the desirability of prepayment 
detection, which links up with the points 1 and 2 above. 
4. It is agreed that the bank is the better risk bearer. However, and this point seems to be 
overlooked in much of the criticism of the verification and conclusive evidence 
                                                
822 Ibid, at 569. 
823 Ibid. 
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clause, the clause does not automatically alter the risk between bank and customer for 
unauthorised debits. If the customer fulfils his duty of verification and notification, 
the risk remains with the bank. And the verification and notification duty is not 
ordinarily an onerous, difficult or expensive duty to fulfil. The second point is that 
while the bank may be the better risk bearer, it does not follow that it should bear the 
loss. While the “means test”824 has historically been a factor in deciding policy issues 
relating to liability, it has its limitations;825 arguments for liability based on who is 
best able to bear it or insure against it, have been described by P S Atiyah as “going 
out of fashion today”.826 Taken to its logical extreme, it could lead to the downfall of 
a bank. Passing on the loss, whether to insurance companies or back to bank 
customers in the form of bank charges, is hardly a satisfactory answer. Keith 
Perrett827 notes that distributing the loss through bank charges means that all 
customers subsidize careless, and in some cases reckless, customers, who, in turn, 
have no incentive to change their habits.828 Loss reduction, it is submitted, is superior 
to loss distribution and the verification and conclusive evidence clause is particularly 
suited to reduce losses from unauthorised debits. 
5. The merits of certainty and fairness in the law generally, and in this particular 
scenario, are undeniable. Risk reduction is equally desirable. Encouraging diligence 
and sound practices for detection and elimination of forgery losses, insofar as it 
pertains to banks, has already been covered in points 1 and 2. Insofar as it applies to 
                                                
824 Term used by E P Ellinger in “Reflections on Recent Developments Concerning the Relationship of 
Banker and Customer” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 129 at 132. 
825 See statement to this effect by Elisabeth Peden, “Policy Considerations Behind Implications of Terms in 
Law” (2001) 117 LQR 459 at 471. 
826 P S Atiyah  An Introduction to the Law of Contract (1995, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 5th ed), 206. 
827 Keith W Perrett “Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own 
Business?” (1999) 14 BFLR 245. 
828 Ibid, at 271. 
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customers, the verification and conclusive evidence clause is well targeted to meet 
this goal. It is an excellent tool to detect fraud, albeit after–the–fact, and while it 
cannot eliminate losses, it can reduce them by stemming fraud before it is repeated. 
The clause fares well on a measure of certainty: the bank is liable, irrespective of 
fault, provided that the customer fulfilled his duty to verify and notify and is not in 
breach of his duties. The issue of fairness is more problematic. There is no doubt that 
in some cases the clause operates fairly, such as in the case of a diligent customer 
who reports errors to his bank promptly. So too, in a Tai Hing Cotton Mill scenario 
for example, many would consider it fair for a properly drafted clause to penalize the 
dilatory customer. In that case, four of the nine judges829 considered it appropriate for 
the customer to be sanctioned for apathy and five,830 while unwilling to sanction the 
customer, conceded that the customer’s conduct was irresponsible. Nevertheless, the 
scope for harsh application of the clause has been acknowledged above. This will be 
discussed further below. 
6. Geva criticizes the allocation of losses from forgery on the basis of customer fault.831 
The argument that follows was advanced by Edward Rubin in 1991 in the context of 
proposed revisions to the United States’ Uniform Commercial Code.832 The 
allocation of loss in the payment system on the basis of fault undermines the 
efficiency of the system in a number of ways. It can lead to customers taking 
                                                
829 See Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd, [1986] AC 80 (PC) at 100. The court a quo 
found in favour of two of the three banks. The Hong Kong Court of Appeal found in favour of the banks, 
[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555. 
830 In the Privy Council. 
831 B Geva “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparitive Aspects, Policies and a model for Reform” 
(1998) 114 LQR 250 at 285, fn194. 
832 E Rubin “Efficiency, Equity, and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4” (1991) 42 Ala LR 551 from 
561. 
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disproportionate loss avoidance measures;833 it causes heavy losses to be suffered by 
a single customer;834  allocating the loss through litigation is expensive.835 Efficiency 
of the payment system can be better achieved by spreading the bulk of the loss and 
allocating the balance to the party in the best position to have avoided it to encourage 
loss avoidance.836 This means assigning the bulk of liability to the bank with some 
liability to the customer sufficient to incentivise him to take precautions; the bank can 
spread the losses and take loss avoidance measures.837 Rubin adds: “Beyond a certain 
point, liability simply punishes the consumer without achieving any increased level of 
loss reduction.”838  
 
In reply to Rubin’s comments, the “fault” that forms the basis for loss allocation in the 
context of the verification and conclusive evidence clause is the failure to notify the bank of 
errors in the bank statement. It is not apparent what disproportionate loss avoidance 
measures Rubin sees customers taking; the required loss avoidance measure is verification 
and notification, this is not disproportionate either in relation to the benefit to be obtained 
or having regard to the measure itself. There is, unavoidably, the need for fact finding once 
the customer notifies the bank of an error in his statement. The drawback of expensive 
litigation is not inevitable but it is an unfortunate possibility. Once the facts are established, 
however, the allocation of loss under the clause is straightforward. Fault–based liability, 
despite its drawbacks, is fundamental to our legal system, criminal and civil. A glance at 
                                                
833 Ibid, at 564. 
834 Ibid. 
835 Ibid, at 565. 
836 Ibid, at 564–566. 
837 Ibid, at 564. 
838 Ibid, at 568. 
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the contents pages of numerous tort and criminal law textbooks supports this view.839 
Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort states: “In most cases liability is based upon fault: sometimes 
an intention to injure is required but more often negligence is sufficient.”840 In the context 
of the criminal law, Criminal Law by Chan, Hor and Ramraj says: “One of the core 
assumptions of the criminal law is that criminal liability should reflect culpability or degree 
of fault of the accused”.841 It is the accepted basis for determining the incidence of liability. 
Rubin’s criticism that failure to verify and notify can lead to heavy losses for the customer 
because there is no spreading of the loss is valid. 
 
4.5 Bank Negligence  
The issue of negligence in the context of the verification and conclusive evidence clause 
arises in different senses. First, how does negligence by the bank in the payment process 
interact with a customer’s failure to fulfil his verification and notification duty? The second 
point was raised in the discussion above of the Greenwood duty:842 is the customer excused 
for failing to verify or notify if his failure is not negligent? In other words, is his obligation 
to verify and notify absolute or is it a duty of care? Third, can a customer who verifies or 
notifies negligently, nevertheless escape liability on the basis that he fulfilled his 
contractual duty. These questions all raise issues regarding the interpretation of the 
                                                
839 For example, John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9th ed, LBC Information Services, 1998); R F V Heuston 
and R A Buckley Salmond & Heuston on the Law of Torts (21st ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 1996); 
Anthony M Dugdale (Gen ed) Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (19th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006); W V 
H Rogers Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (16th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002); Chan Wing Cheong, 
Michael Hor Yew Meng, Victor V Ramraj Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law (Singapore, Lexis 
Nexis, 2005); J C Smith Smith & Hogan Criminal Law (10th ed, Butterworths Lexis Nexis, 2002). 
840 Rogers Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort para 3.1 (2). 
841 Chan, Hor Ramraj Criminal Law 139. 
842 See chapter 3.8.4. 
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contract, as the verification and notification duty is contractually imposed. The first and 
second questions are relevant to fairness and the third will be considered later.  
 
4.5.1 The Verification and Conclusive Evidence Clause and Bank Negligence 
Whether the verification and conclusive evidence clause protects or should protect the bank 
in the event of its own negligence is a thorny issue. The T&C may be explicit on this point. 
In Singapore, HSBC,843 expressly uses the verification clause to protect itself against fraud, 
forgery or negligence. The other Singapore T&C studied here do not mention negligence 
but are in broad terms capable of interpretation to cover bank negligence. The operation of 
the clause where the bank has been negligent may seem unfair given the bank’s strict 
common law duty to pay only on an authentic mandate. This criticism highlights one of 
Geva’s principles listed above: that the bank is the superior prepayment detector and it 
should not be able to shirk this responsibility lightly. Some would go so far as to maintain 
that a bank is prevented from contracting out of its own negligence on grounds of public 
policy.844 The Singapore and United Kingdom legislatures did not, however, share this 
view when they enacted the Unfair Contract Terms Act, which does not render void an 
exclusion of liability for negligence other than negligence causing death or personal injury, 
and specifically envisages that such a provision could be reasonable. One aspect of this 
debate is whether in terms of the UCTA it is reasonable for the verification clause to excuse 
the bank of negligent breach of its duty to pay on a valid mandate.845  
 
                                                
843 HSBC Part A 3.1. 
844 Discussed by Bradley Crawford Crawford and Falconbridge Banking and Bills of Exchange: a treatise on 
the law of banks, banking, bills of exchange and the payment system in Canada  (8th ed, Toronto, Canada 
Law Book Inc, 1986), 748–749 and 774. 
845 The application of the UCTA to the verification and conclusive evidence clause is discussed in chapter 7 
below. 
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In Elis Tjoa v United Overseas Bank  the Singapore High Court said, without much 
discussion, that the verification and conclusive evidence clause in question was “reasonable 
irrespective of whether UOB was negligent or not.”846 In Pertamina, the court upheld a 
verification and conclusive evidence clause. The court described the conduct of the bank, 
through its officer, as bordering “precariously on negligence”.847 No such finding was 
made, however, and the question of its interaction with a verification and conclusive 
evidence clause was not considered; the court did indicate that a case might have been 
made for contributory negligence.848  
 
The effectiveness of a verification clause where the bank has been negligent is an issue 
which has arisen relatively frequently in Canada. Keith Perrett849 writes that it is 
“surprising that, after almost a century of consideration, Canadian courts still consider it an 
open question whether these clauses are enforceable where the financial institution has been 
negligent in the administration of the customer’s account.”850 This is evident in the series of 
cases since the seminal decision in Arrow Transfer v Royal Bank of Canada851 in 1972 with 
the two camps lining up behind the views in that case of the majority (“the ‘plain meaning’ 
approach”)852 and Laskin J (the “contracts of adhesion” approach).853 A consideration of 
the Canadian cases is instructive in highlighting the issue in a variety of circumstances. 
Arrow Transfer did not involve negligence by the bank but it is apparent that Laskin J 
                                                
846 Elis Tjoa v United Overseas Bank [2003] 1 SLR 747 at 769. 
847 Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 306. 
848 Ibid. 
849 Keith Perrett, “Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own 
Business?” (1999) 14 BFLR 245. 
850 Ibid, at 246. 
851 (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81. 
852 Keith Perrett “Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own 
Business?” (1999) 14 BFLR 245 at 247. 
853 Ibid, at 247. See also Arrow Transfer v Royal Bank of Canada (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81 at 97. 
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(dissenting) took the view, in the context of a broader customer duty of care, that the bank 
should not be able to point to the customer’s breach where it was guilty of negligence.854 
Arrow Transfer is discussed in more detail below.855 In the United States, the Uniform 
Commercial Code section 4–406 bars a customer who has failed to verify from claiming 
against the bank unless the bank was negligent in which case it allows for an apportionment 
of loss.  
 
The Canadian Cases 
Le Cercle Universitaire d’Ottawa v National Bank of Canada856 (1987), came before the 
Ontario High Court of Justice. The bookkeeper of the customer fraudulently deposited 
cheques, payable to the customer, into the bookkeeper’s own account with the same bank. 
The customer sued the bank for negligence. The bank admitted that it was negligent in not 
detecting the payee discrepancy but raised in its defence the customer’s failure to notify it 
of the omissions in their monthly statements, as required by their contract. It was held that 
the clause protected the bank. It was clear, unambiguous and brought home the customer’s 
obligation. Steele J said it was hard to see what the clause applied to if not “all aspects of 
negligence by the bank.”857 The customer’s argument based on Tai Hing Cotton Mill and 
the minority reasoning in Arrow Transfer, failed. 
 
                                                
854 Arrow Transfer v Royal Bank of Canada (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81 at 101. 
855 In chapter 6.2. 
856 (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 147. 
857 Ibid, at 150. In Arrow Transfer v Royal Bank of Canada (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81at 98, Laskin J used the 
same test to conclude that forgery was not covered by that verification clause. Steele J’s conclusion on this 
point was criticized by Lambert JA in Cavell Developments Ltd v The Royal Bank of Canada (1991) 78 
DLR (4th) 512 (BCCA) at 519. 
 144
Royal Bank of Canada v Larry Creighton Pro Corp858 (1989) in the Alberta Court of 
Appeal is a refreshing contrast from the familiar scenario of the dishonest employee 
cheating his employer (and potentially his employer’s bank). The dispute was over the rate 
of interest charged by the bank on certain loans. The court found that a lower rate than that 
claimed by the bank applied. The bank argued that the verification and conclusive evidence 
clause precluded the customer from complaining of the rate charged after the lapse of 30 
days. Stratton JA agreed with Laskin J in Arrow Transfer that verification clauses should be 
strictly construed. He went on to find that the verification clause expressly applied to the 
current account, but while the interest charges on the loans were debited to the current 
account, the clause did not have the effect of acknowledging that the correct interest rate 
had been applied to the loans. 
 
Kelly Funeral Homes Ltd v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce859 (1990) was also a 
decision of the Ontario High Court of Justice. The manager of the customer stole by 
negotiating cheques drawn by him on the customer’s account. He was an authorized 
signatory of the customer’s cheques and there was therefore no forgery of the drawer’s 
signature. In relation to one group of cheques, however, the bank had been given 
instructions for the cheques to be signed by two signatories, which instruction the bank had 
not observed. The bank was therefore in breach of its mandate in paying these cheques. The 
account agreement contained a verification and conclusive evidence clause. It was held that 
the clause availed the bank. Walsh J’s cursory reasoning on this issue was that the customer 
could have discovered the bank’s failure by examining cancelled cheques as required by the 
                                                
858 [1989] 3 WWR 561 (Alta CA) 
859 (1990), 72 DLR (4th) 276. 
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verification clause. A persuasive factor was the inequity of leaving the bank to bear the loss 
of a fraud committed by the customer’s employee over a long period of time in an 
environment of inadequate accounting procedures.860 Walsh J went on to make a strong 
statement in support of the verification and conclusive evidence clause: “given the volume 
of transactions which pass through a bank daily and present–day computerized cheque–
processing systems which do not read signatures, it is not economically feasible to expect a 
bank to scrutinize every transaction that passes through a customer’s account. It surely 
makes sense, therefore, to shift the burden of monitoring its cheques to the customer who 
generally has far better opportunities of uncovering irregularities on the part of its 
employees. Any potential losses to the customer can be offset somewhat by the use of 
surety bonds and proper accounting procedures.”861 
 
In Cavell Developments Ltd v The Royal Bank of Canada862 (1991), the bank negligently 
honoured a company cheque signed by only one signing officer. The British Columbia 
Court of Appeal held that an account verification clause did not excuse the bank from its 
own negligence. The decision was based on a strict interpretation of the agreement and, in 
particular, an application of the rule that exclusion clauses capable of covering damage 
arising other than by negligence are interpreted as being restricted to such damage only, 
and not extending to negligence.863 In other words, clear words are required to exclude 
liability for negligence. In Cavell, the agreement was capable of applying to non–careless 
breaches of the bank mandate and did not have to include negligence to be meaningful. 
                                                
860 Ibid, at 284. 
861 Ibid, at 284–5. 
862 (1991) 78 DLR (4th) 512 (BCCA). 
863 Lord Greene MR’s dicta in Alderslade v Hendon Laundry Ltd [1945] 1 All ER 244 at 245 was cited and 
followed. 
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Lambert JA distinguished Kelly Funeral Homes on the basis that the bank in the latter was 
not found to be negligent.864 
 
Don Bodkin Leasing Ltd v The Toronto–Dominion Bank865 (1993) was decided by the 
Ontario Court (General Division). The customer’s accounting officer defrauded it by 
forging cheques and by diverting the proceeds of cheques intended for the issue of bank 
drafts. The court found that the forgeries were plausible and the bank was not negligent in 
failing to detect them.866 The forged cheques escaped detection because, although an officer 
of the company scanned the bank statements and examined the paid cheques, the modus 
operandi of the dishonest employee was to collect the statements and remove the forged 
cheques before the verification process was undertaken. What the customer did not do was 
match the cancelled cheques to the debit entries in the statement and hence the forgeries 
went undetected.  
 
The court found that the verification and conclusive evidence clause imposed a duty on the 
customer to examine the bank statements and cancelled cheques “in a sufficient and 
effectual manner”,867 that it had not done so, and that the clause protected the bank from 
liability for the forgeries despite the assumption that the bank was not authorized to hand 
over the statements and cancelled cheques to the dishonest employee. Ewaschuk J said: “it 
is far easier for the customer to detect the forgery by examining the cancelled cheques, or 
                                                
864 Cavell Developments Ltd v The Royal Bank of Canda (1991) 78 DLR (4th) 512 (BCCA) at 520. 
865 (1993) 14 OR (3d) 571 (Gen Div). 
866 Although this was not relevant to its common law duties. See (1993) 14 OR (3d) 571 at 579. 
867 (1993), 14 OR (3d) 571 at 582. 
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even when, as here, the cheque is ‘lifted’ by a rogue employee, to detect its absence”.868 In 
relation to the diversion of funds to another account, the court found that the bank was 
negligent in accepting oral instructions from the fraudulent employee. The issue therefore 
arose whether the verification and conclusive evidence clause applied where the bank had 
been negligent. The clause did not specify that it covered bank negligence but it did say that 
the bank would be “released from all claims”.869 It was held that the wording was wide 
enough to release the bank from a claim in negligence. 
 
In Alberta Ltd v Patel870 (1993), the Alberta Court of Appeal found the bank was negligent 
for transferring monies held in a term deposit on the authority of a single signing officer 
contrary to the customer’s resolution. The court, using the same reasoning as Lambert JA in 
Cavell Developments, held that the verification agreement did not avail the bank.871 
 
This survey of relatively recent Canadian cases shows how divided the courts are on the 
question whether the verification and conclusive evidence clause protects banks from their 
own negligence. The cases reflect divergent policy positions. Those opposed to the inroads 
made by the verification and conclusive evidence clause on the rights of customers, adopt a 
strict contractual approach to interpretation. They restrict protection of banks against their 
own negligence by demanding precise and explicit drafting. Those persuaded that the 
equities favour the banks are content with a less exacting standard of drafting. This view is 
                                                
868 Ibid, at 583. 
869 Ibid, at 580. 
870 [1993] 8 WWR 199 (Alta CA). 
871 Ibid, at 205. 
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supported by Carleton Roman Catholic Separate School Board v Ruddick and Others872 
(1994). The school board raised funds by issuing debentures. Its employee had a previous 
conviction for fraud but this was not known to the board at the time of employment. The 
employee cashed matured debentures over a period of years at three Canadian banks. Her 
modus operandi was to delete pertinent parts of the debentures in a way which the court 
found left them noticeably altered; this meant that the banks were negligent when paying 
them. The verification of the bank statements was the duty of the rogue employee and was 
therefore ineffective. In this respect the board was negligent. One of the issues for decision 
was whether a verification and notification clause availed the bank in respect of the 
debentures that it had cashed. Bell J commented that the cases of Kelly Funeral Homes, 
Don Bodkin, Cavell Developments and Le Cercle were not “entirely reconcilable”. He 
decided the matter on a point of interpretation, namely a “release from all claims” would 
excuse bank negligence but a “conclusively settled” clause would not.  
 
Implied Terms, the Verification and Conclusive Evidence Clause and Bank Negligence 
Another question is whether there is any scope for an implied term that the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause is not applicable where the bank has been negligent. This is 
obviously not feasible where the T&C expressly cover negligence. It is trite that terms 
should not be implied lightly; therefore any argument in favour of an implied term must 
overcome the law’s resistance to supplementing a contract in this way.  
 
Andrew Phang expresses the view that the grounds for implying a term in fact are narrow, 
being confined to the intention of the parties, while those for implying terms by law, not 
                                                
872 (1994) 45 ACWS (3d) 309. 
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having to accord with the intention of the parties, are wider.873 Although the grounds for 
terms implied by law may be based on wider policy considerations, it is submitted that it is 
harder to succeed in proving a term implied by law than in fact. The circumstances 
warranting a court’s intervention on the grounds of an implied term applying to all 
contracts of the same type, based on policy considerations, must be limited. The judiciary 
are particularly cautious about recognising terms implied by law and, it is submitted, prefer 
to find terms implied by the more concrete criterion of the parties’ mutual intention.  
 
In the context of the verification and conclusive evidence clause, the test of necessity for a 
term implied by law is unlikely to be satisfied. This discussion will therefore be confined to 
terms implied in fact. Discussion of a term implied in fact in the context of the verification 
and conclusive evidence clause is problematic from the outset. While the bank, through its 
lawyers and draftsmen, can be assumed to have directed its mind to the contract and to have 
an intention regarding the many issues it covers, most customers cannot. They may be 
unaware that there is a verification and conclusive evidence clause in their contract at all; 
even less can they be considered to have contemplated, at the time of contracting, how the 
clause will operate in various factual scenarios. According to Treitel, “the test of 
implication under the officious bystander test is subjective: what would the parties have 
agreed? – not what would reasonable persons in their position have agreed?”874 He 
identifies two situations in which terms will not be implied in fact: if one party is ignorant 
of the issue or the “facts on which the implication is to be based”;875 or if the parties have 
                                                
873 See Andrew Phang, “Implied Terms Revisited” [1990] JBL 394 at 394. Also Scally v Southern Health and 
Social Services Board [1991] 3 WLR 778 at 787. 
874 Treitel Contract, 204. 
875 Ibid. 
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opposite interests such that they would not have agreed to the same provisions in the 
term.876  
 
The mere fact that the parties have opposite interests in the matter should not, however, be 
fatal. In many situations one party will, perhaps grudgingly, know and accept that a 
particular term is necessary for the viability of the transaction or the willingness of the 
other party to enter into it. Knowing these realities, the first party will accept the inclusion 
of the term in the contract. Such a term can be said to have accorded with both parties’ 
intentions.  
 
Further, while in many cases the customer is ignorant of the specific provisions of the T&C 
including the verification clause, and would therefore not have any unexpressed intention 
on the matter, that need not necessarily be the end of the enquiry on the existence of an 
implied term. The ignorant customer who has not read the T&C and is oblivious as to their 
contents, can sincerely maintain that he agreed to the standard T&C in the belief that the 
bank intended to contract fairly and reasonably and that the T&C would be fair and 
reasonable in their ambit and their application. It would be untenable and embarrassing for 
banks to argue otherwise. The United Kingdom Banking Code says: “We promise that we 
will act fairly and reasonably in all our dealings with you …”;877 Standard Chartered’s 
T&C for Internet banking in Singapore says: “We believe the terms of this agreement are 
fair.”878 
 
                                                
876 Ibid. 
877 Section 2. 
878 Std Ch Internet T&C, cl 13.2. 
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There is no general principle of fairness or reasonableness in English and Singaporean 
contract law but this does not mean that a party cannot allege that in his specific agreement 
it was intended that the contract terms would be fair and reasonable in their application. 
Support for an implied term of this nature can be found in Paragon Finance plc v Staunton 
and Nash.879  The Court of Appeal (England) held that a mortgage agreement contained an 
implied term that a contractual discretion given to a lender to vary the interest rate would 
not be exercised “dishonestly”, “capriciously”, “arbitrarily”, “for an improper purpose” or 
unreasonably in the sense that no reasonable lender would act in that way.880 This 
implication was on the basis of the expectation of the parties, a term implied in fact.881 
Chitty on Contracts882 has elevated this to a term that will be implied in all contracts of loan 
that give the lender a discretion to vary the interest rates.  
 
Persuading a court to acknowledge a mutual intention to contract fairly and reasonably 
would be only the first hurdle for the customer to overcome. The second limb of the 
customer’s argument would have to be that it is unreasonable for the bank to escape 
liability for a negligent breach of its primary duty to honour its mandate by relying on a 
verification clause. It is on this second limb that the outcome is unpredictable. A similar 
debate arises under the Unfair Contract Terms Act. The outcome involves policy 
considerations.  
 
                                                
879 [2002] 2 All ER 248.  
880 Ibid., at 262, 263. 
881 Ibid.  
882 HG Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2 vols, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) vol 1 para 26–
156 fn 858. 
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For the more informed customer, who is aware of the verification term, the argument can 
be more direct and need not raise the issue of reasonableness. It would be that the customer 
intended that his express duty of verification and notification would not be used to excuse 
negligent breach of the bank’s fundamental duty to observe the customer’s mandate. 
Depending on the circumstances, the bank may not be willing to maintain otherwise. This 
position of the customer could, it is submitted, pass either the business efficacy test or the 
officious bystander test. In conclusion, an argument for an implied term against the 
application of the verification clause where the bank has been negligent is not as far–
fetched as it may initially seem and could succeed in favourable factual circumstances. 
Banks intending that the verification and conclusive evidence clause should protect them 
against their own negligence should consider expressly indicating as much.  
 
Breach of the Macmillan Duty and Bank Negligence 
The ability of a bank to escape the consequences of its own negligence by pointing to a 
breach of duty by the customer has been considered in the context of the Macmillan duty. 
Paget expresses the view that “Macmillan … offers no relief” to the bank where the 
alterations are evident or discoverable by the exercise of due diligence or the appearance of 
the cheque raises suspicions.883 In other words, the bank cannot raise a breach of the 
Macmillan duty to avoid liability for payment of an unauthorised alteration which was 
apparent or should have raised suspicions. In the old case of Scholey v Ramsbottom and 
Others884 (1810), a cheque torn into four pieces by the customer was visibly pasted together 
                                                
883 Mark Hapgood QC (Gen ed) Paget’s Law of Banking (13th ed, Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2007) para 19.7, 
at page 489. This position is based on Scholey v Ramsbottom 170 ER 1227 to the effect that if a bank pays 
a cheque which is in a condition that should put them on enquiry, they cannot reimburse themselves.  
884 (1810) 170 ER 1227. 
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and presented for payment and paid. Lord Ellenborough considered that the bank was not 
justified in paying the cheque and was therefore not entitled to be reimbursed. Paget’s view 
was followed, obiter, in Singapore in Bintai Kindenko Pte Ltd v Sanwa Bank Ltd & Anor.885 
A cheque drawn by the customer was fraudulently altered. The High Court found that the 
customer was not in breach of its Macmillan duty but even if it was, the alterations were 
evident and therefore the bank could not be relieved of its duty (to pay only on a valid 
mandate). This outcome recognises the bank’s primary responsibility to pay on a valid 
mandate, as well as its status as superior prepayment detector.  
 
If the same reasoning were applied in the context of the verification and conclusive 
evidence clause, a bank that has been negligent in not detecting or querying an instrument 
raising suspicion or having apparent, discoverable alterations will not be able to rely on the 
customer’s failure to verify his bank statements to escape the consequences of its 
negligence or omissions. The qualification would uphold the bank’s primary responsibility 
to pay on a valid mandate; give recognition to its status as superior prepayment detector 
and better risk bearer (assuming acceptance of Geva’s principles); and encourage 
investment in fraud and forgery detection methods. The qualification retains the 
requirement to determine fault but, as already pointed out, fault–based liability is not in 
itself objectionable and in any event, as Geva says, the bank’s fault is relatively easier to 
determine than the customer’s.886  
 
                                                
885 [1994] 3 SLR 459 at 468–9. 
886 “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparitive Aspects, Policies and a Model for Reform” (1998) 
114 LQR 250 at 289. See also page 287. 
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The discussion so far has considered the prospects of a customer persuading a court that 
there is an implied term in fact that the bank cannot invoke the verification and conclusive 
evidence clause where the bank has been negligent in making payment; and authority 
stating that a breach of the Macmillan duty, followed by bank negligence, will not avail the 
bank.   
 
An Argument that the Clause Should Operate in Cases of Bank Negligence 
There is an argument from the bank’s perspective, however, that the verification clause is a 
valuable aid to banks in detecting their own negligence and denying application of the 
clause in instances of bank negligence would defeat that purpose.887 For the banks it may 
be said that they recognise that they may be negligent in a certain number of cases and this 
is one of the reasons why they impose a verification duty on their customers, so that they 
may deal with negligent and non–negligent errors alike. If the aim of the clause is to 
combat fraud and forgery through bank accounts, is it not irrelevant that there was 
negligence by the bank? The customer is afterall the superior post–payment detector. 
Timeous notification by the customer and action by the bank may lead to recovery of the 
stolen monies. The bank suffers detriment if not notified of the error, even if it was 
culpable in making it in the first place. 
 
It has already been said that the verification clause is a more severe contractual expression 
of the common–law Greenwood duty. In Greenwood, the bank negligently failed to detect 
                                                
887 A similar view was expressed in Don Bodkin Leasing Ltd v The Toronto–Dominion Bank (1993) 14 OR 
(3d) 571 (Gen Div) at 583. 
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that the signatures on the cheques had been forged.888 The House of Lords expressly 
pointed out that this made no difference to the operation of the estoppel, preventing Mr 
Greenwood from raising the forgeries and the bank’s breach of its mandate. The bank’s 
negligence had no bearing on the detriment suffered by the bank, which lay in the loss of its 
right of action against Mrs Greenwood due to Mr Greenwood’s silence about the forgeries 
until after her death.889  
 
It is interesting to consider whether the bank would have been able to resist Mr 
Greenwood’s claim for reimbursement if Mrs Greenwood had not died? Assume, for 
example, that Mrs Greenwood committed further forgeries and the bank continued to make 
payments negligently after Mr Greenwood became aware of his wife’s actions. Would the 
estoppel have operated against Mr Greenwood in this scenario, in which the detriment 
suffered by the bank would have been caused by its own negligence? This hypothetical 
scenario would, it is submitted, have posed a dilemma for the Law Lords. On the one hand, 
the bank’s negligence led to the unauthorised debit; on the other, the customer has 
intentionally stood by and allowed the bank to operate under the misapprehension that the 
payments are in good order. It is submitted that in this situation, the decision of the House 
of Lords would have been unchanged because of Mr Greenwood’s intentional silence, 
because it constitutes bad faith vis–à–vis the bank. 
 
Another issue to consider is proximity to the loss. Where a bank pays a cheque that has 
been altered, if the bank is negligent in failing to detect the alterations, it is the bank’s 
                                                
888 See discussion in chapter 3.8.4 above. 
889 See discussion of the decision of the Court of Appeal above. 
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negligence that is the more proximate cause (in time) of the loss. Where a customer is 
unaware of a previous forged cheque being drawn on his account, the customer’s innocent 
silence facilitates but does not cause a subsequent fraudulent withdrawal. This changes if 
the customer knows about the first forgery and remains silent deliberately. His silence 
condones the bank’s breaches to date and, it is submitted, what was facilitation where the 
silence was innocent, becomes a cause of the subsequent forgeries where the silence is 
deliberate. The leap from facilitation to cause is possible because the customer who 
maintains a deliberate silence about a forgery knows, or is reckless about the likelihood, 
that further forgeries may result.  
 
On this analysis the bona or male fides of the customer is crucial. Where the customer is 
mala fides, and the bank only negligent, the equities favour the bank. Equities is used here 
in the sense of what justice demands, i.e. what is fair, just, moral and ethical.890 Many 
customers do not actually read their bank statements and their knowledge of unauthorised 
transactions can, at best, be deemed. A failure by the ignorant customer to notify the bank 
of an unauthorised debit is considered innocent by opponents of the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause, particularly where the bank has been negligent. But how 
innocent is a customer, fully appraised of the risks and what is contractually asked of him, 
who habitually fails to undertake the verification exercise? The ubiquitous cases of 
unsupervised, dishonest customer employees underscores the case for the banks.  
 
                                                
890 As opposed to the branch of law known as Equity. See Jill E Martin Hanbury & Martin Modern Equity 
(17th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), 3. 
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In summary, opposing arguments for the bank and for the customer on this issue, both have 
merit. The solution, it is submitted lies in an apportionment of loss.891 
 
4.5.2 A Strict Duty or a Duty of Care? 
The second question which was raised about negligence and the verification and conclusive 
evidence clause is whether the customer’s duty to verify and notify is absolute or a duty of 
care.  
 
Failure to perform a contractual obligation constitutes a breach of contract in the absence of 
lawful excuse.892 Generally, contractual obligations are strict and there can be no lawful 
excuse even in the absence of fault.893 The bank’s obligation to pay only on a valid mandate 
is such an example. Events beyond the control of a customer may prevent him from 
performing his duty of verification. For example, assume a customer who lives alone falls 
ill and is in a coma in hospital for months. As a result, no verification of bank statements 
occurs. If a fraudster siphons money out of the customer’s account during that time, the 
bank would be in breach for making payments without a mandate. However, the contract 
contains a verification clause. If the customer’s verification duty is strict, the bank would 
be able to raise the breach regardless of the reason. Laskin J in Arrow Transfer favoured a 
                                                
891 Discussed in chapter 8 below. 
892 G H Treitel The Law of Contract (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003), 835. 
893 Ibid, 838 citing Raineri v Miles [1981] AC 1050 at 1086 where Lord Edmund–Davies said: “in relation to 
claims for damages for breach of contract, it is, in general, immaterial why the defendant failed to fulfil his 
obligation, and certainly no defence to plead that he had done his best.” See also Stephen A Smith Atiyah’s 
Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th ed, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005), 167 et seq. 
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duty to examine statements with reasonable care894 and Geva has proposed that a customer 
should have a duty of care to examine bank statements, to detect and report forgeries.895  
 
The verification duties set out in the Singapore T&C covered by this study are not 
expressly stated to be duties of care. Generally speaking, contractual duties are absolute and 
failure to perform cannot be excused by the absence of negligence. To contend otherwise, 
on the basis of the rules of interpretation, would be difficult. The other option, once again, 
would be to turn to implied terms. The arguments are similar as before. There are two 
apparent obstacles to implying that the customer’s verification and notification duty is a 
duty of care rather than an absolute duty. The first, again, is the ignorant customer who 
cannot be said to have an unexpressed intention on the matter. But as before, he can 
sincerely argue that he agreed to the standard T&C in the belief that the bank intended to 
contract fairly and reasonably and that the T&C would be applied in a fair and reasonable 
way by the bank. If it would be unfair or unreasonable for the duty to be an absolute one, 
the customer’s lack of specific knowledge need not be an obstacle. The second problem 
concerns the intention of the bank. At first sight it seems obvious that the bank would 
intend that the customer’s duty be absolute. But this is less certain when probed a little 
deeper. No bank in Singapore would maintain that it was its intention for the verification 
and conclusive evidence clause to operate unfairly or unreasonably to penalize a customer. 
Rather, it is in circumstances such as Tai Hing Cotton Mill, where the customer is guilty of 
gross neglect, that the clause is intended to operate. On this there is therefore a meeting of 
                                                
894 Arrow Tranfer Co Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada et al (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81 at 101. 
895 “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparative Aspects, Policies and a Model for Reform” (1998) 
114 LQR 250 at 290. 
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the minds between bank and customer and, using either the business efficacy test or the 
officious bystander test, there is potential for an implied term.  
 
The next question is about the specifics of any implied term that the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause is not absolute, i.e. imposes a duty of care. Such an implied 
term would have to be cast generally, for example, that the bank will not use the 
verification and conclusive evidence clause where it would be unreasonable or unfair to do 
so. Next, in the example above, the customer would have to aver that it would be 
unreasonable or unfair to apply the verification clause. The facts of each case would be 
vital to the outcome on the merits. For the customer who was aware of the verification 
term, and believed and intended the verification duty to be qualified by the requirement of 
reasonableness, the argument is more direct. Bank would probably take issue with what 
constitutes reasonableness.  
 
A problem with the verification and notification duty as a duty of care is the scope it gives 
for spurious arguments by customers aimed at excusing them for their failure to fulfil the 
duty. Geva says: “I do not believe that in this context, there is a real danger of wasteful and 
extensive litigation on the breach of the duty of care.”896 The positions of Laskin J and 
Geva, that the customer’s duty to examine bank statements should be a duty of care, is 
supported but subject to the following clarifications: 
• Failure to verify or notify will be excused only where it is as a result of events 
beyond the control of the customer, such as serious, overwhelming illness or 
                                                
896 “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparative Aspects, Policies and a Model for Reform” (1998) 
114 LQR 250 at 290. 
 
 160
accident. The customer will be expected to make alternative arrangements wherever 
possible. 
• Absence from the mailing address, not falling into the first category above, will not 
excuse a failure to verify; verification via electronic banking is usually an 
alternative and the customer bears the risk if his destination precludes this facility. 
• Failure to detect an erroneous debit which is detectable from the statement will not 
be excused. 
 
4.5.3 Negligent Verification or Notification by the Customer:  
This issue is linked to the one above. If the customer has a duty of care to examine bank 
statements, he will be liable for negligent verification or non-notification. On the other 
hand, if the duty is strict, the customer will be liable for any failure to notify an error, 
whether innocent or negligent.   
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Chapter 5: A ‘Stand–Alone’ Verification Clause 
  
Given the criticism against the conclusive evidence portion of the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause, this chapter will examine whether a verification clause is viable 
without the support of the conclusive evidence portion. This will be referred to as a “stand–
alone” verification clause. The effect of other clauses appearing in Singapore T&C such as 
broad exclusions of liability and/or indemnity clauses will be ignored in this chapter and 
discussed below.897 
 
It is significant that banks in England are reluctant to use the conclusive evidence clause 
and some even shy away from imposing a duty on customers to verify their bank 
statements.  HSBC898 (in the United Kingdom) does not impose any verification duty in 
their T&C for personal customers while their personal Internet T&C contain a verification 
clause;899 Barclays Bank imposes a verification duty on personal customers,900 while 
National Westminster Bank901 uses non–obligatory wording. None of these provisions 
include a conclusive evidence clause. For business customers HSBC imposes a verification 
duty without a conclusive evidence provision.902 
 
The reason for this very different approach may be self–imposed restraint on the part of the 
banks and their subscription to the United Kingdom Banking Codes, which urge but do not 
                                                
897 In chapter 10. 
898 See HSBC (UK) Personal T&C, Section 2, 2.2 “Statements”.  
899 HSBC UK Personal E–terms 2.5: “You agree to check carefully …” 
900 Barclays Retail Customer Agreement, cl 6.1: “You must check your statement carefully and tell us as soon 
as possible…”. 
901 NatWest General Conditions, Section A, cl 9.1.2: “You should read these statements and tell us as soon as 
possible …”. 
902 HSBC (UK), Business T&C, Section 1, cl 10.1. 
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insist on verification: “We recommend that you check your statement or passbook 
regularly.”903 From a risk management viewpoint, it would undoubtedly be useful for these 
United Kingdom banks to deploy the conclusive evidence clause. Their decision not to do 
so is perhaps attributable to a desire to be seen as fair, socially–conscientious participants in 
the financial markets.904  
 
Verification clauses drafted in non–mandatory terms, as a recommendation or request, fall 
short of imposing an enforceable verification duty on the customer. This has been the 
shortcoming of verification and conclusive evidence clauses before.905 The failure to 
specify a time period in which the verification must be undertaken and errors reported also 
detracts from the enforceability of the term. The remainder of this discussion concerns a 
stand–alone verification clause drafted in mandatory terms. 
 
In Singapore, HSBC uses a stand–alone verification clause in its terms for Internet 
banking.906 It has no conclusive evidence provision, although the general T&C governing 
accounts, including a full verification and conclusive evidence clause, are stated to 
supplement the terms for Internet banking.907 This may not be sufficient, however, to 
incorporate the conclusive evidence clause from the general T&C. The reason is one of 
interpretation. It is stated that in the event of conflict the Internet terms prevail.908 This 
means that the stand–alone verification clause in the Internet terms may prevail over the 
                                                
903 UK Banking Codes, March 2005, section 12.3. 
904 See Law Commission Report No 219 “Contributory Negligence as a Defence in Contract” (London, 
HMSO, 1993), 25 – “fear of losing business in a competitive market.” 
905 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 1 AC 80 is an example. 
906 HSBC E–terms 3.l. See also Std Ch E–terms 3.4 but this must be read in conjunction with 4.4. Electronic 
banking T&C are discussed in chapter 11 below. 
907 HSBC E–terms 2.b. 
908 HSBC E–terms 2.c. 
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verification and conclusive evidence clause in the general T&C. In this particular case it is 
submitted that the absence of a conclusive evidence provision may be deliberate as it is not 
compatible with another of the terms, discussed in detail later.909  
 
5.1 The Operation of a Standalone Verification Clause 
Postulate payment of a forged cheque debited to an account governed by T&C containing a 
stand–alone verification clause. The bank will be in breach of contract for paying without a 
mandate. It may, in addition, have been negligent. If the customer verifies but fails to notify 
the bank of the error, he will probably be in breach of his Greenwood duty and will be 
estopped from denying the bank’s mandate to pay. If the customer fails to verify, he will 
not have the necessary knowledge for the Greenwood estoppel to arise. If the customer fails 
to verify a bank statement when there is an express duty to do so, there would be a breach 
of contract but not negligence as, Khoo Tian Hock aside, there is no duty to examine bank 
statements.  
 
The question to be addressed now is how the bank can raise the customer’s breach of a 
contractual duty to verify, imposed by a stand–alone verification clause, in an action by the 
customer seeking correction of his account by the bank; and how would the two breaches of 
contract square up to each other.  
 
                                                
909 HSBC E–terms 10. This is discussed in chapter 11.2. 
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5.2 Cross–Breaches 
Treitel910 distinguishes between three types of performance under a contract:  
1. Performance which is a condition precedent to the other party’s performance. In such 
a case, the party whose performance is conditional upon the other party performing 
first can raise the failure of that party to perform first, as a defence to a claim brought 
against him. 
2. Performance which is to be simultaneous. The example used is a contract for the sale 
of goods where payment and delivery are to be performed simultaneously. The 
inability of one party to perform would be a defence to a claim for breach against the 
other party. 
3. Performance of independent promises. In such a case, “each party can enforce the 
other’s promise although he has not performed his own.”911 
 
It is clear that a bank’s promise to pay only on a valid mandate and a customer’s promise to 
verify his bank statements and notify the bank of errors are not intended to be performed 
simultaneously, nor is the one a condition precedent to the other. They are independent 
promises and therefore can be enforced irrespective of the other party’s performance.  
 
Bearing this in mind, a bank which is sued for breach of the obligation to pay on a valid 
mandate, as in the scenario set out above, can respond in a number of ways:  
 
                                                
910 Treitel, Contract, 761 et seq and 835. See similar discussion in H G Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts 
(29th ed, 2 vols, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) vol 1 para 12–028 et seq. See also Stephen A Smith 
Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th ed, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2005), 192, 195 
911 Treitel, Contract, 763. 
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1. It can deny that its breach of mandate was the cause of the customer’s loss,912 
asserting rather that it was the customer’s breach of the verification clause that 
occasioned the loss suffered by the customer. Such a plea could only apply to the 
second and subsequent debits in a scheme of unauthorised transactions. 
 
2. The bank could counterclaim against the customer for the breach of the verification 
clause, either on the ground that notification would have enabled recovery of the 
stolen monies, or, where a second unauthorised debit occurred, the bank could allege 
that the customer’s breach led to the second unauthorised debit and thereby caused 
the bank loss. The bank’s loss is the cost of reimbursing the customer. In defence to 
the counterclaim, the customer could deny the causal connection between his breach 
and the bank’s loss, contending that the loss flows from the bank’s breach. Support 
for the bank’s counterclaim option is found in Macmillan,913 which recognizes that 
the customer’s duty (not to be negligent in writing cheques) can be explained as a 
measure to avoid circuity of action. The defence and counterclaim options are 
analysed in greater detail in section 5.5 below. 
 
3. The bank could plead a right of set–off based on the customer’s breach of the 
verification clause. Support for this option can be found in the advice of the Privy 
Council in Tai Hing Cotton Mill914 and in the House of Lords judgment of Lord 
                                                
912 The importance of the causal connection can be seen, for example, in Sykes and Others v Midland Bank 
Executor and Trustee Co Ltd and Others [1971] 1 QB 113, which highlighted the need for the damage to 
flow from the negligence. In this case, the wrong lies in the breach of contract, not negligence. 
913 London Joint Stock Bank Limited v Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 at 793 (per Lord Finlay LC), 
818 (per Viscount Haldane). 
914 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 1 AC 80 at 110. 
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Edmund–Davies in Moorgate Mercantile v Twitchings.915 Adapting Lord Edmund–
Davies’s words to the current scenario, the customer’s action against the bank for the 
unauthorised debit “constitutes an attack upon” (i.e. ignores and undermines) the 
bank’s right to be notified of the unauthorised debit. This enables the bank to set off 
its damages against and in extinction of any successful claim by the customer. This is 
discussed in section 5.7 below. 
 
4. The bank could plead that the customer is estopped from alleging the bank’s breach 
of mandate because of the customer’s breach of the verification duty, as discussed in 
greater detail in section 5.8 below. 
 
5.3 The Pleading and Quantification of the Claims  
The accepted manner of pleading a claim against the bank for an unauthorised debit 
consists of an allegation that the payment was unauthorised and a claim for repayment.916 
In the summary of his claim, the customer seeks a declaration that the bank was not entitled 
to make the debit, followed by a plea for the amount of the unauthorised payment.917 As the 
debit is a breach of contract by the bank (payment without a mandate) the customer can, 
alternatively, plead his claim as one for damages in the amount of the unauthorised debit 
from the bank.918 In some circumstances the customer may base his claim on the bank’s 
refusal to make a payment to a third party for lack of funds which arises because of an 
                                                
915 [1977] AC 890 at 916. 
916 See Lord Brennan & William Blair (Gen eds), Bullen & Leake & Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings (15th ed, 
London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), precedent 5–C6 at 114. 
917 From the reports, this appears to be how the following claims were put: London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v 
Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 at 787, 812; Greenwood v Martins Bank Limited [1933] AC 51 at 
55; Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 1 AC 80 at 96. 
918 Support for this can be found in the judgment of Viscount Haldane in London Joint Stock Bank v 
Macmillan [1918] AC 777 at 813. 
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earlier unauthorised debit made to the account by the bank. In such a case, the customer 
will have made a demand, possibly in the form of a cheque or a standing payment 
instruction, and his claim is based on the bank’s refusal to honour the demand.  
 
The customer’s basic claim will be for the amount of the unauthorised debit. This would be 
the ordinary damages flowing from the breach. The customer might wish to make an 
additional claim for interest foregone, as a second head of damage. It is not uncommon 
today for a current account to attract a small interest rate, possibly subject to the proviso 
that a specified minimum balance is maintained in the account for the relevant interest 
period. Alternatively, certain bank charges may be avoided if a minimum balance is 
maintained. The applicable rate is generally low and therefore interest is unlikely to be a 
big issue.  
 
While interest on a debt cannot ordinarily be claimed as general damages, as the 
entitlement in the banking context to interest is contractual, there is no obstacle to claiming 
interest, lost through the fault of the bank, as damages.919 In any event, a claim by a 
customer for recrediting an unauthorised debit to an account or for damages for breach of a 
mandate is not a claim for failure to pay a debt. Although the money standing to the credit 
of the customer in his bank account represents a debt due from the bank to the customer, it 
                                                
919 President of India v La Pintada Compania Navegacion SA [1985] AC 104 is House of Lords authority 
confirming that interest cannot be claimed as general damages in a claim for failure to make payment of a 
debt where no interest is provided for, although it may be claimed as special damages, e.g., where failure to 
repay a debt forces the plaintiff to obtain a loan and incur interest, see Wadsworth v Lydell [1981] 1 WLR 
598 and TKM (Singapore) Pte Ltd  v Export Credit Insurance Corporation of Singapore Ltd [1993] 1 SLR 
1041 at 1075 et seq. Interest may be awarded on a judgment debt in Singapore in terms of section 12 Civil 
Law Act, Cap 43; see also the Singapore Rules of Court, O42 r12 and Sheriffa Taibah bte Abdul Rahman v 
Lim Kim Som [1992] 2 SLR 517 at 567. In England section 17 Judgments Act, 1838 awards interest on 
judgment debts, see also the Civil Procedure Rules, Part 40.8.1. 
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is repayable only after a demand by the customer. Where the customer has not made a 
demand, a claim based on a wrongful debit to the account is not a claim for failure or late 
payment of a debt, rather it is a liquidated claim for repayment or for damage to the 
customer’s asset arising from breach of contract.  
 
A customer may consider that he is also entitled to consequential damages. The 
unavailability of the wrongfully debited funds may, for example, lead to the failure to make 
a payment to a third party with consequent losses. The law governing consequential 
contractual damages was stated in Hadley v Baxendale920 with subsequent application in 
Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd921 and endorsement in The Heron 
II922. The last case affirms that the measure of contractual damages is to put the aggrieved 
party into the position he would have been in had the contract been performed923 and this 
entitles him to the damages which the other party should reasonably have contemplated 
would flow from his breach. More recently, Sir Thomas Bingham MR in Banque Bruxelles 
Lambert v Eagle Star Insurance said on the recoverability of damages that the question was 
“whether, at the date of the contract or tort, damage of the kind for which the plaintiff 
claims compensation was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach of contract or 
tortious conduct of which the plaintiff complains. If the kind of damage was reasonably 
foreseeable it is immaterial that the extent of the damage was not.”924 As a general rule, 
                                                
920 (1854) 156 ER 145. 
921 [1949] 2 KB 528. There has been debate, beyond the scope of this study, whether Victoria Laundry altered 
the rule in Hadley v Baxendale. In The Heron II,  the majority of the House of Lords did not think so, and 
they found it a helpful analysis of the older case. See Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd [1969] 1 AC 350 at 399 
(per Lord Morris of Borth–y–gest), 410 (per Lord Hodson), 417 (per Lord Pearce), 424 (per Lord Upjohn). 
922 Koufos v C Czarnikow Ltd [1969] 1 AC 350. 
923 Ibid, see 414 (per Lord Pearce) and 420 (per Lord Upjohn). 
924 Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1995] QB 375 at 405; quoted with approval 
in Brown v KMR Services Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 513 at 557. In the same case, at 542, Stuart–Smith LJ 
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consequential loss is too remote to be recoverable unless, at the time of contracting, that 
loss was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties as a not unlikely consequence 
of the breach of contract.925  
 
Treatment of consequential losses in the T&C varies. HSBC excludes liability for such 
losses in a term dealing specifically with that head of damage.926 DBS excludes liability for 
“any loss”.927 OCBC covers consequential losses in a wide indemnity for losses, including 
losses resulting from reliance on an instruction purportedly from the customer.928 Standard 
Chartered’s indemnity clause, while not expressly excluding consequential losses, provides 
that the bank shall have “no liability whatsoever” in connection with, for example, 
instructions purportedly from the customer.929 From an interpretation standpoint, it is 
submitted that there is no reason why words such as “any loss” or “no liability whatsoever” 
should not extend to consequential losses. “Consequential loss” is a technical term 
understood by lawyers whereas a customer reading his T&C is more likely to understand 
“any loss” or “no liability whatsoever” as conveying that liability will be nil. There should 
be no magic in use of the word “consequential”. The commonsense approach of the 
Singapore Court of Appeal to interpretation in Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit 
Suisse930 supports this view. The T&C for electronic banking, discussed below, also deal 
                                                                                                                                               
endorsed Chitty on Contracts (27th ed) vol 1 para 26–023: “A type or kind of loss is not too remote a 
consequence of a breach of contract if, at the time of contracting (and on the assumption that the parties 
actually foresaw the breach in question), it was within their reasonable contemplation as a not unlikely 
result of that breach”. 
925 Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2004) vol 1 para 26–047, referred to with approval in Korea 
Jonmyong Trading Company v Sea–Shore Transportation Pte Ltd and another [2003] 1 SLR 702 at 707.  
926 HSBC 20.1. 
927 DBS 21.1 excludes liability for “any loss” in a variety of situations including where the forgery could not 
be detected or was facilitated in certain ways. 
928 OCBC 27. 
929 Std Ch 11.3. 
930 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 295. 
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with consequential losses.931 It is submitted that, as a general rule, the exclusion of 
consequential losses is reasonable under the Unfair Contract Terms Act. The exclusion of 
consequential losses is evident also in bank T&C in the United Kingdom.932 
 
A bank, responding to a customer’s claims arising from an unauthorised debit, would want 
to meet each of the customer’s claims with a commensurate claim. The bank’s argument 
would be that the customer’s failure to verify his statement and report the unauthorised 
transaction caused the bank loss in the same amount. The quantum of the bank’s claim 
would mirror the customer’s claim; so, too, for consequential damages and interest 
foregone. The bank’s liability to the customer for consequential losses and/or interest 
would translate into damages suffered by the bank attributable to the customer’s breach. 
Unless the bank can adequately demonstrate that swift notification would have enabled it to 
recover the monies lost from the unauthorised debit, the causal element would only 
potentially be satisfied in the case of the second or subsequent unauthorised transaction, 
which the bank would have had the opportunity to halt if the first or a previous 
unauthorised transaction had been detected and reported to the bank. 
 
5.4 Apportionment of Damages 
Before discussing how the cross–breaches may be reckoned with by the principles of 
causation, it is appropriate to consider the scope under the law for an apportionment of 
damages. Under the common law, contributory negligence by a plaintiff was fatal to his 
claim in tort. The injustice that ensued prompted the United Kingdom legislature to 
                                                
931 See discussion in chapter 11 below. 
932 E.g., Barclays 9.3; HSBC (UK) Personal T&C 9.3.1; HSBC (UK) Business T&C 10.4.3. 
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intervene. The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945 was primarily aimed at 
the apportionment of damages in tort cases,933 although many held the view at one time that 
it was capable of applying where the duty arises only in contract. The key provision of 
Singapore’s Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Act is in similar terms to the 
British statute. The application of the legislation to damages claimed under contract was 
considered by the Court of Appeal (England) in Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher 
and Others.934 It endorsed the court a quo’s classification of contractual duties into three 
categories:  
1. Absolute duties; i.e., breach of the duty is not determined by negligence. 
2. Duties of care not mirrored in the common law (tort) in the absence of the contract. 
3. Duties of care that mirror duties in tort. 
The court ruled that the Act applies to any claim in contract where the contractual duty falls 
under category 3, i.e., the duty is mirrored in tort. One of the reasons given was that a 
plaintiff who is guilty of contributory negligence should not be able to escape 
apportionment of damages by pleading the case in contract.935 The Singapore Court of 
Appeal supported this position in Fong Maun Yee & Anor v Yoong Weng Ho Robert.936 It 
said, “where a defendant’s liability in contract is concurrent with an identical duty in tort, 
                                                
933 In Forsikringsaktieselskapet Vesta v Butcher and Others [1988] 3 WLR 565 at 589 Sir Roger Ormrod in 
the Court of Appeal went so far to say: “the Act is concerned only with tortuous liability…”. This is 
because contributory negligence was, at one time, a complete defence to a claim in tort whereas it had no 
such impact on a claim in contract. This could lead to a plaintiff recovering more than, in fairness, he 
deserves, or less, by the courts endeavoring to compensate for the gap in the law by making an unfounded 
decision of novus actus interveniens or failure to mitigate. See the expression of this view in Law 
Commission Report No 219 “Contributory Negligence as a Defence in Contract” at 13, 16. 
934 [1988] 3 WLR 565. The case proceeded to the House of Lords, reported at [1989] 2 WLR 290, but on a 
different issue. 
935 Ibid, at 578 per O’Connor LJ. 
936 Fong Maun Yee & Anor v Yoong Weng Ho Robert (practicing under the name and style of Yoong & Co) 
[1997] 2 SLR 297; also Jet Holding Ltd and others v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another 
[2006] 3 SLR 769 at 811 et seq, 818. 
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the defence of contributory negligence is available to the defendant.”937 The inference is 
that apportionment of damages is not available in contractual claims involving duties that 
fall under categories 1 and 2.  
 
The British Law Commission in its Report on Contributory Negligence in 1993938 
considered that Vesta settled the debate on the possibility of the legislation applying more 
widely to contractual claims.939 It recommended, however, that apportionment of damages 
should be available where there was contributory negligence by the plaintiff and the 
defendant was in breach of a contractual duty to exercise reasonable skill or care,940 i.e. 
cases falling into category 2, but not where the defendant was liable for the breach of a 
strict contractual duty,941 i.e. cases falling into category 1. This has not yet been 
implemented. 
 
Applying this to the cross–breaches that may arise between a bank and a customer, it is 
clear that apportionment of damages will not be possible under the Act as the law now 
stands: the bank’s duty to pay on a valid mandate is not determined by negligence, i.e. it 
falls under category 1, and the customer’s verification duty does not exist but for the 
contract, i.e., it falls under category 2. 
 
                                                
937 Ibid, at 316–7. 
938 Law Commission Report No 219 “Contributory Negligence as a Defence in Contract”. 
939 Ibid, at 3. 
940 Ibid, at 33. 
941 Ibid, at 28. 
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5.5 The Bank’s Defence and Counterclaim 
Both the bank’s defence to the customer’s claim and the customer’s defence to the bank’s 
counterclaim set out above,942 raise the issue of causation, namely whether their respective 
breaches are causally linked to the loss which has resulted.943 “The claimant may recover 
damages for a loss only where the breach of contract was the ‘effective’ or ‘dominant’ 
cause of that loss”.944 The burden of proof of causation ordinarily lies on the claimant, on a 
balance of probabilities.945  
 
In Galoo Ltd v Bright Grahame Murray946 Glidewell LJ said of causation: “There is no 
doubt that this is one of the most difficult areas of the law.”947 On the other hand, Lord 
Hoffmann has said: “There is nothing special or mysterious about the law of causation.”948 
A point made by John Fleming, in the context of causation in the field of tort, is worth 
bearing in mind: “causation is not an objective notion, as was once pretended, but one 
varying with the reason or policy for which causal ascription is being sought.”949 The task 
of determining causation is commonly divided into an identification first of factual 
causation, then legal causation.950   
                                                
942 In chapter 5.2. 
943 HG Beale (Gen Ed), Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2 vols, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) vol 1 para 
26–029: “there must be a causal connection between the defendant’s breach of contract and the claimant’s 
loss”. 
944 Ibid. 
945 John G Fleming The Law of Torts (9th ed, Sydney, LBC Information, 1998) at 227. 
946 Galoo Ltd (in liquidation) and Others v Bright Grahame Murray (a firm) and Another [1994] 1 WLR 
1360. 
947 Ibid, at 1369. 
948 Leonard Hoffmann “Causation” (2005) 121 LQR 592 at 603. 
949 Fleming, The Law of Torts, at 227. The case of Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 is a good example of the 
impact of policy considerations on causation reasoning. 
950 See for example, Fleming, The Law of Torts, at 218; Andrew Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of 
Contract (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, 2004) at 45. Lord Hoffmann criticizes this approach as an over–
complication, see “Causation” (2005) 121 LQR 592 at 598 but it is also used in Singapore, see for example 
Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 3 SLR 782 at 802. 
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The “causa sine qua non”951 or “but for” test aims to establish factual causation.952 It has its 
limitations, however, for instance in the case of “alternative sufficient causes”.953 In 
Chester v Afshar,954 Lord Bingham of Cornhill acknowledged the limitations of the test but 
added, “in the ordinary run of cases, satisfying the ‘but for’ test is a necessary if not a 
sufficient condition of establishing causation.”955  
 
Factual causation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for legal liability. The quest 
is to identify the cause recognized by the law as resulting in the loss. This has been 
described as a, “normative question of whether a particular consequence of breach should 
be judged to be within the scope of liability for the breach.”956 The cause in question must 
be the dominant, effective or proximate cause:957 “one has to ask oneself what was the 
effective and predominant cause”.958 This “is not necessarily the one which operates 
last.”959 It involves “a process of selection from among the co–operating causes to find 
what is the proximate cause in the particular case.”960 Heber Hart wrote in 1904 that, where 
                                                
951 See Hobhouse LJ criticising this expression in County Ltd and another v Girozentrale Securities [1996] 3 
All ER 834 at 857.  
952 See Burrows Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract, at 45 et seq. 
953 See John G Fleming The Law of Torts 1998 at 222. The limitations of the test were acknowledged in 
Singapore in Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 3 SLR 782 at 803, 810. 
954 [2005] 1 AC 134. 
955 Ibid, at 141. 
956 Jane Stapleton “Occam’s Razor Reveals An Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar” (2006) 122 LQR 426 at 
426. 
957 Proximate cause was used in Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B) [1949] AC 196 
at 212. 
958 Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] AC 691 at 698. See also County Ltd 
and another v Girozentrale Securities [1996] 3 All ER 834 at 849 per Beldam LJ, (“effective cause”) and 
at 857 per Hobhouse LJ, (“effective cause”). 
959 Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] AC 691 at 698 per Viscount Simon 
LC. See also Lord Wright at 706 that proximate means “not latest in time, but predominant in efficiency”; 
and Lord Porter at 715: “the proximate cause is not necessarily the nearest in point of time.” 
960 Ibid, at 706. 
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both bank and customer have been negligent, the determining question is “whose 
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss?”961 
 
A commonsense approach to causation has been supported by the courts. For instance, in 
Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport,962 Lord Wright said: “This 
choice of the real or efficient cause from out of the whole complex of the facts must be 
made by applying commonsense standards.”963 And Hobhouse LJ said in County Ltd v 
Girozentrale Securities, “legal causation is a matter of fact and common sense.”964 The 
breach does not have to be the sole cause of the loss to entail liability for damages965 but a 
distinction is drawn between conduct that “occasions” damage and that which causes it.966 
For example, in Galoo the Court of Appeal held that negligent auditing of a company’s 
accounts gave the opportunity but was not the cause of the company’s subsequent trading 
losses.  
 
Foreseeability of the damage has been identified as a relevant factor for determining 
causation967 but in Quinn v Burch Bros (Builders) Ltd968 Salmon J demonstrated that while 
foreseeability of possible damage may be a guide, it was not the criterion for determining 
                                                
961 Heber Hart The Law of Banking (London, Stevens and Sons, Limited, 1904), at 282. 
962 [1942] AC 691. 
963 Ibid, at 706. See also Sunny Metal & Engineering Pte Ltd v Ng Khim Ming Eric [2007] 3 SLR 782 at 802. 
964 [1996] 3 All ER 834 at 858; see also Galoo Ltd (in liquidation) and Others v Bright Grahame Murray (a 
firm) and Another [1994] 1 WLR 1360. See however, the dicta of Lord Hope of Craighead in Chester v 
Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 at 161: “An appeal to common sense when determining issues of causation is 
valuable in the right context. But out of its proper context, and without more, it may pull in two or more 
directions.” 
965 G H Treitel The Law of Contract (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003), 975. 
966 Quinn v Burch Bros (Builders) Ltd [1966] 2 QB 370. Endorsed, for example, in Galoo Ltd v Bright 
Grahame Murray [1994] 1 WLR 1360. 
967 Roe v Ministry of Health, Woolley v Ministry of Health [1954] 2 QB 66 at 84–5; Banque Bruxelles 
Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1995] QB 375 at 420; County Ltd and another v Girozentrale 
Securities [1996] 3 All ER 834 at 858.  
968 [1966] 2 QB 370. 
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causation.969 Although not in so many words, his Lordship went on to apply a 
commonsense approach.970 The relevance of foreseeability to the question of remoteness of 
damage, on the other hand, is well established.  
 
Applying the above principles to the current dilemma, the question is whether the bank, 
which has made an unauthorised payment from the customer’s account in breach of its 
mandate, can maintain that it has suffered loss from the customer’s failure to verify his 
bank statements and notify the bank of the unauthorised transaction; alternatively allege 
that the customer has caused his own loss? Conversely, can a customer who has failed to 
verify his bank statements and notify the bank of errors, point to the bank’s breach, 
ignoring the customer’s own, as the cause of the loss? 
 
Of course, the primary cause of the loss is the dishonesty of the third party procuring the 
unauthorised transaction from the bank. Still, in every case, the bank and possibly the 
customer or both will have contributed to the causal chain; it does not matter that their 
conduct was not the only or main cause of the resulting loss; it is sufficient if it was an 
effective cause.971  
 
In BRDC v Hextall Erskine,972 in the Chancery Division, Carnwath J considered a question 
of causation in the context of a solicitor’s negligence. He observed that generally a solicitor 
advising a client on legal action to recover damages from a third party is unlikely to be the 
                                                
969 Ibid, at 394. 
970 Ibid, at 394. 
971 Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [1995] QB 375 at 406. 
972 British Racing Drivers’ Club Ltd and another v Hextall Erskine & Co (a firm) [1996] 3 All ER 667. 
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direct cause of the damage. Where the solicitor is negligent in rendering legal services to 
that client the question is whether the damage is “within the reasonable scope of the 
dangers against which it was the solicitor’s duty to provide protection”.973  
 
In the current bank and customer scenario, the causal connection between the bank’s breach 
and the customer’s loss is clear; the unauthorised debit, the bank’s breach, is an effective 
cause of the loss by reducing the customer’s bank balance. If the bank can demonstrate that 
it could have recovered the money had it been notified, there will be a causal connection 
between the customer’s breach and the bank’s loss for which it can counterclaim and plead 
set–off. There is also a link between the customer’s breach of the duty to verify and notify 
and any further breach by the bank of its duty to pay with a mandate, leading to further 
loss; but whether this is an effective cause of any subsequent debits is open to doubt.  
 
The customer’s breach of the verification duty does not on its own cause any loss; it is the 
bank’s breach which is the conditio sine qua non of the loss. The customer’s failure to 
verify and notify the bank of an unauthorised debit deprives the bank of the “red light” that 
would alert it to dishonest activity on the account. The customer’s breach fails to alter the 
bank’s conduct regarding any subsequent unauthorised debit. This suggests that, where a 
subsequent debit has been made, the customer’s breach of his verification duty is not a 
cause of the bank’s subsequent breach but merely “occasions” the bank’s breach, as in the 
Quinn and Galoo cases. The failure to verify may be analogous to the negligent auditing of 
a company’s accounts as in Galoo, where the auditing failed to reveal the insolvency of the 
company and the need for insolvency procedures to be instituted, but it did not cause the 
                                                
973 Ibid, at 681. 
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business practices responsible for the losses. If this analysis is correct, the customer’s 
breach of the verification duty is not a factual cause of any second and subsequent debits, 
and is therefore not an effective cause of the loss.  
 
The bank would argue otherwise. Its argument would have to be premised on it taking 
appropriate action after notification of the unauthorised transaction, to halt any further 
debits. The next question is whether the bank must prove that it would have taken steps to 
halt the fraudulent scheme, what those steps would have been and that they would have 
been effective. Where the breach complained of consists of an omission (in this case the 
customer’s omission to verify his bank statement and notify errors to the bank), the 
question of causation depends on the answer to the hypothetical question: what would the 
bank have done had the duty been fulfilled?974 The bank would be required to persuade the 
court, on a balance of probabilities, that it would have taken steps to avert the risk of further 
unauthorised transactions.975 Ordinarily, where subsequent action would definitely benefit 
the party complaining of the breach (the bank), a court would be likely to accept that the 
preventive measures would have been implemented.976 A bank should have no problem in 
persuading a court that it would have taken steps to halt a fraudulent scheme had it been 
notified of an earlier unauthorised debit. Of course, it is open to the customer to dispute the 
effectiveness of any measures which the bank could have taken. For present purposes, it is 
reasonable to conclude that this issue of hypothetical action by the bank to halt further 
debits is likely to be resolved in its favour. Assuming the bank persuades the court that it 
                                                
974 Adapted from the judgment of Stuart–Smith LJ In Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons (A 
Firm) [1995] 1 WLR 1602 at 1610. 
975 Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons $ Simmons (A Firm) [1995] 1 WLR 1602 at 1610 and 1622; Brown v 
KMR Services Ltd [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 513 at 539. 
976 Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons $ Simmons (A Firm) [1995] 1 WLR 1602 at 1610. 
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would have taken effective steps to halt further debits, it is nevertheless submitted that the 
customer’s breach does no more than “occasion” the bank’s breach; and the bank’s breach 
constitutes the legal cause of the loss.  
 
Assuming, contrary to the view taken above, that the bank can persuade a court that the 
customer’s breach of the verification/notification duty was an effective cause of the second 
and subsequent debits, it will not be able to deny the essential contribution made by its own 
breach (the unauthorised debit). The question is how, if at all, the two breaches can be 
taken into account to allocate loss between them, bearing in mind that the apportionment of 
loss legislation is not applicable. 
 
The case of Tenant Radiant Heat Ltd v Warrington Development Corporation977 posed a 
conundrum of “cross” causes in a landlord and tenant context. The tenant of premises sued 
the landlord for damage to the tenant’s property caused by the collapse of the roof of the 
premises. The landlord counterclaimed for the cost of repairing the roof on the basis of the 
tenant’s undertaking to maintain the premises. The Court of Appeal (England) found that 
the tenant’s undertaking extended to the roof and that the tenant was in breach of that 
contractual obligation. It also upheld the landlord’s liability in tort to the tenant for failing 
to keep the roof in good repair. The issue was the “interplay”978 of these two liabilities.  
 
                                                
977 [1988] 1 EGLR 41. 
978 Ibid, at 43. 
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The court confirmed that an apportionment of damages was not possible under the 
contributory negligence legislation, discussed above.979 Croom–Johnson LJ said: “Breach 
of a strict duty under a contract has never given rise to the defence of contributory 
negligence.”980 Dillon LJ stated the issue before the court: to what extent was the tenant’s 
damage (to goods) caused by the landlord, notwithstanding the tenant’s breach of contract; 
and to what extent was the landlord’s damage (to the building) caused by the tenant’s 
breach, notwithstanding the landlord’s tort.981 Dillon LJ concluded: “The effect is that on 
each question, apportionment is permissible.”982 This, he acknowledged, achieved the same 
effect as the Act,983 but he was adamant that the result was not derived through the Act 
because the Act was not applicable. Regrettably, he did not elaborate on the basis on which 
he considered an apportionment to be within the court’s competence, although a clue lies in 
his identification of the issue as “a problem of causation of damage.”984   
 
Confirmation of this can be found in the concurring judgment of Croom–Johnson LJ who 
said that “simply as a matter of causation”985 an apportionment was possible. “Where one is 
dealing with two contemporaneous causes, each springing from the breach of a legal duty 
but operating in unequal proportions, the solution should be to assess the recoverable 
damages for both on the basis of causation.”986 In other words, the court apportioned the 
                                                
979 The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. 
980 Tenant Radiant Heat Ltd v Warrington Development Corporation [1988] 1 EGLR 41 at 44. 
981 Ibid, at 44. 
982 Ibid. 
983 The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945. 




“causative potency”987 of the parties’ respective breaches in relation to the damages 
suffered, not the parties’ relative degrees of fault.988 
 
There is support in Canada for an apportionment in contract where separate breaches 
contribute to a loss. In Canadian Western Natural Gas Co v Pathfinder Surveys Ltd,989 in 
the Alberta Court of Appeal, Prowse JA expressed his support for the application, under the 
common law, of the principles of contributory negligence to a claim in contract on the basis 
of the principle that “where a man is part author of his own injury, he cannot call on the 
other party to compensate him in full.”990 In Cosyns v Smith et al,991 the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, obiter, supported the application of apportionment in contract as well as tort where 
the “negligence of the plaintiff has concurred with that of the defendant to produce the 
misfortune for which damages are claimed.”992 
 
Dugdale & Stanton993 apparently support the Tenant Radiant Heat decision but the weight 
of authority is against it. Chitty on Contracts describes it as “unusual”994. Andrew 
Burrows995 says it is “controversial as a decision on causation (as opposed to contributory 
negligence).”996 From this it is understood that Burrows agrees with the court’s ruling that 
the contributory negligence legislation was not applicable but is doubtful about the 
                                                
987 The phrase was coined by Denning LJ in Davies v Swan Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd [1949] 2 KB 291at 326. 
988 Ibid, at 326. Denning LJ said that, in applying The Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, the 
courts consider both the causal potency and the comparative blameworthiness of the two parties.  
989 (1980) 12 Alta LR (2d) 135. 
990 Ibid, at 158. This is a reference to a dictum by Viscount Simon in Nance v British Columbia Electric 
Railway Co Ltd [1951] AC 601 at 611. 
991 (1983) 146 DLR (3d) 622. 
992 Glanville Williams Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (London, Stevens, 1951), 214 –5. 
993 A M Dugdale & K M Stanton, Professional Negligence (2nd ed, London, Butterworths, 1989), at 517. 
994 HG Beale (Gen Ed), Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2 vols, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) vol 1 para 
26–036 and 26–043. 
995 Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract. 
996 Ibid, 77. 
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apportionment of causation. Most significant is the decision of the Court of Appeal 
(England) in Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) 
Ltd,997 which expressed reservations about the decision. The court said that for it to apply 
the principle enunciated in Tenant Radiant Heat it would have required the issue to be 
argued fully by counsel.998  The Law Commission Report on Contributory Negligence999  
expressed the view that Tenant Radiant Heat will be restrictively interpreted and limited to 
its facts.  
 
The bank cannot deny that its breach caused the first unauthorised debit, which it is liable 
to reimburse. It may be able to prove that the customer’s breach caused it loss by denying it 
the opportunity to recover the monies which it is liable to reimburse. Where there have 
been subsequent unauthorised debits, it is doubted whether the customer’s breach will 
constitute a legal cause of those losses. In the event that they are, the ability of the court to 
take the customer’s contribution into account, along with the bank’s undeniable 
contribution, is subject to the acceptance of Tenant Radiant Heat as authority for such a 
course of action. 
 
The bank may allege that the customer’s failure to verify was a novus actus interveniens: a 
new cause occurring after the initial cause which breaks the causal chain between the initial 
cause and the result. It is submitted here that the doctrine of novus actus interveniens does 
not find application. Where the intervening conduct is that of the claimant, it is normally 
                                                
997 [1990] 1 QB 818. 
998 Ibid, at 904. The Tenant decision was mentioned but not analysed in Jet Holding Ltd and others v Cooper 
Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd and another [2006] 3 SLR 769 at 816. 
999 Law Commission Report No 219 “Contributory Negligence as a Defence in Contract”, at para 3.13. 
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more appropriate to deal with the issue with reference to the duty to mitigate damages and 
the law relating to contributory negligence.1000 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts say that where the 
“conduct of the claimant is so wholly unreasonable and/or of such overwhelming impact 
that the conduct eclipses the defendant’s wrongdoing”,1001 it may constitute a novus actus. 
It is submitted that the customer’s failure to verify, which in itself does not cause any loss, 
is insufficient to constitute a novus actus interveniens.  
 
Remoteness of damage1002 and the duty of the plaintiff to mitigate against his loss1003 are 
also relevant concepts. While they may achieve the same result, they are distinct and apply 
in different circumstances. In the present scenario, the ordinary damages (the amount of the 
unauthorised debit) do not raise the issue of remoteness. They flow directly from the bank’s 
breach. The principle of mitigation is that a claimant cannot recover loss or damage to the 
extent that it is caused or increased by his own failure to limit the loss. The requirement for 
the plaintiff is to act reasonably, but the standard is not high given that the defendant is in 
the wrong.1004 Mitigation and novus actus interveniens deal with the same issue although 
mitigation is usually more appropriate where there is an omission.1005 The customer’s 
verification duty should not be seen as a duty to mitigate his loss in the event of a breach by 
the bank of his mandate. The duty to mitigate only arises once there is knowledge of the 
                                                
1000 Anthony M Dugdale (Gen ed) Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (19th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006), para 
2–96; HG Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2 vols., Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) vol 1, para 
26–034. 
1001 Dugdale Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, para 2–96. 
1002 See Treitel, Contract, 976. 
1003 See discussion by Andrew Burrows in “Contributory Negligence in Contract: Ammunition for the Law 
Commission” [1993] 109 LQR 175 at 176. 
1004 British Racing Drivers’ Club  v Hextall Erskin & Co [1996] 3 All ER 667 at 684, see also Beale (Gen Ed) 
Chitty on Contracts, vol 1, para 26–095. 
1005 See discussion by Andrew Burrows in “Contributory Negligence in Contract: Ammunition for the Law 
Commission” [1993] 109 LQR 175 at 176. 
 184
breach.1006 In this case the verification exercise is the means of obtaining that knowledge; 
the customer who has failed to verify will not know of the bank’s breach.  
 
5.6 Assessment of the Standalone Verification Clause 
The viability of a stand–alone verification clause must be measured having regard to its 
effectiveness in protecting the bank against ongoing fraudulent schemes. It has been shown 
that the verification and conclusive evidence clause is effective in such a situation. The 
above analysis of causation is in the context of a bank arguing, as a defence or a 
counterclaim, that the customer’s breach of the verification duty caused the loss and not the 
bank’s breach of mandate. The above analysis suggests that the protection of the stand–
alone verification duty is illusory; because courts are unlikely to resolve the causation 
dilemmas1007 in favour of banks, the clause is inadequate for the purpose for which it is 
designed. The stand–alone clause may be fairer than a verification and conclusive evidence 
clause to the customer, whose failure to verify did not contribute to the loss in the case of 
the one–off forgery, but it does not solve the problem of the customer whose failure to 
verify is without fault, such as the solitary customer who, without blame, is incapacitated to 
the extent of being unable to check his bank statements. The stand–alone verification clause 
does not on its own distinguish between the wilful dilatory customer and the involuntary 
dilatory customer. This depends on another issue: whether the customer’s verification duty 
is strict or a duty of care, as discussed above. In summary, the analysis thus far suggests 
                                                
1006 See Eley v Bedford [1972] 1 QB 155 at 158; Youell v Bland Welch & Co Ltd (The “Superhulls Cover” 
case)(No 2) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 431 at 462; Schering Agrochemicals Ltd v Resibel NVSA 26 November 
1992 (unreported, CA). HG Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2 vols, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2004) vol 1 para 26–096 refers to the claimant’s knowledge of the breach or the time when he 
ought to have known of the breach. 
1007 Relating to the distinction between occasioning versus causing the loss and the prospects of obtaining an 
apportionment in circumstances where the Act does not apply. 
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that the stand–alone verification clause has little to recommend it. It probably does not 
protect the bank because of causation problems and even if it did, it does not treat the 
dilatory but non–negligent customer any better than the verification and conclusive 
evidence clause does. 
 
5.7 Set–Off   
Set–off takes a variety of forms.1008 Contractual set–off is not subject to the restrictions, 
such as those concerning future, contingent, collateral and several liabilities, which are 
attendant on the other forms of set–off. This makes it an attractive tool for banks and banks 
in Singapore give themselves wide express powers of set–off.1009 Whether the set–off 
provision in the T&C avails the bank in the situation of cross breaches of contract will 
depend on the terms of the clause. The matter would come to a head in much the same 
manner as the claim and counterclaim discussed in the preceding paragraphs: the bank will 
debit the customer’s account with the unauthorised transaction, the customer will object 
(after the time stipulated in the stand–alone verification clause) that the bank had no 
mandate and therefore no right to debit its account; the bank’s response is that the customer 
breached the verification clause and this has occasioned damages to the bank, which it is 
entitled to set off against the customer’s claim.1010 If successful, the bank’s set–off of its 
damages neutralizes the customer’s claim to reimbursement and/or damages, leaving the 
customer with the loss.  
                                                
1008 Insolvent set–off, legal set–off, equitable set–off and contractual set–off. Sheelagh McCracken The 
Banker’s Remedy of Set–Off (2nd ed, London, Butterworths, 1998) at 62 argues that there is “an evolution, 
albeit gradual, of a single concept of set–off, squarely based on notions of justice and fairness.”  
1009 UOB 20; OCBC 25; DBS 15; HSBC 21; Std Ch 12. 
1010 The bank will not have sustained damages from a breach of a verification clause until the second in a 
scheme of unauthorised withdrawals is made from the account unless it can show that swift notification of 
the first unauthorised debit would have enabled it to recover some or all of the monies lost.  
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Set–off is a subject in itself and it is not proposed to discuss this aspect in further detail. 
Suffice to say that the bank’s “debt,” giving substance to the set–off in this scenario, is 
subject to the causation problems discussed above. The issue therefore is not so much the 
availability of the set–off but the legitimacy of the underlying claim on which it is based. 
 
A similar conclusion as that reached on the protection offered by a standalone verification 




Geva refers to the verification and conclusive evidence clause as an “estoppel by 
contract.”1011 The description is apt in that the clause contains all the terms necessary to 
block any dispute the customer may have with the accuracy of his statement. The bank does 
not need to fall back on the general law and the doctrine of estoppel to be effective. The 
question is whether breach of a standalone verification clause can give rise to an estoppel 
against the customer, and what the nature of that estoppel is?  
 
It is apparent that the customer’s contractual promise to verify his bank statements cannot 
in itself give rise to an estoppel by representation (as in the case of the Macmillan and 
Greenwood duties) for an estoppel by representation requires a representation of an existing 
                                                
1011 Benjamin Geva “Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills of Exchange Act – Some Doctrinal Aspects” 
(1981–2) 6 Can Bus LJ 269 at 323. 
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fact.1012 An undertaking to verify bank statements is not a representation of an existing fact 
but rather, a promise to do something in the future. According to Spencer Bower, any 
statement which is intended to be a promise, or cannot reasonably be understood as being 
anything else, is not a representation of fact and cannot operate to found an estoppel other 
than a promissory or a proprietary estoppel.1013 Proprietary estoppel can be dismissed from 
this discussion as the promise or representation on which it is based concerns the 
acquisition of rights in property.1014 This leaves promissory estoppel for consideration. 
Promissory estoppel is an equitable estoppel1015 which was articulated in the judgement of 
Denning J in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd.1016  
 
Spencer Bower comments that where a promise is made in a binding contract, it is not 
necessary to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, presumably because enforcement 
is facilitated by the contract, but the two are “closely analogous in many respects”.1017 
Estoppel may be the bank’s only solution, given that enforcement of the stand–alone 
verification promise based on the principles of contract is doubtful because of the difficulty 
in proving that the loss was caused by the customer. 
 
                                                
1012 See e.g. L F Everest Everest and Strode’s Law of Estoppel, (3rd ed, London, Stevens and Sons Limited, 
1923), at 279; K R Handley Estoppel by Conduct and Election (London, Thomson  Sweet & Maxwell, 
2006), para 1–006. See also Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 at 
134. 
1013 Piers Feltham, Daniel Hockberg, Tom Leech Spencer Bower: The Law Relating to Estoppel by 
Representation (4th ed, Lexis Nexis, UK, 2004), para II.4.1. 
1014 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, para I.2.6; Handley Estoppel by 
Conduct and Election, para 1–029; Elizabeth Cooke The Modern Law of Estoppel (Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 42. 
1015 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, para XIV.1.1; K R Handley 
(London, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) Estoppel by Conduct and Election, para 1–029. 
1016 [1947] KB 130. 
1017 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, para XIV.2.2 at page 450. 
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The first issue which arises is whether there is any reason why a contractual promise cannot 
give rise to an estoppel? On the principle that the greater includes the lesser, it is surely 
competent for the contracting promisee to fall back on the “weaker” doctrine of promissory 
estoppel to enforce his contractual rights, provided all the elements of a promissory 
estoppel are met. Lord Scarman’s dicta in Tai Hing Cotton Mill1018 suggest that the 
existence of a contractual right is not an obstacle to recourse to estoppel. He had no 
difficulty with the fact that the duty in question (to examine the statements) was a 
contractual duty although he does say that in such a case the estoppel is “academic” as the 
bank can rely on the defence of set–off or counterclaim.1019 The 9th edition of Paget 
expressed the view that, “Estoppel may yet be available to limit the customer’s freedom 
from responsibility in connection with his supervision of his banking account by reference 
to his banker’s statements.”1020  
 
Assuming that there is no policy precluding the enforcement of contractual promises by 
applying the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the next question is whether a verification 
promise meets the elements of a promissory estoppel, a specialist topic in itself. The 
discussion which follows will be in broad terms only. 
 
The elements of a promissory estoppel are a clear and unequivocal promise,1021 which is 
intended to be binding,1022 reliance1023 and possibly detriment.1024 There may be a further 
                                                
1018 [1986] 1 AC 80 at 110. 
1019 Ibid. 
1020 Maurice Megrah and F R Ryder Paget’s Law of Banking, ( 9th ed, London, Butterworths, 1982), 113. 
1021 Woodhouse AC Israel Cocoa Ltd v Nigerian Produce Marketing Co Ltd [1972] AC 741 at 755, 761, 762, 
771. See also discussion in Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, para 
XIV.2.2. 
1022 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, para XIV.2.22. 
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requirement, namely an existing legal relationship.1025 Spencer Bower explains that doubt 
has been cast on this requirement in a number of cases;1026 in the present context the 
requirement is met and it need not be discussed further. To meet the requirement of a clear 
and unequivocal promise, it is assumed for present purposes that the stand–alone 
verification clause is drafted in clear, unequivocal and mandatory terms. Translating the 
dicta in Peyman v Lanjani1027 and Motor Oil Hellas1028 into a banking context, the customer 
in making the promise to verify his bank statements does not have to be aware of the legal 
rights created by his promise in order for the estoppel to arise.1029 The customer must have 
intended the promise to be binding and intended that the bank would rely on it.1030 The 
customer agreeing to a stand–alone verification clause in a standard–term agreement may 
not know of the contents of the agreement. He does, however, know that he is entering into 
a legal relationship governed by terms with which he has not familiarised himself. A legal 
fiction operates to the effect that he is aware of the terms, and he is bound by them. This 
should be sufficient to satisfy this element.  
 
Reliance and detriment are the remaining elements. Reliance will be present “if the promise 
had a material influence or effect on the conduct of the estoppel raiser.”1031 The bank may 
seek to prove this by pointing to its failure to take recovery steps or, where there has been a 
series of unauthorised debits, the bank may argue that the customer’s failure to keep his 
                                                                                                                                               
1023 Ibid, at para XIV.2.31. 
1024 Ibid, at para XIV.2.37. 
1025 Ibid, at para XIV.2.23. 
1026 Ibid, at para XIV.2.23–2.25. See also Cooke The Modern Law of Estoppel, 39. 
1027 [1985] Ch 457 at 495.  
1028 Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA v Shipping Corpn of India (‘the Kanchenjunga’) [1990] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 391 at 399. 
1029 See also Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, at para XIV.2.18. 
1030 See Ibid, at para XIV.2.22. 
1031 Ibid, at para XIV.2.33. 
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promise facilitated the second and subsequent debits. The element of reliance is 
contentious. The customer may dispute that recovery would have been possible, or he may 
deny that his promise materially influenced the bank in making the subsequent debits; 
rather it was the bank’s routine procedure that led to the debit. Had there not been a 
verification duty in the contract, the bank would nevertheless have made the debit, the 
customer may argue. The merits of the bank’s claim to have lost an opportunity to recover 
the loss as a consequence of the customer’s failure to verify and notify is dependant on the 
facts. This argument is developed in the discussion about estoppel by representation further 
down. 
 
The need to demonstrate detriment is debateable. Spencer Bower submits that detriment in 
a wide sense must be present1032 but there is authority that it is not a requirement.1033 In the 
scenario of unauthorised debits, detriment is likely to be met and is accordingly not 
contentious.  
 
There are two further factors relevant to the doctrine of promissory estoppel: the purpose of 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel is to prevent the insistence on legal rights where it 
would be “unconscionable or inequitable”.1034 It is often said that promissory estoppel is a 
shield and not a sword.1035 Generally this means that the bank can seek to rely on 
                                                
1032 Ibid, at para XIV.2.45; see also Cooke The Modern Law of Estoppel, 68, 100. 
1033 The ‘Post Chaser’ [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 695. 
1034 See dictum by Lord Goff in Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA v Shipping Corpn of India (‘the 
Kanchenjunga’) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 391 at 399; in Singapore, see QBE Insurance (International) Ltd v 
Winterthur Insurance (Far East) Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 711 at 719. Also Feltham, Hockberg, Leech 
Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, e.g., para XIV.2.23, XIV.2.37; Cooke The Modern Law of 
Estoppel, 37, 65. 
1035 See, for e.g., Stephen A Smith Atiyah’s Introduction to the Law of Contract (6th ed, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 2005), 124. 
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promissory estoppel as a defence but not as a counterclaim. This purpose of the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel does not fit comfortably with a bank insisting on its right to 
verification under the contract, especially when it is in breach of the obligation, perhaps 
through negligence, to pay only on a valid mandate. Promissory estoppel is designed to 
avoid inequity.1036 That, coupled with equitable maxims such as “he who comes into equity 
must come with clean hands,”1037 is problematic for a bank which is in breach.  
 
For these reasons, the availability of a promissory estoppel to enforce a stand–alone 
verification clause is uncertain, rendering it unsuitable for the purpose of protecting a bank 
against unauthorised debits. 
 
Another possibility is to shift the focus away from the customer’s promise to his silence 
and examine whether this amounts to a representation of fact that the bank statement is in 
order, i.e. constitutes an estoppel by representation. This issue was raised in Tai Hing 
Cotton Mill but rejected by the Privy Council.1038 The reason is summed up in the 
following words of Lord Scarman: “Once it is held that [the statements] were not 
conclusive, silence, i.e. in this case failure to object, cannot be interpreted as a 
representation that the statements were correct for the simple reason that the company was 
not precluded by the terms of business from asserting that they were incorrect.”1039 Lord 
Scarman seemed to be saying that the contract did not prevent the customer from disputing 
                                                
1036 Feltham, Hockberg, Leech Spencer Bower: Estoppel by Representation, para XIV.3.13; Cooke The 
Modern Law of Estoppel, 37. 
1037 See articulation by John McGhee Q.C. (Gen Ed)  Snell’s Equity (31st ed, London, Thompson Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2005), 98. 
1038 [1986] 1 AC 80 at 110. 
1039 Ibid, at 111. 
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the accuracy of the statements and therefore his silence could not be interpreted as an 
assertion that they were accurate. 
 
It is respectfully submitted that the conclusive effect of the statements is not the key issue. 
If the clauses in question had achieved the conclusive effect which was obviously desired, 
there would have been no need to rely on an estoppel. Crucial to the estoppel is whether an 
unequivocal duty to verify, which is missing at common law, is created by the contract.  
 
A representation based on silence requires a duty to speak, which at common law arises 
with the knowledge of forgery. Where the customer has not verified his bank statement and 
does not have actual knowledge of an error, the question is whether the duty to verify is 
sufficient to found the estoppel, i.e., to bridge the knowledge gap? It is submitted that it is. 
This is reminiscent of the discussion above on whether bank statements give rise to an 
account–stated.1040  
 
The elements of reliance and detriment also need to be met. As before, the requirement of 
reliance can be debated. The merits of this argument are the same as those discussed under 
promissory estoppel. The bank relies on the customer to fulfil his promise to verify and 
notify. The customer’s silence is taken as a representation that the statement is correct and 
the bank is therefore not alerted to the danger of further unauthorised debits and the need to 
take action to take preventive measures. The argument has merit. 
 
                                                
1040 In chapter 4.1 above.  
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On the facts of Tai Hing Cotton Mill, the decision, with respect, was correct because the 
verification duty was not as strongly worded as is desirable. The T&C of Liu Chong Hing 
Bank said that customers are “desired” to check their statements, Tokyo Bank’s T&C said 
the statement “will be confirmed” and Chekiang Bank’s T&C implied a need to verify but 
did not express it at all. In the court below,1041 the customer was found to be in breach of its 
duty to “take reasonable care to protect the interests of the bank,”1042 per Cons J, and “to 
ensure the proper working of the account,”1043 per Hunter J. The breach of this duty gave 
rise to negligent estoppel.1044  
 
It is submitted that estoppel by representation of fact is the strongest argument which can 
be made to enforce a stand–alone verification clause. There is no doubt that from an 
effectiveness perspective, the verification and conclusive evidence clause is superior. If the 
stand–alone verification clause is enforceable, it is not materially different to the 
verification and conclusive evidence clause; to the contrary, the latter is preferable as it 
informs the customer of the disadvantage of not verifying while the former leaves him to 
deduce the consequences for himself. 
 
                                                
1041 The Hong Kong Court of Appeal, reported at [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555. 
1042 Ibid, at 563.  
1043 Ibid, at 580.  
1044 Ibid, at 567 (per Cons J) and 581 (per Hunter J).  
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Chapter 6: A Comparative View 
 
It is instructive to view the common law approach to a customer’s duties in countries that 
share, or at some point did share, a common legal history with Singapore.  
 
6.1 The United States  
The United States and England share a common legal background. Lawrence M 
Friedman1045 writes that “the United States was first settled by English–speaking people in 
the early seventeenth century.”1046 As a result of British colonisation, the “content and 
method of the [English] common law were absorbed into American social culture and have 
never been displaced”.1047 Today, a verification duty is imposed in the United States by the 
Uniform Commercial Code, section 4–406.1048 Prior to the codification of the duty there 
was case law to the same effect. Frank v Chemical National Bank of New York1049 (1881) 
and Leather Manufacturers’ Bank v Morgan and Others1050 (1886) were early cases to 
assert a depositor’s duty to examine his account passbook and notify the bank of errors. In 
Leather Manufacturers’ Bank v Morgan, reference is made to Clayton’s case1051 (1816) in 
support of the duty,1052 which if breached would result in an estoppel by negligence against 
                                                
1045 American Law: An Introduction (2nd ed, W W Norton & Company, United States of America, 1998). 
1046 Ibid, at 52. 
1047 Graham Hughes, “Common Law Systems” in Alan B Morrison (ed), Fundamentals of American Law, 
(Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 9–25 at p. 12. Per Lawrence M Friedman A History of American Law 
(Simon and Schuster, New York, 1973), at 15: “The basic substratum of American law, …, is English.”; in 
Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns Olje–Fabriker (A/B) [1949] AC 196 Lord Wright said at 231: 
“The origin and foundation of the law in both countries [United States and Britain] are the same.” 
1048 The article does not specify a period of time in which the customer must act, it says ‘promptly’. See also 
limitations imposed by 1–102 and 4–103 on contracting out of obligations of good faith, diligence, 
reasonableness and care. 
1049 84 NY 209.  
1050 117 US 96, a decision of the New York Circuit Court. 
1051 Devaynes v Noble: Clayton’s Case (1816) 35 ER 767 at 778. 
1052 117 US 96 at 106. 
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the customer. One condition was that the bank must not have been negligent in paying the 
cheques. In England, Clayton’s case1053 was subsequently marginalized in Chatterton v 
London and County Bank1054 (1890).  In Thomson v New York Trust Co1055 (1944), the 
majority of the New York Court of Appeals endorsed the following statement:1056 “A 
depositor of a bank is under a duty to examine such statements of account, and to give 
notice of errors therein.”1057 The same court in Maryland Casualty Co v Central Trust 
Co1058 explained the basis of the rule: it promoted justice as either the depositor or the bank 
could suffer loss from a third party’s wrong and prompt action from the depositor enables 
the bank to pursue the forger and take steps for its own protection and the general banking 
community.1059  
 
In Shipman v Bank of the State of New York,1060 (1891) the court said: “Payments made 
upon forged indorsements are at the peril of the bank, unless it can claim protection upon 
some principle of estoppel or some negligence chargeable to the depositor.”1061 In Stella 
Flour & Feed Corporation v National City Bank1062 (1954), the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court of New York, per Bergan J, said “negligence chargeable to the depositor” 
comprises: 
                                                
1053 Devaynes v Noble: Clayton’s Case (1816) 35 ER 767 at 778. 
1054 The Times, Jan 21 1891. 
1055 56 NE2d 32 at 36. 
1056 Ibid, at 36. 
1057 Made in Potts & Co v Lafayette National Bank 199 NE 50, at 52. 
1058 79 NE2d 253. 
1059 Ibid, at 257. 
1060 (1891) 27 NE 371. 
1061 Ibid, at 372. 
1062 (1954) 136 NYS2d 139 affd 127 NE2d 864. 
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1. a delay in examining returned vouchers or accounts and in notifying the bank of 
wrongful debits, materially undermining the bank’s ability to recover the loss;1063 and 
2. conditions “created or allowed by the depositor which greatly facilitate the deception 
imposed on the bank”.1064  
This would excuse the bank unless it was also negligent so as to set-off the negligence of 
the depositor. 
 
From this it is apparent that, at least 30 years prior to Macmillan’s case in England, United 
States’ courts were taking a stricter view of the customer’s obligations in regard to his bank 
account. This reflects an ideological difference between the two jurisdictions. 
 
Today the Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code provides as follows:  
Section 1–302 recognises the right of a bank and its customer to expressly contract for their 
rights and duties, subject to obligations of “good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care” 
prescribed by the Act. The standards by which those obligations are measured may be 
agreed between the parties, provided they are not clearly unreasonable. 
Section 3–103 defines “ordinary care” where it is required of a person engaged in business, 
as the “observance of reasonable commercial standards”. Further, “reasonable commercial 
standards” do not require a bank to examine the item it is paying or collecting, provided 
this is its procedure and is not an unreasonable departure from banking practice. 
Section 3–406 estops a person who negligently facilitates the alteration or forgery of a 
mandate, from raising the defect against, inter alia, a bank which pays it honestly and in 
                                                
1063 136 NYS2d 139 at 143. 
1064 Ibid. 
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accordance with its reasonable practice. This provision was said in the Comment to the 
1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code1065 to adopt the doctrine of Young v 
Grote.1066.  
Article 4 concerns bank deposits and collections.  
Section 4–103 allows banks and depositors to determine their obligations to each other, i.e. 
to vary the provisions of article 4, except that a bank may not disclaim its duty of good faith 
or ordinary care. The parties may, however, determine the applicable standards provided 
they are not “manifestly unreasonable”. This reflects the provisions of section 1–102. The 
1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code1067 says: “Under this article banks 
come under the general obligations of the use of good faith and the exercise of ordinary 
care.” 
Section 4–202 specifies when ordinary care is required from a collecting bank, e.g., in 
presenting an item, settling for an item and making protest.  
Section 4–406 imposes a verification duty on the customer. The article does not specify a 
period of time in which the customer must act; it says “promptly”.   
 
                                                
1065 Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text with Comments (The American Law Institute and 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1962) Comment 1, 294. 
1066 (1827) 130 ER 764. 
1067 Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 Official Text with Comments, Comment 4, 367. 
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6.2 Canada 
In Canada, like England, there is “judicial reluctance to impose upon a depositor a duty to 
examine bank statements and to report any discrepancies within a reasonable period.”1068 
The response of banks has been to achieve the same result contractually. Verification and 
conclusive evidence clauses have been used in Canada in some form for more than 100 
years,1069 with one of the earliest cases on validity dating back to 1916.1070 There has since 
followed a long line of litigation on this point. Some of the more recent Canadian cases, 
that involve negligence by the bank, are discussed above.1071 
 
The seminal case is the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Arrow Transfer Co Ltd 
v Royal Bank of Canada1072 (1972). The facts are all too familiar. A senior employee of the 
customer forged cheques on the company’s bank account over a period of five years. The 
customer alleged that the bank had paid without a mandate; the bank in turn sought to rely 
on a verification and conclusive evidence clause. The majority of the court upheld the 
verification and conclusive evidence clause. The majority and the dissenting judge (Laskin 
J) disagreed on interpretation, on how explicit the clause had to be to cover forgery. Laskin 
J adopted a strict approach: if a clause, not expressly covering forgery, would have subject 
matter without forgery, a strict interpretation of the clause means that forgery is not 
covered.1073 Laskin J considered that a contra proferentem interpretation was justified:1074 
                                                
1068 See statement of Laskin J (dissenting) in Arrow Transfer Co Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada 27 DLR (3d) 
81at 99. This reluctance is not shared by Laskin J; see at 101.  
1069 Keith W Perrett “Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own 
Business?” (1999) 14 BFLR 245 at 246. 
1070 Columbia Gramophone Co v Union Bank of Canada (1916) 34 DLR 743.  
1071 In chapter 4.5.1. 
1072 (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81. 
1073 Arrow Transfer Co Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81at 98. 
1074 Ibid. 
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“the principal question is … what is the scope of protection which [the bank] has achieved 
under a document which is more a contract of adhesion than a bargained arrangement.”1075  
 
While favouring a narrow construction of the verification agreement, Laskin J struck out in 
the other direction as regards a customer’s duties to its bank: “I do not think it is too late to 
fasten upon bank customers in this country a duty to examine bank statements with 
reasonable care and to report account discrepancies within a reasonable time.”1076 In 
support of this view, Laskin J referred to the Uniform Commercial Code and its provision 
for such a duty. Laskin J’s finding against the customer, however, went beyond a breach of 
a duty to examine bank statements. The customer’s neglect of proper accounting 
procedures, coupled with knowingly employing a person with a history of dishonesty, 
“precluded” the customer from claiming against the bank in respect of any of the 72 forged 
cheques.1077 Nicholas Rafferty1078 submits that while Arrow Transfer concerned forgery, 
the reasoning should apply to fraud that the customer could have prevented.1079  
 
Geva1080 criticises the majority for applying an expansive construction of the clause rather 
than instituting change in the common law. In his view, they used the verification 
agreement to circumvent the consequences of their refusal to recognise a broader duty of 
                                                
1075 Ibid, at 97. 
1076 Ibid, at 101. 
1077 Ibid, at 102 - 103. 
1078 Nicholas Rafferty “Account Verification Agreements: When Can a Bank Protect Itself Against Its Own 
Negligence?” (1993) 8 BFLR 403. 
1079 Ibid, at 407. 
1080 Benjamin Geva “Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills of Exchange Act – Some Doctrinal Aspects” 
(1981–2) 6 Can Bus LJ 269. 
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care to examine bank statements and notify errors.1081  He considers that negligence is a 
sounder basis for liability than estoppel.1082  
 
In Laskin J’s dissenting view in Arrow Transfer, the duty of the customer to verify bank 
statements was clearly a duty of care;1083 the customer’s responsibility, however, for the 
employment of a dishonest person and its failure to supervise him was not discussed with 
reference to a duty of care. It is submitted that Laskin J’s words point to a decision rooted 
in negligent estoppel, particularly the use of the word “precluded”. If so, it is implicit that 
Laskin J recognised a duty of care going beyond the duty to examine bank statements.  
 
In Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal,1084 the Supreme Court of Canada 
acknowledged the uncertainty on this aspect of Laskin J’s ruling in Arrow Transfer. Le 
Dain J said it “appears to have been the basis of a broader duty of care”.1085 Nicholas 
Rafferty agrees; it was a “broader duty on a customer to carry on its business with 
reasonable care”.1086 In Canadian Pacific Hotels, an employee of the customer forged 23 
cheques on the customer’s account over a period of 15 months. The customer received 
daily statements from the bank but there was no verification agreement between the parties. 
The trial court1087 (Montgomery J) found in favour of the bank on the basis, inter alia, of an 
implied duty arising from commercial custom to verify bank statements.1088 An interim 
                                                
1081 Ibid, at 323. 
1082 Ibid, at 324. 
1083 Arrow Transfer Co Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81at 101. 
1084 Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385. 
1085 Ibid, at 418, see further at 419. 
1086 “Account Verification Agreements: When Can a Bank Protect Itself Against Its Own Negligence?” (1993) 
8 BFLR 403 at 406. 
1087 Decision reported at Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal (1981) 122 DLR (3d) 519. 
1088 Ibid, at 533. 
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appeal court upheld the decision by a majority.1089 On further appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Canada overturned the decision.1090 Le Dain J’s detailed judgment in the Supreme Court 
delved back to cases like Evans’ Charities.1091 In conclusion he doubted the basis for the 
commercial custom found by Montgomery J and dismissed the implication of the broader 
duties favoured by Montgomery J. In short, absent a verification agreement there was no 
duty on the customer to examine his bank statement and notify the bank of discrepancies. 
 
Hayek1092 criticizes Le Dain J’s decision for not taking account of the “present–day 
banking milieu”.1093 He points to the “depersonification of banking” and its implications: 
increased number of customers including large corporate customers, greater volume of 
transactions and electronic processing. He goes on: “On policy grounds, there does not 
seem to be any valid reason for allocating a loss to the bank rather than to a large corporate 
customer …”1094 These same policy considerations, it is submitted, justify the use of the 
verification and conclusive evidence clause. 
 
Laskin J’s minority judgement in Arrow Transfer was an important precedent for the trial 
judge in Canadian Pacific Hotels.1095 Montgomery J’s decision quotes extensively from 
Laskin J1096. In an argument based on the needs of the modern banking environment and 
the incongruity of the existing, limited customer duties, Montgomery J recognised two 
                                                
1089 A decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, reported at (1983) 139 DLR (3d) 575. 
1090 Reported at (1988) 40 DLR (4th) 385. 
1091 Discussed in chapter 3.5 above. 
1092 “Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 361 at 369. 
1093 Ibid, at 369. 
1094 Ibid. 
1095 In the Ontario High Court. 
1096 See Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal (1981) 122 DLR (3d) 519 at 530. 
 202
implied duties on the sophisticated customer:1097 the institution of acceptable internal 
controls and the duty to examine bank statements with reasonable care and to report errors 
within a reasonable time.1098 His legal basis for the implication was “commercial custom”; 
the guiding principle employed by Montgomery J is that where “two suffer for the fraud of 
a third, the one who most enabled that third party to create the fraud should bear the 
loss.”1099 This is reminiscent of Lickbarrow v Mason,1100 which puts the point almost 
identically,1101 and Meyer & Co Limited v The Sze Hai Tong Banking and Insurance 
Company Limited .1102  
 
Laskin J’s dissenting view in Arrow Transfer, stands in contrast to the position in 
Macmillan, where the negligence must be in the transaction itself, meaning today that the 
negligence must be in the drawing of the mandate. Lord Finlay LC in Macmillan, 
specifically said: “It would be no defence to the banker, if the forgery had been that of a 
clerk of a customer, that the latter had taken the clerk into his service without sufficient 
inquiry as to his character.”1103 In Arrow Transfer, the facts were stronger than the scenario 
painted by Lord Finlay as the customer in Arrow Transfer, had actual knowledge of a 
history of dishonesty on the part of the employee, yet he was employed in an accounting 
position with access to the customer’s cheque book and was inadequately supervised. One 
cannot but doubt whether Lord Finlay in Macmillan would have maintained this position on 
the more extreme facts of Arrow Transfer. The facts illustrate the risk to banks from their 
                                                
1097 See (1981) 122 DLR (3d) 519 (HC) at 532, 533.  
1098 Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal (1981) 122 DLR (3d) 519 (HC) at 533–534. 
1099 Ibid, at 533. 
1100 (1787) 100 ER 35. 
1101 Ibid, at 39: “whenever one of two innocent parties must suffer by the act of a third person, he who has 
enabled such person to occasion the loss must sustain it.”  
1102 [1913] AC 847 at 852. 
1103 London Joint Stock Bank Limited v Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 at 795. 
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customer’s imprudence. Nevertheless, on the authority as it presently stands in England, the 
customer does not owe a duty to his bank at common law to exercise care in the 
employment of staff. In Singapore, based on Khoo Tian Hock, the general duty not to 
facilitate fraud would, it is submitted, be wide enough to penalize the customer for 
employing a person in the circumstances of Arrow Transfer.  
 
Keith Perrett writes that the reaction of Canadian banks to the “strict interpretation” cases 
was to bolster their T&C on account verification.1104 Perrett’s extracts of particular 
exclusion clauses in use in Canadian bank’s T&C in 1999 reveals a use of the following 
provisions: 
1. A widespread exclusion of liability for losses attributable to forged or unauthorised 
signatures. This may be qualified if the loss was caused by the bank’s fault, and if the 
customer can prove, inter alia, that the loss was not made by a current or previous 
employee or agent and that the loss was unavoidable despite the customer having 
taken all feasible steps to avoid it including implementation of measures to supervise 
and monitor employees and agents. 
2. An obligation to implement supervisory and monitoring controls, inter alia of staff. In 
some cases, specific procedures are detailed. Obviously, if adopting such an 
approach, care should be taken to ensure that these specific measures are not 
interpreted as exhaustive, failing which the bank could find itself the victim of its 
own explicit drafting, especially in an environment of strict interpretation of terms.   
 
                                                
1104 Keith Perrett “Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own 
Business?” (1999) 14 BFLR 245 at 257. 
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Having regard to the clauses cited by Perrett,1105 Canadian banks have, on the whole, 
continued to shy away from express exclusions for bank negligence. Their T&C make it 
plain that they do not wish to be liable for losses attributable to forged or unauthorised 
signatures made by employees or agents, past or present, that could have been detected by 
the implementation of proper procedures and checks and balances; nor losses contributed to 
or facilitated by the customer’s own lack of diligence in relation to his account, even if the 
bank was also negligent. 
                                                
1105 Ibid, at 257–263. 
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Chapter 7: The UCTA and the Verification and Conclusive Evidence Clause 
 
The validity of a verification and conclusive evidence clause was recognised in Consmat 
Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association1106 by the 
Singapore High Court. The customer signed the T&C of the bank on opening the account. 
It included a verification and conclusive evidence clause. The clause was challenged after 
15 forged cheques were debited to the account. It was held that the clause imposed an 
obligation on the customer to verify statements within the stipulated period, failing which 
they were conclusively correct. Although the court considered the issue to be governed by 
the Bills of Exchange Act1107 to the exclusion of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
(UCTA),1108 it nevertheless expressed the view that the clause was reasonable within the 
terms of the UCTA. Central to the court’s reasoning was the fact that the bank returned 
paid cheques to the customer together with periodic statements, which facilitated 
verification.  
 
The practice of returning paid cheques to customers is no longer standard, leaving scope 
after Consmat for the argument that a verification clause is unreasonable,1109 but 
subsequent decisions in Singapore have upheld the validity of verification and conclusive 
evidence clauses.1110 Recent Court of Appeal recognition came in Pertamina Energy 
Trading Limited v Credit Suisse.1111 The customer, a company, opened a deposit account 
                                                
1106 [1992] 2 SLR 828. 
1107 Cap 23. 
1108 Cap 396. 
1109 A point made by Poh Chu Chai Law of Banker and Customer (5th ed, Lexis Nexis, 2004), 922. 
1110 See Elis Tjoa v UOB [2003] 1 SLR 747; Stephan Machinery Singapore Pte Ltd v Overseas–Chinese 
Banking Corporation Ltd [2000] 2 SLR 191. 
1111 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 299. 
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with the bank. A credit facility, secured by a charge over the deposit account, was later 
granted to the company. The charge was defective and a nullity. One of the authorised 
signatories to the account had the bank statements sent to his personal address. Thereafter, 
he fraudulently procured a drawdown of US$8 million under the facility. The bank set off 
the amount against the deposit account. At common law, the bank had paid without a 
mandate but the court upheld the verification and conclusive evidence clause. V K Rajah J, 
confining his decision to verification and conclusive evidence clauses used by commercial 
entities, said, “conclusive evidence clauses if and when properly and reasonably defined are 
enforceable”.1112 V K Rajah J refrained from expressing his opinion on the reasonableness 
of conclusive evidence clauses in the context of individual and non–corporate customers, 
this being unnecessary on the facts.1113 
 
7.1 Application of the UCTA 
Before the issue of reasonableness under the UCTA arises, it is necessary to bring the 
clause within the terms of the Act. UCTA does not apply to all contracts,1114 nor does it 
apply to all clauses within a contract. It is targeted at clauses that have any of a number of 
specified effects, primarily of excluding or limiting liability. The verification and 
conclusive evidence clause may be caught by different sections of the Act.  
 
S 2(2) requires a clause that excludes or restricts liability for negligence to be reasonable. A 
verification and conclusive evidence clause does not overtly exclude liability for 
                                                
1112 Ibid, at 296. 
1113 Ibid. 
1114 See for example, the First Schedule to the Act which excludes sections 2–4 from certain types of contract, 
such as insurance contracts. 
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negligence. However, the effect of the clause is to exclude the bank’s liability for 
negligence by putting errors, including negligent errors, in bank statements beyond dispute 
after expiry of the stipulated time period.  
 
An analogous situation arose in Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland and another1115 in the 
context of a contract for plant hire that included the services of a driver or operator. A 
clause of the contract made the hirer of machinery responsible for the acts or omissions of 
the driver, but there was no specific exclusion for negligence by the driver. The plant owner 
argued that while the clause in question did affect its liability for negligence, it did not 
exclude or limit liability for negligence per se and therefore did not come within the ambit 
of the section. Slade LJ in the Court of Appeal (England) rejected the argument. He said: 
“In applying s 2(2), it is not relevant to consider whether the form of a condition is such 
that it can aptly be given the label of an ‘exclusion’ or ‘restriction’ clause.”1116 “To decide 
whether a person ‘excludes’ liability by reference to a contract term, you look at the effect 
of the term. You look at its substance.”1117 The court also said, but without elaboration, that 
the term there in question was caught by section 13(1) of the Act.1118 A later Court of 
Appeal (England) decision, Thompson v T Lohan (Plant Hire) Ltd,1119 supported (and 
distinguished) the Phillips decision. 
  
                                                
1115 [1987] 1 WLR 659. 
1116 [1987] 1 WLR 659 at 666. 
1117 Ibid. 
1118 Ibid. 
1119 Thompson v T Lohan (Plant Hire) Ltd and Another (JW Hurdiss Ltd, third party) [1987] 1 WLR 649 at 
656 where the court found that a clause which passed liability from a wrongdoer to a third party, but 
which did not affect liability to the victim of the wrongdoing, was not affected by section 2(1) of the 
UCTA. 
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Sir Nicholas Browne–Wilkinson VC, in Tudor Grange Holdings Ltd and Others v Citibank 
NA and Another1120 had to consider the application of the UCTA to settlement agreements. 
In this context he said: “The Act of 1977 is normally regarded as being aimed at exemption 
clauses in the strict sense, that is to say, clauses in a contract which aim to cut down 
prospective liability arising in the course of the performance of the contract in which the 
exemption clause is contained.”1121 Cons J, in Tai Hing Cotton Mill in the Hong Kong 
Court of Appeal, considered when a clause could be termed an exclusion clause. Although 
his comments were not made in the context of the UCTA, they are pertinent: “The clause, if 
effective, will relieve the bank of what would otherwise be its liability and that, to my 
mind, is conclusive of its nature.”1122 There is no doubt that the effect of a verification and 
conclusive evidence clause is to exclude, among other things, negligence and therefore 
section 2(2) of the UCTA applies.  
 
S 3(2)(a) requires a clause that excludes liability for a breach of contract to be reasonable. 
Once again, a verification and conclusive evidence clause does not expressly exclude 
liability for breach of contract but in effect it does just this. The breach of contract lies in 
the bank’s payment without a mandate.1123 Recognition of the application of this section to 
the clause can be found in Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse.1124 
 
S 3(2)(b)(i) requires a clause allowing performance in a manner substantially different from 
what was reasonably expected, to be reasonable. This will apply if the customer can 
                                                
1120 [1992] Ch 53. 
1121 Ibid, at 65. 
1122 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 566. 
1123 This is the basis on which Poh Chu Chai in Law of Banker and Customer argues that the UCTA applies to 
the clause, at 923. 
1124 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 295. 
 209
persuade the court that the verification and conclusive evidence clause entitled the bank to 
render performance substantially different from what the customer reasonably expected. 
The argument could run along the lines that the customer expected the bank to act only on 
an authentic mandate and to be liable to reimburse it in the event of breach but the effect of 
the verification and conclusive evidence clause is to excuse the bank of the consequences of 
failing to observe its mandate. In Paragon Finance plc v Staunton and Nash,1125 the Court 
of Appeal ruled that a discretion to vary interest rates was not “performance” within the 
meaning of the Act.1126 It is submitted that the duty to observe the mandate will qualify as 
“performance” as it is used in the Act. 
 
S 3(2)(b)(ii) applies to contractual provisions that entitle the rendering of no performance at 
all, and is unlikely to be applicable in the present context. 
 
S 13 is also relevant. The Court of Appeal (England) in Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & 
Co Ltd1127 gave the section a broad interpretation, saying that it extended the scope of the 
Act by increasing the types of exclusions falling within the ambit of the Act.1128 A 
verification and conclusive evidence clause excludes a right or remedy in respect of 
negligence; this brings it within the terms of section 13(1)(b), alternatively it excludes or 
                                                
1125 [2002] 2 All ER 248.  
1126 Ibid at 270–271. 
1127 [1992] QB 600. 
1128 Ibid at 605. In doing so, it rejected a narrow interpretation that the section only applied to an exclusion 
which indirectly achieved what was caught by other sections of Part I of the Act. Andrew Phang 
“Interpretation, Severance and Policy and the Unfair Contract Terms Act” [1992] LMCLQ 467 at 468 
points out that the narrow interpretation of the clause “is not without merit” but concludes that the broad 
interpretation may better serve the overall policy of the Act1128 which is “at best, neutral and, if at all, 
tends to render such clauses unenforceable.” 
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restricts the rules of evidence by making the bank statement conclusive, making section 
13(1)(c) applicable. 
 
It is worth considering whether a standalone verification clause is caught by any of the 
provisions of the UCTA. The clause merely requires the customer to examine his periodic 
statements and to report any errors to the bank. No adverse consequences for failing to do 
so are stipulated. There is no exclusion of liability for negligence, hence section 2 is 
apparently not applicable. There is no exclusion of liability for the bank’s breach of 
contract or a claim to be entitled to render substantially different or no performance at all, 
hence section 3 is apparently not applicable. Section 4 is not applicable as there is no 
indemnity by the customer to the bank. Nor are there any of the exclusions stipulated in 
section 13 (rules of evidence, onerous conditions or prejudice on the enforcement of a 
liability). On the face of it therefore, the UCTA does not apply. 
 
However, where the T&C contain a general exclusion of liability and/or indemnity for 
breach of contract, the general exclusion of liability will apply because failure to verify the 
bank statement constitutes a breach of the stand–alone verification clause. The UCTA will 
apply to that clause; ss 2(2), 3(2)(a), 3(2)(b)(i) are all potentially relevant. The other 
possible basis for the application of the UCTA to a stand–alone verification clause is on the 
basis of Phillips Products v Hyland,1129 that the substance of the clause is determinative. 
This is premised on the enforceability of the clause on its own terms.1130  
 
                                                
1129 [1987] 1 WLR 659. 
1130 See the discussion of this issue in chapter 5 above where it is argued that the stand–alone verification 
clause is inferior without some stipulated sanction. 
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7.2 Reasonableness 
The discussion above shows that UCTA, sections 2(2), 3(2)(a), 3(2)(b)(i) and 13 are all 
capable of applying to a verification and conclusive evidence clause. Bringing a clause 
within the terms of the Act is only the first hurdle for the customer resorting to the UCTA 
for relief. The second stage is the adjudication of the issue of reasonableness. The burden of 
proof lies with the bank, the entity averring that the term is reasonable;1131 the bank “has to 
make a positive case and prove whatever is necessary by way of factual background and 
other commercial considerations that [it] says suffice to establish the reasonableness of the 
clause.”1132 In Kenwell & Co Pte Ltd v Southern Ocean Shipbuilding Co Pte Ltd1133 the 
court suggested that the more unreasonable a term appears to be, the greater the burden of 
proof which has to be discharged. Kenwell is authority for the proposition that the ubiquity 
of verification and conclusive evidence clauses in Singapore does not mean that they are 
reasonable.1134 
 
Poh Chu Chai argues that verification and conclusive evidence clauses are unreasonable.1135 
An impediment to this position lies in the acceptability which these clauses have acquired 
in Singapore case law, particularly since the decision in Pertamina Energy Trading v 
Credit Suisse.1136 The Court of Appeal endorsed the view that “in principle conclusive 
evidence clauses employed in a banker and corporate customer relationship afford a 
                                                
1131 Unfair Contract Terms Act, section 11(5). 
1132 Per Hobhouse LJ (dissenting on the issue of incorporation) in AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] 
CLC 265 at 278.  
1133 [1999] 1 SLR 214 at 228. 
1134 Ibid. 
1135 Poh Chu Chai  Law of Banker and Customer, 917, 922. 
1136 [2006] 4 SLR 273. 
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practical and reasonable device for pragmatic management of risk allocation.”1137 This 
dictum appears to concede however, that the clause has the potential to operate 
unreasonably. Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland and another1138 stresses that the question is 
not whether the clause in question is reasonable per se but whether it is reasonable in the 
particular circumstances in which it arises. Given an apt factual matrix, it is submitted that 
a credible attack can still be made on verification and conclusive evidence clauses in 
Singapore despite the in–principle approval which the clause has received. It is important 
that, despite their legitimate interests in using the conclusive evidence clause, banks should 
feel constrained by the UCTA not to abuse their dominant contractual position in protecting 
their interests.  
 
 As verification and conclusive evidence clauses are wide enough to protect the bank 
regardless of how the incorrect entry arose, the argument that they are unreasonable is 
supported by Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd, where a clause which could 
extend to a defence based on fraud was considered “plainly unreasonable”.1139   
 
S 11(1) of the UCTA requires the term to be a “fair and reasonable one to be included 
having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known 
to or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made.” Although the 
Guidelines in the Second Schedule are stated to be applicable to a determination of 
                                                
1137 Ibid, at 295. 
1138 [1987] 1 WLR 659 at 668. 
1139 [1992] QB 600 at 608. 
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reasonableness under s6 and s7, they “are usually regarded as being of general application 
to the question of reasonableness.”1140  
 
The majority of the Guidelines offered in the Second Schedule to the Act for determining 
reasonableness seem to favour the customer. 
 
Guideline (a) calls for a consideration of the parties’ relative bargaining positions. In 
general, the customer has no bargaining position vis–à–vis the bank. Hobhouse LJ, in AEG 
(UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd,1141 considered that this factor militated strongly in favour 
of the non–proffering party.1142  He stated that guidelines (a) and (c) are concerned with the 
reality of consent from the non–proffering party against a contractual background which 
tolerates objective (as opposed to subjective) consent to give rise to a binding contract.1143 
 
Guideline (b) has regard to the availability of a similar contract with other persons without 
the offending term and whether the customer received inducements to agree to the term. 
Because verification and conclusive evidence clauses are ubiquitous in bank T&C in 
Singapore, the customer cannot easily avoid the term by taking his banking business 
elsewhere. However, in Elis Tjoa v United Overseas Bank, the Singapore High Court did 
not consider that this rendered the clause unreasonable.1144  The prevalence of fraud and 
forgery was considered an adequate justification for the clause.1145  
                                                
1140 Ibid. See also Singer Co (UK) Ltd and Another v Tees and Hartleypool Port Authority [1988] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 164 at 169. 
1141 [1996] CLC 265. 
1142 Ibid at 279; see also Hirst LJ at 274. 
1143 AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265 at 279. 




Guideline (c) raises the question of the customer’s knowledge of the term. The majority of 
customers would be unaware of the term and of its implications and banks do not routinely 
draw customer’s attention to the clause when opening the account. As mentioned in the 
discussion above on Guideline (a), Hobhouse LJ (dissenting on the issue of incorporation) 
in AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd,1146 explained that this factor is relevant 
notwithstanding that the term passes the test for incorporation1147 because under the UCTA, 
particularly paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Second Schedule, the reality of consent of the 
non–proffering party is accorded some weight: “It is necessary in order to assess 
reasonableness to consider to what extent the party has actually consented to the 
clause.”1148 Robert Bradgate points out that guideline (c) is not purely subjective; it 
contains an objective “ought reasonably to have known” element.1149 He suggests that 
while it takes an objective view of the profferee’s awareness of the term, it is subjective in 
that it does so from the profferee’s point of view and not that of the profferor.1150 
 
Guideline (d) requires consideration of the ease of compliance with the term as assessed at 
the time of contracting. This is the only factor that arguably favours the bank in that 
compliance with the term, i.e. verification and notification of errors, is in most cases 
practicable;1151 the absence of paid cheques with the bank statement (at least in the context 
of a corporate customer) was dismissed by V K Rajah J in Pertamina Energy Trading v 
                                                
1146 [1996] CLC 265 at 278. 
1147 AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265 at 279. See also comment by Hirst LJ at 273 –4. 
1148 Ibid, at 279. 
1149 Robert Bradgate “Unreasonable Standard Terms” (1997) 60 MLR 582 at 591. See Granville Oil & 
Chemicals Ltd v Davis Turner & Co Ltd [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 356 at 361 for an application of the 
objective element. 
1150 Ibid, at 592. 
1151 The position where the bank holds statements for the customer is discussed below in chapter 10.1. 
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Credit Suisse as swaying the issue of reasonableness.1152 It may seem that the verification 
and conclusive evidence clause is more reasonable for business accounts where the 
customer has staff who manage the accounts and can undertake the verification exercise as 
part of their duties while for private customers, who do not have the same resources, it may 
be unreasonable. On the other hand, in most cases a private customer’s banking affairs are 
significantly smaller in volume, compensating for the fact that verification must be 
undertaken by himself. 
 
Guideline (e) is not significant in the bank–customer context.1153 
 
The Guidelines are not the only considerations for evaluating the issue of reasonableness. 
The court must take into account all the relevant factors of the case before it.1154 In The 
Zinnia,1155 Staughton J suggested that terms can be unreasonable, first, for being in such 
fine print that they can hardly be read and secondly for “convoluted and prolix”1156 
language such that they are difficult to understand.1157 A verification and conclusive 
evidence clause relieves the bank of the consequences of breach, including negligent 
breach, of a duty that is fundamental to the banking relationship, namely, to pay in 
accordance with the mandate. This alteration to such a basic duty is, it is submitted, a 
relevant factor in determining whether the express term is reasonable.  
 
                                                
1152 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 296. 
1153 It relates to the manufacture of goods. 
1154 Kenwell & Co Pte Ltd v Southern Ocean Shipbuilding Co Pte Ltd [1999] 1 SLR 214 at 228. 
1155 Stag Line Ltd v Tyne Ship Repair Group Ltd and Others [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 211. 
1156 Ibid, at 222. 
1157 Ibid. 
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Lord Griffiths in Smith and Eric S Bush v Harris and Another and Wyre Forest District 
Council1158 identified further relevant considerations. First, the difficulty of performing the 
task for which liability is sought to be excluded. The greater the difficulty, the higher the 
risk of failure, supporting the justification of an exclusion of liability. In the banking 
context, the task being undertaken is to pay in accordance with the mandate. The bank may 
argue that a meticulous examination of all mandates is not feasible in modern banking 
operations and cannot reasonably be expected by customers. Bank practice, already referred 
to, of not examining mandates below a certain threshold can be viewed as falling on either 
side of the reasonableness divide, depending on whether the practice is accepted as being 
commercially necessary to enable banks to deliver the service to larger volumes of 
customers, quicker and cheaper, or whether one views it as a practice to maximize bank 
profits. Banks can point to the difficulty posed by sophisticated forgeries even after a 
meticulous examination. The existence of forgery detection technology is relevant to this 
argument. The failure of a bank to embrace affordable scientific and technological 
advances would be damaging to its argument and its reputation.1159 On the other hand, the 
exclusion of liability, through a verification and notification clause, for what transpires to 
be a patent or obvious forgery or fraud, is unacceptable.  
 
Another consideration identified by Lord Griffiths is the “practical consequences of the 
decision on reasonableness”, particularly the ability of the respective parties to bear the loss 
                                                
1158 [1990] 1 AC 831 at 858. 
1159 Where banks do embrace new technology to help them in determining the authenticity of a mandate it will 
be necessary to include in the T&C an exclusion of liability for declining to honour a mandate on the basis 
of an application of such technology. 
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and the ability of one party to distribute the loss.1160 It is accepted that the bank is able to 
distribute the loss and is better able to bear the loss. While this may be a factor for 
consideration, it must be treated with caution as discussed in chapter 4.4 above.  
 
Lord Griffiths considered that the reasonableness of the exclusion of liability may be 
judged differently depending on the size of the amount involved. He held that an exclusion 
of liability in the context of a valuer’s report of a modest house was unreasonable, but 
expressed the view that it may be reasonable if applied to a much bigger property 
investment.1161 In the banking context, this factor may work the other way around. An 
exclusion of liability for small payments may be acceptable having regard to the volume of 
transactions banks must process each day, the majority of which will fall into the small 
category. At the other extreme, it may be reasonable to expect banks to exercise individual 
caution before making large payments.  
 
There is no exhaustive list of the factors that may affect the reasonableness of an exclusion 
or limitation. All relevant factors must be taken into account. The determination of 
reasonableness is a question to be determined by the court,1162 to be made with regard to the 
term as a whole at the time of contracting1163 and without regard to the use which may 
                                                
1160 [1990] 1 AC 831 at 858–859. 
1161 [1990] 1 AC 831 at 859. 
1162 Per Stuart–Smith LJ in Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] QB 600 at 608. 
1163 Ibid, at 608–9. Stuart–Smith LJ bases this view on the wording of the Act and on the inability of the other 
party to assess reasonableness for himself or to know the extent of the term if the proffering party can rely 
on only portion of the term. 
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subsequently be made of the term.1164 It is no defence therefore to say “we would never 
apply the term in that way.”1165  
 
The court in Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd1166 rejected the use of the blue 
pencil test to change an unreasonable clause into a reasonable one. It was inconsistent with 
the policy and purpose of the Act for the court to sever the offensive parts of a clause, 
leaving the remainder intact, Stuart–Smith LJ said.1167 This position is supported by 
Andrew Phang,1168 while Lee Beng Tat argues that Stewart’s case should be restricted to 
“contract terms which are not clearly severable”,1169 and that severance should be allowed 
where “a clause is clearly intended to exclude or limit liability under several distinct and 
independent circumstances”.1170  
 
Based on the authority as it stands, banks are best advised to break up exclusions and 
limitations into smaller constituent parts. Most of the T&C examined have severance 
clauses aimed at overcoming the knock–on effect of a finding of unlawfulness or 
unenforceability of any provision.1171 The severance clause provides that the remainder of 
the contract will not be affected by one of the clauses being declared a nullity. 
 
                                                
1164 [1992] QB 600 at 607, 608. 
1165 In AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265 Hobhouse LJ (dissenting on the issue of 
incorporation) said that the clause in question must be viewed against the breach of contract, but this is 
“clearly wrong”, flying, as it does, in the face of the words of the statute, namely circumstances pertaining 
“when the contract was made”, per Bradgate “Unreasonable Standard Terms” at 585. 
1166 [1992] QB 600. 
1167 Ibid, at 609. 
1168 “Interpretation, Severance and Policy and the Unfair Contract Terms Act” [1992] LMCLQ 467 at 470. 
1169 “Where an Exclusion Clause is Unreasonable Only in Part” Lee Beng Tat [1992] SJLS 557 at 565. 
1170 Ibid, at 563. 
1171 UOB 30; OCBC 34; HSBC Part A 24; Std Ch 25. Electronic terms: UOB 13(a); OCBC 4.6; DBS Part A 
32, Part B 64; HSBC 16.d; Std Ch 13.1. 
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7.3 Reasonableness of the Verification and Conclusive Evidence Clause 
Banks can point to the changes in the business of banking since 1933, when Greenwood 
recognised a customer’s duty to report forgeries, to justify the verification and conclusive 
evidence clause. Banks are bigger, there are fewer of them, they operate in larger 
geographical areas than before. The availability of bank accounts to the masses1172 means 
that banking has become impersonal. The bank’s duty to know his customer’s signature 
was developed in a far smaller, more intimate environment.1173 Customers are no longer 
known at their branch by sight, even less are their signatures recognized on sight. This is 
the reality of modern banking, it is an unavoidable consequence of banking for the masses. 
Customers, with the strong encouragement of their banks, do not confine their banking 
business to their branch during banking hours;1174 they have access to 24–hour banking 
facilities such as ATM machines and internet banking. Computerisation has facilitated new 
and quicker ways of doing the business of banking. This has reduced the importance of the 
branch and led to the centralisation and specialisation of bank activities. There is 
recognition of this in the judgment of Staughton L in Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers 
Trust Co:1175 “In the age of the computer it may not be strictly accurate to speak of the 
branch where the account is kept.”1176 The bank’s mandate, in the sense of the means of 
                                                
1172 The Jack Report (Banking Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee, Feb. 1989), at 9 
referred to the “vast increase in the banked population”. It put the figure at 30% of the adult population in 
1959, and 87% in 1984. It considered this figure had risen possibly to 89% by 1989. The website of the 
British Bankers Association in 2008 states that banks provide banking services to 95% of the British 
population: see http://www.bba.org.uk/bba/jsp/polopoly.jsp?d=469&a=7447. 
1173 Per John F Dolan “Impersonating the Drawer: A Comment on  Geva’s ‘Consumer Liability in 
Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfers’” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 282 at 283: “It was a commercial reality 
in the 18th century, a time when the number of literates was small and merchant numbers even smaller, 
that traders knew each other’s signature if not each other’s face”. 
1174 As decided in Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110. Although the common law has not 
changed on this issue, bank T&C have given effect to the change; see e.g., UOB 2.7, 3.8; OCBC 6.4; DBS 
3.3; HSBC 5.1. 
1175 [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 259. 
1176 Ibid, at 270. 
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verification used by banks,1177 is no longer confined to signature. The customer’s signature 
now takes more varied forms, such as a username and PIN for internet banking, or 
production of a card and a PIN for an ATM machine. It is to be expected that customer 
signatures are not recognized on sight. These views are widely shared.1178 In the words of 
Keith Perrett,1179 “given the realities of modern–day, high–volume, computer– and 
technology–based cheques–clearing systems, there is little that financial institutions can do 
to detect and prevent forgeries through the scrutiny of signatures.”1180  
 
The customer, on the other hand, has an array of practices and procedures to ensure good 
governance of his bank account. Perrett divides the measures into three:1181 “corporate 
controls1182, document controls1183 and computerised cheques reconciliation 
procedures”1184. At the heart of the issue lies a question of policy. The arguments in favour 
of the clause, in principle, are not difficult to make. They are much the same as the 
argument in favour of a change in the common law duties, made for example by Emil 
Hayek, who points to the following:1185 the “depersonification of banking”, a product of 
                                                
1177 See the analysis of the banking mandate by Ross Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 140. 
1178 Emil Hayek “Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 361 at 369; M H 
Ogilvie “Bank Accounts and Obligations” (1985–1986) 11 Can Bus LJ 220 at 226; Keith Perrett “Account 
Verification Clauses: Should Bank Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own Business?” (1999) 14 BFLR 
246. 
1179 “Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own Business?” (1999) 
14 BFLR 246. 
1180 Ibid, at 270. See also “Bank Accounts and Obligations” M H Ogilvie (1985–1986) 11 Can Bus LJ 220 at 
226. 
1181 “Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own Business?” (1999) 
14 BFLR 246 at 270. 
1182 This includes checking employment references, separation of duties pertaining to payments and 
reconciliation, and audits. 
1183 Security features which make counterfeiting and alteration of cheques more difficult. 
1184 Enables immediate verification that a cheque presented for payment is in its original state. 
1185 “Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 361 at 369. 
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greater customer numbers, large corporate customers, volume of transactions and electronic 
processing.   
 
The verification and conclusive evidence clause aims to accomplish greater information 
sharing between bank and customer than the common law requires. It should not be seen as 
detracting from the bank’s duties but rather as increasing the customer’s duties so as to 
complement the bank’s duty, as a result of which far fewer fraudulent transactions will 
succeed. The justification for imposing this additional duty on the customer lies in the 
climate in which we live. Fraud, forgery and dishonesty perpetrated through the banking 
system are a worldwide problem costing billions of dollars each year.1186  The greater good 
of society requires that it be combated. Banks cannot, and there is no reason why they 
should, engage in that battle on their own. To be effective, a multi–pronged attack is 
needed and customer diligence is a very effective way in which to limit these losses. There 
are some forgeries and alterations that even with the exercise of due diligence by the bank, 
cannot easily and confidently be identified. The bank faced with a skilled forgery has no 
basis on which to refuse payment.1187 They are under a duty to comply promptly1188 with a 
valid payment instruction1189 and they face liability for damages if they fail to do so.1190  
                                                
1186 Tony Wojciechowski and Geoff Newiss, using data obtained from the British Home Office, put the value 
in the United Kingdom in 2001 of payment fraud at 75 million pounds, and plastic card fraud at 114 
million pounds. Forged cheques made up a significant component of the payment fraud statistic. See 
Claire Flood–Page and Joanna Taylor (eds) “Crime in England and Wales 2001/2002: Supplementary 
Volume” (RDS Publication, 2003), at 78–9 at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/hosb103.pdf. 
1187 Electronic mandates are an example. 
1188 See Lord Shaw of Dunfermline in London Joint Stock Bank Limited v Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 
777 at 824; Bank of Baroda v Punjab National Bank [1944] AC 176 at 184, per Lord Wright: “Other 
things being equal, in particular if the customer has sufficient funds or credit available with the bank, the 
bank is bound either to pay the cheque or dishonour it at once.” 
1189 Westminster Bank v Hilton (1926–1927) 43 TLR 124 at 129 (HL), per Lord Shaw: “When a banker is in 
possession of sufficient funds to meet such a cheque from a customer, the duty of the bank is to honour 
that cheque by payment, and failure in this duty may involve the bank in serious liability to its customer.” 
Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation [1921] 3 KB 110 at 119, per Bankes LJ: “The banker contracts to 
 222
On the other hand, a customer who verifies his bank statements should have no difficulty 
detecting an unauthorised payment. It is easier for the customer to detect forgeries or 
alterations than it is for the bank because the transaction shows up in the periodic statement 
irrespective of the level of skill with which the fraud or forgery was accomplished. Fraud 
through the banking system should be seen as a collective problem for which a collective 
response is required. This underscores the benefits of a principle of mutuality. The 
verification and conclusive evidence clause promotes bank and customer cooperation in the 
fight against fraud. The problem is much bigger than the issue of apportionment of liability 
between bank and customer; it is about reducing the occurence of dishonesty for the greater 
prosperity of society.  
 
“Law and lawyers operate not in a vacuum but within a commercial, social and economic 
context.”1191 The law exists to facilitate commerce, and must, so far as possible, 
accommodate, rather than inhibit, the commercial dictates of the industry concerned. The 
fast processing of large numbers of cheques and the availability of automated banking 
facilities are the ways in which banks are able to meet the needs of their customers. 
Customers cannot on the one hand demand the benefits of 24–hour banking facilities, rapid 
clearance of cheques and relatively low charges, while on the other hand insist on a 
meticulous, manual examination of all instruments and bespoke execution of transactions. 
Banks can deliver the greater volume and speed which is expected but in return they require 
some vigilance from the customer in relation to his own affairs. 
                                                                                                                                               
act as [the customer’s] mandatory and is bound to honour his cheques without any delay to the extent of 
the balance standing to his credit.” 
1190 See e.g., Marzettie v William (1830) 109 ER 842; Rolin v Steward (1854) 139 ER 245. 
1191 “Understanding Banking Law” Ross Cranston 1988 LMCLQ 360 at 377. 
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Geva comments that unauthorised withdrawals arise mostly from the dishonesty of an 
employee of the customer.1192 The Singapore High Court made the same point in Elis Tjoa 
v United Overseas Bank.1193 The cases discussed in this study bear this out. If that be so, 
the argument in favour of the verification and conclusive evidence clause is even stronger. 
The bank is a hostage to fortune: it has no say in the selection of the customer’s employees, 
or in their supervision or in the establishment of checks and balances within the business. 
Yet, in the absence of a verification and notification duty, it is the bank which stands to lose 
when dishonest transactions are made by employees under the nose of the customer – a Tai 
Hing Cotton Mill scenario.  
 
The threat posed by careless customers also spills over to the collecting bank, as illustrated 
by the Canadian case of Westboro Flooring & Décor Inc v Bank of Nova Scotia ,1194 
described by Rafferty & Hamilton as “a clearer and more egregious illustration of a 
collecting bank’s bearing the risk of a drawer’s negligence”.1195 The collecting bank which 
has unwittingly opened a bank account for an employee with fraudulent intentions has no 
contractual means to protect itself against the careless employer, but it would benefit from a 
broader duty of care and a verification and notification clause. 
 
                                                
1192 Benjamin Geva “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparative Aspects, Policies and a Model for 
Reform” (1998) 114 LQR 250 at 287. 
1193 [2003] 1 SLR 747 at 769, “the wrongful act is often facilitated by the misplaced trust or negligence of the 
customer himself.” 
1194 (2004) 241 DLR (4th) 257. 
1195 Nicholas Rafferty & Jonette Watson Hamilton “Is the Collecting Bank now the Insurer of a Cheque’s 
Drawer against Losses Caused by the Fraud of the Drawer’s Own Employee?” (2005) 20 BFLR 427 at 
428. 
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In Macmillan, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline expressed the view that the bank’s lack of 
“control over or participation in”1196 the period before presentation of a cheque justified the 
imposition of liability on the customer where he had facilitated forgery through negligent 
drawing of the cheque. The customer’s negligence in employing and/or supervising 
employees is equally beyond the control or participation of the bank and this surely entitles 
them to introduce measures to safeguard themselves against losses which are facilitated by 
the customer’s acts or practices. Every business, including banks, runs the risk of losses 
from internal dishonesty. Why should banks run the risk of such losses for their customers 
as well as for themselves? As recognized by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Tai Hing 
Cotton Mill1197, the present state of the law forces banks to act as insurers for their 
customers’ misfortunes and follies. Dishonest employees can, and do, occasion loss to their 
employers in other ways unconnected with the bank account; theft of cash, trading stock or 
equipment and supplies are examples. There is no question of bank liability for such losses, 
but where the dishonesty is perpetrated through the bank account, customers can lay the 
losses so occasioned at the feet of banks. One might counter that banks can insure against 
these losses. Insurance, however, only spreads the risk; it does not combat the problem, and 
the cost of the insurance is inevitably passed on to customers. It is not a satisfactory 
solution.  
 
The arguments against the verification and conclusive evidence clause reflects an 
adherence to banking practices and circumstances which no longer pertain. Ellinger 
expresses the view that the verification and conclusive evidence clause does not impose on 
                                                
1196 London Joint Stock Bank Limited v Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 at 825. 
1197 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 560, 569, 576. See also M H Ogilvie “Bank Accounts and Obligations” 
(1985–1986) 11 Can Bus LJ 220 at 225. 
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the customer an unreasonable burden.1198 Roy Goode has countered, saying that banks 
make fulfilment of the duty “as difficult as possible” by not identifying the payee of debits 
in the statement and by not returning cancelled cheques.1199  The point is relevant, but how 
arduous a task is it to cross–check a bank statement with counterfoils and other records for 
verification? The Singapore Court of Appeal, in Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v 
Credit Suisse,1200 took the view that, for commercial customers, the absence of cancelled 
cheques did not have an adverse effect on the reasonableness of the clause.  
 
It is submitted that the position of the personal customer is the same. In the case of the 
average individual, he is unlikely to have such a high level of activity on his account that he 
is not able to identify quite quickly (or if necessary with some cross–referencing) the 
legitimacy of debit entries. Commercial customers, who are likely to have a higher volume 
of activity on their account, employ people to perform this task. The nature of the task, 
even without cancelled cheques and payee identification, is commensurate with what the 
vast majority of customers in their different predicaments can manage. V K Rajah J in 
Pertamina makes the point that some accounts where the verification and conclusive 
evidence clause is used, do not involve the use of cheques at all.1201 The more often the 
customer examines his statements, the smaller the burden of verifying their accuracy; there 
will be fewer transactions to verify and they will probably be fresh in his memory. This is 
possible through electronic banking facilities which offer around the clock access to 
account information.  
                                                
1198 E P Ellinger in “Reflections on Recent Developments Concerning the Relationship of Banker and 
Customer” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 129 at 142. 
1199 R M Goode “Comments on Peter Ellinger’s Paper” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 179 at 181. 
1200 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 296. 
1201 Ibid, at 296–297. 
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It is true that where the verification and conclusive evidence clause is invoked it departs 
from the bank’s fundamental duty to pay only on a valid mandate. It is also true that, as 
commonly drafted, the clause can operate harshly in certain circumstances, such as where 
the defect in the mandate was patent. Indiscriminate application of the clause could shake 
the confidence of the public in banks as the custodians of their money. For this reason it is 
proper for the clause to be neutralized in appropriate circumstances and for the courts to be 
robust in their application of the UCTA to this end. The statement in Elis Tjoa v United 
Overseas Bank that the verification and conclusive evidence clause was “reasonable 
irrespective of whether UOB was negligent or not”1202 is, with respect, not sustainable as a 
general proposition. An exclusion purporting to cover a patent forgery is surely 
unreasonable and contrary to public policy. The court did qualify its statement, saying that 
it may be unreasonable or against public policy to allow reliance on a verification and 
conclusive evidence clause where a debit is made without any instruction at all, as opposed 
to a forged or fraudulent one. It should be remembered that the reasonableness of the 
verification and conclusive evidence clause is to be judged at the time of contracting and 
therefore on the potential it has to apply to a wide variety of situations. All verification and 
conclusive evidence clauses in Singapore, as drafted, are wide enough to protect the bank 
where no payment instruction of any kind was given to them. On this basis, they could all 
be thrown out as unreasonable. 
 
While the verification and conclusive evidence clause may be reasonable in many contexts, 
its potential to apply unreasonably in other contexts is relevant under the Act. Giving it a 
                                                
1202 Elis Tjoa v United Overseas Bank [2003] 1 SLR 747 at 769. 
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blanket stamp of approval, without regard to its potential to apply unreasonably, is contrary 
to the terms of the UCTA. The Act should be applied with confidence by the courts to 
throw out broadly drafted clauses that can potentially be used abusively by the banks. 
Banks should feel some pressure to define the exclusion more specifically. In terms of the 
UCTA, it is not sufficient for banks to say that they would never use the clause in an 
abusive way. The reasonableness of the clause under the Act must be judged according to 
its capacity, not its intended or subsequent application. Suggestions for the reform of the 
clause are made below.1203 
 
7.4 Reasonableness of a Standalone Verification Clause  
A verification recommendation or request is clearly reasonable, albeit legally ineffective. A 
verification duty without any penalty is unlikely to come within the purview of the UCTA, 
given that it does not have any of the effects stipulated mainly in sections 2 and 3 of the 
UCTA as discussed above.1204 A standalone verification duty which is enforceable with 
recourse to a general exclusion of bank liability for breach of contract, does come within 
the purview of the UCTA and the arguments for or against its reasonableness are akin to 
those discussed above for the verification and conclusive evidence clause, subject to one 
comment. For the customer who chooses to read the T&C or whose attention is drawn to 
the verification and conclusive evidence clause, the penalty for non–compliance is clearly 
stipulated. The customer who reads a standalone verification clause, on the other hand, 
which is enforceable with reference to a general exclusion of liability for breach of contract 
stipulated elsewhere in the T&C, will most likely not be aware of the consequences of non–
                                                
1203 In chapter 8. 
1204 As discussed in chapter 7.1 above. 
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compliance. This detracts from the reasonableness of the term, particularly under Guideline 
(c) of the Second Schedule of the UCTA, which takes into account the customer’s 
knowledge of the term.   
 
7.5 Other Aspects of Reasonableness  
Leaving aside the reasonableness of a verification and conclusive evidence clause in 
principle, another aspect which can affect the reasonableness of the clause is the time 
period in which the customer must act before the statement becomes conclusive of its 
contents. Three of the five Singapore banks covered in this study require notification within 
14 days of the date of the statement;1205 the DBS gives 14 days from receipt of the 
statement;1206 HSBC, in striking contrast, gives 90 days from the date of the statement.1207 
Poh Chu Chai uses the example of the customer who is away on holiday to support his 
argument that these clauses are unreasonable because of the short time period given by 
banks.1208   
 
In Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse,1209 the Singapore Court of Appeal 
considered that a period of 14 days was reasonable and did not impose too harsh a burden 
on the customer.1210 A factor for the court was that the customer was a commercial entity. 
The court presumably had in mind that the customer employed staff to whom the task could 
be delegated. It is submitted that for a commercial customer a period of 14 days, while not 
generous, may not be unduly harsh. For individuals, however, it is submitted that a period 
                                                
1205 UOB 13.4; OCBC 9; Std Ch 5.1.1. 
1206 DBS 11.1(c). 
1207 HSBC Part A 3.1. 
1208 Poh Chu Chai Law of Banker and Customer, 918. 
1209 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 292. 
1210 Ibid, at 299. 
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of 14 days is too short. 1211 As argued by Poh Chu Chai, it is not unusual for people to be 
away from home or the office for two weeks, or to be indisposed for any variety of reasons 
for that period of time. Of course, the shorter the time period, the more effective the clause 
is in protecting banks and, assuming diligent customers, the more efficient such clauses 
would be in fighting fraud and making recoveries. But efficiency is not the only 
consideration. In Elis Tjoa v United Overseas Bank,1212 the court suggested that the bank 
may consider extending the verification and notification period to 21 days from 14 days to 
give customers a reasonable opportunity to fulfil the duty.1213 In Canada, a period of thirty 
days appears to be standard.1214 
 
Customers, particularly personal customers, have more than bank statements on their 
minds. They should be given a reasonable length of time in which to verify the statements. 
Ignoring prolonged absences from home or work, for which alternative arrangements 
should be made between bank and customer, it is submitted that a period of 30 days is 
reasonable. For active bank accounts, statements are commonly sent out on a monthly 
basis. It is reasonable for a customer to have the whole of the period before his next 
statement arrives to reconcile and verify it. It is submitted, on the other hand, that it is 
unwarranted to compromise the efficiency of the clause by going beyond 45 days. By that 
time the customer is in possession of two statements which he must verify. Human nature 
                                                
1211 While different legal treatment of personal and commercial customers is not supported (see the discussion 
below in chapter 12), it is submitted that different time limits for examination of bank statements is not 
different legal treatment but a difference in degree, according to what is appropriate, having regard to 
some of the practical distinctions between a personal and a business customer. 
1212 [2003] 1 SLR 747. 
1213 Ibid, at 768. 
1214 See examples of specific clauses cited by Keith Perrett “Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank 
Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own Business?” (1999) 14 BFLR 245 at 246; the Royal Bank 
provision for 45 days is an exception. 
 230
being what it is, it is thought that the greater the accumulation of unverified statements, the 
smaller the likelihood that they will be verified in the short term or at all.   
 
From an evidential point of view, it is undesirable to have time running from a point which 
cannot be ascertained objectively, such as the date of posting or the date of receipt of the 
bank statement. On the other hand, particularly where the time allowed for verification is 
short, it is unsatisfactory to have time running from a day when the customer is not in 
possession of the statement, for example, the statement date. There may be a delay, for 
whatever reason, in the statement reaching the customer. The UOB, OCBC and Standard 
Chartered clauses effectively give the customer less than 14 days in which to verify the 
statement because time runs from the date of the statement which is before the customer is 
in receipt of it. This supports the argument in the paragraph above that a period of 14 days 
is too short. Another provision in the T&C attempts to address the problem posed by non–
receipt of statements.1215  
 
7.6 Drafting, Interpretation and Contracting Aspects  
Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others1216 conceded the 
legitimacy of bank recourse to the verification and conclusive evidence clause in principle, 
but its hostile attitude to the clause is displayed in the strict interpretation given to the 
various permutations of the clause used there. The customer’s internal controls in Tai Hing 
were considered inadequate, and undoubtedly facilitated the loss that ensued. Yet, the Privy 
Council found that the express clauses did not constitute “conclusive evidence clauses”: 
                                                
1215 In chapter 10.1 below. 
1216 [1986] 1 AC 80. 
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they did not “bring home to the customer” the importance of inspecting statements or the 
conclusive effect if it failed to do so.1217 Hunter J in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal1218 
took the same view. The shortcoming of the clauses lay in their drafting. The same 
weakness was identified in Canada by Laskin J (dissenting) in Arrow Transfer Co Ltd v 
Royal Bank of Canada.1219 Laskin J found it appropriate to construe the clause contra 
proferentem the bank; the failure to state explicitly that the protection afforded was for 
forgery of the drawer’s signature, which would normally lie at the risk of the bank, was 
fatal.1220  
 
The Privy Council in Tai Hing Cotton Mill and Laskin J (dissenting) in Arrow Transfer 
revealed their hostility to the verification clauses by the restrictive interpretations they gave 
to them. On the other hand, Cons J in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal, while agreeing that 
the verification agreements, as exclusion clauses, should be clear, unambiguous and 
construed contra proferentem, he considered such construction should be as an ordinary 
person “looking for no subtle distinctions, seeking no refined shades of meaning”.1221 On 
this basis he considered the clauses to be effective against the customer. The position of the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse1222 aligns 
with the view of Cons J. V K Rajah J said “if a clause is worded widely enough to the 
effect that ‘all’ discrepancies … will be deemed conclusive unless reported within a 
reasonable time, it is not open to a customer to argue that a fraud or forgery does not fall 
                                                
1217 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 1 AC 80 at 109–110. Similar 
words were used by Laskin J (dissenting) in Arrow Transfer Co Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada (1972) 27 
DLR (3d) 81 at 98. 
1218 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 581. 
1219 (1972) 27 DLR (3d) 81. 
1220 Ibid, at 98. 
1221 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 567. 
1222 [2006] 4 SLR 273. 
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within the scope of such a clause.”1223 While a less restrictive interpretation is indicated by 
this decision, careful attention to the drafting of the clause is important. At the same time, it 
is clear from Pertamina that the Singapore courts are less likely to apply restrictive 
interpretation, as has been the case in Canada.1224 
 
The Privy Council in Tai Hing did not examine the clauses in detail and highlight their 
shortcomings. Reference to the clauses, as they are reproduced in the Privy Council 
judgment,1225 reveals the following weaknesses: The customer’s obligation to verify the 
statement is, in one case, not expressly stipulated at all;1226 in another, the verification is 
“desired,” suggesting best practice but not compulsory action;1227 even “will be confirmed” 
does not adequately set out the obligation to verify and notify.1228 The language used, 
stating that the bank statement “may be deemed to be correct”1229 or “the bank may take the 
said statement as approved” indicates that such an outcome is discretionary. The words 
“deemed to be correct” and “shall be deemed to have been confirmed”1230 and 
                                                
1223 Ibid., at 295. 
1224 The Canadian cases are discussed in chapter 4.5.1 above. 
1225 [1986] 1 AC 80 at 109. 
1226 In the case of Chekiang First Bank Ltd, the clause said: “A monthly statement for each account will be 
sent by the bank to the depositor by post or messenger and the balance shown therein may be deemed to 
be correct by the bank if the depositor does not notify the bank in writing of any error therein within 10 
days after the sending of such statement …” 
1227 In the case of Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd, the clause said: “A statement of the customer’s account will be 
rendered once a month. Customers are desired: (1) to examine all entries in the statement of account and 
to report at once to the bank any error found therein, (2) to return the confirmation slip duly signed. In the 
absence of any objection to the statement within seven days after its receipt by the customer, the account 
shall be deemed to have been confirmed”. 
1228 In the case of Bank of Tokyo Ltd: “The bank’s statement of my/our current account will be confirmed by 
me/us without delay. In case of absence of such confirmation within a fortnight, the bank may take the 
said statement as approved by me/us.” 
1229 See the clause used by Chekiang First Bank Ltd, above. 
1230 See the clause used by Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd, above. 
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“approved”1231 do not convey the irrebuttable status which the banks wished the statements 
to acquire.  
 
In the opinion of the Privy Council, in all three clauses, “the burden of the objection and of 
the sanction imposed” was not “brought home to the customer.” 1232 Geva observes that the 
clause used by Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd1233 would have passed the test laid down by the 
majority in Arrow Transfer but not the dissenting judgment of Laskin J.1234 The court in Tai 
Hing noted that paid cheques were not returned to the customer with the bank statements in 
any of the cases but it did not indicate that this was significant to the outcome of the matter. 
In the case of Chekiang First Bank Ltd, the customer had, for about twenty years, returned 
confirmation slips to the bank, signed by two authorized signatories.1235 Cons J in the 
intermediate court of appeal found that the wording of the confirmation slips1236 constituted 
a representation that the balance stated in the statement was correct and in the learned 
Judge’s view, the customer could not “now, go behind them”.1237 The Privy Council did not 
address this view. 
 
                                                
1231 See the clause used by Bank of Tokyo Ltd, above. 
1232 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1986] 1 AC 80 at 110. 
1233 Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd’s terms stated: “A statement of the customer’s account will be rendered once a 
month. Customers are desired: (1) to examine all entries in the statement of account and to report at once 
to the bank any error found therein, (2) to return the confirmation slip duly signed In the absence of any 
objection to the statement within seven days after its receipt by the customer, the account shall be deemed 
to have been confirmed” 
1234 Geva “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparitive Aspects, Policies and a Model for Reform” 
(1998) 114 LQR 250 at 272. 
1235 [1986] 1 AC 80 at 109. 
1236 See Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1984] 1 Lloyd’s rep 555 at 567: 
“I/We acknowledge receipt of your monthly statement of my/our current account with you showing the 
following balance which has been examined and found correct …”. 
1237 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1984] 1 Lloyd’s rep 555 at 567–8. 
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In Consmat Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Bank of America National Trust & Savings 
Association1238 the Singapore High Court considered the verification clause1239 to be wider 
than the three clauses in Tai Hing Cotton Mill and therefore not vulnerable to the same 
adverse interpretation.1240 There are, undeniably, significant differences between the clause 
in Consmat and the clauses used by the Hong Kong banks in Tai Hing Cotton Mill: the 
Bank of America clause is drafted in mandatory terms, the customer’s obligation to verify 
and notify is spelt out and the conclusive consequence is strongly and clearly worded. 
There is no doubt that, from an interpretation viewpoint, the Consmat clause is superior to 
the Tai Hing Cotton Mill clauses.  
 
Turning now to the clauses used by the five local banks, whose terms are analysed here:1241  
                                                
1238 [1992] 2 SLR 828 at 835. 
1239 “I/We hereby undertake to verify the correctness of each statement of account and accompanying cheques 
or vouchers received from you and to inform you within seven (7) days from the receipt thereof of any 
discrepancies, omissions or debits wrongly made to or inaccuracies or incorrect entries in the account as 
so stated and that at the end of the said period of seven (7) days the account as kept by you shall be 
conclusive evidence without any further proof that … the account is and entries therein are correct, and 
except as provided above you shall be free from all claims in respect of the account.”  
1240 A view with which Poh Chu Chai Banker and Customer disagrees, at 922. 
1241 UOB’s clause 13.3 states:  
“The customer is under a duty:–  (a) to check all entries in the statement of account … (b) to report 
promptly to the bank any irregularities … errors …”  
Clause 13.4 states: “If the Bank does not receive from the customer a written objection within fourteen 
(14) days … (a) the Customer shall be deemed conclusively:–  (i) to have accepted, and shall be bound by 
… the transaction(s)/entries and the balance set out in the statement … (b) the statement … shall …be 
deemed conclusive evidence … (c) the Customer shall have no claim against the Bank howsoever 
arising…” 
OCBC’s clause 9 states:  
“The Customer agrees to verify the correctness of all details….and to notify the Bank within 14 days… . 
Upon expiry … the Statement of Account shall be conclusive against the customer…” 
DBS’s clause 11.1(c) states:  
“You shall: examine all … entries in the Statement of Account … and report any … debits or credits 
wrongly made or made without authority. You must object to such debit or credit entries … within 14 
days … . If you do not do so: (i) such entries made in the statement of account … shall be deemed correct 
and conclusive without further proof … (ii) you will be bound by the Statement of Account …; and (iii) 
we will be free from all claims …”  
HSBC’s clause 3.1 states:  
“The Accountholder agrees to examine each statement of account and notify the bank …. of … errors … 
from whatever cause (including … forgery, fraud, lack of authority or negligence of any person), failing 
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They are all in mandatory terms, they specify clearly the action required of the customer 
and the consequences of failure are explicit. The clauses that are broken down into sub–
paragraphs are preferable in that this aides clarity and could avoid problems in the event of 
any striking out in terms of the UCTA. The clauses which reinforce the conclusive effect 
by indicating that the statement will be binding and no claims will be competent against the 
bank are better at bringing home the effect to the customer. HSBC’s is the only clause 
which explicitly covers fraud, forgery and negligence. From a restrictive interpretation 
perspective, it is superior to the others. On the other hand, this may make it more 
vulnerable to a finding of unreasonableness under the UCTA.1242 All the clauses are 
capable of applying to a debit made in the absence of any instruction at all – which was 
highlighted by the court in Elis Tjoa v United Overseas Bank1243 as potentially 
unreasonable.  
 
Along with Burnett v Westminster Bank Ltd,1244 Canadian Pacific Hotels v Bank of 
Montreal1245 highlights the importance of incorporating the verification and conclusive 
evidence clause in the T&C as opposed to in the statement.1246 A direction to verify, a 
fortiori a request to do so, in the statement itself, is inadequate to ensure the contractual 
                                                                                                                                               
which such statement of account shall be conclusive evidence as to the balance(s) shown…” 
Standard Chartered’s clause 5.1.1 states:  
      “Customer must verify the correctness of each entry in each such statement … and notify the bank 
promptly, …. of any irregularities, ….errors… . Omission to do so indicates approval of the contents 
thereof, and that the Account as kept by the Bank is conclusive evidence … and the Bank shall be free 
from all claims in respect thereof.” 
1242 In Stewart Gill Ltd v Horatio Myer & Co Ltd [1992] QB 600 at 608 a clause which could extend to a 
defence based on fraud was considered “plainly unreasonable”.  
1243 [2003] 1 SLR 747 at 769. 
1244 [1966] 1 QB 742. See further discussion in chapter 10.18 below. 
1245 (1988) 40 DLR (4th) 385. 
1246 A point also made eg by  Ellinger in (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 129 at 143. 
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obligation that the bank seeks to achieve. Bradley Crawford1247 argues that Burnett is 
authority for the proposition that reasonable efforts to bring a clause to the customer’s 
attention or acknowledgement from a customer that he was aware of the condition (which 
is unlikely to be forthcoming once litigation is underway) coupled with the continued use 
of the account, amounts to acquiescence in the new terms. Whatever the merits of that 
argument, banks must be advised to be conservative and incorporate the clause in their 
T&C.  
 
Should banks, at the time of opening a bank account, draw customers’ attention to the 
verification and conclusive evidence clause? The suggestion from the Court of Appeal 
(England) that there may be a duty to bring certain terms, having regard to their nature and 
effect, to the attention of a contracting party has been mentioned.1248 This development has 
not been endorsed in Singapore.1249 Drawing a customer’s attention to the term may be 
unnecessary in order to incorporate it into the contract, but it can only benefit the bank to 
do so. While the law operates on the basis that the customer is familiar with the T&C, we 
know that he is not. Drawing the customer’s attention to the term informs him of something 
he may not otherwise know. There is a growing emphasis on the need for banks to assume 
an educational responsibility toward their customers.1250 Telling the customer what is 
expected of him under the contract weakens arguments that the clause is unreasonable. 
                                                
1247 “Comments on Peter Ellinger’s Paper” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 171 at 173. 
1248 In chapter 2.1 above. See Ocean Chemical v Exnor [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 446 at 454. 
1249 Consmat Singapore (Pte) Ltd v Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association [1992] 2 SLR 828 
at 838. 
1250 The Jack Report (Banking Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee, February 1989), 
for example, at 45 recommended that banks be required to give customers “a fair and balanced view” of 
their terms “and of the rights and obligations that exist on each side.” The Singapore Banking Code 
reflects similar sentiments: see Cl 3.b., “transparency” relating to products and services; Cl 5, 
“Information Your Bank Will Provide”; Cl 8, on information relating to terms and conditions. 
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Having drawn the customer’s attention to the clause, it is as well for it to be marked in the 
customer’s copy and initialed in the bank’s copy, or both, to show that it was brought to his 
attention.  
 
From a practical perspective, if bank staff are trained to spend 5 minutes highlighting the 
clause to new customers, explaining the importance of verifying the statement, and the 
consequences of not doing so, the percentage of customers who regularly undertake the 
verification will surely increase. This should be the primary objective of a verification 
clause. It should not be aimed primarily at relieving banks of their responsibilities or at 
protecting them in an environment of rampant fraud but of harnessing customer–power to 
combat it. The education process need not stop at the account–opening stage. Singapore 
banks print messages to customers in bank statements on matters ranging from interest rates 
to spending incentives. A prominent “WHEN LAST DID YOU CHECK YOUR BANK 
STATEMENT?” in big red letters on the envelope containing the statement, with a 
reminder inside of the obligation and the adverse consequences of failure, would go a long 
way in keeping the issue prominent in the customer’s consciousness. 
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Chapter 8: Reform of the Verification and Conclusive Evidence Clause 
 
The verification and conclusive evidence clause has much to recommend it. It embodies the 
principle of mutuality, it harnesses the superior post–payment fraud detection position of 
the customer, it gives the customer an incentive to be diligent about his banking affairs and 
above all, if implemented by customers, it is beneficial to both parties to the contract and 
society in general by reducing loss through dishonesty. It is also a contractual reality in 
Singapore. The main areas of concern about the clause are the causal connection between 
customer breach and the loss, customer breach without culpa, and bank negligence.  
 
The first issue can be remedied by excluding application of the clause to the first 
unauthorised transaction, which would not be prevented through punctual verification and 
notification. There is a counter–argument, however, that the clause should apply even to the 
first unauthorised debit because failure to verify denies the bank the opportunity of taking 
timeous action against the wrongdoer. The discussion on estoppel revealed that the loss of a 
right of action or removal of assets from the jurisdiction can constitute detriment.1251 It is 
submitted, on balance, that the customer can reasonably be penalised for his neglect to 
verify and notify and there is no need for special treatment even in the case of a single or 
first unauthorised transaction.  
 
                                                
1251 See chapter 3.8.2 above. 
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The second concern, of failure to verify and notify without fault, can be dealt with by 
making the verification duty a duty of care.1252 As discussed above,1253 the potential for 
spurious excuses from the customer must be addressed. Customers should not be able to 
evade their duty unless it is attributable to events beyond their control, such as serious 
illness or accident. Customers absent from home nowadays have the option of verifying 
accounts electronically in most parts of the world and therefore need not be excused from 
this duty. The customer should bear the risk if his choice of destination precludes this 
facility. Bearing in mind that a verification period of at least 30 days is advocated, 
customers will not be affected by ordinary holiday absences. Special arrangements can 
always be made with the bank if warranted. Failure to detect an erroneous debit which is 
detectable from the statement should not be excused.  
 
The problem of bank negligence is more difficult. The arguments and counter–arguments 
have been aired.1254 There is a strong case for the operation of the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause even in the event of bank negligence on the grounds that the 
clause is a valuable aide to banks in detecting their own errors. Still, it is inequitable for the 
customer alone to be penalised in this situation. This, it is submitted, is an appropriate 
situation in which to apportion loss under the Contributory Negligence and Personal 
Injuries Act.1255 This can only be achieved by a provision in the T&C or by legislation, as 
the Act would not otherwise be applicable.1256  
                                                
1252 This is supported by Geva, see “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparative Aspects, Policies and 
a Model for Reform” (1998) 114 LQR 250 at 283, 287–8. Geva dismisses, in this context, the drawback of 
litigation to resolve the matter. 
1253 In chapter 4.5.2 above.  
1254 In chapter 4.5.1 above. 
1255 Cap 54. 
1256 See discussion in chapter 5.4. 
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At its simplest, it could be provided that the terms of the Act1257 shall apply in the event of 
loss arising from bank negligence and customer breach of the verification clause.1258 The 
Act does not, however, provide a formula for the swift resolution of the matter. Section 3, 
which sets out the principle of the Act, clearly envisages the involvement of a court of law 
in making an apportionment. Edward Rubin makes a valid, damning criticism of the 
structure of the legal system particularly as it applies in the bank–customer context: the 
bank is able to debit a customer’s account, leaving the customer to sue the bank if he 
disagrees with the debit; because most customers cannot afford the costs of litigation, they 
are left helpless in the face of a debit they do not agree with; and where they do resort to 
litigation, the cost of doing so is disproportionate to the benefit; this constitutes an 
economic inefficiency in the fault–based system.1259 Geva has expressed a similar view.1260 
 
Any apportionment of liability is inherently unscientific because it involves the attribution 
of a numerical value to human conduct that is judged to be a departure from the norm. 
Bearing this in mind, and given the expense and uncertainty of litigation to obtain a court–
ordered apportionment of loss, it is submitted that the T&C or statute should apportion the 
loss in accordance with a pre–determined ratio.1261 There are many possible permutations; 
the benefits of simplicity must be balanced against the greater accuracy that can be 
achieved through complexity. It is submitted that a just outcome can be achieved by 
                                                
1257 Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Act, Cap 54.  
1258 The suitability of these principles was also suggested by the UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Electronic 
Funds Transfers (United Nations, New York, 1987), 53 para 26. 
1259 E Rubin “Efficiency, Equity, and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4” (1991) 42 Ala LR 551 at 
569–570, 576 - 577. 
1260 See e.g., Geva “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparative Aspects, Policies and a Model for 
Reform” (1998) 114 LQR 250 at 288. 
1261 The UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Electronic Funds Transfers (United Nations, New York, 1987), 53 para 
26, acknowledges that recourse to the courts to determine an apportionment is not usually warranted 
having regard to the amount in dispute. 
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distinguishing between fault by the customer in the form only of failing to verify/notify and 
the more serious situation of the customer facilitating the loss by a breach of a duty of care 
and failing to verify/notify. Singapore T&C reflect the view that where the customer has 
contributed to the loss, banks consider customers should be liable for it, irrespective of the 
bank’s contribution.1262 A more balanced outcome is called for.  
 
The following is a suggested formula for apportionment of loss where the bank has been 
negligent and the customer is in breach of his duties:  
1. Where the customer is in breach only of the verification duty, the customer will be 
liable for 20% of the direct loss. The allocation of the majority of the loss to the 
bank reflects the bank’s greater culpability for the loss, but at the same time 
recognizes the customer’s failure in combating the loss.  
2. Where the customer has facilitated the loss by a breach of its duty of care in 
addition to failing to verify bank statements, the customer will be liable for 50% of 
the direct loss. 
 
The exact ratio of apportionment can be debated and adjusted if necessary. It is less 
appropriate for large losses to be dealt with on the basis of a pre–determined formula. 
Accumulated losses exceeding, it is suggested, $50,000 should be resolved by recourse to 
the courts if the parties are unable to agree on an apportionment. The court would be 
entitled to apportion the loss in accordance with the guiding principle in the Act, namely to 
reach a “just and equitable” outcome.1263   
                                                
1262 Specific examples of such provisions will be discussed in chapter 10 below. 
1263 Contributory Negligence and Personal Injuries Act, section 3. 
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Given that banks are unlikely to concede their own negligence, this system will only be 
workable if the customer is given the right of recourse to a less costly tribunal established 
by the government or the banking industry. The dispute resolution process envisaged by the 
Singapore Banking Code may be suitable. In addition, the customer should have the right 
of appeal to a court of law if he takes the view that the formula operates harshly against 
him.  
 
The Singapore Banking Code requires subscribing banks to create a process, which, at its 
highest level, establishes a panel of mediators to hear the dispute. Under the Code, certain 
claims are excluded, including those in excess of $50,000 and those of business customers. 
Although the stratification of customers is not favoured in this study, it should at least be 
extended to sole proprietors, small partnerships and small companies. This could be 
delineated by reference to the paid–up share capital or turnover of the enterprise.  
 
Under this scheme, the bank would not have the right to appeal rulings by the tribunal for 
claims under the threshold, in order to prevent banks from abusing their superior resources 
to bully customers into submission. The formula route deals with a major criticism of an 
apportionment system, namely the cost to the customer of obtaining relief. Although the 
formula may be criticised for being inherently inaccurate, the proposal gives the customer 
the alternative of seeking bespoke apportionment from the courts. Apportionment involves 
placing a value on something not inherently capable of quantification. Where the amount in 
dispute is relatively small, the apportionment formula provides a quick and inexpensive 
solution to the problem and leaves the customer better off than he would be under the T&C 
as they currently stand in Singapore. 
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The verification and conclusive evidence clause is not the panacea of all banking ills. There 
are cases of forgery that will not be identifiable from the ordinary bank statement. This 
could happen in different ways; one obvious example is the alteration of the payee in a 
payment instruction but without changing the amount of the payment. Suffice to say that if 
the transaction is not identifiable as an error, based on the information provided by the bank 
in the statement, the verification and conclusive evidence clause should not apply. Banks 
choosing to give customers more information than is standard in statements, such as 
identifying the recipient of the payment or providing an image of the cheque paid,1264 will 
therefore derive greater benefit from the verification and conclusive evidence clause. 
 
Apportionment of loss is not supported other than in instances of bank’s negligence. 
Customers should be properly informed of the verification and notification duty at the time 
of opening their bank accounts. They should be reminded regularly of their obligations and, 
it is submitted, they should face the consequences of default. 
 
The qualification of the verification and conclusive evidence clause by taking account of 
situations in which customers should reasonably be excused for their failure and of bank 
negligence, would put it in better standing vis–à–vis the UCTA. At the same time, it would 
reflect the policy adopted in the judgments of the Singapore courts and subscribed to in this 
thesis, that customers should accept greater responsibility for their accounts. Harsh 
operation of the verification and conclusive evidence clause would be ameliorated.  
 
                                                
1264 A practice adopted by Citibank Singapore Ltd. 
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How is such reform of the clause to be achieved? Banks, mindful of their upstanding 
reputation in society and apprehending the risk that a standard verification and conclusive 
evidence clause can unreasonably relieve the bank of negligence or penalize a non–
negligent customer, should ideally introduce these changes to their T&C voluntarily. 
Failing that, legislative intervention may be necessary. Banks that are reluctant to 
voluntarily introduce these reforms may consider the following:  
1. There is a risk that the courts may strike out the verification and conclusive evidence 
clause on the grounds that it is unreasonable in terms of the UCTA. This would be 
embarrassing and leave the banks exposed vis–à–vis all the other customers who 
contracted under the same T&C. It would be far preferable for banks to temper the 
T&C themselves.   
2. Legislative intervention to alter the verification and conclusive evidence clause may 
be more extensive than the changes suggested above, removing the bank’s control 
over the issue. As a matter of principle, banks would prefer not to have the legislature 
regulating this aspect of their business. The verification and conclusive evidence 
clause could only be the beginning; there are many other issues raised by bank T&C 
which could also be targeted. Banks are already a heavily regulated sector, adding a 
significant compliance burden. It is preferable, from the banks’ point of view, to 
exercise self–restraint and refrain from rampant self–protection in the T&C than to 
have public intervention into yet another aspect of their business. 
3. Singapore banks may not feel under any pressure to soften the impact of their T&C 
(in general) and the verification and conclusive evidence clause (in particular) in the 
present climate. The UCTA has yet to bite in these circumstances and statutory 
change on this topic is probably not high on the legislature’s current agenda. Yet, 
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banks should not be complacent. As argued, there remains scope for the UCTA in this 
situation and the announcement (see Straits Times 13.11.05) that the Consumer 
Protection (Fair Trading) Act1265 would extend to banks, although yet to be 
implemented, may signify the start of a new trend.  
 
                                                
1265 Chapter 52A.  
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Chapter 9: Mutuality of Duties 
 
The arguments above,1266 in favour of the reasonableness of the verification clause, reflect 
support for the merits of mutuality in the bank–customer relationship, aptly summarised in 
a Canadian court, per Montgomery J, “so that both the bank and its customer are jointly 
engaged in prevention and minimisation of losses occurring through forgeries”1267.  
 
The application of a principle of mutuality of obligations was dealt a blow by the Privy 
Council in Tai Hing Cotton Mill and by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Pacific 
Hotels, where arguments for the extension of the customer’s duty based on modern banking 
realities were rejected. In both these cases, the intermediate appeal courts1268 were 
convinced of the merits of mutuality and ruled accordingly: in Canadian Pacific Hotels, the 
Ontario Court of Appeal1269 by a majority endorsed the trial court decision of Montgomery 
J to the effect that the sophisticated customer had a duty to institute internal controls to 
prevent loss to its bank; in Tai Hing Cotton Mill,1270 it was argued that a broader duty of 
care on a customer was reciprocal to the general duty of care imposed on banks in the 
Selangor Rubber, Karak Rubber and Lipkin Gorman trilogy. Cons J in the Hong Kong 
Court of Appeal inclined to the view that customers should reciprocate, not with a duty to 
exercise skill, but with a duty to exercise care “of the interests of the bank”.1271  
 
                                                
1266 Chapter 7.3 above. 
1267 Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal (1981) 122 DLR (3d) 519 (HC) at 533. 
1268 The Hong Kong Court of Appeal (Fuad, Cons and Hunter JJ) and the Ontario Court of Appeal (Jessup and 
Houlden JJA, Lacourciere JA dissenting). 
1269 (1983) 139 DLR (3d) 575. 
1270 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 559. 
1271 Ibid, at 560. 
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The principle of mutuality is strongly supported as a desirable goal in the allocation of 
duties and risk in the bank–customer relationship. It harnesses the commendable ideal of 
two parties in a contractual relationship, each making their contribution to its success.1272 
The three seminal cases of the 20th century concerning the bank customer’s duty upheld the 
ideal in principle, even if restrictively in application. Thus in Macmillan, Viscount Haldane 
spoke of reciprocal, correlative and complementary obligations;1273 and Lord Shaw of 
“reciprocal obligations”.1274 In Joachimson, Atkin LJ said the banking contract involves 
“obligations on both sides”1275 and in Greenwood, in the Court of Appeal, Scrutton LJ 
spoke of “mutual” duties1276 and “corresponding” duties1277 in the bank–customer 
relationship. Adherence to the narrow customer’s duties comes, however, at the expense of 
mutuality.  
 
A reciprocal obligation to the bank’s duty of care would be a duty to exercise care in the 
conduct and operation of the bank account. The bank’s duty of care came to be fully 
articulated relatively recently. By that time the concept of a duty of care was well 
developed and the courts were well equipped to articulate the bank’s duty as a flexible 
principle capable of applying to any variety of situations as necessary and, importantly, 
capable of moving with developments in banking so that what might not form part of the 
bank’s duty of care today may well do so tomorrow.  
 
                                                
1272 See similar view and argument by M H Ogilvie “Bank Accounts and Obligations” (1986) 11 Can Bus LJ 
220. 
1273 London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 at 814. 
1274 Ibid, at 824. 
1275 [1921] 3 KB 110 at 127. 
1276 Greenwood v Martins Bank, Limited  [1932] 1 KB 371 at 380. 
1277 Ibid, at 381. 
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Adherence to the narrow traditional duties undermines mutuality; it sets the bank and 
customer on a collision course. In the words of M H Ogilvie,1278 it “leads to an undesirable 
confrontation of banker and customer in a context in which their respective interests are 
complementary and interconnected.”1279 The need for a principle of mutual responsibility in 
banking is particularly evident in the area of self–service electronic banking facilities. This 
is recognised by the regulatory authority, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS),1280 
and reinforced by the Singapore Banking Code, which says “the security of the system also 
depends on you”.1281 
 
                                                
1278 “Bank Accounts and Obligations” M H Ogilvie (1985–1986) 11 Can Bus LJ 220. 
1279 Ibid, at 226. 
1280 MAS “Internet Banking Technology Risk Management Guidelines”, June 2003 cl 9 particularly cl 9.01 
and cl 9.05. 
1281 Code of Consumer Banking Practice, 2002, cl 18. 
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Chapter 10: Other Express Duties of the Customer 
 
It is submitted that the verification and conclusive evidence clause is the most important of 
the customer’s express duties for combating the unauthorised debit. For the verification 
clause to operate effectively, it is necessary to ensure that the statements are received by the 
customer. To achieve this, banks impose additional duties on the customer, such as the duty 
to notify a change in the customer’s mailing address and the duty to notify non–receipt of 
bank statements. There are numerous other provisions in bank T&C that are concerned with 
responsibility for unauthorised debits, such as exclusions of liability where the bank is not 
at fault, or where the customer facilitated the loss. Electronic banking is a growing trend 
that gives rise to particular problems that are less acute in traditional banking. Provisions 
for loss allocation in this area need to be examined. Finally, there are terms that do not 
directly concern the unauthorised debit but which have an impact on the allocation of risk, 
such as variation and limitation clauses. These various provisions will be discussed in this 
chapter and the next. References in this chapter are to the provisions of the five banks 
operating in Singapore that have been the subject of this study, unless stated otherwise.  
 
A general comment from a drafting perspective about the use of “negligence” in the T&C is 
appropriate. The T&C may exclude liability where the customer has been negligent. One 
should question what “negligence” means here. The dual meaning of negligence has been 
discussed.1282 In the strict, narrow sense, the customer will not be negligent unless he is 
under a duty of care. A restrictive interpretation of the T&C will ascribe this narrow 
                                                
1282 In chapter 3.3 above. 
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meaning to “negligence”. This means that an exclusion of liability “where the customer has 
been negligent” goes no further than the common law already provides, namely the 
customer is liable for a breach of his established duties.1283 If the bank is seeking protection 
beyond the Macmillan and Greenwood duties, more akin to Khoo Tian Hock, a reference to 
“negligence” may be effective only if a broader duty of care has been stipulated in the 
contract. 
  
10.1 Communications, Instructions and Mandate1284  
The verification and conclusive evidence clause is a safety check designed to ensure that 
the bank is observing the customer’s mandate primarily as regards payments. The mandate 
to pay is an instruction that must be communicated to the bank, along with a variety of 
other instructions such as countermands, changes in particulars and account closures. All of 
these must be implemented by the bank subject to their T&C. Banks also need to 
communicate with their customers, informing them of changes in interest rates, new 
practices, new products, branch closures and mergers etc. It is not surprising therefore that 
bank T&C contain extensive provisions on communications and instructions. They reflect a 
concern about authenticity and clarity of instructions on the one hand, and delay or non–
receipt of communications on the other.  Provisions cover the following issues:  
1. The means of giving instructions: written, oral; mail, fax;1285 
2. Flawed and ambiguous instructions;1286 
                                                
1283 The Macmillan and Greenwood duties. The Khoo Tian Hock duty is much more extensive, but there is the 
question over how established it is in Singapore law, as discussed in chapter 3.1 above. 
1284 UOB 4, 22, 23, E–terms 2.2, 2.7, 13(e)–(f); OCBC 2, 6.5, 8, 31, E–terms 1.3, 2.3, 3.3, 3.8, 4.3; DBS 5.14, 
5.15, 5.16, 26, 27 E–terms Part A 26, Part B 20–31, 66–68; HSBC A 4, 11, 18, E–terms 4, 12, 16a.; Std 
Ch 14, 15, E–terms 4.1–4.3, 4.7–4.9, 14, 15. 
1285UOB 4.3, 22, E–terms 2.7 (b), 13(e); OCBC 2.1, 6.5, E–terms OCBC 3.8, 4.3.1; DBS 27.1–27.3, E–terms 
Part B 26(b); HSBC A 11; Std Ch 15.1, 15.2, E–terms 14.1. 
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3. The bank’s right to act or refuse to act on instructions;1287 
4. The delivery of bank communications to the customer, non receipt and deemed 
receipt;1288 
5. The use of signature stamps and seals;1289 and 
6. Countermand.1290 
 
The law recognizes the right of the bank, as an agent, to receive clear, unambiguous 
instructions. An agent will not be penalised for giving a reasonable construction to 
ambiguous instructions.1291 However, where the ambiguity is patent, it is not reasonable for 
the bank to act without taking further instructions. In Patel v Standard Chartered Bank,1292 
Toulson J held that the doctrine that an agent who acts on ambiguous instructions is not in 
default if he can show that he adopted a reasonable construction, may apply to the bank–
customer relationship, but that it was not applicable where the instruction was contained in 
a pre–printed form prepared by the bank and any irregularity in its completion was 
apparent.1293 A similar requirement applies to authenticity; the bank must be reasonable in 
acting or declining to act on a particular instruction.1294 Obviously, oral instructions pose 
evidential problems and therefore have greater potential for dispute. Banks should carefully 
                                                                                                                                               
1286 UOB 4.2, E–terms 2.2 (a); OCBC 2.7, 27.4, E–terms 1.3, 2.3, 3.3; DBS 27.2, E–terms Part B 21, 
26(c)(1)–(2); HSBC A 16.c.ii ; Std Ch 15.1, E–terms 4.3. 
1287 UOB 3.4, 4.1, E–terms 2.2(c); 2.2(e); OCBC 2.6, 6.5; DBS 27.2, DBS Part A 12, Part B 26(c); HSBC A 
18.2, E–terms 4.d–e; Std Ch 4.9, 15.1–15.2, E–terms 4.8.1. 
1288 UOB 23, E–terms 13 (e)–(f); OCBC 31.2, E–terms 4.3.2; DBS 26.1, 26.2, E–terms Part A 26, Part B 24; 
HSBC A 18.3, E–terms 16.a.; Std Ch 14.1, 14.3, E–terms 14.4. 
1289 UOB 4.6; DBS 5.16; HSBC A 23.8, Std Ch 15.4. 
1290 UOB 4.8, E–terms 2.2(d); OCBC 2.2, 8, E–terms 1.3, 2.3, 3.3; DBS 5.14, 5. 15, E–terms Part B 23; 
HSBC Part A 4, E–terms 4c, 12b; Std Ch 4.4, E–terms 4.7. 
1291 George Ireland and Others v Joseph Gibbons Livingstone (1872) LR 5 HL 395 at 416; Curtice v London 
City and Midland Bank Limited [1908] 1 KB 293 at 299; Midland Bank Ltd v Seymour [1955] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 147 at 153. 
1292 [2001] Lloyd’s Rep Bank 229. 
1293 Ibid, at 234. 
1294 Per Fletcher Moulton LJ in Curtice v London City and Midland Bank Limited [1908] 1 KB 293 at 299 
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consider their willingness to accept oral instructions and contract accordingly in the T&C. 
In Singapore, the T&C reflect that while banks prefer written instructions and may reserve 
their right to receive instructions in writing, oral instructions are generally accepted, subject 
to disclaimers. To avoid disputes over the content of oral instructions, the T&C may 
provide that the bank may record telephone communications1295 and that the customer is 
bound by such a recording.1296 
  
The right of a customer to countermand payment instructions is established in the case 
law1297 and recognized by statute.1298 A countermand instruction revokes the authority of 
the bank such that it may not reimburse itself if it proceeds to make the payment.1299 On the 
other hand, a bank is under a duty to comply promptly with a valid payment instruction and 
faces liability for damages if it fails to do so.1300 Between these two rules, there is no scope 
for error on the part of the bank and it is both reasonable and prudent for banks to define 
the terms on which they will accept countermand instructions.  
 
Stop payments are probably most commonly associated with cheques, and many of the 
cases concern cheques. Nevertheless, other forms of payment (such as electronic funds 
                                                
1295 E.g., DBS 27.4, Std Ch E–terms 15. 
1296 E.g., DBS 27.4. 
1297 The old cases include: Williams v Everett and Others (1811) 104 ER 725; Wienholt v Spitta (1813) 170 
ER 1416; Gaunt v Taylor (1843) 67 ER 170; Morrell v Wootten (1852) 51 ER 753. They recognise that an 
instruction from a customer to his bank to pay a third person can be countermanded before it is carried out. 
1298 Singapore: Bills of Exchange Act (Chapter 23) section 75; England: Bills of Exchange Act 1882, section 
75. 
1299 See statement of these principles by Goff J in Barclays Bank Ltd v W J Simms Son & Cooke (Southern) 
Ltd and Another [1980] 1 QB 677 at 699. Other examples of an absence of a mandate are where the bank 
has received notice of its customer’s death and where the customer’s signature is forged. For House of 
Lords authority, see Westminster Bank Ltd v Hilton (1926–1927) 43 TLR 124. 
1300 See, e.g., Marzettie v William (1830) 109 ER 842; Rolin v Steward (1854) 139 ER 245. 
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transfers, standing payment orders) are, in principle, capable of being stopped.1301 Section 
75 of the Bills of Exchange Act,1302 which recognizes the right to countermand a bill, does 
not prescribe any rules for countermand but various principles can be distilled from the 
case law.  
 
Countermand must be made at the branch of the bank where the account is kept.1303 This is 
the corollary of the requirement that demand for payment must be made at the branch 
where the account is kept.1304 Today this is out of keeping with the expectations of 
customers and the practice of banks, which provide their customers with facilities, such as 
the ATM, to obtain repayment the world over.1305 Some banks make it clear that the 
acceptance of countermand instructions is in the discretion of the bank.1306 Some banks 
indicate that they will accept oral or electronic countermand instructions.1307  Where the 
T&C do not address the issue, the general law will prevail and oral countermand is 
possible. 
 
                                                
1301 One significant difference however, is that a stopped cheque gives a cause of action to the payee against 
the drawer, while other payment instructions can be revoked without any recourse for the payee. See The 
Brimnes [1975] 1 QB 929. All the members of the Court of Appeal agreed that a payment instruction by 
telex could not be equated with payment in cash or by cheque because of this difference, per Edmund 
Davies LJ at 949, Megaw LJ at 965 and Cairns LJ at 969.  
1302 England and Wales: 1882; Singapore: Cap 23. 
1303 Burnett v Westminster Bank Ltd [1966] 1 QB 742. London Provincial and South–Western Bank (Limited) 
v Frank Buszard (1918–1919) 35 TLR 142 is to the same effect; it was held that notice of countermand to 
one branch of a bank is not effective against other branches of the same bank. Here a branch of the bank, 
without notice of the countermand, advanced money on a cheque which had been countermanded at the 
branch where the account was kept. The bank, as a holder in due course of the cheque, obtained judgment 
against the drawer of the cheque. 
1304 See, for example, Burnett v Westminster Bank Ltd [1966] 1 QB 742 at 760. 
1305 See e.g., UOB 3.8; DBS 3.3.  
1306 E.g., OCBC 8.1. 
1307 DBS 5.14; Std Ch 4.4. 
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The authenticity of countermand instructions, as with any instructions to a bank, whether 
oral or written, must be capable of verification.1308 An unauthenticated countermand might 
be ground for a bank to postpone payment without risk of liability and investigate the 
authenticity of the countermand.1309 The instruction to countermand must be unambiguous 
and contain sufficient information for the bank to be able to identify the payment which is 
to be countermanded.1310 The furnishing of incorrect details at the time of countermanding 
will ordinarily excuse the bank in the event of payment being made, although the customer 
may have a case if the bank should reasonably have been able to identify the payment that 
the customer intended to be stopped.  
 
The T&C of Singapore banks studied here have varying provisions: a range of specified 
details1311 or full details may be required;1312 or only the cheque number.1313 Exclusions of 
liability and indemnities for any losses arising from the countermand being executed or not 
being executed are predictably present. The exclusions or indemnities may be specific to 
countermand1314 or be contained in wide, general indemnities that will be discussed below. 
A particularly thorny issue is the time at which a payment instruction can no longer be 
countermanded. Countermand is obviously no longer possible once payment is complete 
                                                
1308 In Curtice v London City and Midland Bank Limited [1908] 1 KB 293 the issue was whether a cheque was 
effectively countermanded by telegram. Cozens–Hardy MR in the Court of Appeal said at 299: “I am not 
satisfied that the bank is bound as a matter of law to accept an unauthenticated telegram as sufficient 
authority for the serious step of refusing to pay a cheque.” In Chua Neoh Kow v Malayan Banking BHD 
[1986] 2 MLJ 396 at 399 Shankar J said of oral countermand, “provided the bank is in no doubt that the 
verbal instructions have originated from the customer and the notice is unambiguous and unequivocally 
refers to the particular cheque, then the banker must stop payment.”  
1309 Curtice v London City and Midland Bank Limited [1908] 1 KB 293. See judgments of Cozens–Hardy MR 
at 299; Fletcher Moulton LJ at 300; Farwell LJ at 301. 
1310 Curtice v London City and Midland Bank Limited [1908] 1 KB 293 at 299; Westminster Bank Limited v 
Hilton (1926–27) 43 TLR 124. 
1311 HSBC Part A 4.1. 
1312 OCBC 8.1; Std Ch 4.4. 
1313 DBS 5.14. 
1314 E.g., OCBC 8.2. 
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but the point of no return may be reached prior to completion. Identifying this moment in a 
particular payment method is tricky; isolating a general principle for all payment methods 
may be impossible. While countermand is primarily an issue between the bank and its 
customer, third parties may be involved, namely the intended recipient of the payment, 
possibly his bank and, depending on the payment method, clearing agents. Banking practice 
and clearing house rules may come into play; this raises the issue of the extent to which 
customers are bound by them.  
 
For these reasons, banks should define in the T&C, or where appropriate in other 
documentation, the point at which countermand instructions will not be entertained. A 
similar recommendation was made by Roy Goode in 1985.1315 In Singapore, OCBC 
stipulates that once received, instructions cannot be cancelled unless the bank agrees;1316 
HSBC will accept a countermand instruction if the cheque has not been presented.1317 
Electronic instructions are widely stated to be irrevocable. It is appropriate for electronic 
instructions to be irrevocable because of the speed with which the transaction is executed. 
Banks may be willing to undertake countermand on a “best endeavours” basis.1318 It is also 
appropriate for bank forms, e.g., for fund transfers, to specify countermand terms. 
 
Certain accounts, e.g., joint, corporate, partnership and trust accounts require special 
provisions. Banks are concerned about who is authorized to operate the account and issues 
such as conflicting instructions, disputes between the joint account holders, effective 
                                                
1315 R M Goode “Electronic Funds Transfer As An Immediate Payment System” in R M Goode (ed) 
Electronic Banking – The Legal Implications (London, The Institute of Bankers and Centre for 
Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, University of London, 1985), 15 at 27. 
1316 OCBC 2.2. 
1317 HSBC 4.1. 
1318 E.g., DBS E–terms Part B 23. 
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communication with the account holders, change in the communication address or mandate 
and incapacity of one of the account holders. As a result, all T&C contain particular 
provisions dealing with the complexities arising from such accounts.1319  
 
Overall, the T&C reinforce the bank’s common law right to clear, unambiguous and 
authentic instructions. In the problem areas of ambiguity, inconsistency, accuracy and 
authenticity, the banks contract for protection by excluding liability or taking indemnities. 
Some provisions are wide enough to alleviate the bank of their common law duties to 
exercise care and to observe their mandate, provided they acted in good faith; these 
provisions are capable of excluding liability for patently flawed instructions or limiting the 
duty to verify signatures.1320 The UCTA, particularly sections 2(b) and 3.2 would apply; the 
issue is whether such provisions are reasonable.  
 
Automation and mass processing of bank procedures means that individual examination of 
each instruction and mandate received by the bank is compromised. To what extent should 
this excuse the bank from their common law obligations? The automation of bank 
processes has become a necessity of modern banking not only for banks but also for 
customers. For the customer it offers reduced costs in the form of bank charges (reflecting 
savings on the number and size of branches and staff numbers), greater efficiency in the 
execution of instructions and convenience. The argument against the reasonableness of 
such provisions should not, therefore, be based on an assumption that such procedures 
benefit only the bank. If it is accepted that the automation of bank processes is necessary in 
                                                
1319 UOB 9–11; OCBC 12–15; DBS 12–14; HSBC 7; Std Ch 8–10. 
1320 E.g., UOB 4.2; OCBC 27.4; DBS 27.2; Std Ch 15.2. 
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the modern banking environment, the logical extension is that the individual examination of 
the mandate is no longer feasible in all circumstances. Who should bear the risk of losses 
arising from the new, accepted methods? 
 
It is clear that a bank should not be able to use exclusionary provisions in the T&C to 
escape liability where they have actual or so–called Nelsonian knowledge of a defect in a 
mandate or instruction that they nevertheless proceed to execute. To allow this would be to 
legitimise mala fides, which is contrary to public policy. The qualification that the bank 
acted in good faith is important to avoid application where there was mala fides but a bank 
can act negligently and still act in good faith. If the customer is also in breach, the resulting 
loss may fall to be apportioned in terms of the recommendation above;1321 if the customer is 
not in breach of his duties, it is submitted that an exclusion or indemnity which excuses 
bank negligence is not reasonable. Where neither party is negligent, it is submitted that 
bank’s should bear the risk of payment without a mandate, not because they introduced a 
system which does not involve examining every mandate but because the default rule 
(based on the absence of a mandate) allocating liability to the bank should prevail. The risk 
to the bank is reduced by the broader customer’s duty of care that is advocated here. 
  
All the T&C contain provisions designed to ensure efficient delivery of bank 
communications to the customer.1322 The most common provision is that posting to the 
                                                
1321 See chapter 8 above. 
1322 UOB 13.3(d), 23.2, 23.3, 23.4, 23.5, 23.8, E–terms 13 (e)–(f); OCBC 31.2, 31.3,E–terms 4.3.2; DBS 10.1, 
26.1, 26.2, E–terms Part A 26, Part B 24; HSBC Part A 18.3, E–terms 16.a.; Std Ch 14.1–14.3, E–terms 
14.4. 
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customer’s latest address on record with the bank is effective delivery.1323  This is 
commonly coupled with a provision for deemed receipt. In contrast, communications from 
the customer to the bank may be stated to be effective only on actual receipt.1324 The most 
important, and probably most frequent, of the bank communications to be effected by the 
deemed receipt provisions, is the bank statement. For the verification and conclusive 
evidence clause to be effective, the bank must ensure that it provides the customer with his 
bank statements. This is illustrated by the case of Ri Jong Son v Development Bank of 
Singapore Ltd1325 where the court held that the bank’s failure to prove that the statements 
were posted meant that the provision for deemed receipt did not avail them. Banks may 
boost their position by imposing on the customer the obligation to notify them in the event 
that the statements are not received at the usual time.1326  
 
The UCTA will apply to exclusions of liability for non–receipt or delay in receipt of 
communications. Some of the provisions, such as deemed receipt of communications, may 
not appear to be an obvious target for the UCTA. The deemed receipt clauses may, 
however, be caught in the UCTA web by being part of an overall clause that excludes or 
limits liability, or gives an indemnity. This is because the clause is looked at as a whole.1327 
Even on their own, deemed receipt clauses have the potential to limit the bank’s liability, 
for example where a bank is seeking to enforce a verification and conclusive evidence 
clause it has the effect of removing the customer’s defence of non–receipt of bank 
                                                
1323 UOB 23.2, E–terms 13(e); OCBC 31.2, E–terms 4.3.2; DBS 26.1, E–terms Part A 26, Part B 24;; HSBC 
A 18.3, E–terms 16.a; Std Ch 14.1, E–terms 14.4.  
1324 E.g., DBS E–terms Part B 67; HSBC E–terms 16.a.; Std Ch 14.2. 
1325 [1998] 3 SLR 62 at 72–74. 
1326 E.g. UOB 13.3(d); DBS 10.1. 
1327 AEG (UK) Ltd v Logic Resource Ltd [1996] CLC 265 at 278, per Hobhouse LJ (dissenting on the issue of 
incorporation).  
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statements. The interpretation given to section 13 in Stewart Gill v Horatio Myer,1328 and 
the examples given by Richard Lawson1329 of what would be caught by the section, suggest 
that the UCTA should apply. Lawson’s examples include clauses that impose a requirement 
to notify a claim within a particular time, reverse the burden of proof, and restrict the 
remedies available to a party aggrieved by a breach.1330  
 
In general, it is submitted that the deemed receipt provisions are reasonable in the 
environment of impersonal banking for the masses and a reliable postal system. Some T&C 
provide, however, that a communication will be deemed to be received even where it is 
returned undelivered.1331 When a communication is returned undelivered, banks cannot 
assume that the customer is in breach of the duty to keep the address updated. The 
communication may have been delivered to the wrong address. Because of the importance 
of the verification and conclusive evidence clause to the armour against dishonesty, and 
because of the impracticality of expecting the bank to confirm receipt of bank statements by 
customers and the problems associated with proof of delivery,1332 it is submitted that it is 
reasonable for customers to be saddled with the responsibility of ensuring that they receive 
the means of verification i.e., the bank statement.  
 
The practice of a bank holding mail for customers raises the question of what it means for 
the verification and conclusive evidence clause. This may be a continuing arrangement 
requested by offshore customers from the outset of the banking relationship, or it may be 
                                                
1328 [1992] QB 600. See the discussion in chapter 7 above. 
1329 Richard Lawson Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms (8th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2005).  
1330 Ibid, at para 7.02. 
1331 E.g., DBS 26.1, Std Ch 14.1. 
1332 The incidence of the onus of proof is an important issue; it is discussed in detail in chapter 11. 
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appropriate in the event of a planned long absence from the mailing address. It is trite that 
the verification and conclusive evidence clause is dependant for its operation on receipt of 
bank statements by the customer. Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse1333 
illustrates the danger of retained mail arrangements. The customer’s account was subject to 
a verification and conclusive evidence clause. Initially, the bank was instructed to retain the 
bank statements; later an authorized signatory directed all mail to be sent to his address. 
One unauthorised transaction took place, 1334 in which the authorized signatory was 
complicit, for the substantial sum of US$8 million. The statements were not verified until 
six months later. The Court of Appeal held that the customer had to bear the consequences 
of the diversion of the correspondence to the authorised signatory’s address.1335 
 
While the issue did not arise in Pertamina, by availing the customer of the hold–mail 
service, it may be argued that the bank is waiving its right to verification and notification 
by the customer. If this is not the desired position, the bank should insert an exclusion of 
liability clause for any losses that result from the customer not receiving statements and 
other communications at his request. It is recommended that banks consider their position 
in hold–mail cases and make an informed choice in their T&C. UOB’s T&C provide that 
dispatch/receipt of communications is deemed to have taken place where the bank is 
instructed to hold mail for collection.1336 Being effectively an exclusion clause, this would 
be subject to the provisions of the UCTA, but it is submitted that such an exclusion would 
generally be reasonable. Similar issues may arise where a customer requests statements at 
                                                
1333 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 292. 
1334 The customer had a credit facility ‘secured’ by an invalid charge on a deposit account. The unauthorized 
transaction was a drawdown on the credit facility.  
1335 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 299. 
1336 UOB 23.6. 
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longer intervals such as six months or a year for accounts that are rarely used. It may be 
sensible practice for the bank to send statements at shorter intervals whenever there has 
been activity on the account other than routine entries such as interest or bank charges. 
 
10.2 Duty to Notify the Bank of a Change of Particulars, Including Signature1337  
This duty extends to changes in contact details (address and contact numbers, nowadays it 
may include email addresses), name (most applicable to woman getting married and taking 
their husband’s name), partners/directors, constitution/rules of companies, partnerships, 
clubs etc, occupation and identity documents. The identity and names of customers or 
partners/directors of customers, and the constitution/rules of incorporated and 
unincorporated customers are relevant when the bank determines whether it has a binding 
mandate to act. The customer’s contact details are vital to the prevention of fraud and 
forgery losses and to the effectiveness of the verification and conclusive evidence clause, 
premised, as it is, on the receipt of bank statements. Telephone and fax details may not be 
as important to the verification and conclusive evidence clause, but they are essential to the 
bank’s fulfilment of its role as pre–payment detector of fraud or forgery.1338  
 
The T&C may give the bank time in which to process any notified change in signature or 
other details.1339 The bank can have no way of knowing the customer’s details without 
being informed by the customer. In Industrial & Commercial Bank v Li Soon Development 
                                                
1337 UOB 23.1, E–terms 13(f); OCBC 31.1, E–terms 4.3.1; DBS 26.3; HSBC 18.1; Std Ch 14.1, 15.9.  
1338 The bank may wish to verify a mandate by telephoning the customer and the customer’s mobile number 
may be used by the bank in electronic banking to provide a one–time PIN number. 
1339 DBS 26.4, 26.5; Std 15.9. 
 262
Pte Ltd,1340 the Singapore High Court said, per Chao Hick Tin J: “I do not think it is the 
duty of a banker to keep track of the address of a customer. The duty rests with the 
customer to notify the banker of any change.”1341  
 
There is no obvious basis for the UCTA to apply to this term, but if it did, it should pass the 
test of reasonableness. Banks must obviously verify the authenticity of notifications to 
change details, particularly those supporting the verification and conclusive evidence 
clause, and those affecting the bank’s mandate. The provisions of this clause are important 
and necessary for the safe operation of the account, yet the consequences of breach are not 
generally stipulated. This, one must assume is deliberate. Banks are content to rely on the 
general exclusions of liability or indemnity for breaches of contract1342 stipulated elsewhere 
in the contract.  
 
10.3 Duty or Liability Arising From Non–Receipt of Cheque Book1343  
The bank’s concern about non–receipt of cheque books is obvious: a cheque book in the 
wrong hands can lead to payments without a mandate. Banks seek to protect themselves 
from this risk in various ways, one of which is the verification and conclusive evidence 
clause; it is an effective way in which to identify when a cheque book has fallen into the 
wrong hands. Other protections include: excluding bank liability for cheque books not 
received, putting the risk of loss from failed delivery of a new cheque book on the 
customer; indemnifying the bank for lost or stolen cheque books; imposing a duty on the 
                                                
1340 [1994] 1 SLR 471. 
1341 Ibid, at 483. 
1342 UOB 21.1(c), 25.1; OCBC 27.6; DBS 16.2; HSBC Part A: 19.1; Std Ch 11.1.3. 
1343 UOB 14(a)(iii); OCBC 7.2, 27.9; DBS 11.2(a); HSBC Part B 1.6; Std Ch 4.8, 11.1.12. 
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customer to notify non–receipt of a requested cheque book, and to check that the cheque 
book is received intact and notify the bank if not. Additional security measures may also be 
undertaken, such as shrink–wrapping the cheque book to prevent tampering before it 
reaches the customer. The T&C also give the bank the right to choose the method of 
delivery of the cheque book, commonly by post.1344  
 
Some banks automatically send a new cheque book to the customer when their computer 
system notifies them that the customer is approaching the end of his cheque book. In such a 
case, there is no “request” by the customer and, on a strict interpretation of the term, the 
duty to notify non–receipt of a requested cheque book will not arise. This is appropriate as 
a customer who has not requested a cheque book will not ordinarily have the receipt (or 
non–receipt) of the cheque book on his mind. He will have no yardstick by which to 
measure an unusual delay in receipt of the cheque book. T&C should take account of this 
practice and not make the duty dependant on a request from the customer. This problem 
could be remedied by mailing a separate letter informing the customer of an automatic 
dispatch of a cheque book, coupled with a direction to notify in the event of non–receipt.  
 
The UCTA is applicable to the extent that this clause excuses the bank of breach of contract 
or negligence. In dispatching cheque books to customers, it is reasonable that banks must 
act with care; they cannot, by passing the risk of delivery to the customer, ignore realities 
of which they are aware. Thus, if it is known that the postal system is unreliable, or that 
there is a high incidence of cheque books being stolen in the course of posting, banks 
should not be able to turn a blind eye to the risk and rely on their T&C to protect them 
                                                
1344 OCBC 7.2; DBS 5.11; HSBC Part B 1.6; Std Ch 4.8, 11.1.12.  
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when losses ensue. The clause would be improved by inserting the requirement that the 
bank act reasonably in choosing the method of delivery. The duty to notify tampering with 
the cheque book is reasonable and would probably be required under the general Khoo Tian 
Hock duty. It is submitted that the duty to notify non–receipt of a requested cheque book 
would be reasonable if the customer is notified by separate communication that a cheque 
book has been posted.  
 
Loss or non–delivery of a cheque book may cause the customer loss other than by falling 
into the wrong hands, i.e. by depriving him of a means of payment leading to late or non–
payment of debts or liabilities and loss of opportunities. Banks obviously do not wish to be 
liable for this very open–ended category of losses and the passing of this risk to the 
customer is surely justifiable, as the customer can take steps to mitigate or avoid losses and 
inconveniences from not having a cheque book. 
 
10.4 Customer’s Duty to Prevent Loss or Theft of Cheques, Cheque Books and 
 ATM Cards, and Notify the Bank of Such Loss.1345  
Having received the cheque book (or ATM card) it is equally important to keep it in a safe 
place. These duties fall under the Khoo Tian Hock duty to prevent fraud. In that case the 
customer was penalised for not storing the cheque book in a way that would deny access to 
their son, who had defrauded before. The court took the view that, to limit losses, 
customers need to exercise care in all facets of their banking affairs, not only in the drawing 
                                                
1345 UOB 14(a)(i)–(ii); OCBC 7.7, 26.2(e), 27.9; DBS 11.2(b), 11.3 (a); HSBC Part A 15; Std Ch 4.3, 35(e).  
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of cheques and notification of known forgeries on their accounts. Fraud is not perpetrated 
through the careless drawing of cheques alone.1346  
 
The position advocated here is that to confine customers’ duties to the drawing of cheques 
can only lead to greater losses and the financial detriment of society as a whole. It is 
reasonable for banks to require care from customers in the handling of cheques, cards and 
access codes. Given that the duty set out in Khoo Tian Hock has been questioned by the 
Court of Appeal in Singapore, it would be advisable for banks to make this duty an explicit 
term of the contract. HSBC drafts the duty to take care of cheque books, etc., as a duty of 
care.1347 It is submitted that this is reasonable under the UCTA and represents a more 
balanced allocation of risk than an absolute duty. 
 
10.5 Duty Not to Draw Cheques or Keep a Cheque Book in a Way that 
 Facilitates Fraud or Forgery;1348 Duty Not to Operate an Account in a Way 
 that Facilitates Fraud or Forgery1349 
These duties encompass the Macmillan and Khoo Tian Hock duties existing at common 
law.1350 In some cases the customer’s liability is drafted not as a duty but as an exclusion of 
bank liability.1351 Given that these duties exist at common law,1352 express terms imposing 
similar duties should pass the test of reasonableness under the UCTA. A key difference, 
however, is that the express duties may be absolute and not duties of care. It is submitted 
                                                
1346 Per Woo Bih Li J in Khoo Tian Hock v OCBC [2000] 4 SLR 673 at 707. 
1347 HSBC Part A 15. 
1348 OCBC 7.3, 7.7; HSBC Part A 15, Part B 1.2, 1.5; Std Ch 4.3. 
1349 UOB 14(a)(iv); DBS 11.2(c); Std Ch 11.1.7, 11.3 (indemnity and exclusion of liability). 
1350 See discussion in chapter 3 above on Khoo Tian Hock v OCBC [2000] 4 SLR 673 and subsequent 
comments in Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse [2006] 4 SLR 273. 
1351 E.g., HSBC Part B 1.2; Std Ch 11.1.4, 11.1.7. 
1352 Subject to the doubts over the Khoo Tian Hock duty. 
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that the bank is adequately protected by a duty of care in these circumstances. A breach of 
certain other express duties in the T&C, for example, breach of the duty to notify a change 
in particulars or the duty to notify non–receipt of a new cheque book1353 may constitute 
fault or facilitation by the customer for the purposes of the duty not to facilitate fraud or 
forgery. 
 
10.6 Duty to Comply With T&C Contained in the Cheque Book1354   
These instructions explain and illustrate to the customer the proper writing of a cheque and 
overlap with the duty to draw cheques in a manner which does not facilitate fraud. 
Basically they traverse the requirements comprised in the Macmillan duty, and extending 
towards the Khoo Tian Hock duty, for example, to keep the cheque book locked in a safe 
place. They may reiterate the requirement to notify non–receipt of a cheque book, an 
irregularity upon receipt of the cheque book, and loss of the cheque book or cheques.  
 
Contractual terms written in a cheque book cover raise the question of incorporation into 
the contract. As the cheque book is provided to the customer after the opening of the 
account, to the extent that it contains terms that are not reflected in the T&C, they will not 
be incorporated in the contract.1355 The bank may argue that continued operation of the 
account with knowledge of the terms constitutes acquiescence, but this requires proof that 
the customer was aware of the terms contained in the cheque book. Banks seeking to make 
                                                
1353 As discussed in chapter 10.3 above. 
1354 DBS 11.2(c);   
1355 As happened in Burnett v Westminster Bank Ltd [1966]1 QB 742. See the discussion in chapter 10.15 
below. It has been argued by Bradley Crawford “Comments on Peter Ellinger’s Paper” (1988) 14 Can Bus 
LJ 171 at 173 that acquiescence can be based on reasonable efforts to bring the provisions to the 
customer’s attention. 
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the provisions in the cheque book part of the contract should ensure that they are 
incorporated explicitly1356 or by reference1357 in the T&C. 
 
Duplication of the T&C in the cheque book is superfluous but worthwhile nevertheless to 
educate customers. The Association of Banks in Singapore in their Guidelines to the 
Banking Code recommend the use of the cheque book cover to convey guidelines to 
customers on how and how not to draw cheques.1358 
 
10.7 The Customer’s Duty to Monitor the Account at All Times and Report 
 Unauthorised Debits1359 
This term resembles the verification clause without the conclusive aspect. Bearing in mind 
that the T&C include a verification and conclusive evidence clause, exactly what the bank 
envisages here bears examination. Customers with active accounts are sent statements once 
a month, or more frequently, which they are required to verify and notify in the event of 
error in accordance with the verification and conclusive evidence clause. An additional 
duty to monitor the account “at all times” assumes that the customer has access to account 
information at all times. This monitoring clause may be aimed at other information 
received by the customer in connection with his account between statements, for example 
through ATM’s and Internet banking. 
 
                                                
1356 OCBC 7.3–7.4; HSBC Part B 1.1–1.3; Std Ch 4.3. 
1357 UOB 14(a)(iv); DBS 29. 
1358 Guidance for Code Subscribers, 1 Sep 2004, cl 18.b. 
1359 UOB 14(c); DBS 11.1(a). 
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The duty to monitor “at all times” cannot be interpreted as requiring customers to avail 
themselves of ATM and Internet banking facilities. It does not expressly do so and use of 
such facilities is clearly not obligatory. The banks that impose this duty may be seeking to 
extend the effect of the verification and notification duty to any information a customer 
acquires in between periodic statements. The Greenwood duty largely achieves the same 
end. The rationale behind the clause is clearly to require diligence in regard to the account, 
but it seems to impose an active duty, as opposed to a passive one, without specifying the 
source of the information.  
 
The UCTA will apply to this clause if it excludes or limits liability or indemnifies the bank. 
To the extent that the clause is a reiteration of the Greenwood duty, it would be reasonable. 
To the extent that it requires something more, it may be vulnerable to attack for being void 
for vagueness. 
 
10.8 The Duty to Sign and Return Confirmation Slips1360 
Confirmation slips may be enclosed with bank statements for return to the bank confirming 
receipt of the statement and agreement with its contents. The use of confirmation slips is 
not currently common practice in Singapore. The effectiveness of confirmation slips to bind 
a customer to the entries in a statement of account, in the absence of a duty to verify the 
account, is unclear.1361 Use in conjunction with a verification and conclusive evidence 
clause is superfluous although, if properly worded, it could, in principle, constitute an 
                                                
1360 UOB 13.3(c); DBS 11.1(b). 
1361 See Geva “ Allocation of Forged cheque Losses – Comparitive Aspects, Policies and a Model for 
Reform” [1998] 114 LQR 250; Kepitigalla Rubber Estates Ltd v National Bank of India Ltd [1909] 2 KB 
1010 at 1028; Arrow Tranfer Co Ltd v Royal Bank of Canada et al 27 DLR (3d) 81 at 87, 96. 
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estoppel. The signed confirmation slips used by one of the banks (Chekiang First Bank Ltd) 
in Tai Hing Cotton Mill did not ultimately avail the bank because the effect was not 
brought home to the customer, although Cons J, in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal1362 took 
a different view.1363  
 
Requiring signature and return of confirmation slips may have an impact on customer 
behaviour by procuring verification from those customers who comply with the request to 
sign and return the slips but on the whole it is submitted that the effort of enforcing 
compliance with the duty would outweigh any benefits. Voluntary compliance is likely to 
be low. Banks would then face the dilemma of whether to chase up outstanding 
confirmation slips each month or to ignore the non–compliance. The latter is an 
unattractive option and must be avoided; the former is impractical and, in any event, is 
unlikely to produce full compliance. 
 
10.9 Exclusion of Liability for Paying on Forged or Altered Cheques1364  
An exclusion of liability for losses from paying on forged or altered cheques has a variety 
of permutaions in the T&C including: where a customer was negligent or facilitated the 
defect,1365 where erasable ink or equipment, cheque writers or franking machines were 
used,1366 where the defect cannot easily be detected or the mandate appears to be the 
                                                
1362 Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Liu Chong Hing Bank Ltd and Others [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 567. The 
slip read as follows: “I/We acknowledge receipt of your monthly statement of my/our current account with 
you showing the following balance which has been examined and found correct …”. 
1363 See the discussion in chapter 7.6 above. 
1364 UOB 3.3, 3.10; OCBC 26.2(g), 26.3; DBS 21(b); HSBC Part B 1.5; Std Ch 11.1.4, 11.1.7. 
1365 UOB 3.10; OCBC 26.2(g), 26.3; DBS 21(b); HSBC Part B 1.5; Std Ch 11.1.7. 
1366 UOB 3.10; OCBC 26.3; DBS 21(b); HSBC Part B 1.1;     
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Customer’s1367 and third party fraud.1368 As these provisions exclude bank liability for 
breach of contract, the UCTA is applicable. The test is reasonableness.1369  
 
The exclusion where the customer is negligent or facilitates the defect is subsumed by the 
Khoo Tian Hock duty not to operate the account in a manner facilitating forgery. The clause 
does not exclude the possibility that the bank was also negligent, in which event it penalises 
the customer for his fault while disregarding the bank’s fault. Consistent with the 
submission above,1370 where both parties have been negligent, there should be an 
apportionment of loss. 
 
In relation to the exclusion where erasable ink, cheque writers or franking machines are 
used, in Macmillan, Lord Shaw alluded to the problem of cheques tampered with prior to 
presentation for payment.1371 The scenario he was addressing was one of a customer having 
exercised due care in the drawing of the cheque but subsequent tampering is executed with 
such skill that the bank is not negligent in failing to detect it. In this context, he mentions 
deletions “accomplished by chemical aid”.1372 Lord Shaw’s expressly obiter view was that 
the customer would be liable for the ensuing loss. His reasoning is based on the point of 
time at which the bank’s duty to observe the customer’s mandate arises. This he identifies 
as the moment at which the customer presents the cheque. Until then, responsibility for the 
cheque is the customer’s, and the fate of the cheque is completely beyond the bank’s 
control. Lord Shaw’s view is, it seems, expressed in the context of a bearer cheque payable 
                                                
1367 UOB 3.3, 3.10; OCBC 10.3, 26.2(f), 38.6; DBS 21(b); HSBC Part B 1.5; Std Ch 4.5, 11.1.4, 11.1.6. 
1368 HSBC Part B 1.5; Std Ch 11.1.4. 
1369 As discussed in chapter 7.2 above. 
1370 In chapter 8. 
1371 London Joint Stock Bank Ltd v Macmillan and Arthur [1918] AC 777 at 824–6. 
1372 Ibid, at 826. 
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to drawer. In the case of a cheque payable to a third party, the argument based on the 
customer’s responsibility for the fate of the cheque until presentation is weaker, although 
obviously the bank’s responsibility until presentation remains nil. It has no knowledge of 
the cheque until presentation, whether it is a bearer, order or non–transferable cheque.  
 
Lord Shaw did not reconcile his view of this aspect with the Macmillan duty which only 
arose where there was “negligence in the transaction itself”. The absence of blame on the 
part of the bank, on its own, cannot be decisive as it raises the perennial problem of 
allocation of loss between two innocent parties but here it is coupled with, and this is 
significant, the duty of the bank to observe promptly an apparently legitimate mandate. It is 
submitted that the exclusion of liability where erasable ink, cheque writers or franking 
machines have been used may be reasonable, having regard to the reasons expressed by 
Lord Shaw in Macmillan and because of the ease with which a fraud can be perpetrated 
through their use. It is a way of discouraging use of such equipment, when there are other, 
more acceptable ways of executing the mandate.  
 
The exclusions covering defects that cannot be easily detected or authorisations that appear 
to be the customer’s also suggest the absence of fault on the part of the bank. One question 
is what depth of detection must be undertaken before it can be said that the defect was not 
easily detectable? The common law does not answer this question because the duty to 
observe the mandate is strict. The bank’s answer will be based on what is feasible in the 
circumstances, for example, in the case of written mandates, a focused but brief comparison 
using the naked eye with the specimen signature on record. Some banks specify the extent 
of detection that will be deployed. OCBC provides that the bank may, but is not bound to, 
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verify signatures other than by comparing it with specimen signatures held by the bank; 
further, that bank opinion on the issue is conclusive and a cheque may be dishonoured on 
the basis of this examination.1373 Provisions defining the extent of signature verification are 
anomalous with the modern practice to do so only for high–value cheques.1374 The 
threshold amount for verification is kept confidential by banks because of the obvious 
opportunity it offers to fraudsters. It is kept constantly under review and fluctuates during 
the year according to various factors. Signature verification provisions can be criticized for 
misleading customers into thinking that verification is undertaken. 
 
It is submitted that where the customer is not in breach of his duty of care, it is 
unreasonable for banks to exclude loss on the ground that the defect cannot be easily 
detected or the mandate appears to be that of the customer: the customer is already under a 
verification and notification duty to aide in the detection of forgeries; the risk of clever 
forgeries is inherent in the business of banking and should be borne by the bank. Some of 
the provisions excuse the bank for paying on a signature “purporting” to be that of the 
customer.1375 This can apply unreasonably, for example, where a forgery of a customer’s 
name makes no attempt to resemble the customer’s signature, yet it purports to be that of 
the customer. It is clearly unreasonable for a bank to be excused in such cases. 
 
                                                
1373 OCBC 2.5.  
1374 The practice is acknowledged in the literature. See e.g. David Hay (Gen Ed) Halsbury’s Laws of 
Singapore “Finance and Banking” vol 12 (Lexis Nexis Singapore, 2002) para 140.658 fn. 4; J R S Revell 
Banking and Electronic Fund Transfers 1983, 18, 82; R M Goode “Introduction” in R M Goode (ed) 
Electronic Banking – The Legal Implications (London, The Institute of Bankers and Centre for 
Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, University of London, 1985), pX; Johanna Vroegop “The 
Legal Implications of Cheque Truncation” (1990) LMCLQ 244 at 250; See further discussion below in 
chapter 10.15. 
1375 See e.g., OCBC 10.3; Std Ch 11.1.4. 
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The broad exclusion of liability for third party fraud overlaps with the other exclusions 
discussed here, and similar considerations apply. It is submitted that it is unreasonable. 
 
The interaction of these exclusions (defect which cannot be easily detected/authorisation 
which appears to be the customer’s, customer facilitation, third party fraud, erasable ink, 
cheque writing equipment) with the verification and conclusive evidence clause bears 
consideration. They are all targeted at unauthorised debits. Whereas the verification and 
conclusive evidence clause, in principle, preserves the customer’s right to a reversal of 
incorrect entries, the current exclusions give the customer no opportunity to demand 
rectification. Thus a customer, who in fulfilment of his verification duty notifies the bank 
of an unauthorised debit, could be met with the response that the error was not easily 
detectable or arose from the use of erasable ink and therefore the bank is not liable for the 
loss. The bank appears to be contracting out of the verification and conclusive evidence 
clause in the specific circumstances covered by these exclusions, predominantly situations 
in which they are not at fault or at least where the customer is at fault. This suggests that 
the verification and conclusive evidence clause is intended to apply in circumstances where 
bank is at fault.1376 
 
10.10 Exclusion of Liability for Loss Arising without Bank Fault1377 
A general exclusion where the bank is not at fault is common. This is in addition to the 
exclusions discussed immediately above, which generally involve an absence of, or reduced 
                                                
1376 The right of the bank to use the verification and conclusive evidence clause where it has been negligent is 
defended in chapter 4.5.1 above. 
1377 UOB 25.1; OCBC 26.1; 26.3; DBS 21.1(a); Std Ch 11.8. 
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blame on the part of the bank. Through the no–fault exclusion the bank is contracting out of 
its strict duty to pay only on a valid mandate.  
 
This provision was considered in Ri Jong Son v Development Bank of Singapore.1378 The 
action was brought against the bank by one of two joint account holders on the basis that 
his signature had been forged by the other account holder. The Singapore High Court held 
that ordinarily a debit without a mandate would have resulted in the bank’s liability to the 
plaintiff but that the above clause excused the bank of liability where it was without fault; 
further, the plaintiff had not proved that the bank’s signature verification procedure had 
been negligent. On the application of the UCTA, it was held that because the exclusion 
clause did not exclude liability for negligence it was not subject to the requirement of 
reasonableness in section 2(2) of the UCTA. The court indicated, in any event, that it 
considered a provision confining liability to where the bank was at fault, to be reasonable. 
It held that the clause was not unclear or ambiguous.  
 
The court’s ruling that section 2(2) of the UCTA did not apply is, with respect, correct. 
This illustrates a limitation in the UCTA’s effective operation in the banking context. A 
major concern about contractual fairness is the exclusion of liability for negligence. In this 
instance, the bank purports to concede liability for negligence and therefore UCTA alarm 
bells do not ring; yet the limitation of bank liability to negligence represents a significant 
departure from the much wider strict liability at common law for paying without a mandate. 
The court’s interpretation of fault to include “negligence” in this context is supported. The 
wider the interpretation given to fault, the smaller the ambit of the exclusion.  
                                                
1378 [1998] 3 SLR 64.  
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The Ri Jong Son decision can be criticised for not considering the application of section 
3(2) of the UCTA, namely the possibility that the bank was in breach of contract (paying 
without a mandate), or was claiming to be entitled to render performance substantially 
different from that which was reasonably expected of him (to pay only on a mandate); and 
therefore that the clause was subject to the requirement of reasonableness.1379  
 
The court’s dicta that the clause was reasonable in the event that the UCTA did apply, 
reflects a value judgment for which both support and criticism can be garnered from a 
spectrum of commentators. The exclusion of liability for loss where the bank is not at fault 
means that where loss must be allocated between an innocent bank and an innocent 
customer, it falls on the customer, while at common law it would fall on the bank. Bearing 
in mind that the duty to pay on a valid mandate is fundamental to the business of banking, it 
is submitted that the loss should fall on the bank unless the customer has breached his duty 
of care, which it is submitted, should be a general duty of care along the lines of the Khoo 
Tian Hock duty. The bank has the protection of the verification and conclusive evidence 
clause in such a situation and this, it is submitted, is sufficient to reduce the risk which they 
face. 
 
10.11 General Exclusions of Liability1380 
All the T&C contain wide exclusions of liability. Some of the exclusions are in addition to 
those discussed above. Examples are an exclusion of liability for acting or failing to act, an 
                                                
1379 See Poh Chu Chai Banker and Customer at 900. 
1380 OCBC 26.1; DBS 21.1(e); HSBC 20.4; Std Ch 11.5. 
 276
exclusion for losses arising from the bank’s exercise of its rights under the T&C and an 
exclusion for loss howsoever caused. In some cases the exclusion is stated not to extend to 
gross negligence or wilful default. It is submitted that such broad exclusions are not 
necessary or appropriate where the customer has a general duty of care and a verification 
and notification duty, and that they are not reasonable under the UCTA. Where specific 
situations justify the use of an exclusion clause, it should be specifically targeted. The T&C 
of the United Kingdom banks that have been considered do not contain similar exclusions 
although an exclusion for losses from events beyond the control of the bank is used.1381 
 
10.12 Cheque Truncation Provisions1382 
In July 2003 Singapore introduced cheque truncation into its cheque clearing system.1383 
Under this system, abbreviated as CTS, the cheque is replaced by a scanned image thereby 
avoiding the need for physical transport and sorting. The image is made where the cheque 
is deposited and sent electronically to the relevant parties, i.e. the clearing house and the 
drawee bank. Under this system the paying bank does not get the opportunity to examine 
the paper cheque unless it requests to do so.1384 While the new system offers benefits of 
efficiency and reduced costs in the long term, one concern is that the inability of the paying 
bank to scrutinize the original cheque reduces its ability to detect forgeries and alterations. 
This concern is addressed in the T&C by an exclusion of liability for payment of a cheque 
                                                
1381 E.g., Barclays 9.2; NatWest 8.2; HSBC UK Personal T&C Section 1,cl 7.7. 
1382 OCBC 38; DBS 6; HSBC Part A 23; Std Ch 3, 4. UOB’s CTS provisions are set out in a separate 
“Additional Terms and Conditions Governing Accounts and Services”. 
1383 This summary of the cheque truncation system is based on David Hay (Gen Ed) Halsbury’s Laws of 
Singapore “Finance and Banking” vol 12 (Lexis Nexis Singapore, 2002) from para 140.652 and the 
website of the Monetary Authority of Singapore at www.mas.gov.sg. 
1384 Section 89(2) Bills of Exchange Act. 
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where the alteration or forgery is not apparent from the CTS image presented to a bank1385 
or a more general exclusion for any loss whatsoever, arising from the CTS.1386  
 
The reality, as discussed above,1387 is that individual examination by banks of cheques 
below a certain amount, is no longer undertaken. This is a strategic decision by banks 
worldwide based on the relative costs of scrutinizing large volumes of cheques versus the 
losses from paying on forgeries.1388  
 
Exclusions falling under this head overlap with some of the exclusions already discussed, 
such as where the defect cannot be easily detected and losses not attributable to the bank’s 
fault. The UCTA applies; both sections 2 and 3 are relevant. It is submitted that to the 
extent that loss must be allocated to one of two innocent parties, it should be borne by the 
bank, for the reasons submitted in respect of the exclusion for losses where the bank is not 
at fault.   
 
There are other predictable exclusions in the T&C for failure or delay of the CTS system or 
the systems and networks employed by it, 1389 exclusions relating to the loss of the items or 
                                                
1385 OCBC 38.6; Std Ch 4.5, 11.1.6. 
1386 DBS 6.6; HSBC Part A 23.3. 
1387 See chapter 10.10 above. 
1388 See e.g. David Hay (Gen Ed) Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore “Finance and Banking” vol 12 (Lexis Nexis 
Singapore, 2002) para 140.658 fn 4; J R S Revell Banking and Electronic Fund Transfers 1983, at pages 
18, 82; R M Goode “Introduction” in R M Goode (editor) Electronic Banking – The Legal Implications  
(London, The Institute of Bankers and Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, 
University of London, 1985), pX; Johanna Vroegop “The Legal Implications of Cheque Truncation” 
(1990) LMCLQ 244 at 250.  
1389 Eg OCBC 38.7; Std Ch 11.3.1/2/3. 
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images of the cheque1390 and provisions dealing with the changes in the bank’s 
responsibilities as a result of the new system, which are beyond the scope of this study. 
 
10.13 Indemnities1391 
All the T&C contain indemnity clauses. Whether in the general T&C or in separate 
electronic terms, the structure is generally the same: a broad, general indemnity for all 
losses, liabilities, claims, etc., which the bank may incur in connection with the operation 
and performance of the contract with specific instances of application being particularized 
for areas of obvious or high concern. Some of these indemnities have been discussed in the 
course of particular exclusions. Section 4 of the UCTA applies to unreasonable indemnity 
clauses where the customer deals as a consumer. Richard Lawson writes, “in so far as an 
indemnity term seeks to provide cover for an act of negligence, it is difficult to see that any 
such could ever pass the reasonableness test.”1392 The all–encompassing clauses prevalent 
in Singapore, which indemnify the bank for claims of whatsoever nature and howsoever 
arising, are obviously vulnerable under the UCTA. It is submitted that the all–
encompassing indemnities are unreasonable and inconsistent with the proposals put 
forward here for a more balanced allocation of risk between bank and customer. 
 
10.14 Conclusiveness of Bank Records1393 
Bank statements are not the only documents that acquire conclusive effect under the T&C. 
Most of the terms considered have broad provisions deeming bank records in general or of 
                                                
1390 OCBC 38.8; HSBC 23.6. 
1391 UOB 21, E–terms 10; OCBC 27, E–terms 4.2; DBS 16, E–terms Part A 23, Part B 54; HSBC Part A 19, 
E–terms 16.c; Std Ch 11, E–terms 8.4. 
1392 Exclusion Clauses and Unfair Contract Terms (8th ed, 2005) at para 9.09. 
1393UOB 22.3, 34.9, E–terms 13(i); OCBC E–terms 2.9, 3.9; DBS 30, E–terms Part A 24, Part B 53; HSBC 
Part A 2.5, 13.7, 14.5, E–terms 8.b.; Std Ch 3.2, 35(l). 
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particular transactions, such as cash deposits, ATM, debit card, Internet and CTS 
transactions, to  be conclusive and binding against the customer. Some provide for their 
admissibility in evidence1394 and that the accuracy and authenticity of computer data will 
not be disputed on this basis.1395 The concerns addressed by these provisions include the 
absence of any other, or better, proof of transactions, the problem of falsification by the 
customer of his records, and efficiency. 
 
The UCTA clearly applies: the provisions restrict the rules of evidence, (section 13) and 
may excuse the bank’s negligence (section 2(2)) or breach of contract (section 3(2)(a)) and 
possibly entitle the bank to render performance substantially different from what is 
reasonably expected (section 3(2)(b)(i)). The provisions on conclusiveness of bank records 
add to the immunity which the T&C give to the banks and their reasonableness should be 
carefully scrutinized by the courts.  
 
DBS excludes calculation or obvious errors in records of electronic transactions other than 
Internet banking from the conclusive presumption.1396 There is no apparent reason why this 
exclusion should not apply also to Internet banking. In the United Kingdom, HSBC’s 
Personal Internet Banking Terms and Conditions contract for the evidential value of their 
records unless they are proved wrong.1397 In Singapore, HSBC’s Internet T&C provide for 
the bank’s records to prevail in the event of conflict between the bank’s records and 
information held by the customer, unless the contrary can be proved. Although the burden 
                                                
1394 HSBC Part A 17.1. Electronic terms: DBS Part B 53 
1395 DBS 30. Electronic terms: DBS Part B 53 
1396 DBS E–terms, Part A 24, Part B 53. 
1397 HSBC (UK) Personal T&C E–terms 7. 
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of proof may detract from these provisions,1398 they are commended for acknowledging the 
customer’s legitimate interests. It is submitted that banks can reasonably be expected to 
concede the correctness of their records in the face of evidence to the contrary and in the 
case of obvious or calculation error.   
 
A presumption in favour of bank records for ATM deposits is necessary. The customer 
keys in the amount he is depositing but the bank has no means at that stage of verifying that 
cash or cheques to that value have indeed been received by them. It is essential therefore 
that banks verify the amount deposited. It is reasonable for these deposit records to have 
deemed validity subject to clear evidence from the customer to the contrary. Provisions for 
the conclusivity of electronic transactions are consistent with the general approach of the 
T&C in this area, as discussed above. 
 
10.15 Variation Clauses1399  
As a general contractual principle, contracts cannot be unilaterally amended. This is 
illustrated by Burnett v Westminster Bank.1400 As a result of computerisation, the bank 
introduced a term into the contract that the account details in pre–printed cheques could not 
be altered by the customer. The new term was printed on the cover of the cheque book. 
Mocatta J held that notice of this change in terms had not adequately been given to the 
customer and was accordingly not effective. 
 
                                                
1398 See the discussion of the effect of the burden of proof in chapter 11.2 below. 
1399 UOB 28.1–2, E–terms 13(b); OCBC 32, E–terms 4.4; DBS 28, E–terms Part A 31, Part B 61; HSBC Part 
A 22.1–2, E–terms 13(f); Std Ch 22, E–terms 12. 
1400 [1966] 1 QB 742. 
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Banks therefore contract for the right to vary the T&C, with provision for notice to be given 
to the customer. The right to vary the T&C is very important to the bank and is invoked 
relatively often. The T&C all provide that a customer, by continuing to operate the account 
after notice of the proposed changes, is deemed to have consented to them.1401 Such a 
provision essentially articulates the general law which would in any event apply. In 
Burnett, where there was no express agreement for the particular changes in the terms but 
the customer had continued to use his cheque book, the argument of deemed consent failed 
on the facts as the court found that inadequate notice of the change had been given to the 
customer; the customer’s conduct could not therefore be taken as acquiescence.  
 
The steps taken to bring the variations to the customer’s attention are important and should 
be dealt with in the T&C. This is done by all the banks under consideration.1402 Where 
there are separate electronic terms, the incorporation of the general terms (which contain 
the notification procedure) into the electronic terms should be sufficient. Although the 
customer is not ordinarily involved in the process of varying the terms, by continuing to 
operate his account after notice of proposed changes, he signifies his consent to the 
variations. If he does not consent he may decline to continue the relationship and close the 
account. As such, variations to the T&C, although not achieved by negotiation, are 
arguably achieved by consent, manifested by the customer’s subsequent acquiescence, 
although he cannot insist on any other terms.  
 
                                                
1401 UOB 28.2; OCBC 32.2, E–terms 4.4.2; DBS 28.3, E–terms Part A 31, Part B 61; HSBC Part A 22.2; Std 
Ch 22.1, E–terms 12.2. 
1402 UOB 28.1, E–terms 13(e); OCBC 32.3, E–terms 4.4.4; DBS 28.2, E–terms DBS Part B 61; HSBC Part A 
22.2, E–terms 13(f); Std Ch 22.1, E–terms 12.1. 
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Variation clauses are commonplace and have gained general acceptance in contract law but 
they are potentially problematic. Cranston says they may be void for vagueness1403 
although Chitty1404 and Treitel1405 agree that they are legitimate. Cranston refers to the 
Australian case of Kabwand Pty Ltd & Ors v National Bank of Australia Ltd,1406 which 
concerned a provision entitling the bank, in its sole discretion, to vary the interest rate of a 
loan in conformity with general movements in the bank’s interest rates. On appeal, the Full 
Court of the Federal Court of Australia held that the clause was not void for uncertainty. A 
significant factor for the court was the stipulation that variations would conform with 
general movements, thereby applying an objective market standard. The court did not 
express a view on an unfettered right to vary interest rates.  
 
In Lombard Tricity Finance Ltd v Paton,1407 the English Court of Appeal, considering an 
agreement governed by the Consumer Credit Act 1974, held that in general it was unusual 
for an agreement to provide for unilateral variation by one party in his discretion and to the 
detriment of the other, and clear words would be required to achieve this.1408  
 
In Paragon Finance plc v Staunton and Nash,1409 the same court implied a term into a 
mortgage agreement that a contractual discretion given to the mortgagee to vary the interest 
rate would not be exercised “dishonestly”, “capriciously”, “arbitrarily”, “for an improper 
                                                
1403 Ross Cranston Principles of Banking Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 2002), 146. 
1404 HG Beale (Gen Ed) Chitty on Contracts (29th ed, 2 vols, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004) vol 1 para 
22–039. 
1405 G H Treitel The Law of Contract (11th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003), 58: “a term, by which 
interest rates are expressed to be variable on notification by the creditor, is perfectly valid”. 
1406 (1989) ATPR 40–950. 
1407 [1989] 1 All ER 918. 
1408 [1989] 1 All ER 918 at 923. 
1409 [2002] 2 All ER 248. 
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purpose” or unreasonably in the limited sense that no reasonable lender would act in that 
way.1410 This implication was made on the basis of the expectations of the parties, an 
implication of fact. The variation clause itself is probably not subject to adjudication under 
the UCTA but a variation facilitated by such a clause may be challenged if it has any of the 
effects targeted by the UCTA.  
 
10.16 Limitation Period  
Clauses altering limitation periods do not directly affect the allocation of risk between bank 
and customer for unauthorised debits, but they affect the customer’s ability to enforce his 
rights. Unresolved grievances can ultimately only be brought to a head by recourse to the 
courts.1411 In Singapore, a customer would ordinarily have a period of six years from the 
date of the cause of action arising to bring a claim against his bank.1412 In the case of 
contractual claims, the cause of action arises when the breach occurs. Some T&C contract 
out of this period and replace it with a shorter period, such as one year.1413  
 
Based on Judith Prakash J’s comments in Press Automation Technology Pte Ltd v Translink 
Exhibition Forwarding Pte Ltd,1414 this is a “substantial restriction” of the customer’s 
rights. Section 3 of the UCTA applies. The onus of proving reasonableness is on the bank. 
In Press Automation, Prakash J accepted that a time bar was in accordance with the local 
                                                
1410 Ibid. 
1411 The dispute resolution procedures outlined in the Singapore Banking Code do not apply in all areas of 
dispute, there is for example a monetary limit on the size of claims and even if available, the customer 
may prefer to have his complaint dealt with in a court of law.  
1412 Section 6, Limitation Act, Cap 163. 
1413 UOB 25.2; Std Ch 11.9. 
1414 [2003] 1 SLR 712 at 730. 
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and international practice of freight forwarders.1415 This was not determinative of the 
matter, however, as the reasonableness of the provision in the contract in question had to be 
decided. Two specific arguments in support of reasonableness were made: first, that the 
time bar was necessary to allow for a right of recourse against the third party carrier in the 
event of a claim by the client, and second, to enable the carrier to obtain reasonable 
insurance rates. Prakash J found, however, that neither circumstance was proved and the 
clause was not, therefore, reasonable. She did not indicate whether, if proved, those two 
circumstances would have justified the clause. This decision suggests that the time bar in 
bank contracts may be unreasonable.1416 
 
It is submitted that the verification and conclusive evidence clause, which ousts the general 
law on limitation, is justified and reasonable for the reasons submitted earlier.1417 
                                                
1415 Ibid. 
1416 Each case depends on its own facts, see Press Automation Technology Pte Ltd v Translink Exhibition 
Forwarding Pte Ltd [ 2003] 1 SLR 712 at 727. 
1417 Chapter 7.2–7.3 above. 
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Chapter 11: Electronic Banking 
 
Electronic banking involves the use of technology, particularly computer technology, in the 
delivery of banking services.1418 It is evident from bank websites that customers are 
encouraged to make use of this new means of operating their bank accounts. The Electronic 
Transactions Act,1419 although excluded from application in some areas of banking,1420 
demonstrates the legislature’s support for the trend toward automation. Electronic banking 
facilities in Singapore include ATM machines, Internet banking, debit cards, EFTPOS1421 
and telephone banking. A common denominator is the use of codes to gain access to the 
facility.  
 
The typical clauses in bank T&C that have been discussed above1422 apply also to 
electronic banking but electronic banking poses particular challenges not raised by 
traditional banking methods. It is therefore warranted to consider the subject separately. 
Electronic banking has become a specialist subject and to a large extent it cannot be 
addressed without a reference to the evolving technology which underpins it. It is beyond 
the scope of this study to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the issues. The focus here 
will be on the allocation of risk for electronic banking as manifested in the T&C, 
particularly in the context of ATM and Internet banking.  
 
                                                
1418 See David Hay (Gen Ed) Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore “Finance and Banking” vol 12 (Lexis Nexis 
Singapore, 2002) para 140.617. 
1419 Cap 88. 
1420 Most notably, cheques. See section 4(1)(b). 
1421 Electronic funds transfer at point of sale. 
1422 In chapters 4 and 10 above. 
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The treatment of electronic banking in the T&C varies. UOB,1423 HSBC1424 and Standard 
Chartered1425 deal with ATM cards in the general T&C and have separate T&C for Internet 
banking. OCBC and DBS have separate T&C for all their electronic services. The 
following additional electronic T&C will be referred to:1426  
• UOB’s “Terms and Conditions of UOB Personal Internet Banking Access” 
11/20061427 
• OCBC’s “Terms and Conditions Governing Electronic Banking Services – Personal”, 
November 20061428  
• DBS’s “Terms and Conditions Governing Electronic Services”, July 20071429 
• HSBC’s “Terms and Conditions for online@hsbc Personal Internet Banking”, 
20071430 
• Standard Chartered’s “Electronic Banking Terms and Conditions”, 6 November 
2006. 
 
Reference will be made to the following electronic banking T&C in England: 
• HSBC’s “Personal Internet Banking Terms and Conditions”,1431 undated 
• HSBC’s “Business Internet Banking Terms and Conditions”,1432 2007 
• Halifax’s “Fraud Guarantee”1433 and “Online Service Conditions” 
                                                
1423 UOB 3.3, 14, 15, 33, 34. 
1424 HSBC Part A 13, 14. 
1425 Std Ch 35. 









• Barclays Bank’s Online Banking Guarantee1434 
 
Provisions governing risk allocation for electronic banking reflect concern about two main, 
overlapping issues: authenticity and verification of mandate on the one hand, and system 
integrity, failure and faults on the other.  
 
11.1 Authenticity and Verification of the Mandate 
Concerns about authenticity and verification of mandate give rise to rules aimed at 
regulating the customer’s conduct. For example, terms include the duty to safeguard the 
means of access to the electronic facility, whether it be an ATM card, password, username, 
PIN or other code.1435 In all e–banking, the customer’s contact with the bank is impersonal. 
The traditional form of mandate and the traditional forms of verification of mandate are 
accordingly not available. In their place come different combinations of a plastic card, PIN 
number, username and password. More recently, at the instigation of the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore,1436 Singapore has seen the introduction of an additional tier of 
security for Internet banking, the so–called two– or second–factor authentication (2FA). 
This is a one–time password generated by a hardware device furnished to the customer by 
the bank or notified to the customer via his mobile phone.  
 
The problem with all the electronic forms of mandate is that they are remote from the 
customer and can be used by anybody getting access to them. Whereas, in theory at least, a 




1435 UOB 15.1 E–terms 2.1(a), 2.1(e); OCBC E–terms 1.2, 2.2, 3.2, 3A.3; DBS E–terms Part A 2; Part B 15; 
HSBC Part A 15, E–terms 3.g, 10.b, 10.c; Std Ch 34.1, 35(d), E–terms 3.3. 
1436 MAS circular no. SRD TR 02/2005. 
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forged signature is detectable because of execution by a different hand, a fraudulent use of 
somebody else’s card, PIN, password, etc., so long as they match, is not objectively 
detectable. Even the recently introduced 2FA cannot prevent all forms of unauthorised use. 
Anybody possessed of the customer’s username and PIN for Internet banking with access 
to the customer’s hardware device or mobile phone (most likely a member of the 
customer’s household or an employee) will be able to access the Internet banking facility. 
Because of this, Geva writes that this form of authentication is more akin to a seal than a 
signature.1437 His point is valid but it must be noted that this is the form of the mandate for 
electronic banking purposes. Concern among banks about the potential for loss in these 
situations is warranted and they justifiably impose an obligation on the customer to 
safeguard the means of access. Specific examples of safeguards are to memorise the codes 
and certainly not to record them recklessly, not to divulge them to anybody and to log out 
when leaving the computer used for Internet access. These are commonly referred to as the 
customer’s security duties in the T&C.1438 
 
These duties are analogous to the Macmillan duty. A customer who carelessly keeps his 
ATM card and PIN together in circumstances where others can get access to them is 
analogous to a customer who signs the cheques in his cheque book in blank.1439 The latter is 
in breach of the Macmillan duty. Such provisions are not only reasonable; they are 
necessary and are in compliance with the Monetary Authority of Singapore’s 
                                                
1437 Benjamin Geva  “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 
207 at 229. 
1438 See e.g. HSBC E–terms 3, Std Ch E–terms 3.3, 3.5–3.7. 
1439 Martin Karmel “Procedure and Evidence: The Maintenance of Transaction Records: Proving the State of 
Account in EFT Transactions” in R M Goode (ed) Electronic Banking – The Legal Implications (London, 
The Institute of Bankers and Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, University of 
London, 1985) 45 at 52. 
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requirements.1440 The potential for loss is great and many of the safeguards lie within the 
control of the customer. There are safeguards which fall within the ambit of the bank’s duty 
of care; they include daily and monthly withdrawal limits, encryption, denial of access 
when the incorrect code is used, usually after the third attempt, procedures designed to 
avoid interception of access codes/devices that are mailed, privacy at ATM machines to 
avoid detection of PIN’s by criminals, customer profiling, and monitoring of the integrity 
of ATM machines, but these measures cannot replace the necessity for the customer’s care 
in safeguarding the means of access. 
 
A problem with unauthorised access is the difficulty of proving whether the use of the card, 
PIN, password, username, 2FA, etc., was by the customer or authorized by him. Online 
fraudulent withdrawals will generally take the form of transfers from the target bank 
account to an account chosen by the fraudster; cash withdrawals are obviously not possible 
through online or telephone banking. The recipient account will have had to be linked to 
the target account; the fraudster might take steps to avoid the detection of his scheme, such 
as changing the account address so as to divert bank statements. So long as the sum in 
question remains within the banking system, it can be traced and potentially retrieved with 
the necessary legal procedures, but once withdrawn, the chances of recovery deteriorate.  
 
Martin Karmel, in 1985, commented that the PIN system might not be the best and that 
signature or voice recognition systems might be better.1441 Two years earlier, J R S Revell 
                                                
1440 See, e.g., MAS Internet Banking Technology Risk Management Guidelines June 2003, cl 9.0.3. 
1441 Martin Karmel “Procedure and Evidence: The Maintenance of Transaction Records: Proving the State of 
Account in EFT Transactions”, 45 at 52. 
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wrote, “PINs are most unsatisfactory security devices”.1442 Today, more than twenty years 
later, the PIN system continues to be a major basis for authentication in electronic banking. 
Karmel points out, in the context of ATM banking, that where the customer has negligently 
facilitated the unauthorised use of his card, for instance by writing his PIN number on the 
card, the bank would in theory be able to allege a breach of the Macmillan duty; in practice, 
the bank would, in most cases, have a problem proving the necessary facts. It is for this 
reason that wide exclusions of liability for electronic banking transactions are prevalent. 
 
All the T&C analysed in this study reflect a concern about authority and authenticity of the 
mandate. It is not uncommon for the T&C to make the customer liable for any losses 
arising from access to e–facilities using the correct codes.1443 Some provisions deem all 
transactions using the electronic facility to be with the customer’s authority;1444 a variant is 
that the customer contracts to bear any loss occasioned by use of the facility;1445 or the 
customer is made responsible for all instructions given electronically;1446 another version is 
that all withdrawals by electronic channels bind the customer and discharge the bank of 
liability;1447 and the customer is precluded from making a claim/disputing the 
transaction.1448 The bank may take an indemnity for carrying out instructions that are 
                                                
1442 J R S Revell Banking and Electronic Fund Transfers (Paris, OECD, 1983), 86. See a similar statement in 
the Jack Report (Banking Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee Feb, 1989), at 
para 10.06, page 83. 
1443 UOB 3.3, 15.1, 15.3, E–terms 2.1(a), 2.1(c), 2.2(a), 7(b)(i), 7(b)x; OCBC E–terms 1.3, 1.7, 2.3, 2.7, 3.3, 
3.6; DBS E–terms Part A–11; Part B 20, 21; HSBC Part A 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, E–terms 4.b.; Std Ch 34.2, 
35(f), E–terms 4.1, 8.2.1.  
1444 E.g., OCBC E–terms 1.3, 2.3, 3.3; DBS E–terms Part B 20; HSBC Part A 13.5; 
1445 E.g., HSBC Part A 13.6.  
1446 UOB 15.1, E–terms 2.1(c); OCBC E–terms 1.7, 2.7, 3.6; DBS E–terms Part A 11; Part B 20; Std Ch 34.2.  
1447 UOB 3.3; OCBC E–terms 1.3, 2.3, 3.3; DBS E–terms Part B 21. 
1448 UOB E–terms 2.1(a), 2.1(c); DBS E–terms Part A 11. 
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unauthorised or imperfect.1449 These terms are supported by provisions that bank records of 
transactions are conclusive against the customer.1450 The exclusions of liability discussed 
here do not hinge on proving a breach of the customer’s duties of care because of evidential 
difficulties. In summary the customer may have to bear the loss in circumstances where he 
has not facilitated an unauthorised withdrawal.  
 
In Geva’s view, liability for the customer on the basis that the bank has adhered to its 
security procedure is unfair because of the difficulty the customer will have to prove that he 
did not give the instruction.1451 The evidential problems in electronic banking reinforce the 
arguments in chapter 7.3 above in favour of a verification and notification duty. The 
benefits of loss detection, particularly to facilitate mitigation and prevention of further 
losses, cannot be underestimated. 
 
HSBC (Singapore) and Standard Chartered (Singapore) make significant concessions. In 
HSBC’s terms for personal Internet banking, clause 10, titled “Your Liability for 
Unauthorised Transactions”, states that the customer will not be liable for “direct loss” 
unless: he has been fraudulent or grossly negligent1452 or if he has allowed a third party to 
use any of his access codes1453 or contributed to the loss, e.g., by failing to observe the 
security measures required of customers.1454 The customer’s potential liability for 
unauthorised transactions is also clearly drawn to his attention in the T&C at the beginning 
                                                
1449 UOB 21.1(a), E–terms 10(a)(ii); OCBC E–terms 4.2; DBS E–terms Part B 54; HSBC E–terms 16.c.; Std 
Ch 11.1.4.  
1450 UOB 13(i); OCBC E–terms 2.9, 3.9; DBS E–terms Part A–24, Part B 53; HSBC 13.7; Std Ch 35l. 
1451 Benjamin Geva “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 
207 at 237. 
1452 HSBC E–terms 10a. 
1453 HSBC E–terms 10b. 
1454 HSBC E–terms 10c. 
 292
of the document. It is submitted that the words “direct loss” are used to exclude 
consequential losses. The bank’s liability for consequential losses is specifically excluded 
elsewhere.1455 Clause 10 also states that the customer will not be liable for losses caused by 
the fraud or negligence of bank staff, system fault, a crime which should have been 
prevented by the bank’s risk control measures and other loss not contributed to by the 
customer.1456 Standard Chartered makes similar concessions.1457 
 
In the United Kingdom, HSBC’s Personal Internet Banking Terms and Conditions provide 
that the bank may act on all “apparently valid instructions”1458 but if the customer did not 
facilitate the loss (fraudulently or negligently1459) the amount in question, along with 
interest and charges will be reimbursed.1460 A breach of the specified security duties,1461 
such as safeguarding of access codes, ATM cards, etc., will be negligence facilitating the 
transaction. The terms for business customers are less generous. HSBC’s Business Internet 
Banking Terms and Conditions in the United Kingdom exclude bank liability except in 
instances of gross negligence or wilful misconduct by the bank;1462 the bank’s liability is 
subject to limits per transaction and per year. Consequential losses are excluded.1463 The 
contrast between this treatment of personal and business customers reflects a widespread 
view that more onerous terms for business customers are justified. 
                                                
1455 HSBC E–terms 9aii. 
1456 HSBC E–terms 10e. 
1457 Std Ch E–terms 4.4 and 4.5 state that the customer will not be liable for misuse of the password where the 
customer proves that he adhered to his security duties or where, inter alia, the bank has breached its 
commitment to provide a secure system, as stated in cl 8.1. 
1458 HSBC UK Personal E–terms 3.1. 
1459 “acted without reasonable care”. 
1460 HSBC UK E–terms 4.1–4.2. 
1461 HSBC UK Personal E–terms 2. 
1462 HSBC UK Business E–terms 14.1. 
1463 HSBC UK Business E–terms 14.1. 
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Halifax Plc provides that the customer is responsible for online transactions using the 
correct access codes unless fraudulent.1464 In addition, the bank tenders an “Online Fraud 
Guarantee” on its website as follows: “If a customer of our online service is a victim of 
online fraud, we guarantee that they won't lose any money from their account, and will 
always be reimbursed in full.”1465 There is no qualification that the customer must not have 
facilitated the withdrawal. 
 
Barclays Bank also tenders an “Online Banking Guarantee” for customers who “innocently 
suffer Internet fraud”.1466 The qualifications are similar to those used by HSBC in 
Singapore, in Clause 10, including reasonable care and compliance with standard security 
practices. 
 
Halifax and Barclays may tender their online fraud guarantees to encourage use of online 
banking and confidence in the services. References to the “unlikely event” of fraud in both 
guarantees suggest that they are the outcome of cost–benefit analyses and assessments of 
the risk of fraudulent withdrawals.1467 There is an obvious benefit to banks from increased 
use of electronic services. A large–scale shift of customer banking activity to the Internet, 
coupled with use of the ATM network for cash withdrawals, will reduce bank overheads 
such as staff and high street premises.  
 
                                                
1464 Clause 4b, c, d Online Service Conditions. 
1465 http://www.halifax.co.uk/SecurityandPrivacy/onlinefraudguarantee.asp 
1466 http://www.personal.barclays.co.uk/BRC1/jsp/brccontrol?task=homefreegroup&value= 
      13491&target=_self&site=pfs 
1467 http://www.halifax.co.uk/SecurityandPrivacy/onlinefraudguarantee.asp 
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The question arises why UK banks can offer electronic banking to customers on more 
generous terms than the majority of the Singapore banks studied here. One would expect 
the risk to be no greater in Singapore than in the United Kingdom. Chris Reed suggests an 
answer: when electronic banking was first introduced in the United Kingdom, “banks 
adopted a conservative risk management approach to this new technology.”1468 It was not 
unusual, he goes on, to find terms placing all liability for transactions using the correct 
codes, on the customer.1469 The similarity with the current trend in Singapore is striking. In 
Reed’s view some of the terms may have fallen foul of the UCTA but they were never 
challenged.1470 It then became clear, “that such a conservative approach to the allocation of 
risks … could not continue, because the early contracts were far too one–sided.”1471 
Pressure for change came in the form of a European Commission Recommendation in 
1988, followed by the Jack Report in 19891472 and a government White Paper in 1990,1473 
which suggested a solution in the form of a Code of Practice. The United Kingdom 
Banking Code1474 followed. This states that unless the bank can prove fraud or a failure to 





                                                
1468 Chris Reed, Ian Walden and Laura Edgar (Editors) Cross–Border Electronic Banking: Challenges and 
Opportunities (2nd ed, LLP London, 2000), 156. 
1469 Ibid, 156. 
1470 Ibid. 
1471 Ibid. 
1472 Banking Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee, CM 622 (HMSO, London, 1989), 
chapters 9–10. 
1473 Banking Services: Law and Practice Cm 1026 (HMSO, London, 1990). 
1474 Discussed in chapter 2.3 above. 
1475 The Banking Code, March 2005, cl 12.11–12.12.  
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11.2 The Burden of Proof 
In some, perhaps most, online frauds it is not possible to objectively conclude that a 
withdrawal was fraudulent. The main source of such information would be the subjective 
assertion of the customer that a withdrawal was not made by him. Banks are vulnerable to 
false allegations of fraud by customers. Karmel’s article discusses apparently inexplicable 
ATM withdrawals from places remote from the cardholder who swears he was at all times 
in possession of his card.1476 The majority of these cases, he says, are probably the 
unauthorised activity of somebody linked to the customer; nevertheless, the possibility of 
system error or unrelated third party tampering cannot be excluded.  
 
The incidence of the burden of proof where a customer alleges an unauthorised debit is 
particularly significant in the context of electronic banking because of the dearth of 
evidence. Benjamin Geva says that the bank must prove that it was entitled to debit the 
customer’s account.1477 This means, in the context of an ATM withdrawal, proof that it 
verified the PIN and that the card used was genuine; in addition, the bank must prove the 
adequacy of the security procedure and the absence of negligence by the bank.1478  
 
The Evidence Act1479 applies to judicial proceedings in Singapore. Section 104 states: “The 
burden of proof in a suit or proceedings lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at 
                                                
1476 Martin Karmel “Procedure and Evidence: The Maintenance of Transaction Records: Proving the State of 
Account in EFT Transactions” in R M Goode (editor) Electronic Banking – The Legal Implications 
(London, The Institute of Bankers and Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, 
University of London, 1985) 45 at 50–51. 
1477 “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” Benjamin Geva (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 
207 at 232 et seq. Chris Reed expresses a similar view, see Joseph J Norton, Chris Reed and Ian Walden 
(Eds) Cross–Border Electronic Banking: Challenges and Opportunities (1st ed, London, LLP, 1995), 85. 
1478 Geva “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” 232. 
1479 Cap 97. 
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all were given on either side.” Section 105 puts the burden of proof of particular facts on 
the person who wishes the court to believe their existence. Section 108 puts the burden of 
proving facts especially within the knowledge of one party, on that party.  
 
Jeffrey Pinsler, in his book on the law of evidence in Singapore, writes: “In civil cases the 
incidence of the burden of proof is primarily determined by the pleadings which reflect and 
formulate the … issues”.1480 The facts which are not admitted, and therefore remain in 
issue, must be proved by the plaintiff.1481 The burden of proof must be distinguished from 
the burden to adduce evidence, which may oscillate between the parties according to the 
effect of the evidence that has been led.1482 Pinsler points out that the drafting of the 
pleadings can affect the incidence of the burden of proof.1483 In a simple bank–customer 
dispute, the customer may plead the existence of the contract with the bank and the term of 
the agreement that debits will be made from the account only with a valid mandate. The 
bank would admit this. The customer may plead, furthermore, that the debit was made 
without a mandate. This, the customer may have to prove, unless the bank pleads that it 
paid with a mandate, in which case it is conceivable that the burden of proof may be the 
bank’s. Furthermore, if the bank pleads a breach by the customer of his duties, the bank 
may be required to prove that.  
 
                                                




1483 Ibid, at 251. 
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In Yogambikai Nagarajah v Indian Overseas Bank,1484 the Singapore Court of Appeal held 
that the burden of proving forgery was on the party alleging it, and that the required 
standard of proof is a higher degree of probability than the ordinary civil standard, albeit 
not as high as the criminal standard,1485 following Hornal v Neuberger Products.1486 It 
appears that the customer in Tai Hing Cotton Mill was put to the proof of the alleged 
fraud.1487 An allegation of fraud in the context of an unauthorised debit will invariably 
emanate from the customer; from this it seems that the customer will bear the burden of 
proof. Indeed, in Khoo Tian Hock, the court applied the authority of Yogambikai to require 
the customer to prove the forgeries.1488 In Ri Jong Son v Development Bank of Singapore 
Ltd,1489 a joint account holder claimed that his signature had been forged by the other 
account holder and he sought a declaration that the debit was without authority. The bank 
denied these allegations. It is apparent that the customer bore the onus of proof.1490 
 
This analysis of the position in Singapore suggests that the onus of proof will mostly be on 
the plaintiff customer. Assuming, however, that the burden is on the bank, it would have to 
prove on a balance of probabilities that the debit was authorized. In the context of 
electronic banking, compliance with the mandate will not be difficult for the bank to 
demonstrate, although the bank may in addition be required to prove that its security 
                                                
1484 [1997] 1 SLR 258. 
1485 Ibid, at 269 et seq. Note, however, in Tong Yoke Kheng (trading as Niklex Supply Co) v Lek Benedict and 
others [2005] 3 SLR 263 at 274 - 275 the Singapore Court of Appeal stated that the burden of proof in 
civil cases is a balance of probabilities even in cases of fraud but the more serious the allegations, the 
more the assertor will have to do to establish them. 
1486 [1957] 1 QB 247. 
1487 See the judgment of Cons J in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 568 et seq. 
1488 Khoo Tian Hock & Anor v Oversea–Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (Khoo Siong Hui, Third Party) 
[2000] 4 SLR 676 at 681. 
1489 [1998] 3 SLR 64 
1490 Ibid, at 71. This was on a higher standard as is “needed to support a claim of forgery.” 
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procedures are sound and in ATM transactions that the card which was used was the 
customer’s authentic card.1491 Geva concedes that it is “debatable how far the financial 
institution ought to go in making its case.”1492 Although he does not elaborate, it seems that 
he is acknowledging that at a certain point, the bank will have adduced sufficient evidence 
to cast an evidential burden on the customer to refute evidence that the bank acted in 
accordance with a mandate. In many cases the customer may only have his own evidence 
denying that the mandate emanated from him, unless he has knowledge of where the lapse 
occurred, in which case it may point to a breach of his duties to safeguard the means of 
access to the account.  
 
In these disputes, the customer cannot escape the need to prove his claim to a certain extent, 
either in the form of the burden of proof, perhaps requiring a higher standard than a balance 
of probabilities, or an evidential burden. The assessment of the customer’s credibility will 
be key to the acceptance of his evidence.  
 
The requirements of proof may detract from the value of the concessions made by HSBC 
and Standard Chartered.1493 Nevertheless, they represent a more customer–friendly position 
than a provision deeming all transactions using the correct codes to be authorized. They 
recognize that there are circumstances in which the customer could be the blameless victim 
of fraud, and give the customer a chance to prove that.  
                                                
1491 It seems that this may not be difficult in the case of online (as opposed to offline) transactions, see Joseph 
J Norton, Chris Reed and Ian Walden (Eds) Cross–Border Electronic Banking: Challenges and 
Opportunities (1st ed, London, LLP, 1995), p83. 
1492 Geva “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” 232. 
1493 Std Ch E–terms 4.4 makes it clear that the customer, to escape liability for unauthorized instructions 
emanating from a third person, must prove to the satisfaction of the bank that, inter alia they adhered to 
the security procedures stipulated. 
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HSBC’s T&C governing ATM cards in Singapore contrast with their online banking T&C. 
The former, like the other Singapore banks studied here, reflect anxiety about unauthorised 
transactions using the ATM card. All transactions effected using the card are deemed to be 
authorised by the customer;1494 all losses arising in connection with the use of the card are 
to be borne by the customer;1495 the bank may debit the account with any withdrawals and 
transfers made with the card, irrespective of the customer’s authority and knowledge of the 
transactions.1496  It is not obvious why HSBC’s approach to ATM banking should differ so 
much from that for Internet banking. Could it be that the bank has empirical evidence to the 
effect that unauthorised debits are more prevalent through the ATM than on the Internet? 
Perhaps Internet banking fraud requires a greater level of expertise; the inability to extract 
cash directly through the Internet is another possibility; the greater number of security tiers, 
username, password, 2FA for Internet banking compared with only a password (once 
possession of the ATM card has been obtained) for ATM banking is another consideration.  
 
11.3 Risk Allocation Alternatives 
Absent fraud or negligence (“without reasonable care”) by the customer, all the United 
Kingdom T&C consulted here state that the customer is not liable, or his liability is limited 
to 50 pounds, for unauthorised card transactions.1497 This is consistent with The Banking 
                                                
1494 HSBC Terms and conditions governing personal deposit accounts, 1 December 2006, Part A, cl 13.5. 
1495 Ibid, cl 13.6. 
1496 Ibid, cl 13.7. 
1497 See e.g. Barclays 3.3–3.5; NatWest General Conditions, section A, cl 13.10; HSBC (UK) Personal T&C, 
Section 2, cl 9.3; Halifax 10, 14–17.  
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Code to which these banks subscribe.1498 Customers are, of course, required to comply with 
their security duties.  
 
Geva has made the following loss allocation proposal: 1499 
1. The customer is liable for fraudulent withdrawals in which he is complicit and 
authorized withdrawals. His definition of “authorized” would include cases where the 
customer caused or contributed to the loss through fault. The burden of proof is on 
the bank. 
2. The customer is liable on a no–fault basis for unauthorised debits up to a minimum 
amount, provided the bank can prove its compliance with verification procedures. 
This will promote diligence by the customer and take account of the usual inability to 
prove where the security breach arose. 
3. The balance of the loss is to be borne by the bank. 
4. A verification and notification duty is imposed on the customer. Failure to comply 
can lead to customer liability.  
 
The verification duty is the main difference between Geva’s proposal and the prevailing 
position in the United Kingdom.  
 
Geva acknowledges that while banks may prima facie be justified in passing the risk for 
properly authenticated but unauthorised transfers to the customer, he says there are a 
number of factors which detract from that conclusion: the large losses which the customer 
                                                
1498 UK Banking Code, March 2005, section 12.12. 
1499 Geva “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 207 at 239 
et seq and 278. 
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may have to bear, the virtues of loss distribution, negligence by either bank or customer and 
the bank’s responsibility for facilitating an insecure system.1500 Some of these 
considerations have been discussed in the context of the verification and conclusive 
evidence clause and the need for a broader duty of care.1501 The points concerning bank 
negligence and facilitating a risky system need to be considered. In Geva’s view they are 
related: in the context of electronic banking where authentication is impersonal, bank 
negligence is likely to consist in failure to implement adequately secure systems and 
procedures.1502 This is the second major concern reflected in the T&C. 
 
11.4 System Integrity, Failure and Faults 
The bank’s duty of care to the customer1503 extends to the provision of electronic banking 
services. The duty requires, inter alia, that banks offering electronic services set up a safe 
system. Whether the bank has discharged this aspect of its duty will be judged with 
reference to a wide range of factors including the technological capabilities of the time, 
identified vulnerabilities, customer education and information on electronic banking and 
cost. The bank’s responsibility in this area is reinforced by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore1504 and the Singapore Banking Code, which states: “Your bank will ensure that 
its banking systems are reliable and secure.”1505  
 
                                                
1500 Benjamin Geva  “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 
207 at 229. 
1501 See chapter 4.4 above. 
1502 Ibid, at 231. 
1503 See discussion in chapter 1.5 above. 
1504 Monetary Authority of Singapore statements, circulars and notices on Internet banking are numerous. See, 
for example, MAS Policy Statement on Internet Banking, 9 July 2000; MAS “Internet Banking 
Technology Risk Management Guidelines”, June 2003. 
1505 Code of Consumer Banking Practice, Sep 2002, cl 3.d.iii, 18. 
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In the United Kingdom, Halifax tells the customer: “We do all we can to protect you 
online”1506 and “we are committed to looking after your money”.1507 The security measures 
employed are detailed on the website.1508 In Singapore, OCBC for example, on its website, 
takes a more guarded position: it explains that there are risks inherent in the system, theft of 
access codes and fraudulent transactions are mentioned as examples of such risks. This is 
followed by a warning that while OCBC takes security measures to safeguard against these 
risks, it is “unable to guarantee the complete security of your transactions against any 
attacks from malicious programs.”1509 DBS Internet banking T&C contain an 
acknowledgement by the customer of the “internet–related risks” which are listed as: 
inadequate technical knowledge, failure to take safety measures, monitoring by third 
parties, third party access, viruses, and other similar threats.1510 It is regrettable that these 
risks are buried in the body of the T&C rather than being highlighted at the beginning of 
the document. Bank websites are ideal platforms for giving customers the necessary 
information on electronic banking. It is desirable that customers are informed of the risks 
associated with the service.  
 
Customer education is an important aspect of electronic banking security and of the bank’s 
duty. The bank’s responsibility for customer education is recognized by the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore1511 and Singapore banks are clearly conscious of their responsibility 
for educating customers. For example, in the context of Internet banking, their websites 




1509 “Benefits and Risks of Internet Banking” at https://www.ocbc.com/internet–banking/ 
1510 DBS E–terms Part B 36. 
1511 See, for example, Monetary Authority of Singapore Annual Report 2003/2004, Box 9; “Internet Banking 
Technology Risk Management Guidelines”, June 2003. 
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give instruction on proper logging out procedures, cache clearing, changing passwords 
regularly, alerts on phishing; ATM cards are accompanied by instructions not to store the 
card and the PIN in the same place, to memorise the PIN rather than write it down and 
customers are warned to be on the lookout for ATM machines that have been tampered 
with.  
 
Last year1512 OCBC had an alert on its website for ATM skimming devices. This, it 
explained, is an unauthorised physical device placed over part of the ATM machine; it is 
used to obtain information from cards inserted into the ATM machine which facilitates 
counterfeit card production, sale of personal information and credit card fraud. If used in 
conjunction with a camera device, PIN details may be gleaned, enabling unauthorised 
withdrawals. While the website attempts to educate customers on how to identify these 
devices and warns them not to use affected machines, this information would not come to 
the attention of all ATM users and even among those who see it, some may not recognize 
the device. Despite the customer’s innocence in such circumstances, provisions deeming 
access to be authorized because the correct codes were used, would saddle the customer 
with liability.  
 
This highlights circumstances in which such provisions operate harshly against the 
customer. The bank is responsible for the maintenance and integrity of the systems it makes 
available to customers. Other than being vigilant about patent system tampering or 
malfunction, there is nothing the customer can do to prevent such problems. Banks are in a 
better position to identify system faults and tampering than the customer. In the United 
                                                
1512 March 2007. 
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Kingdom, Halifax informs customers that they monitor and analyse online transactions 24 
hours a day.1513 The same can be expected in Singapore. Unlike banks with a wide ATM 
network in larger countries like the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, banks in 
Singapore operate in a very limited geographical area. Frequent physical inspection, 
installation of security cameras and monitoring of transaction and other data, are, it is 
submitted, duties that customers can reasonably expect banks in Singapore to undertake.  
 
With proper monitoring by banks, overt criminal activity such as skimming devices should 
not succeed, and it is reasonable to expect banks to bear losses arising from such third party 
tampering unconnected with the customer. Where banks do discover evidence of third party 
tampering, it is submitted that their duty of care to customers requires them to take steps to 
alert all, or at least potentially affected customers and to ascertain whether unauthorised 
transactions have been made. New cards and access codes may have to be issued. The 
Monetary Authority of Singapore requires “an open policy of disclosure of security 
incidents” to customers.1514 
 
Electronic banking T&C reflect concern among banks about liability arising from faults 
and failures in the hardware and software of their systems; they shift this risk to customers. 
There are provisions indemnifying the bank against losses arising from system faults, 
waiving the customer’s right to claim against the bank in the event of system fault, 
excluding liability for loss from failure or non–availability of the service or equipment.1515 
                                                
1513 http://www.halifax.co.uk/securityandprivacy/technology.asp 
1514 MAS circular no. FSG 61/2001. 
1515 UOB 23.8, 25.1(b), E–terms 2.5(b), 7(b)(v), 7(b)(vi), 7(b)(xiv), 7(b)(xv), 7(b)(xvi), 8(d); OCBC 26.2(c), 
E–terms 2.8, 4.2; DBS E–terms Part A 20(c), 20(e), Part B 43, 47; Std Ch 14.3, 34.2, 35(x), E–terms 8.2.3. 
 305
HSBC, on the other hand, says that the customer will not be liable for faults in their 
systems unless they were obvious or the customer had notice of them,1516 while Standard 
Chartered excludes liability for system or equipment breakdown or failure except where 
they should have prevented them.1517 In some cases, the more general exclusions of liability 
or indemnity are broad enough to cover the risk in question. For online banking, Halifax in 
the United Kingdom has a more succinct but similar exclusion for any loss suffered where a 
communication between bank and customer is distorted, fails to reach its destination or is 
sent in error.1518 Significantly, it is subject to the fraud guarantee.  
 
Claims arising from equipment or system failure may be analysed from different 
perspectives. For example, one may seek to identify whether the bank was at fault. In the 
context of the T&C and the risk burden, it is submitted that the significant distinction lies 
not primarily in the determination of fault but in the nature of the loss. The most common 
complaint regarding equipment or system failure will be about the non–availability of the 
service; in most cases this will amount only to inconvenience to customers. At the other 
end of the scale, the non–availability of an electronic facility could give rise to a claim for 
large consequential losses owing, e.g., to the late payment of monies to a third party. The 
reasons for the failure may be attributable to the bank’s fault such as failure to maintain or 
update equipment or failure to have suitable back–up for known risks. On the other hand, 
the problem may be beyond the control of the bank, e.g., a power failure. Contractual 
doctrines such as force majeure and frustration may apply and provide the bank with 
protection in certain circumstances.  
                                                
1516 HSBC 10.e.ii. 
1517 Std Ch 8.2.3. This concession should, however, be read in conjunction with cl 8.3. 
1518 Halifax Online Service Conditions cl 4.d. and 4.e. 
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It is submitted that it is reasonable for the bank to exclude liability for consequential losses 
arising from the unavailability of the service, whether attributable to the bank’s fault or not 
except in instances of gross negligence or wilfulness on the part of the bank. In general, the 
law has reservations about liability for consequential losses and it is not unreasonable for 
banks to contract that customers bear the risk of system or equipment failure giving rise to 
such losses.1519 Of course, an alternative means of performance should be given so far as 
possible in the event of system or equipment failure, such as withdrawals from the bank 
counter when an ATM machine is out of order.  
 
In a small number of cases, presumably rare, claims may be for actual losses from the 
account because of system or equipment failure. This could arise from a programming 
deficiency or a mechanical fault. Martin Karmel1520 refers to alleged occurrences of ATM 
machines spewing out notes without being prompted to do so. The difference between this 
and the scenario discussed in the paragraph above is that here system failure results in an 
unauthorised debit to the customer’s account. Again, such losses may or may not be 
attributable to the fault of the bank. It is submitted that losses from a customer’s account 
caused by system or equipment failure, not facilitated by the customer, should in 
accordance with basic banking principles, be borne by the bank, irrespective of fault. The 
hardware and software for electronic banking services are in the custody of the bank. The 
                                                
1519 UOB 25.1 (“any loss”) but qualified by “through no fault of the bank”, E–terms 7(e);OCBC 26 (any loss 
or other consequences”), E–terms 4.2 (indemnity for any losses “whatsoever and howsoever caused”); 
DBS 6.6, 21.1 (“any loss”), E–terms Part A 22, Part B 47; HSBC 9.a.ii; Std Ch 11.3.1, 34.2, 35(w), E–
terms 8.2, but see also 8.3. 
1520 “Procedure and Evidence: The Maintenance of Transaction Records: Proving the State of Account in EFT 
Transactions” in R M Goode (editor) Electronic Banking – The Legal Implications (London, The Institute 
of Bankers and Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary College, University of London, 1985), 
45 at 51. 
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customer has no control over the systems employed, their maintenance and repair. It is 
harsh for a customer to be liable for a loss over which he has no influence.  
 
The reality, however, is that, where there has been system malfunction, it will not always 
be possible to identify genuine customer loss from a hoax. In the banks’ defence, the risk of 
unauthorised debits caused by system error or failure pales in comparison with the risk of 
unauthorised debits facilitated by the customer.1521 Nevertheless, we have seen that HSBC 
and Standard Chartered in Singapore have seen fit to contract on a more balanced basis.1522 
Consequential losses may result from the unauthorised debit, for example because of an 
inability to pay a third party. It is submitted that the exclusion of consequential losses 
which is ubiquitous in Singapore T&C should not apply in the event of the bank’s gross 
negligence or wilful default. 
 
DBS excludes liability for any loss suffered in connection with the use of Internet banking 
“howsoever caused” and notwithstanding that the bank could have anticipated or had been 
notified of the possibility of the loss.1523 It is submitted that such a clause is unreasonable 
under the UCTA. In connection with the use of other electronic services, such as telephone 
and ATM services, DBS excludes liability for loss unless attributable to the bank’s 
negligence or wilful default.1524  
 
                                                
1521 See eg UNCITRAL Legal Guide on Electronic Fund Transfers 1987: “The errors which occur as a result 
of hardware or software failure are a minute proportion of the total number of transactions.” 
1522 See discussion above on HSBC’s terms for online banking. 
1523 DBS E–terms Part B 47. 
1524 DBS E–terms Part A 20. 
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11.5 Conclusion  
The problem of proof in electronic banking prompts some banks to use sweeping 
provisions placing all the risk on the customer. Banks are vulnerable to unscrupulous 
customers alleging fraudulent or erroneous withdrawals from their account. The United 
Kingdom experience, however, does not seem to have led to an opening of the fraud 
floodgates. The 2FA used in Singapore will help to reduce the scope for fraud.1525  
 
It is submitted that the apportionment of risk in electronic banking should not differ 
markedly from that for banking in general, and the following usual provisions should 
apply: 
1. The bank is liable unless there are grounds to hold the customer liable for a loss. 
2. The customer is under a general duty of care in the conduct of his bank account. 
This will include the requirement that he comply with the security procedures for 
electronic banking. Breach may excuse the bank from liability. 
3. The customer is under a duty to verify and notify the accuracy of his bank 
statement, failing which it becomes conclusively binding on him. 
4. Losses are to be apportioned where the bank has been negligent and the customer is 
in breach of his duty of care and/or his verification duty, in accordance with the 
proposal set out above.1526 
 
                                                
1525 The notification of the second tier password by mobile phone may facilitate better verification of the 
truthfulness of a dishonest claim of fraud by a customer by having reference to the telephone records kept 
by the mobile telephone provider. 
1526 In chapter 8 above. 
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It is submitted that the following additional terms, unique to electronic banking are 
appropriate: 
1. The burden of proving a prima facie valid mandate, appropriate security procedures1527 
and the proper functioning of the system should be on the bank. The customer will 
carry an evidential burden to rebut this evidence. The outcome may depend on the 
customer’s credibility. Relevant details include, in an ATM transaction, whether the 
card is still in his possession, how and when he considers it went missing, what steps he 
took thereafter, the terminal from where the unauthorised transaction was made, the 
time of the transaction; in the case of an internet transaction, the terminal which was 
used and the time of the transaction, information relating to the 2FA tier of security, 
how it was stored, how it was breached, and telephone records if the 2FA is notified by 
telephone, information relating to people who may have obtained access such as family 
members, etc. If the bank alleges circumstances which excuse it from paying on a valid 
mandate, i.e. a breach of the general duty of care or the security duties, the burden of 
proof is on the bank. Section 108 of the Evidence Act will apply where particular 
information is within one party’s knowledge; and an argument akin to the res ipsa 
loquiter presumption may be made in some circumstances. 
2. The bank’s exposure in electronic transactions can be tempered by the imposition of 
reasonable daily, monthly and transaction limits. These may vary from individual 
customers to business customers. The customer may increase these limits but, it is 
submitted that it is reasonable to provide that any loss which would not have occurred 
                                                
1527 It is thought that this would be met by the bank demonstrating that its technology is in line with that used 
by other banks in Singapore and elsewhere. Apart from the technological safeguards, this would include 
monitoring of ATM facilities, withdrawal limits and customer profiling. 
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but for the customer’s increase of these limits will be borne by the customer except in 
the case of gross negligence or wilfulness by the bank.1528 
3. The bank will fully investigate a complaint of fraud or erroneous debiting to the 
customer’s account1529 within a stipulated time period. The findings will be shared with 
the customer along with any relevant bank records, e.g., relating to the proper 
functioning and suitability of its equipment and systems. The customer will cooperate 
fully with the bank giving it access to any information that will aid in the 
investigation.1530 Failure to do so will be relevant in determining whether the bank has 
discharged its burden.1531 Banks should set up a procedure whereby the customer is 
required to complete a form with all relevant details to initiate the investigation.  
4. The customer will not be liable for debits made after notification of a breach in the 
security of the access card/token/PIN. 
5. Consequential losses are excluded unless attributable to the bank’s gross negligence or 
wilfulness. Some T&C make the customer liable for consequential losses suffered by 
the bank because of the customer’s breach.1532 This, it is submitted, is one–sided and 
unreasonable.  
 
It is clear that the UCTA applies to the various exclusions of liability and indemnities for 
electronic banking. The issue is one of reasonableness. Singapore courts have been cautious 
in the past about declaring bank terms unreasonable but, based on the discussion above, a 
                                                
1528 See similar provisions in UOB E–terms 2.4(c). 
1529 A requirement suggested by Geva in “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds Transfers” 
(2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 207 at 279. 
1530 Ibid. 
1531 Ibid. 
1532 See, e.g., UOB E–terms 2.8 for any breach of the agreement by the customer; OCBC 27 indemnity for any 
loss from the bank’s “execution, performance or enforcement” of the T&C. 
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strong argument can be made that some of the terms are unreasonable and banks should 
consider a revision. Court decisions will reflect the prevailing mores. The relatively harsher 
terms imposed by Singapore banks in comparison with the United Kingdom suggests that 
banks do not currently feel the need to pander to consumer interests. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The Singapore T&C weave a tight mesh of protection around the bank. The various 
provisions intertwine, overlapping in many places, plugging particular exposure in others. 
Their impact cannot be assessed in isolation. It is necessary to determine the net effect, the 
overall allocation of risk and incidence of liability.  
 
It has been shown that in Singapore the T&C for a current account may contain most or all 
of the following provisions: 
• a duty on the customer to prevent fraud and forgery;1533 
• a verification and conclusive evidence clause;1534 
• deemed validity of electronic transactions;1535   
• an exclusion for loss arising without bank fault;1536 
• an exclusion for loss from forged or altered cheques where the defect cannot be 
detected,1537 or where the signature appears to match the mandate;1538 
• an exclusion of bank liability where the customer has facilitated the loss;1539 
• a general exclusion, for example, for loss howsoever arising;1540 
• conclusiveness of bank records;1541 
                                                
1533 UOB 14(a)(iv); DBS for cheque books and passbooks: 11.2, 11.3; Std Ch 11.1.7, 11.3 (indemnity and 
exclusion of liability). 
1534 UOB 13.3, 13.4; OCBC 9; DBS 11.1(c); HSBC Part A 3; Std Ch 5.1.1. 
1535 UOB 15.1, E–terms 2.1(c); OCBC E–terms 1.7, 2.7, 3.6; DBS E–terms Part A 11, Part B 20, 21; HSBC 
13.5, 13.6, 14.5, 14.6; Std Ch 34.2, 35(w). 
1536 UOB 25.1; OCBC 26.3; DBS 21.1(a); Std Ch 11.8. 
1537 UOB 3.10; OCBC 26.2(f), 38.6; HSBC Part B 1.5; Std Ch 4.5, 11.1.6. 
1538 UOB 3.3; OCBC 10.3, 26.2(f); Std Ch 4.5, 11.1.4. 
1539 UOB 3.10; OCBC 26.2(g), 26.3; DBS 21.1(b); HSBC Part B 1.5; Std Ch 11.1.7. 
1540 OCBC 26.1; DBS 21.1(e); HSBC 20.4; Std Ch 11.5. 
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• general exclusions of liability;1542 
• broad indemnities for claims against the bank;1543 
• variation clauses;1544 and 
• a shortened limitation period.1545 
 
Let us consider a hypothetical set of bank T&C imposing only a verification and conclusive 
evidence clause and a general duty of care on the customer not to facilitate fraud and 
forgery on his account (a Khoo Tian Hock duty). The bank will also have an implied duty 
to exercise care in the conduct of the account and to observe its mandate. Assuming no 
further contractual inroads, if there is no breach by the customer of his contractual duties, 
the incidence of loss between the innocent bank and the innocent customer as a result of the 
dishonesty of a third party, is on the bank. Although the duties posited are more extensive 
than under the common law, the default allocation of risk to the bank remains intact. 
 
The picture changes, however, when the usual provisions listed above are added to the 
contract. Exclusions of liability for electronic transactions carve off large areas of bank 
exposure irrespective of fault, with a commensurate increase in customer exposure. The 
bank’s potential liability is now confined mainly to cheque and counter transactions, and 
fund transfers not made by electronic banking. Further narrowing of the bank’s exposure 
comes from the exclusion where the bank is not at fault. This reverses the risk where both 
                                                                                                                                               
1541 UOB 22.3, 34.9, E–terms 13(i); OCBC E–terms 2.9, 3.9; DBS 30, E–terms Part A 24, Part B 53; HSBC 
Part A 2.5, 13.7, 14.5, E–terms 8.b.; Std Ch 3.2, 35(l). 
1542 OCBC 26.1; DBS 21.1(e); HSBC 20.4; Std Ch 11.5. 
1543 UOB 21, E–terms 10; OCBC 27, E–terms 4.2; DBS 16, E–terms Part A 23, Part B 54; HSBC Part A 19, 
E–terms 16.c; Std Ch 11, E–terms 8.4. 
1544 UOB 28.1–2, E–terms 13(b); OCBC 32, E–terms 4.4; DBS 28, E–terms Part A 31, Part B 61; HSBC Part 
A 22.1–2, E–terms 13(f); Std Ch 22, E–terms 12. 
1545 UOB 25.2; Std Ch 11.9. 
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parties are innocent. Bearing in mind that payments, whether to the customer himself or to 
third parties on his direction, make up the majority of the bank’s activity on behalf of the 
customer, the replacement of the strict duty to observe the mandate with a duty of care is a 
significant inroad. The exclusion for payment of forged or altered cheques where the defect 
cannot be detected or the signature appears to match the mandate, removes a chunk of bank 
risk in the context of cheques. The ambit of bank liability is now limited to patent forgeries 
in cheque and counter transactions and non–electronic fund transfers. This is further 
constricted by the exclusion that operates where the customer has facilitated the loss. Non–
receipt of bank statements or cheque books is covered. If loss arises from an unforeseen 
situation not already covered, the general exclusion of liability is likely to protect the bank. 
Added to that is the conclusiveness of bank records, the wide indemnities, the bank’s 
ability to vary the contract when a vulnerability is detected and the shortening, in some 
cases, of the time limit in which to bring the claim. 
 
The risk for unauthorised withdrawals from a bank account lies squarely with the customer. 
It is only in very limited circumstances that the customer can look to the bank to bear the 
loss from an unauthorised debit. The result is that the bank is almost untouchable. 
 
It has been argued here that the bank is not adequately protected in the modern banking 
environment by the Macmillan and Greenwood duties, and that the restriction of the 
Macmillan duty to “negligence in the transaction itself” is unsound and unwarranted. On 
the other hand, it is submitted, based on the analysis of various provisions in the T&C and 
having regard to their cumulative effect, that they are excessive in protecting the bank 
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against the risk of the unauthorised debit. The question is how best to rebalance the needs 
of bank and customer today, taking account of modern banking reality.   
• Geva has proposed a statutory scheme to allocate losses from forged cheques and 
electronic funds transfers.1546  
• The Jack Report recommended that the bank should be able to raise a defence of 
contributory negligence where the customer has been so negligent as to render it 
inequitable for the bank to bear all the loss.1547 
• The Singapore High Court has recognised a general duty of care owed by the 
customer to the bank.1548 
 
Geva’s proposal for allocating loss from forged cheque losses1549 is, in summary, as 
follows:1550 
• The default rule is that forgery losses fall on the bank. This is consistent with the 
bank being the better risk bearer and the superior pre–payment detector. Passing on 
resulting costs to the customer is acceptable. 
• The customer will be liable if he has breached the Macmillan duty provided the bank 
has not been negligent AND the customer has not notified the bank of loss or theft of 
its cheque forms. 
                                                
1546 Benjamin Geva “Allocation of Forged cheque Losses – Comparitive Aspects, Policies and a Model for 
Reform” [1998] 114 LQR 250 at 288 et seq. See also his scheme for allocation of losses from 
unauthorized electronic Funds transfers – Geva “Consumer Liability in Unauthorized Electronic Funds 
Transfers” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 207 at 237 et seq. 
1547 Banking Services: Law and Practice Report by the Review Committee (HMSO, London, Cm 622, Feb, 
1989), 43, Recommendation 6(1). 
1548 Khoo Tian Hock & Anor v Oversea–Chinese Banking Corporation Limited (Khoo Siong Hui, Third Party) 
[2000] 4 SLR 673. 
1549 Which adheres to the principles he identifies, discussed in chapter 4.4 above. 
1550 Benjamin Geva “Allocation of Forged cheque Losses – Comparative Aspects, Policies and a Model for 
Reform” [1998] 114 LQR 250 at 288 et seq. 
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•  Customers should bear a small deductible in respect of each forgery loss to 
encourage diligence from the customer. 
• All customers have a duty of care to examine bank statements and report errors 
within a stipulated time. 
• Accounts suffering repeated forgery losses face sanction, for instance by withdrawal 
of payment facilities or higher charges. 
• Sophisticated business customers have a duty of care to prevent forgeries, preferably 
by adhering to stipulated procedures.  
 
Geva’s proposals for unauthorised electronic transfers are similar.1551 His scheme for 
forged cheque losses is rejected here at an ideological level for not adequately valuing loss 
prevention and the mutuality of the banking relationship. It is primarily about loss 
allocation.1552 While it sets a goal of loss prevention, this is seen as disproportionately the 
domain of banks. It has been argued here, and there is wide support from academic and 
judicial quarters, that the most effective and more affordable loss prevention opportunities 
lie with the customer, particularly through verification and notification. Geva’s proposal for 
unauthorised electronic funds transfers recognises the essential role of the verification duty 
for combating losses. Once its vital role is accepted, and coupled with a general duty of 
care, it is submitted that there is no need for loss allocation in the form of a minimum 
deductible against the customer. Geva addresses two particular problem areas: forged 
cheques and unauthorised electronic transfers. Geva’s system is unnecessarily complicated 
for the average customer: for example, the definition of “authorised payments”, deductibles 
                                                
1551 See discussion in Ch10.11 “Electronic Banking” above. 
1552 In “Reflections on the Need to Revise the Bills of Exchange Act – Some Doctrinal Aspects” (1981–2) 6 
Can Bus LJ 269 at 324, Geva recognises the importance of loss reduction. 
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and verification duties of care may be compounded by separate rules according to the 
method of payment. 
 
Geva supports different treatment for personal and business customers, an issue raised in 
Canadian Pacific Hotels. The additional duties recognised by Montgomery J in the trial 
court were limited to sophisticated customers, by which it seems he meant commercial 
customers.1553 One reason for this limitation may be the “commercial custom”1554 on which 
he based the implied terms. On appeal, Le Dain J in the Canadian Supreme Court rejected 
the differentiation between ordinary and sophisticated customers, holding that there was no 
basis in law for the distinction and that it would lead to “great uncertainty.”1555 On this 
aspect, he was in agreement with Cons J in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Tai Hing 
Cotton Mill.  
 
Emil J Hayek’s1556 critique of the Canadian Pacific Hotels decision supported the 
distinction. The two classes of customer are “substantially different” in his view and the 
courts are able to deal with the grey areas. There was a suggestion in the Singapore Court 
of Appeal decision of Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse1557 that the 
distinction is supported. V K Rajah J there referred to the reasonableness of a conclusive 
evidence clause under the UCTA and took account of the fact that the customer was a 
commercial entity. It is submitted that this should not, absent a clearer intention, be taken 
                                                
1553 Montgomery J recognised two additional duties on the customer: the institution of acceptable internal 
controls and the duty to examine bank statements with reasonable care and to report errors within a 
reasonable time, see (1981) 122 DLR (3d) 519 (HC) at 532–534. 
1554 Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal (1981) 122 DLR (3d) 519 (HC) at 532. 
1555 Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 385 at 429. 
1556 “Canadian Pacific Hotels Ltd v Bank of Montreal” (1988) 14 Can Bus LJ 361 at 369. 
1557 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 296. 
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as support for the view that the individual and the business customer are fundamentally 
different. It is support for the view that under the UCTA, the differences between personal 
and business customers are relevant to the determination of the issue of reasonableness.  
 
Hayek’s proposition is disputed. From a banking perspective, the differences between, for 
example, an individual customer and a large corporate customer are not so fundamental as 
to justify a different legal regime; rather, they are differences in detail and differences in 
degree that should be taken into account in the same way that the circumstances of every 
case are to be taken into account. If, for the sake of argument, it were accepted that the two 
classes of customer are substantially different, the problem arises whether there are indeed 
only two classes of customer. Is there one category embracing the ordinary individual 
customer who manages his own bank account and the high–net–worth individual with a 
myriad of accounts assisted in the management of his affairs by an accountant? Does a 
small partnership account belong with the individuals or with the commercial, sophisticated 
customers? And does the small business account get categorised with the multinational?  
 
From a doctrinal and policy viewpoint, it submitted that the law and duties imposed on 
customers should be the same for all, regardless of their legal personality, size or degree of 
sophistication. The differences between customers will naturally be expressed when their 
duties are translated into practice. Generally, the banking affairs of the individual customer 
are simpler and less numerous than the corporate customer; therefore the impact of more 
onerous duties on the former is going to be reduced in terms of what is required of him. The 
verification of bank statements is practically a much simpler task for the ordinary 
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individual than it is for the business customer; and the institution of internal controls has a 
very different meaning for the individual than it does for the business customer.  
 
The biggest risk of bank account losses lies with business customers and their dishonest 
employees. Canadian banks commonly exclude liability for losses caused by the acts of 
business customers’ employees along with detailed provisions for the introduction of 
checks and balances.1558 But the high–net–worth individual customer may also employ 
assistants who pose as much of a risk to the bank. So too, an individual customer may 
facilitate access to his bank account by a spouse, parent or child. Where a third party is able 
to access a customer’s banking facilities, the duty of supervision and the duty to institute 
checks should apply irrespective of whether he is a business or a personal customer and 
irrespective of the customer’s attributes. It is submitted that the duty of vigilance is 
subsumed by a general duty to prevent fraud and forgery (the Khoo Tian Hock duty). This 
duty should be articulated in the T&C.  
 
The fact that banks may use different T&C for personal and business customers does not 
detract from this argument. The position taken here is that personal and business customers 
are not in legal terms different, and that they should not be treated differently by the law. 
Practically, it is recognized that there are differences: the form of the mandate, the level of 
activity on the account, the demand for credit, and international payment facilities are all 
areas in which businesses are likely to differ from individuals. These practical issues justify 
different T&C, but not a different legal regime. 
                                                
1558 Keith W Perrett “Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own 
Business?” (1999) 14 BFLR 245 at 257 et seq. 
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Apportionment of loss, as recommended in the Jack Report, is supported in principle. We 
have seen that it is embraced in the United States in the UCC.1559 It is submitted here that 
apportionment would be particularly apposite to resolve the dilemmas arising where the 
bank and customer have been negligent or the customer has breached the verification duty. 
This potential for complementary use of the verification clause and the principles of 
contributory negligence is recognized also by Rafferty.1560 Ultimately, however, 
apportionment of loss is just another scheme for loss allocation. It does nothing to change 
banking habits and avoid the losses in the first place. It cannot compete with the benefits of 
diligent verification of bank statements to alert the parties to fraud and arrest a scheme in its 
tracks. Contributory negligence is also an ex post facto label of conduct; it is a concept 
remote from customers. It does not inform them what they should do to avoid losses. As 
proposed in the Jack Report, it is a solution which is likely to be arrived at only after 
litigation. It is a useful tool when loss–prevention methods have failed but as a solution to 
the unauthorised debit, it has its limitations. 
 
Numerous exclusions of liability, indemnities and deeming provisions mean that standard 
T&C for bank accounts are extensive and dense. In the unlikely event that a customer takes 
the time to read the T&C, he will be challenged to understand their full impact. The 
cumulative effect is that banks are exposed to limited pockets of potential liability to 
customers for losses. Some of the exclusions make a mockery of the principle underlying 
the verification clause, that the customer who fulfils his verification and notification duties 
will not be liable for unauthorised debits. The British banks studied here do not deploy the 
                                                
1559 Above, see chapter 6. 
1560 “Account Verification Agreements: When Can a Bank Protect Itself Against Its Own Negligence?” (1993) 
8 BFLR 403 at 420. 
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extensive exclusions of liability and indemnities that are standard in the T&C of Singapore 
banks. In this age of consumer rights and protection, the T&C in Singapore should be 
simplified and reflect a better balance of risk and responsibility. At the same time, the 
customer should accept his role and responsibility in loss prevention. 
 
The answer, it is submitted, lies in a general duty of care coupled with a reformed 
verification and conclusive evidence clause. This will provide banks with greater protection 
than they get under the common law while at the same time upholding their duties to, and 
recognizing the legitimate interests of, the customer. Nowhere is the need for a general duty 
of care on the customer better illustrated than in the field of electronic banking. 
  
Deciding a bank–customer dispute by determining whether there has been a breach of a 
duty of care, or negligence, is criticized by Geva and J F Dolan 1561 for necessitating “fact 
finding,”1562 meaning the outcome is uncertain and the process, inevitably through 
litigation, is expensive. To a large extent this criticism has been dealt with elsewhere1563 but 
the point to be made here is that Geva’s proposals in relation to electronic fund transfers do 
not avoid the need for fact–finding and evaluation either. Geva proposes holding the 
customer liable for authorised withdrawals, and fraudulent withdrawals in which the 
customer is complicit. As his definition of “authorised” takes account of customer fault 
                                                
1561 See, for example, Geva in “Allocation of Forged Cheque Losses – Comparative Aspects, Policies and a 
Model for Reform” [1998] 114 LQR 250 at 287 and J F Dolan “Impersonating the Drawer: A Comment 
on Geva’s ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfers’” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 282 
at 291. 
1562 The term used by Dolan “Impersonating the Drawer: A Comment on Geva’s ‘Consumer Liability in 
Unauthorised Electronic Funds Transfers’” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 282 at 291. 
1563 See chapter 4.4 above. 
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causing or contributing to the loss, this will necessitate fact finding. This is acknowledged 
by Dolan,1564 although he maintains that Geva’s scheme avoids the worst of the problems.  
 
A general duty of care surely includes a duty to verify bank statements. There are, 
nevertheless, a number of reasons why an express verification and conclusive evidence 
clause should be stipulated in the T&C in addition to a general duty of care. As mentioned 
before,1565 the general duty of care has yet to be recognized by the Singapore Court of 
Appeal. Even assuming that the broader duty does receive Court of Appeal endorsement, 
the verification duty should nevertheless remain in the T&C. As a major component of a 
general duty of care, it is important to emphasize the verification duty to customers. A 
general duty of care on the part of the customer is, of necessity, devoid of specificity. The 
customer does not know in exact terms, in every scenario, what he is required to do. The 
express verification and conclusive evidence clause gives the customer certainty. He can 
understand what is required of him: he must carefully examine his bank statements and 
notify the bank of any errors within the time period stipulated. This is not an onerous task. 
The duty is straightforward and easy to understand. From a practical viewpoint, verification 
is so central to what banks wish to achieve that they should spell it out in their T&C. A 
further reason for specific inclusion of a verification clause is that the conclusive effect of 
the clause, which gives the clause teeth, would not form part of a general duty of care.  
 
                                                
1564 J F Dolan “Impersonating the Drawer: A Comment on Geva’s ‘Consumer Liability in Unauthorised 
Electronic Funds Transfers’” (2003) 38 Can Bus LJ 282 at 291. 
1565 See chapter 3.1 above. 
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Edward Rubin1566 makes the point that shifting the risk of losses from third party 
dishonesty to the customer will not change his behaviour as it is invariably the result of 
carelessness and not a costs-benefit analysis.1567 While negligence leading to an 
unauthorised debit can be a consequence of human nature, the failure to verify bank 
statements should not be dismissed as inadvertence. It is a habit which needs to be 
cultivated, a necessary requirement consequent on having a bank account. Failure to adhere 
to it goes beyond oversight. 
 
This leads to the question of how the verification duty, as advocated here, should interact 
with the broader duty of care, also advocated here. Compliance with the verification duty 
by a customer who has breached his duty of care, for example by signing cheques in blank 
or inadequate supervision of an employee, will not free him from liability but will assist 
him in mitigating the loss with the bank’s assistance. It is submitted that the bank’s duty of 
care requires it to take all reasonable measures to limit losses once notified by the customer 
of an unauthorised debit. 
 
Hunter J in Tai Hing Cotton Mill in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal1568 said that the 
Canadian experience has shown that bank recourse to protection in their T&C is less 
attractive in practice than it is in theory. The problems that have arisen with the verification 
clause in Canada are restrictive interpretation to avoid the consequences of conclusiveness, 
and the controversy over whether the clause avails the bank where it has been negligent. 
                                                
1566 “Efficiency, Equity, and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4” E Rubin (1991) 42 Ala LR 551. 
1567 Ibid, at 568. 
1568 [1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 555 at 579. 
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The first area is a drafting issue. Pertamina Energy Trading Limited v Credit Suisse1569 
indicates that this may be less of a problem in Singapore than it has been in Canada. Bank 
T&C should be prepared by experts in the field. There is sufficient precedent for the 
draftsman to avoid the pitfalls. The second area, namely negligence by the bank, involves a 
policy decision. It has been submitted above that it is in this context that a rule for 
contributory negligence would be apposite.1570 The statement of Keith Perrett is supported: 
“Rationales based on loss avoidance, fairness and consistency with international banking 
procedures all argue in favour of such a duty”, 1571 namely to verify bank statements. 
 
It has been acknowledged that an unbridled verification and conclusive evidence clause can 
operate harshly in some circumstances. It has also been argued that a verification clause 
without the support of a conclusive evidence clause is inefficient. A revision of the T&C 
along the following lines is proposed:  
1. The customer is under a duty to exercise care in the conduct of his bank account. 
2. The customer is under a duty to examine all bank statements received from the bank 
to verify their accuracy. If there are any entries with which the customer does not 
agree or entries missing from the statement, the customer is under a duty to notify the 
bank in writing within 30 days of the date of the statement. After the lapse of 30 days 
from the statement date, the statement shall be deemed to be correct and conclusive 
against the customer and the bank will be free from all and any claims arising from 
the bank statement. Note: this is a standard verification and conclusive evidence 
                                                
1569 [2006] 4 SLR 273 at 295. 
1570 See chapter 8 above. 
1571 Keith W Perrett “Account Verification Clauses: Should Bank Customers be Forced to Mind Their Own 
Business?” (1999) 14 BFLR 245 at 273. 
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clause which clearly informs the customer what his duty is and the consequences of 
failure. The time period for verification is longer than is common in Singapore. This 
may be qualified by the concession discussed earlier excusing the customer where 
breach of this duty is occasioned by circumstances beyond his control. 
3. Where the bank has been negligent, the customer is in breach of the contract, the total 
losses do not exceed $50,000, and 
3.1 the customer is in breach only of the verification duty, the customer will be 
liable for 20% of the direct loss suffered; or 
3.2 the customer has facilitated the loss by a breach of a duty of care in addition to 
failing to verify bank statements and/or notify errors, the customer will be liable 
for 50% of the direct loss suffered. 
4. Where the bank disputes its own negligence, the customer may apply to a tribunal 
established for this purpose to determine the issue.  
5. The customer will have the right of appeal to a court of law if he takes the view that 
the formula operates harshly against him. The court will apportion the losses to 
achieve a just and equitable result in accordance with the principle set out in section 3 
of the Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability Act. The bank will 
not have the right to appeal rulings by the tribunal.  
6. In the case of accumulated losses from unauthorised debits totalling more than 
$50,000 arising from bank negligence and breach of a duty by the customer, section 3 
of the Contributory Negligence and Apportionment of Liability Act shall apply to 
achieve a just and equitable result. Failing an agreement between the parties on an 
apportionment ratio, recourse shall be had to the courts. 
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7. Where a loss arises from bank negligence and breach of a duty by the customer, and 
the customer has complied with the verification and conclusive evidence clause, an 
apportionment will be made in accordance with paragraph 3.2 to paragraph 6 above.   
It is submitted that the following additional provisions in the T&C are warranted: 
1. The bank will act in good faith and no term should be construed to exclude bank 
liability for gross negligence or wilfulness.1572  
2. Consequential losses are excluded unless attributable to the bank’s gross negligence 
or wilfulness. 
 
It is further proposed that in return for a broad duty of care and a modified verification and 
conclusive evidence clause, banks should relinquish the following clauses in the T&C: 
1. The general exclusions of liability including the exclusions for losses arising in the 
absence of bank fault, losses from altered/forged cheques where the defect cannot be 
detected, or where the signature appears to match the mandate. The customer’s fault, 
and not the bank’s, should be the determining factor. The default rule should remain 
that the bank bears the loss. 
2. The blanket validity of electronic transactions. Rather, the T&C for electronic 
banking should provide that:  
2.1 The bank will fully investigate a complaint of fraud or erroneous debiting to the 
customer’s account upon the filing by the customer of such a complaint. The 
results of the investigation will be shared with the customer along with all 
relevant bank records. The customer’s full cooperation with the investigation is 
                                                
1572 OCBC 26.2(a), for example, excludes liability for loss or damage where it has omitted “to act in good 
faith on the Customer’s instructions.” This, it is submitted is unreasonable. 
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required; failure to cooperate can be taken into account in determining whether 
a valid mandate existed. 
2.2 The customer will not be liable for debits made after notification of a breach in 
the security of the access card/token/PIN. 
2.3 The bank will bear the burden of proving the existence of a valid mandate, or 
circumstances which excuse it for complying with a flawed instruction, 
appropriate security procedures and the proper functioning of the system.  
2.4 Any loss which would not have occurred but for the customer’s increase of the 
bank–imposed transaction limits will borne by the customer except in the case 
of gross negligence or wilfulness by the bank. 
3. Conclusiveness of bank records. At most, bank records should prevail unless there is 
evidence to the contrary. 
4. Indemnities for all claims whatsoever and howsoever arising. Specific indemnities 
may be justified but they should be addressed to particular concerns. 
5. The shortening of the limitation period. A shortening of the limitation period to one 
year, it is submitted, is draconian. If a shorter period is justified, it is submitted that at 
least three years should be given to customers to commence action. 
 
These provisions, operating in areas where the customer has little or no control, make the 
biggest inroads on the customer’s rights. If the customer has a general duty of care not to 
facilitate fraud, including a specific verification duty, it is submitted that there is no 
justification for the broad exclusions of liability and indemnities. Where the equities are 
balanced, i.e. both parties are without fault in causing the loss, the time–honoured 
allocation of risk to the bank is appropriate. It is at this point that the rationale of the better 
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risk bearer applies. The bank’s exposure is still limited: some losses will have been 
facilitated by the customer; the vast majority of losses will be detectable debits in the bank 
statement.  
 
Banks should accept their duty to educate customers regarding the T&C, in particular the 
duty of care, the verification and conclusive evidence clause, the security duties in 
electronic banking and other clauses relevant to the allocation of risk. The duty to educate 
should be seen as ongoing. Banks should accept their responsibility to embrace proven loss 
detection and limitation practices1573 and commercially feasible technological 
advancements. The duty may extend to investment in research and development in such 
technology; the extent of the duty requires an examination of the process of invention of 
new technology which is beyond the scope of this work. 
 
A particular issue is whether customers with Internet banking1574 should be subject to the 
verification and notification duty every time they log on to their bank account. The 
practical importance of this issue lies in the possibility that a fraudster may make 
withdrawals from an account at short intervals such as every week or even every day. By 
the time the printed statement arrives in the mail, many such debits might have been made. 
Undoubtedly a customer, who detects an error in his bank account while using Internet 
banking, should be obliged to notify the bank. This is in keeping with the principle of the 
Greenwood duty, as discussed earlier. But it would be difficult for banks to prove that a 
customer actually detected the unauthorised debit. Bank records will, however, show a 
                                                
1573 Such as profiling customer spending and daily and transaction upper limits. 
1574 The discussion applies with modifications to other forms of automated banking. 
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customer’s log–on history. Imposing a duty to verify and notify every time the customer 
logs on would be simpler. But to require verification every time a customer logs on would 
amount to different treatment of Internet customers from traditional customers and may 
even deter some customers from signing up for Internet banking facilities. Well–informed 
customers with up–to–the–minute information on their accounts is a desirable state of 
affairs. Frequent access to the latest information on a bank account is ideal for combating 
the underlying fraud problem.  
 
Banks should encourage, not deter through harsh provisions, the use of facilities that afford 
customers easy, regular access to account information. Customers who log on to bank 
accounts via the Internet are likely to peruse the information available there, at least the 
most recent transactions, and detect unfamiliar debits out of self–interest. Greenwood 
imposes a duty on those customers to notify any forgeries that they detect. It is therefore 
unnecessary to impose a stricter contractual obligation to verify and notify every time a 
customer logs on. This is a position which should be reviewed as trends in the use of 
Internet banking and other facilities change.  
 
It is preferable for banks to embrace the suggested modifications above in a spirit of self–
regulation. After all, the modifications aim to produce a contract that will operate fairly for 
both parties, an ideal surely shared by the banks. The modifications could be incorporated 
in the T&C by banks, which should not wait for reforms to be introduced by statute. A third 
alternative is soft law, in the form of an enhanced banking code of conduct, requiring 
intervention by the Association of Banks in Singapore. 
 
 330
Some observations about the UCTA in the banking context are appropriate. Clauses in the 
T&C requiring the bank not to be negligent and not to act in bad faith escape the net of 
section 2 of the UCTA because the bank’s duty to observe the mandate is strict, as 
illustrated by Ri Jong Son. Secondly, in terms of section 11(1) of the UCTA, 
reasonableness must be judged at the time the contract was made and not at the time of the 
breach or dispute. The drafters of this legislation no doubt had good reasons for this. It is 
apparent that various clauses in the T&C may operate unreasonably, in which case banks 
are likely to say that they would never robotically apply the T&C according to their full 
potential. It may be that in most cases the banks would accept liability for unauthorised 
debits rather than relying on clauses excusing them on grounds such as an absence of fault, 
or that the signatures appeared to match, and so on. But UCTA measures reasonableness at 
the time of contracting, not of breach. A better result may be achieved if the reasonableness 
of a clause is judged according to its actual use in specific circumstances rather than its 
potential use, encouraging the courts to apply the UCTA more rigorously to bank T&C. 
Rulings will be confined to the facts at the time of reliance on the term and will be only 
indicative of future rulings, easing concern about setting precedents with unpredictable 
consequences.    
 
In conclusion, the express terms of the contract between bank and customer are more 
extensive than those implied by law. It is clear that banks use the contract to achieve a level 
of protection not accorded at common law. It is important to recognise that the modern 
banking environment is vastly different, more sophisticated and more extensive than 
before. This requires recognition that many of the express provisions are necessary and 
justifiable. At the same time, the potential for abuse by banks of their greater bargaining 
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power is manifest in standard T&C. This signifies a need for rigorous application of the 
common law and statutory controls available in Singapore law to maintain a balance in the 
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